













W. Greatbatch sc.

MRS. HASTINGS.

FROM AN ORIGINAL SKETCH BY OZIAS HUMPHRY, R.A.

London Published by Richard Bentley, 1841

WARREN HASTINGS

VOL. II.

LONDON

1841

MEMOIRS

OF

THE LIFE

OF THE

RIGHT HON. WARREN HASTINGS,

FIRST GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL.

COMPILED FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS.

BY THE REV. G. R. GLEIG, M.A.

CHAPLAIN TO THE ROYAL HOSPITAL AT CHELSEA, AND RECTOR OF IVYCHURCH, IN KENT.

AUTHOR OF

THE LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

VOL. II.

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CHAPTER I.

Nuncomar's Trial and Execution—Not attributable to Mr. Hastings—The Majority continue to assail his public and private Character—Correspondence.

AMID scenes like these, where the gravest questions were debated not upon their own merits, but with reference to the parties proposing them, it would have been idle to look for the introduction or maintenance of any settled or well considered plan for the general administration of the affairs of British India. The example set by the supreme government was faithfully imitated in the inferior tribunals, till there was scarce a district, or pergunnah, or zemindarry, or farm, which became not an arena for party struggles. In like manner the Supreme Council and the Supreme Court of Judicature soon found themselves pitted one against the other. The majority in the Council accused the judges of seeking to extend their authority over persons and causes never contemplated by the Act of Parliament; the judges reprobated the interference of the Council in questions which

it belonged to them, and them only, to decide. I should go beyond my proper province were I to specify a tithe of the cases in which judges and councils mutually charged one another with wrong. But the case of Nuncomar I am bound to notice, were it only that the memory of Mr. Hastings may be vindicated from the stain, such as it may be, of his having in any manner contributed to bring that most consummate of all scoundrels to the gallows.

I stated some time ago, that while the prosecution by the Governor-general still hung over the head of Nuncomar, he was suddenly arrested at the suit of a native merchant, and committed to the gaol of Calcutta on a charge of forgery. His committal gave great offence to the majority in Council, who, besides heaping honours and wealth on his son, Rajah Goordass, offered to the judges such remonstrances as were by them felt to be extremely unbecoming. The majority did not of course fail, when communicating with the Court of Directors, to speak of the whole proceeding as a vile conspiracy, of which the objects were, first to get rid of a troublesome witness to Mr. Hastings's delinquency; and next, to deter others, through dread of a similar fate, from coming forward. But with the Supreme Court their immediate dealings were more simple. They protested against the right of the judges to commit, on such a charge, a native of Nuncomar's rank to

a common prison, and required that, in consideration of his religious scruples, he should be set at liberty on bail. It is not worth while to analyze even a few of the haughty messages which passed to and fro between the contending parties. Enough is done when I say, that the judges of the Supreme Court were not disposed to abate one jot of their dignity; and that Nuncomar, having every indulgence extended to him, which the nature of his position would allow, remained in confinement till the period of the assizes came round.

Nuncomar, as is well known, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged. The sentence may or may not have been a harsh one: that is a question with which I am no wise concerned, but that it was strictly legal no one can for a moment doubt, who has paid any attention to the proceedings in the House of Lords during the impeachment, some years later, of Chief Justice Impey. For "the tragedy" again, as the death of the criminal has been called, neither Sir Elijah Impey nor the Governor-general was in any manner accountable. Nor, indeed, could they interfere to prevent it. The chief justice had clearly no power to stay the execution even for a day. His part was played out so soon as the fatal word had been spoken, while Mr. Hastings's share of blame amounts to this, and no more, that he does not seem to have proposed in Council, that the Govern-

ment should exercise a privilege which confessedly belonged to it. Probably Mr. Hastings felt that in this, as in every other instance, a proposal emanating from him would, as a matter of course, be overruled; but why were the majority backward? They had the matter entirely in their own hands. By a simple vote of their body they might have suspended the execution till a reference should be made to the Court of Directors at home; why did they, who were so zealous in Nuncomar's cause prior to the conviction, sit with folded arms and see their protégé put to death? I think that, in the tone of their despatches which succeeded the event, as well as of Mr. Burke's speeches during the trial of Mr. Hastings, some clue may be discovered wherewith to thread our way through the labyrinth. It might not suit the purpose of the majority to save the life of Nuncomar; it might suit that purpose that they were able, however groundlessly, to assert that "the Governor-general murdered him through the hands of Sir Elijah Impey." For even to this day, the impression has not every where been removed, that Mr. Hastings was censurable for failing to effect that which he had no power to effect. The will of the majority was law. Had they willed a reprieve for Nuncomar he must have received the benefit of it. On their heads then, and not on that of Mr. Hastings, must the death of the culprit rest.

Meanwhile the spirit of party, not content to indulge in attacks on the private character of Mr. Hastings, waged incessant and ruinous war against the whole tenour of his public proceedings. The five years' settlement proved to be in its results less favourable than Mr. Hastings had anticipated. The renters fell much into arrear, and the circumstance was, of course, attributed not to their own improvidence either in the hire or management of the farms, but to the mischievous tendency of the Governor-general's system. Nay, nor did the inventive malice of the majority stop there. The same men who accused Mr. Hastings of having demanded from the renters more than the produce of the land was worth, charged it against him as a crime, that he had failed to realize the expectations which he had excited when the leasing system was first introduced. Mr. Hastings's defence, though both simple and just, availed him nothing. He did not deny that his own hopes had failed him. The farmers, in their eagerness to obtain leases, had offered terms for the lands such as they found it impossible to fulfil; and the revenue, when collected, fell proportionably short of the amount on which he had calculated. But was he to blame for this? The majority declared that he was in a twofold degree. For first, it was tyrannical to screw up the public burthens to a degree of pressure which the country could not

bear; and next, he had proved himself entirely deficient in the qualifications necessary to a statesman, seeing that he had not carried out his own device, or, in other words, accomplished an impossibility.

The same spirit which actuated the Council in the review which they took of Mr. Hastings's financial arrangements was eminently displayed in their mode of dealing with his judicial system. They discovered that it was not only founded on wrong, but that its operations were mischievous throughout. The Nabob of Bengal had been cruelly despoiled of his rights. The abolition of the old courts of Nizâmut was both an insult and an injury to the people. The new tribunals were not respected, and came moreover into perpetual collision with the Supreme Court at Calcutta. The majority forgot that if the course of justice were indeed impeded, to themselves no trivial portion of the blame was attributable. Ever since their arrival in Bengal, the arm which used to control and regulate the affairs of British India with a giant's strength had lost its vigour. Wholly occupied with their own party squabbles, they not only left their subordinate functionaries to think and act for themselves, but, by something more than example, they taught them that the best service which they could render to those in power was to bring odium on the government under

which they acted. I do not mean to say that there was no foundation at all for the sweeping condemnation which they passed upon the improved judicial system. Here and there neglects of duty might occur; neglects of duty will always occur where the power or the will to enforce obedience to established regulations is wanting. But as they set out by declaring that it was necessary for the vindication of their own proceedings, to condemn in the mass the administration which preceded them, so this, one of the boldest and wisest of that administration's acts, was not likely to be spared. Accordingly, having begun with effecting a revolution in the Nabob's household, they proceeded to revolutionize the entire province also, by re-establishing the two fold government, his abolition of which had earned for Mr. Hastings the unqualified approval of his superiors. Moreover, Mahommed Reza Cawn, who at first had been entirely neglected, but of whom, in the course of their inquiries into Mr. Hastings's conduct they had latterly made use, was by them reinstated in the obsolete office of Naib Subah; and, as such, placed at the head of the criminal jurisdiction of the kingdom. It was to no purpose that Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell equally protested against these arrangements, and equally referred to the Court's explicit declarations, that Mahommed Reza Cawn, though provided for at the Company's expense, was never

again to be employed in the Company's service. The majority passed their own resolutions, and proceeded at once to act upon them, while their despatches were scarcely more filled with censures of the acts of their predecessors, than with exaggerated encomiums on the wisdom and the justice of their own.

Meanwhile there were not wanting other grounds of difference in the foreign policy, if I may be allowed the expression, of this most divided administration. Of the arrangements entered into with the state of Oude Mr. Hastings had never approved; and the effects of the abject poverty in which the young Nabob found himself on his accession to the throne soon became apparent. His army mutinied for lack of pay. He applied to the English to furnish him with officers, by whom a certain number of battalions might be disciplined; and these, as a matter of course, were sent. But the jealousy of the native leaders put the lives of the Europeans in jeopardy, and a sort of civil war was the result. It ended, no doubt, in the overthrow of the mutineers, as well as in the removal from various commands of chiefs, who, taking advantage of their sovereign's weakness, aimed here and there at independence. Yet all this could not be accomplished without expense, and the subsidies due to the Company were not paid up. In this, however, as well as in the ma-

nagement of things nearer home, Mr. Hastings was a mere spectator. His voice carried with it no authority; his experience was not appealed to. The majority pursued their own course, which seems on all occasions to have been satisfactory to themselves in exact proportion as it promised to lead them farther and farther from the settled policy of their predecessors.

Among other changes effected by the Regulating Act of 1773, a general controlling power was given to the Government of Bengal over the sister governments of Madras and Calcutta. In particular the law required, that the subordinate presidencies should not engage in war without the sanction of the Supreme Government, and formally to communicate this truth in the proper quarters had been one of the first acts of the new Council on its assumption of office. The government of Bombay, however, which had for some time previously been in close connexion with certain of the Mahratta chiefs, were already, ere the letter from Bengal reached them, meditating a military expedition; and confident of its success, as well as of securing the approval of their superiors in England, they did not consider it expedient to suspend their arrangements. After espousing the cause of Ragobah, in a disputed claim to the Peishwaship, and trying in vain to obtain from him the cession of the island of Salsette, the Bombay Government,

fearful that the Portuguese from Goa might anticipate them, resolved to reduce the place by force of arms. Accordingly, on the 12th of December, 1774, an expedition was fitted out under the command of Brigadier-general Gordon and Commodore Watson. On the 28th the principal fortress was taken by storm, and, the island submitting, the Company's agent at Poonah was instructed to make known the circumstance to Ragobah in such terms as might induce him to consent to the retention of the conquest.

Into the history of Ragobah's rise and fall it is not necessary for me to enter. The uncle of the Peishwa, that is of the prime minister, who, keeping up the pageant of a Maha-rajah, exercised, in point of fact, sovereign authority over the Mahratta states, Ragobah, had, in August, 1772, put his nephew to death; and was, with little opposition, received at Poonah as his successor. But there was a powerful party in the empire, the heads of certain influential families, who had been long accustomed to have a voice in such arrangements, and to whom Ragobah's elevation was not satisfactory. These discovering, or pretending to discover, that the widow of the murdered Peishwa was *enceinte*, removed her to a place of safety, where she continued under their protection till a son was born, and they had it in their power to bring forward a new claimant for the dignity which

Ragobah had assumed. A civil war followed, as a matter of course, in which at the outset Ragobah was not successful; whereupon he applied to the government of Bombay for assistance. But as it was offered on terms which he considered too exorbitant, he withdrew for awhile from the contest, and abode in a sort of exile at Baroda. The desire of high station, however, and the inability to furnish the money, in consideration of which the Bombay government had promised to supply him with troops, overcame the disinclination to dismember his country, and he consented, on the 6th of March, 1775, to confirm the English in the possession of Salsette, and to add to it several other valuable acquisitions of which they were covetous. They, on their part, without consulting the Supreme Government at Bengal, or taking any thing into account except the desire which the Company had long avowed to be in possession of Salsette, promised to support him, in his march upon Poonah, with a force of 2,500 men, of which 700 were to be Europeans, Colonel Keating, an officer of experience, being at their head.

When the project of a war with the Mahrattas for the purpose of raising Ragobah to the office of Peishwa was first mooted at Bengal, the Council there was unanimous in condemning it. Orders were accordingly sent off to stay all further proceedings, but before the messengers could reach their

destination the war was actually begun; and the Bombay government remonstrated against the impolicy of putting an abrupt and discreditable stop to it. Mr. Hastings, like a statesman as he was, failed not to perceive that it is one thing to prevent the commencement of hostilities, another to withdraw from the contest suddenly, and at the risk of sacrificing both your army and your national honour. He, therefore, proposed that the suggestions of the Bombay government should be attended to, while at the same time they were desired not on any account to prolong the war beyond the period which might be absolutely required to make peace on honourable terms. Not such were the views of the majority. Exclaiming against the inconsistency of which the Governor was guilty, they gave peremptory directions for the recall of Colonel Keating's brigade, while at the same time they despatched Colonel Upton to Poonah, for the purpose of concluding a treaty with the confederacy there, of which a chief, named Sacaram Bapoo, was at the head. How Mr. Hastings felt on the occasion, and how he acted, will best appear from the tone of a letter which the reader will find introduced into the narrative according to the order of its date.

Thus passed the latter portion of the year 1775, amid incessant toil, anxiety, and extreme mortification to Mr. Hastings. He saw the magnificent

schemes which he had formed for the general administration of affairs in India entirely overthrown. He found himself not only powerless in the government of which he was the ostensible head, but an object of more than party malevolence—of bitter and implacable personal hatred—to his colleagues in office. Charges were brought against his character from day to day; not a despatch went off for London which was not filled with complaints of his misdoings, while his personal friends all suffered, either in their reputations or their fortunes, or both, for no other apparent reason than that to him they owed their situations. It is surprising how a man of acute sensibility should have been able to bear up against such an accumulation of wrong. It is impossible to conceive that he could have sustained it at all, had he not been at the same time endowed with extrordinary vigour and grasp of mind. Yet the following, written early in 1776, will show that, even under such disadvantages, he never lost sight of the interests of British India, nor ceased, however apparently hopeless of success, to aim at their advancement. The undefined powers of the Supreme Court had, from the outset, been a fruitful source of disunion. He was not slow of perceiving this, nor backward in devising a remedy.

To Lord North.

Fort William, 20th January, 1776.

My Lord,—I persuade myself that I shall stand in no need of any apology for troubling your Lordship with the enclosed sheets. They contain the copy of a plan which I have transmitted to the Court of Directors by this despatch, for the more perfect distribution of justice in these provinces. The design of it may be comprised in a few words. It is, to extend the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Judicature to all parts of the provinces without any limitation; to confirm the Courts which have been established on the principles of the ancient constitution of the country, by the names of Nizâmut and Dewanny; to unite the judges of the Supreme Court with the members of the Council in the control of the latter, and to give the Provincial Councils a legal authority in the internal government of the country, and in the collection of the public revenue. It would require too much of your Lordship's time to explain and illustrate every part of the plan, though its length is not considerable. It will best speak for itself. Your Lordship is already acquainted with the nature of the courts and offices which are included in it, as they have been particularly noticed in the late parliamentary investigations; and for any particular information which you may be desirous of obtaining, I would beg leave to refer you to the gentlemen now in England who have been conversant in the business of this government, particularly Mr. Graham, and my excellent young friend, Mr. Elliott, who had the principal charge of the official business of the superior Courts of the Nizâmut and Dewanny, and was the first person appointed to fill the office of superintendent of the Khalsa records.

It may, however, be necessary to point out one peculiarity, though obvious, in the proposed regulations,

because the design of it may not be so apparent. It is proposed to give very ample coercive powers to the Provincial Councils, but none to the Superior. The reason is that this requires none. Its province will be only to receive reports, accounts, and references from the Provincial Councils, and to issue its orders to them. They are entrusted with the detail of business which cannot be conducted without the power of compelling attendance, and of inflicting fines, punishment, and imprisonment; in the exercise of these powers, the members of the Provincial Councils will be restrained by the vigilance of the Superior Council, and the dread of the law. No restraints but their own integrity will or can bind the actions of the ruling members of the state, if they are allowed a power over the persons of individuals. One exception must be made to this rule, which I have not proposed, because I suppose it to be an inherent prerogative of Government; I mean the power of employing extraordinary force in the case of any violent invasion of the public peace, whether by open enemies, hordes of senassies, robbers, or others committing violence, or exercising an unlicensed authority over the inhabitants, which may call for the sudden interposition of Government. This power, in ordinary cases, was left by the late Council wholly to my discretion, and I have a conscious satisfaction in being able to declare that it was never employed by me in a single instance without success; and on such occasions, I would recommend that it should be always left to the Governor, because the success of it must depend always on despatch, and on a local knowledge of the country, of which I suppose the Governor will generally acquire from the experiences of his station, if he does not before possess it, a superior share.

The chief justice, to whom we have submitted the plan, has expressed his entire approbation of it.

Upon this occasion my duty obliges me to declare that in every instance in which I have consulted him, as has frequently happened in points in which the powers of the Board and of the Court were likely to be brought into competition, or in which the acts of the Court might be attended with embarrassment to the Council, I have experienced in the chief justice the greatest candour and readiness to assist me with his advice. In justice I must add, that the conduct of all the judges has been directed by the principles of moderation, and a scrupulous attention to the just authority of Government, and to the laws and customs of the people. I am afraid that to this prudent caution alone it must be ascribed that the undefined state of the powers of the Governor-general and Council, and of the Supreme Court of Judicature, have not been productive of ill consequences both to the Company and to the country. The contests which have already arisen, and are likely to increase, between the Court and the Council render the interposition of a higher authority indispensably necessary to avert the evils which must otherwise inevitably ensue from such disputes. I hope I shall not appear to presume too much in pronouncing that there is but one alternative for this case. Either the Court must be supported, and armed with a full authority, or its operations must be restricted to the town of Calcutta and the commercial factories, and to British subjects only beyond them. On any other footing, its jurisdiction will be eluded, or it will be an embarrassment to the Government.

I took the liberty in a former letter to introduce the name of Mr. George Vansittart to your Lordship. That gentleman is now on his return to England, and I beg your Lordship's permission to remind you of the wish which I before expressed in his favour. In

the course of many years' service he has acquired an extensive knowledge in every branch of the Company's affairs, and has occupied several important stations with an equal superiority of abilities and success. I have always reposed an unreserved confidence in him, and have been much relieved by his assistance in the detail of current business, in which few men possess a greater steadiness of attention, or more quickness of despatch.—I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, my Lord, your Lordship's most obliged and faithful servant.

I add to this two letters, one addressed to the great moralist of the day, the other to Lord Chief Justice Mansfield. They bring the writer before us in a new light, as a scholar and a patron of literary exertion, not less than as the careful guardian of the rights and privileges of the natives of British India. With Dr. Johnson it will be remembered, that Mr. Hastings had formed some acquaintance, while resident in England in 1758. Lord Mansfield's notice he owed entirely to the tenor of his own public life, and to the high opinion which that eminent judge entertained of it.

To Dr. Johnson.

Fort William, 7th August, 1775.

Sir,—I have suffered much pain from my own reproaches for having suffered the ships of the season to depart without replying to the letter which you did me the favour to send me by Mr. Justice Chambers, accompanied by Mr. Jones's ingenious book. I have

since had the pleasure of receiving another letter from you with a present which I esteem of much higher value, and gladly make use of the opportunity now afforded me to make my thankful acknowledgments for the repetition of these kind tokens of your remembrance. I cannot assign my reasons for having thus long delayed them without an appearance of affectation, as it is scarcely possible to explain the nature of my occupations, at the periods of our despatches, but I beg you will do me the justice to believe, that no man living can have a juster sense of your esteem, or feel a stronger ambition to merit it.

Although the situation in which I have been placed has, by a peculiarity of circumstances attending it, precluded me from gratifying my curiosity by researches of my own into the history, traditions, arts, or natural productions of this country, yet I have not been inattentive to them, having esteemed it among the duties of my station to direct and encourage the pursuits of others to these discoveries, who were better qualified by their talents or leisure for the attainment of them, nor I hope altogether without success.

It has been one of my first wishes to be able to free the inhabitants of this country from the reproach of ignorance and barbarism, which has been undeservedly cast upon them by the too precipitate information of those who have wanted opportunities of knowing their real state. Partly with this view, but principally to assist the courts of justice in their decisions, I have for some time past employed some of the most learned of the Mahometan and Gentoo inhabitants in forming a compilation of their respective laws, and have had the satisfaction of receiving an abstract of the Gentoo law, completed under the most respectable authority. A translation of this work into the English language, executed by a young man of genius and abilities, has

been transmitted to the Court of Directors, and I hope will have their sanction for its publication. Whether it will appear to you to deserve it I cannot judge. I beg leave to recommend it to your notice. There is at least a merit in the attempt to explore unknown tracts, although it should not be attended with any useful discovery. I cannot rely on my own judgment, which may be too partial to an object which I have had very much at heart.

An opportunity has lately presented itself for a search of a different nature, the result of which I take the liberty to present you with in the accompanying sheets, and to beg your acceptance of them. They contain the journal of a friend of mine into the country of Tibbet, which, though bordering on this, has till very lately been as little known to the inhabitants of it as if it was at the distance of many degrees. The people, their form of government, their manners, and even their climate differ as much from Bengal as Bengal does from England. When I read the account of your visit to the Hebrides, I could not help wishing that a portion of that spirit which could draw so much entertainment and instruction from a region so little befriended by nature, or improved by the arts of society, could have animated Mr. Bogle, the author of this journal, but I flatter myself that you will find it not unworthy of your perusal. I confess I received great pleasure from it, and I assure myself that whatever originality you may discover in the description of the countries and inhabitants of which it treats, you will at least be pleased with the amiable character of the Lama, which has been confirmed to me by the testimonies of other travellers, who have visited his capital. I have added to the journal two letters from him, one of which furnished me with the first hint of deputing Mr. Bogle to his presence, and the other

contains the issue of his negociations. On these I shall make no comment.

I am afraid it may look like an ill compliment, after having desired your acceptance of this production, to tell you that I have endeavoured to prevail on the writer of them to put them into a more connected form, and to send them with some additional materials to England for publication. If it would not be assuming too great a liberty, I should request to be favoured with your opinion upon the propriety of this intention. The first copies of these sheets were taken, and intended for your perusal, long before I had any thoughts of making them public, and I cannot now deny myself the satisfaction of accomplishing that design whatever may be their future lot.

I have many thanks to make to you for having given me an introduction to Mr. Chambers's acquaintance. I have been unhappily engaged in such busy scenes as have precluded me, in a great degree, from most of the gratifications of society, but I shall study to cultivate Mr. Chambers's acquaintance, and to make mine acceptable to him.

Mr. Lawrence, I believe, had reason to expect my good offices, before you were pleased to mention him to me, and I hope I need not say how much you have added to my desire of serving him.

To Lord MANSFIELD.

Fort William, 20th January, 1776.

My Lord,—Few circumstances could have afforded me more pleasure than the manner in which your Lordship has been pleased to express your acceptance of the specimen which I took the liberty to send you of the Gentoo laws, and your approbation of my endeavours to render the knowledge of them familiar to the inhabitants of this country, and to my own country-

men settled in it; my merit in this performance was very small. It consisted only in the original design, in making choice of persons able and well qualified for such a work, and in encouraging them in the execution of it. I please myself with thinking that I could not have given it in charge to better hands.

I had the honour to supply the sheets which were missing in those which were first sent, by (I believe) the next despatch, and hope you will have received them safe. By the Northumberland I took the liberty to direct to your Lordship a preface to this work, written by the translator, Mr. Halhed, which contains many remarks equally necessary as an illustration of many parts of the composition, and as an apology, perhaps, for others. I have now the honour to send you the remainder of the translation, with a preface and introduction of the pundits, or original compilers. There is an uncommon liberality of sentiment in the preface, or preliminary discourse, which I think I may venture to pronounce will make it highly acceptable to your Lordship; and in the little treatise (p. 37) which comprehends the duties of the sovereign magistrate, although they may not appear to great advantage as soldiers, I am certain your Lordship will admit the good sense and benevolence which appear to have inspired the venerable authors whose precepts are extracted in it.

I cannot quit this subject without acknowledging, which I do with sentiments of the warmest gratitude, the obligation which I owe to your Lordship for the favourable mention which you have been pleased to make of my conduct in this and other instances which have a relation to it. I confess, I little expected, while I meant only to solicit your Lordship's interference in behalf of the rights of the people of this country, and pleased myself in offering a testimony to your Lordship

of the respect and reverence which I bore to your character in the only unexceptionable manner which might admit of it, that I was laying the foundation of my own public credit. But the words uttered by men of your Lordship's eminence never fall in vain. Many letters from England, written both to myself and others, have informed me of these declarations and convinced me of the impression which they have made to my advantage. This, my Lord, is a circumstance of very great importance to a man who has no personal support, and whose sole reliance in all his prospects is on the little reputation which a fortunate disposition of events has enabled him to acquire, and which the breath of faction may blast, with all his hopes, for ever.

Encouraged by your past indulgence, I presume to trouble your Lordship with the copy of a plan which I have drawn up and sent, in conjunction with Mr. Barwell, to the Court of Directors by the present despatches, of additional regulations proposed for the administration of justice in these provinces. The doubts which have arisen, and disputes upon these doubts, concerning the respective powers of the Council and Supreme Court of Judicature, have made it necessary that both should be described by more distinct lines than those by which they are marked in the late Act of Parliament; and more especially that such as were known to exist under the late form of government at the time when the Act was passed, should have a legal authority for their continuance, or that others of greater expediency should be substituted in their room. Your Lordship will find very little of novelty in the plan. The design of it is to prevent innovations, not to add to them; and I sincerely believe that, if it shall be found compatible with the indispensable principles of the English law, neither the laws, usages, nor inclinations of the people of this country will be injured by the introduction of it.

I will not offer any remarks upon this work. To your Lordship, I believe it will be unnecessary. The names of the offices, and the technical terms which occur in it, are mostly explained by the context, and are perhaps not unknown to your Lordship, having appeared often in printed publications, except the superintendent of the Khalsa records, which may require an explanation. This is an office of late institution. The business of the superintendent is to receive and file all complaints and petitions referred to him by the Council, to take the evidences upon them, to trace in the minutes of the Council and other public records, whatever has a relation to them, and to state and prepare them for the Board.

If your Lordship should be curious to obtain any further information, either relating to the manner in which the administration of justice, the collection of the public revenue, or the general business of this Government has been conducted; or to the effects to which any new regulations introduced into the country may be liable, I beg leave to mention the names of two gentlemen who are amply qualified to satisfy your Lordship upon these points,—Mr. George Vansittart and Mr. Alexander Elliott. The first of these was a member of the late Council, and has filled many very important stations in the service with great reputation and success. He possesses an extensive knowledge of the Company's interests in these provinces, with great experience and uncommon ability in the detail of business. This gentleman is a brother of the late Mr. Henry Vansittart. He is now on his return to England.

Mr. Elliott is in England, and will, I hope, have been made personally known to your Lordship before this can reach your hands. I hope you will not form your opinion of his abilities from the youthfulness of his

appearance. If I am not partial to him, his judgment and understanding would do credit to a much more advanced age. He is peculiarly qualified to answer any inquiries which your Lordship may have occasion to make upon the subject of the enclosed sheets, as he had charge of the records of the two Superior Courts of Civil and Criminal Justice, and was the first person appointed to the office of superintendent of the Khalsa records.

These gentlemen are both masters of the Persian language; and while I mention them as persons to whom I refer for that information which I would wish your Lordship to receive as my own, I hope it will not be an improper recommendation of them to add that both have my entire confidence.

I humbly beg leave to recommend the plan to your Lordship's attention. Sir Elijah Impey, who has carefully read it, has authorized me to say that it has his approbation. Knowing my intention to address your Lordship, he has desired me to add on his part, that he laments that he was not sufficiently honoured with your acquaintance to write to you himself, but that he corresponds with the Lord Chancellor and Lord Rochford, and on encouragement from your Lordship would be happy to transmit to you a faithful account of his conduct and sentiments on the business and state of his department. I have a pleasure in declaring that on all occasions it has been his aim in particular, and in general that of the other judges of the Supreme Court, to support the authority of Government, and temper the law of England with the laws, religious customs, and manners of the natives. Your Lordship will hear a different report from my associates in the Council, but I confidently rely on the facts on which our different opinions are founded for confirming my testimony.

I have lately received the letter which you did me

the honour to write to me by the hands of Mr. Hay, and have told him of the title which it gave him to my future services, although my present situation affords me no means of showing him more than common kindness.

I am much honoured by Lord Stormont's remembrance of me, and beg the favour of your Lordship when you see him, to assure him of mine, with my sincere wishes for his prosperity. I beg leave in this place to add my respects to Lady Mansfield * * *

CHAPTER II.

Decision of the Court of Directors—Its effect on Mr. Hastings—His Letters.

ALL this while the rival factions in the Supreme Council at Bengal were anticipating with much anxiety the arrival of despatches which should contain the decision of the Court of Directors on the questions at issue between them. The tone of Mr. Hastings's letters will indeed have shown that he at least entertained no very sanguine anticipations of a triumph. He knew enough of the constitution of the Court to be aware that they would take little interest, as a body, in any measure which had no other object in view than the adaptation of the machinery of the Government under which they lived to the wants and wishes of the people of India. Wherefore, though he remembered that the Court had repeatedly thanked him for reports which contained, among other things, an assurance of increasing revenues and diminishing expenditure—he anticipated no such results on an occasion when the utmost amount of good which he found himself in a condition to prognosticate was, the gradual prosperity of the provinces over which he held sway, and its necessary results—a sure but slow accession to the Company's re-

sources. Moreover, there was a secret conviction on his mind, that such men as Clavering, Monson and Francis never would have been joined with him in working out the experiment of a new system of administration, had there been, on the parts of those with whom the power of choice lay, any disposition to be guided by his judgment. His anticipations, therefore, of support from the Court of Directors were never very sanguine. But to Lord North he did look, as, all things considered, he had a right to do, for support. It was at Lord North's suggestion that his name had been introduced into the list of those to whom, for the first time, the government of India was by Act of Parliament entrusted. From Lord North he had received every encouragement to communicate freely with the King's minister; by Lord North he had been exhorted to bear with patience every little annoyance to which the inexperience or prejudices of his colleagues might subject him; on Lord North, therefore, he relied, with perfect confidence, for the vindication of his policy and good name from the calumnies with which both were assailed. It will be seen by and bye, that whatever might be the soundness of his judgment in the former of these cases, the hopes which he encouraged from a consideration of the latter were abundantly unreal. Meanwhile the following well deserves perusal, not only because of the review

which it takes of the general state of the country at the moment, but because of the insight which it gives us into the workings of a great mind, harassed by many troubles and labouring under much anxiety.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 21st March, 1776.

Dear Sir,—Whatever cause may have heretofore intervened to prevent the decision from being passed on me and my opponents, so many alarming circumstances have lately occurred to show the absolute necessity of putting a speedy end to the disorders of this government, that I think it impossible for them to suffer it to remain longer in a state of distraction. The remedy may be administered when the evil is past cure.

The provinces of Bengal enjoy peace, but no measures are taken for ensuring it; none for the prevention of its internal disorders; none of any kind whatsoever, but such as are calculated to intimidate those who have ever looked to me for protection, or to repeal or render abortive those of my administration. Bitter complaints have been reiterated in all the letters of the majority, that the rents were overrated in the last settlement, yet they reproach me with not having realized it, and refuse to allow of the smallest deduction or remission in the revenues. Complaints are heard only against myself, or others, through whom they may be converted by implication to charges against me; and every decision even on matters in which it is commonly esteemed the most dishonourable to admit of a personal bias, has been dictated solely by the spirit of party. The Dewanny Courts of Justice faintly exist, but without any control; the Sudder Dewanny, or

Court of Appeals, which served as a check and a guard on the rest, having been long since formally abolished. The Foujdarry, or Criminal Courts, which formerly depended on myself, have scarce dared to act since the arrival of the new members of the Council; and the whole province is at this time, even to the boundaries of Calcutta, a prey to decoits. This evil will, I hope, receive some alleviation from the care of Mahommed Reza Cawn, to whom the charge of maintaining the peace of the country, and the superintendence of the Courts of Criminal Justice, has been committed. But his authority is feeble; and though he has been in possession of it these five months, its effects have not yet appeared. He looks, as others do, to a period of tranquillity. With his appointment, which is expressly against the orders of the Company, the Nabob was declared sovereign of the provinces, and possessed of all the rights of the Nizâmut, that is, the exclusive power of administering justice in criminal cases, of appointing guards for the protection of the country, and of punishing all violators of the peace; that is to say, in other words, he is the present instrument of the majority, in the hands of Mahommed Reza Cawn, to execute any violence which they may dictate unseen; and armed by their public and repeated declarations with rights that will enable him to assume an uncontrolled rule for his own behalf, as soon as he shall have spirit to assert them.

It is a little extraordinary that every measure which was taken in the course of my government, though generally approved, has been either repealed, or means taken to render it of no effect, without an attempt to introduce any other system in its stead. Nothing, say they, can now save the country from ruin, but to replace Mahommed Reza Cawn in the authority which I took out of his hands by the orders of the Court of

Directors, and to restore the charge of the collections to supervisors. These measures are even recommended in a plan which Mr. Francis sent by the last ship to the Court of Directors for the new settlement, and why, I cannot conceive, unless it be for the sake of loading me with reproach for having removed both. The maxims which I laid down for my conduct, and by which it was invariably guided, were these:—First, to implant the authority of the Company, and the sovereignty of Great Britain, in the constitution of this country. Secondly, to abolish all secret influence, and make the government itself responsible for all measures, by making them all pass by its avowed authority. Thirdly, to remove all impediments which prevented the complaints of the people from reaching the ears of the supreme administration, or established an independent despotism in its agents. Fourthly, to relieve the reiats from oppressive taxes. Fifthly, to introduce a regular system of justice and protection into the country. Sixthly, to relieve the distresses of the Company at home—you know how great they were—and pay off their heavy debts here, by a uniform and regular mode of collecting their rents, by savings in expenses, and by foreign acquisitions of wealth. And lastly, to extend the political influence of the Company without enlarging their territory or dividing their military strength.

I need not repeat the means which were used to accomplish these ends. The present government has proceeded on principles diametrically opposite to mine. First, they have broken all the arrangements which I made in the Nabob's family in 1772; replaced Mahommed Reza Cawn; restored the office of Naib Suba; dismissed the Begum from her office, which I had assigned her for the express and sole purpose of guarding the Company's authority against encroach-

ment or competition; publicly proclaimed the Nabob's sovereignty, and disclaimed that of the Company. Secondly, they have made their own power uncontrolled, and contrived to preclude its operations from public view, by the pretended independency granted to Mahommed Reza Cawn. Thirdly, they have abolished, or rendered of no effect, all the courts of justice, and avow their intentions of restoring the collectorships. Fourthly, they exclaim against me for overcharging the revenue, though I (I mean, whenever I speak of myself, the late administration) struck off every oppressive article of it, and let the lands on lower terms than the jumna of former years, but such only as the lands, under favourable circumstances, might very well bear, allowing for accidents of drought and inundation, which might entitle the farmers to indulgences. These indulgences, whenever they could prove their title to them, I always granted. The majority allow of none; but while they declare the reiats oppressed, refuse to consent to a single remission which might relieve them. One instance may serve to show the spirit with which they conduct themselves on this occasion. Rajah Cheyton Sing, the zemindar of Bissenpoor, had a writ out against him for a debt. He was actually in the charge of the sheriff's officer. To prevent his being brought in that disgraceful state to Calcutta, or being thrown into gaol, I obtained an order from the under-sheriff for his present discharge, offering myself as the security for his appearance in Calcutta. As soon as the Board met, I informed them of what I had done, and recommended to them to take the Rajah under the protection of the Board, and to assist him in his suit, as this was the first instance; and the decision of it, if favourable to the zemindar, by declaring him exempted from the jurisdiction of the court, would serve as a precedent in all similar

cases. They rejected my proposal; said that, as I had bailed the zemindar without any authority from the Board, I must stand to the consequences; that they would not interfere, but let the law take its course, that the Company might see what dangerous strides the Supreme Court were taking to assume an absolute power over the country. Sixthly, they have branded the suspension of the King's tribute with the appellation of violation of public faith; they have called the cession of Corah the sale of others' property; they have called the subsidy which I had fixed with the Vizier at 210,000 rupees (and which they have augmented to 260,000 rupees), and the stipulation for the Rohilla war, a mercenary prostitution of the Company's arms for hire; they have paid off a part of the bonded debt with the means furnished by these acts of injustice, and now lay claim to the whole merit of it, though it is impossible for them to produce a single instance, in the whole period of their administration, of a rupee saved, or a rupee gained, by any measure of theirs, except the late acquisition of Benares, obtained at the expense of twice the amount of its yearly revenue, which the Nabob of Oude owes to the Company, and which he can never pay them. Lastly, by their pernicious interference in the affairs of Bombay, and by the weakness of their measures in the treaty with the Nabob of Oude, and their subsequent conduct to him, they perverted the great controlling powers of this government to a means of contracting the Company's influence, and of annihilating every advantage which the former servants of the Company had secured for them beyond the limits of Bengal.

The distracted state of the province of Oude exceeds description. The Nabob's character you will learn from universal report. His minister, Morteiza Cawn, is possessed of all his master's vices, with an ordinary

share of understanding, and is in possession of the country, with every place of trust and profit in it. The Nabob's finances and resources are totally exhausted. His troops are disaffected to a man. They have been permitted to oppose his authority in instances of the most criminal disobedience, and the only severity which has been ever exercised towards them was in the massacre of 20,000 of his sepoys (at least Bristow computes the loss at that amount) who mutinied for their pay. This horrid event passed about a month ago. Happily the presence of our brigade serves to check the intestine commotions of his country, and he has no present enemy to throw the materials, which his misconduct has accumulated for his own destruction, into a blaze. The smallest spark of foreign troubles will certainly blow him up.

I have already been so exceedingly prolix on the preceding subjects, that I shall be more concise on the affairs of Bombay. Mr. Taylor* tells me that he has already written to you a very minute detail of all the transactions both of that government and of this in relation to the Mahratta war. I shall, therefore, chiefly dwell on my own part in it.

I have always considered the capture of Salsette as an act of necessity and of good policy, nor inconsistent with the most rigid principles of political justice.

I never approved of the treaty with Ragobah, nor the precipitate measure of the war undertaken without a force or treasure to support it, without a plan of conduct, and with little necessity and less profit to require it. But as it is almost impossible to withdraw from a war before the conclusion of it with honour or safety, had it rested with me I would have directed them to prosecute their original design by escorting Ragobah

* The agent sent from Bombay to protest against the abrupt intervention of the Bengal Government.

to Poona, and to get clear of the war as soon as they could with honour and safety. But I was not in a situation to dictate, and the language of the majority was to order the Presidency of Bombay to withdraw their forces immediately, and without any reservation. All the good that I could do was by temporizing. I therefore advised that an order should be sent to withdraw the army, but I proposed to qualify the order with the following exceptions:—1st. That the safety of the troops might be endangered by it. 2nd. That any decisive advantage had been gained over the enemy; and, 3rdly, That a negociation had taken place, In either of these cases I proposed that the order should not have effect. The majority adopted the first exception, but rejected the other two. I from the first advised, and repeatedly urged them to send supplies both of men and money to Bombay, as the only means of commanding a peace or enabling the gentlemen of Bombay to renew the war with advantage. In this opinion I was supported by Mr. Barwell. The war is now renewed, as might have been expected, at a season in which it is impossible to assist them either with men or money. We have, indeed, sent them eighty men and five lacs of rupees, but the ships which carry these little aids are not yet gone, nor can possibly arrive before the rains. We have given them permission to draw upon us for five lacs more.

If the decided union of the English in every part of India with Ragobah should establish his credit, and give partizans to his cause, which is not unlikely, and if the war is well conducted, it is most probable that it will be concluded in this campaign; and if it is, you will certainly hear of it before you receive this letter. If you do not hear of it, you may conclude that the war is protracted to the next season, and I think the issue of it will then depend on Bengal, and will require all its exertion.

Such as I have described it is the present state of this government, and I presume that it is unnecessary to add other proofs of the necessity of deciding the authority which shall rule it, and apply the remedies to so many complicated disorders. I do not believe that any part of the conduct of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, or any proofs that they have given of their integrity or abilities, will operate to my prejudice, or recommend them for the charge of such a state. Nevertheless, even a determination in their favour would be better than to leave things as they are, for while every proposition which comes before the Board of whatever nature receives the tincture of party, even the absolute authority which they possess must prove insufficient to conduct them with consistency through their own measures or designs.

My respectable friend, Sir Elijah, has undertaken to give my plan for the better administration of justice, which went by the last ship, and which I hope you have read, the form of an act of parliament, and I hope he will be able to complete it in time for it to go by this packet. All the judges approve of it, and I like it myself, which is not always the case with my own productions. I cannot wish to deceive you, and you will think better of me than to suspect me of endeavouring to make you the instrument of deceiving others. With this preface I assure you that it is scarce possible to have acted with more moderation or caution than Sir Elijah has observed in all cases in which the ordinary process of the Supreme Court was likely to affect the collection and management of the public revenue. Indeed the other judges merit the same testimony in their favour. Had a cordial understanding subsisted between the Court and the Council, much of the inconvenience that has arisen from the writs of the

Court would have been avoided, nor would the revenue have been in the least affected by them; but it seems to have been a maxim of the Board to force the Court into extremities for the purpose of finding fault with them. Yet in many cases the acts of the Court have been, and must continue to be, the unavoidable cause of embarrassment. This is owing to a defect in its constitution. By the limitation of its powers it must ever remain a doubt what is the extent of them, as every man in the provinces is in reality subjected to the authority of the Company. If it was constituted to protect the people from oppression, that design would be entirely frustrated were the Board at liberty to employ agents who should be exempt from its authority; and you will have seen many instances in the papers which I have sent home of the most glaring acts of oppression committed by the Board which would have produced the ruin of the parties over whom they were exercised but for the protection of the Court. Great complaints have been made of zemindars and others, who are not liable to the jurisdiction of the Court by the plain construction of the Act, having been arrested, and some thrown into prison by its warrants. But no attention has been paid to the necessity which there is of bringing the persons who are even excluded by the Act from the jurisdiction of the Court in the same way before it to establish their exemption. They may plead to its jurisdiction, and obtain their discharge; but till this is done, I cannot see how it is possible to make the distinction, for if every man who declared himself to be no British subject, nor employed by any, was, in virtue of his own declaration, to be exempted from their authority, all men would make the plea. Their right to this exemption must be tried to be known, and they must be compelled to appear, or give bail for their appearance, that it may be tried.

The truth is, that a thing done by halves is worse done than if it were not done at all. The powers of the Court must be universal, or it would be better to repeal them altogether. The attempt to make a distinction has introduced the most glaring absurdities and contradictions into the Act which virtually declares the British sovereignty over the provinces even in the qualifications which are made use of to limit it. It is declared that the jurisdiction of the Court shall be exercised over all British subjects, and over all who are, or ever were, in the employ of British subjects, that is, over those who are not British subjects, and who of course have no relation or dependence on the British sovereignty which is thus usurped over them. Even in the most ordinary process of the Court, the distinction must be broken through or all its acts impeded. The issuing of subpœnas to witnesses is as much an act of authority as warrants of *capias*, and the parties on whom they are served must be made liable to penalties in case of disobedience; yet it would be the extreme of absurdity to say that no man should be compelled to appear as an evidence who was not a British subject, because it would be impossible in such a case to administer justice; and it is equally a contradiction to say that the persons over whom the authority of the British law is thus exercised are not amenable to it.

I hope that my plan will be found to provide the most effectual relief against all the imperfections of the Act as it now stands. On the one hand, it proposes to give to the Supreme Court an unlimited (but not exclusive) authority over all; and on the other, it provides for the administration of justice in all cases to which its jurisdiction cannot conveniently extend, without the danger of a competition with it. In this coalition of the British judicature with the Dewanny, the latter will obtain a more steady and confirmed au-

thority than it has yet ever possessed; and being open to the daily inspection and control of the judges, the Dewanny Courts will acquire a more regular and legal form than they could have if left to themselves. But I trust the design will best speak for itself, for it has at least the merit of simplicity and precision, if it possesses no other. One only alteration has been made in it in the draft which Sir Elijah is making for me. The superintendent of the Court, called Adawlut Dewanny Zillajaut, who was proposed to be a member of the Provincial Council, as is now the case, holding that office by rotation, is now proposed to be an independent officer (I mean independent of the Provincial Council), and to be removable only for misconduct or by voluntary resignation; and he is to be the judge of all causes that do not immediately regard the revenues (as disputes between farmers, and other proprietors or agents of the collections), which are left to the Provincial Councils.

Mem.—The Superintendent at present holds his office in monthly rotation. My plan lengthens it to a year. Mr. Chambers, on the same grounds, suggested the propriety of making it perpetual, and to be held by a person not a member of the Provincial Council, which I immediately adopted, the chief justice concurring in the same opinion.

There is one point which makes me dread exceedingly the bad effects of a longer continuance of the present scene of disorder. The five years' settlement expires in March, 1777. Many previous arrangements ought to be made some time before the new settlement takes place. I would, had I power, begin them now. But nothing can be done by the present government, which has no principle but that of faction to guide it, and God help this country if it is decided that it shall be left to such rulers.

I have already made my letter of so enormous a

size, that I ought in conscience to put an end to it; but I have been long used to treat you as the confidential repository of my thoughts as they flow warm from my imagination in their natural order, and without correction or reserve, and I have one matter still remaining which is too nearly connected with my own feelings to be suppressed.

I had lately occasion to look over my letters, which were written before the new government took place, to the Court of Directors, and other papers which were written before that period either in recommendation of my own measures, or in refutation of the objections which were made to them. I was struck with the contrast of my own mode of conduct with that of General Clavering and his associates in a more steady adherence to one principle than I myself had ever before suspected, having conformed to it more from the prevailing bent of my own disposition, than from attention to it as a fixed rule of action.

I believe it will be admitted that the government of Bengal never underwent a greater number of variety of changes in all its departments than in the short interval of time in which I presided in it. It seems almost a necessary consequence that new measures imply that the old are wrong, and of course the authors of them deficient either in integrity, ability, or attention. What a field for personal obloquy was this for a man whose feelings might be wounded by the personal successes of men wealthier than himself, or whose spirit could descend to undermine the reputations of others for the sake of building his own on their ruins!

It is with a pride of heart, in which, if I know yours, it will join, that I can now declare that in all the time which I have been speaking of, I never, either in my public minutes or letters, or in my separate addresses

to the Court of Directors, or their Secret Committee, to whom I could have written what I pleased without the hazard of a reply from those whose conduct I might have impeached; nor, I verily believe, in any part of my private correspondence, made use of any argument or assertion which could be imputed to me as proceeding from the least personal ill-will to any of my predecessors, or present opponents in the service. I do not remember that I had ever occasion to make use of the names of either Mr. Cartier, Mr. Verelst, or even Lord Clive; or that in the heat of contest (and I have at times had strong provocation), I ever suffered my pen to express so great a degree of warmth against any man as I have shown (and that never with intemperance, at least I hope not) in private explanations. Sir Robert Barker, Graham, and Barwell are instances of this. These gentlemen might find much cause to be pleased with what I have written unknown to them, but none (I am sure) to complain that I have ever used their names to their discredit.

My conduct to the inferior servants of the Company has been marked with the same moderation. Many sources of profit were shut up, and strict rules made for contingent disbursements, which at one time rendered me very unpopular; but I am told that those who were most offended at these restraints now do me the justice to acknowledge their necessity, and to testify that in enforcing them, I never suffered myself to be biassed by partiality or prejudice to any man.

Many of my letters to the Company, and many of a private nature, but addressed to persons of high rank, or great influence, have treated of the disorders and irregularities of the service, but these I have always attributed (as in my heart I still do) to a defective constitution, not to a depravity of principle in the servants of the Company.

To conclude, whatever may be the lot perhaps already assigned me, I am certain that if ever I am compelled to submit my conduct to the public, my character will stand as fair in their eyes, and my integrity as unblemished as those of any man who ever served the Company, though in abilities I may have been exceeded by many.—I am with the warmest affection and the truest esteem, dear Sir, your faithful and most obedient servant.

P.S.—Since writing the above, all that I have said about our Mahratta negociations is rendered of no consequence. The declaration of the Poona ministers proved to be a mere bravado. By a letter since received from Colonel Upton, dated 24th February, we are informed, that they have assented to the treaty with all the conditions which he required of them, which amount to little more than, that we shall keep Salsette, which we have got, and they Bassein which we could not take; I am too much hurried to give you the particulars. I have written to Mr. Elliott fully upon them, and he will show you my letter. I have taken much pains to temper the severity of our Board, in their letters to Bombay; and Mr. Taylor, if he has done me justice, will have told you, that he has profited by my advice. You long ago knew my wish to see a control given to this government over the other Presidencies, but I never meant such a control as is now exercised; nor did the Parliament mean it. The Act gives us a mere negative power, and no more. It says the other presidencies shall not make war nor treaties without the sanction of this government, but carefully guards against every expression which can imply a power to dictate what the other presidencies shall do; much less does it authorize the Governor-general and Council to make cessions and exchange places for the other presidencies. Instead of uniting

all the powers of India, all the use we have hitherto made of this Act of Parliament has been to tease and embarrass.

It will be gathered from the tone of this letter, that Mr. Hastings, however desirous of a speedy determination of the point in dispute between his rivals and himself, was not without misgivings as to the result. He felt, indeed, how a due regard to consistency and their own interests ought to operate with his employers; yet he hardly dared to anticipate at their hands an open avowal of the right. But he was certainly not prepared for such a decision as that which was conveyed in the Court's Despatch of the 18th of December. An unqualified condemnation of measures which had been over and over again approved, a sweeping censure upon proceedings, of which they who blamed, scrupled not to appropriate the benefits; —this was a direct ranging of themselves on the side of the majority, to which, even from the Court of Directors, he had not looked. I should needlessly swell the bulk of these volumes, were I to insert here the substance of a document which has long ago become a portion of history. But of the effect produced by it on the feelings and determinations of the Governor-general I am bound to give an account; and the reader will, I think, agree with me in thinking that this object cannot be more effectually attained than by permitting

Mr. Hastings to speak for himself. The following is addressed to his friend and agent Colonel MacLeane, of whom notice has already been taken, and of whom I shall have occasion to say more by and bye.

Fort William, 14th July, 1776.

My dear Friend,—No words can do justice to the sense which I entertain of the uncommon zeal which you have manifested in the support of my reputation and interest. Accept of my thanks, and judge from the generosity of your own heart of the grateful warmth with which they are offered from mine. You have effected as much as it was possible to do under the many difficulties which you have had to surmount. I can forgive Lord North for endeavouring to protract the decision on my fate, overwhelmed as he was with other troubles, which must have employed all his power and great abilities to extricate him from them. Yet I cannot excuse him for suffering such unmerited censure to be publicly passed upon my conduct, especially in one instance in which he knew that I had acted with propriety. The letter from the Court of Directors is the most partial that ever bore their seal. It is replete with the grossest adulation to the majority, and of as gross abuse to me, which is conveyed even in the language of my opponents. But I regard it not. If those who penned the letter hope by it to provoke me to give up the battle, they have erred most miserably. Though ruin or death should attend it, I will wait the event, and if I must fall, I will not be the instrument of my own defeat by anticipating it, unless my friends at home shall all join in advising it, and I shall be at the same time convinced of the propriety of a retreat. Hitherto I have acted the part of strict fidelity to my employers, although not the

most political. I have led and laboriously promoted the current business; and, where my opinion has not prevailed, have patiently adopted theirs for the sake of despatch, from a conviction that even wrong movements are preferable to inaction, which is the death of public affairs. There are instances in the foul minutes of the public secretaries of resolutions which have been dictated and erased, till by successive trials I have been able to combine the loose and incongruous opinions of the other members into a form which they might all approve, though foreign from my own; and when this has failed, I have, as the last remedy, stated the subject before the Board in a formal proposition to bring it to an issue. I have explained my conduct in this part of it, because I hear that, among the private charges which are whispered against me, one is, that I have endeavoured to obstruct and embarrass the current business. This is an assertion that will easily gain credit, because it agrees with the obvious and common effects of party divisions; but you may refute it by an appeal to the consultations, which will prove abundantly that I have given despatch to business, and these men only have obstructed it. However I may have erred in this against the principle of discretion, the public ought to allow me a merit in it; for it certainly was in my power by a very regular and justifiable policy, justifiable I mean by the strict forms of the service, to have thrown every thing into the most inextricable confusion. This line I shall still proceed in, for both public and private mandates contain the strongest injunctions of peace, which I will not be the first to break. But as the tempers with which I am associated were not formed for harmony, the present calm cannot be of long duration, and I am afraid I shall be compelled to adopt a different policy, and to leave the whole responsibility of all measures

on those who are the real authors of them, for it is impossible for the present constitution and state of government to subsist much longer without irretrievable ruin. I dread the return of the fair season. The province of Oude has been long ripe for destruction. I dare not trust the description of it to this letter.

At Bombay the hands of the Governor and Council have been tied by the Government of Bengal, and loosened by the Court of Directors, who have confirmed the treaty made with Ragobah, and ordered it to be supported by the forces of all the three presidencies, although they were early apprized of the measures taken from hence to annul it, and might have foreseen what has actually come to pass, that a treaty has been since concluded by the Governor-general and Council with the very state which their present orders enjoin us to treat as an enemy. In their general letter to Bombay, dated 12th April, 1775, they declare their disapprobation of the resolution expressed by that presidency to take possession of Salsette by force, and positively prohibit them from "attempting it *under any circumstances whatever*,"—a favourite expression. In their general letter to us by the Greenwich, they say, "We approve, under every circumstance, of the keeping of all territories and possessions ceded to the Company by the treaty concluded with Ragobah," and direct us "forthwith to adopt such measures as may be necessary for their preservation and defence." Yet they knew that Salsette, the capital of these territories and possessions, had been taken by force, before any treaty existed that could give them a right to it. It is remarkable, too, that in the same letter they say, "We utterly disapprove and condemn offensive wars, distinguishing however between offensive measures unnecessarily undertaken with a view to pecuniary advantages, and those which the preservation

of our honour, or the protection or safety of our possessions, may render absolutely necessary." In the next paragraph, they applaud the majority for their attention to this principle, forbid with the most positive expressions a deviation from it, "for (say they) the prospect of any advantages, however alluring, can in no wise be adequate to the pernicious consequences which must result from examples of disobedience to our orders." And what is the treaty of Surat, with all its antecedent and consequent circumstances, but a series of offensive measures undertaken with a view to pecuniary advantages, and in direct contradiction to their orders? Of their necessity or expediency I say nothing. We have repeated our commands to Bombay to adhere to our treaty, and unless I am greatly deceived in my opinion of the temper and dispositions of the gentlemen of that presidency, they will break it and renew the war as soon as they are furnished with the authority of the Court of Directors for it; and a wonderful scene of intricacies we shall have opened between us.

Of Fort St. George I say nothing; you will hear all from better authority. They seem not to require our aid to throw them into disorder.

I wait impatiently to hear of the Northumberland's arrival, and of the effect produced by her despatches. On these I depend as the crisis of my future fortune, and hope they will have been effectual either to the restoration of my authority or to my recall, for the latter will be preferable to my continuance in my present state.

I shall not acquiesce in the censures of the Court of Directors, not even as they stand qualified by the resolutions of the general court, but intend to make a very full reply to the general letter. I shall never depart from the duties of submission and respect to my supe-

riors; but I will not acknowledge the justice of their strictures where I think them injurious to my character, and contradictory to their own principles and my own certain knowledge of the integrity of my conduct. Do not be surprised, therefore, if you find my next defence shifted from my opponents in the Council to the general letter. Their last attack is not worth a reply.

I can scarce bear with patience the thought that another year must pass in contention; but I must suppose the worst, and provide as well as I can against it. I am certain that you will neither suffer to escape you, nor lightly employ, any advantage which may occur for ensuring my success; but as you will be naturally induced to act with caution in matters which may lead to public contests, lest the event should be violently terminated against me, I now make it my request that you will endeavour to obtain a decision in any way, or by any mode or channel, so that I may be freed from the state of helplessness and humiliation to which I have so long submitted, and am still patient to submit, if an end be not already put to it. It is not that I want fortitude to persevere, for I am resolved, whatever happens, to wait for the final issue; but I see so many evils gathering round me from every quarter, that if this government is left another year to anarchy, I may receive the confirmation of my authority only to suffer misfortune and dishonour in the exercise of it; and in such an event I shall gain less by victory than my enemies would by their defeat. The five years' settlement of Bengal will expire next March, and the worst consequences may be apprehended both to the Company and to the country from a new one formed under all the prejudices, and accommodated to all the objects, of a faction. In a word, *even now* every power of government would be required

to restore it to order. A few months hence may involve it in such distractions as may hazard the loss of the whole. That period may have overtaken it before you receive this; but I hope for the best, and can only desire your good offices in obtaining for me such relief as you can, and when you can. A reconciliation never can take place. Fire and water may more easily be united. I think I possess as placable and as pliant a spirit as most men, but I feel that it is impossible for me to be ever on confidential terms with either of these men. At present I am the link which holds them together, for I am morally certain that if I were to quit them, they would break and begin a scene of continual warfare with each other in less than a month after. I see daily and certain proof of this. I wish I had early received and followed the advice of Sir Gilbert Elliott. I am afraid I have too often furnished the majority with arms against myself by observing a contrary rule. No part of your letter has given me so much pleasure as the information of his disposition towards me. It will have prepared him to receive with greater approbation the event of his son's return. I shall never forgive myself for having consented to it, if he is displeased with it; and yet I am sure that it was placing my friend Elliott in a point of view so conspicuous, that perhaps another opportunity might not have occurred in the course of his life to make his abilities equally known to the public, nor equally useful. But I will not entertain a doubt on the subject. It was a laudable measure; it will be received as such, and it will prove successful in every way. I do not despair of seeing him yet with your namesake. I am proud to find the name of Lord Mansfield amongst my warmest friends, and pleased that I paid my court to him at a time when I could be least suspected of having been influenced by interested motives, or by any worse than

the gratification of my own pride, which implied at least that I held his character in the highest veneration. He will have seen in the behaviour of J. Fowke, during his trial last year (if his curiosity should have led him so far), the strong features of an old acquaintance, for I am told that he was as intemperate on an occasion, which terminated not much to his credit, before the Court of King's Bench, as he was lately before the Supreme Court of Bengal.

Your letter contains so lively and well drawn a picture of the state of affairs at home, that I find it a useful clue to enable me to draw conclusions from other circumstances, and from the events which have occurred since it was written. It has also had one good effect, in arming me with a most stoical indifference for the anathemas of the general letter. Francis calls the last (which is most illiberal towards me) a *brutum fulmen;* and the absurdity of the exhortation with which it concluded so struck the fancy of every member of the Board when it was read, that they all at once burst out into a loud and hearty laugh, the only symptom of unanimity (which the letter recommended) that I have seen in that assembly these two years. Every one is, or affects to be, displeased with it. I expect the next to contain a condemnation of my doctrine of the right of the Governor to dissolve the meetings of the Council. For my consolation, and unluckily for themselves, they assign reasons for their censures, and those generally inconsequent, from a gross ignorance of the subject. Mr. Graham will smile at the woeful blundering which is made in the general letter about the salt balances and Ridgely contracts, two subjects as different as day and night, which they have mistaken for one, and discussed it with all the subtlety and caution of a Hebrew commentator.

I grieve that the Chief Justice's Bill did not go home eighteen months ago. My diffidence of my own ability on a subject so remote from all my occupations, deterred me from attempting anything of the kind; and I found, when I seriously pressed Sir Elijah upon the subject, that he was withheld from it by the want of local experience, and had expected me to form the plan of a judicial establishment for the whole country. How we missed the knowledge of each other's sentiments on such a subject, and with a daily communication, I know not. As soon as I knew his, I instantly set about it. My plan was written on the eve of the close of one packet, and his Bill, from similar causes, and from sickness, was begun and finished during the despatch of another. These circumstances I mention as excuses for any errors or *indiscretions* which may be discovered in them. By *indiscretions* I mean propositions which are *right* in themselves, but *wrong* from the season. Such possibly may be the preliminary article of both, namely, that the British sovereignty shall be diffused equally throughout all the provinces. The touchy temper of the times may interpret this into a surrender of the Company's rights, and such a construction has actually been put upon it; and how can I convince those who will not read, or, if they read, wrest words to their contrary meaning? The words of my plan are,—"and the British sovereignty, *through whatever channels it may pass into these provinces, should be all in all.*" The sentence which I have marked with a dotted line was purposely inserted to prevent a misconstruction, and to obviate the idea of an intention to recommend the conversion of the territorial possessions of Bengal to the King's property. The plain meaning is, that as former charters were confined to the Company's actual possessions, that is, to Calcutta and the subordinate factories, so the new

charter should *extend* to the Company's actual possessions, *i. e.* to *all* Bengal. The British sovereignty has always existed in Calcutta, nor have the Company's rights been affected by it. Let all Bengal be Calcutta, and the British sovereignty in like manner subsist throughout; the Company's rights will subsist also equally unimpaired, if nothing more is done to infringe them. But the majority, in their critique upon this performance, quote my words, with the omission of the explanatory part of them, for the purpose of drawing the anger of the Court of Directors upon me for proposing the surrender of their rights, which I carefully guarded against.

In the preface to the Bill, the like proposition is made in more pointed and precise terms, and a saving clause is added in favour of the rights of the Company. Yet it has been suggested to me that offence will be taken at both. I cannot think it; but though I cannot prevent such a conclusion, I shall still be desirous of effacing the impression made by it, though late, and therefore I have been so circumstantial in this vindication of my intentions.

CHAPTER III.

Proceedings in England—Hostility and double dealing of Lord North's Government—Conduct of the Directors and the Proprietors—Colonel MacLeane's Correspondence.

THUS far we have traced the career of Mr. Hastings as that of a public man, who, in the execution of what he believes to be his duty, has many and grave difficulties to surmount. Under the ancient form of administration these were, indeed, of no very extraordinary nature. He found his province embarrassed; he attributed the embarrassments under which it laboured to mistakes in the system on which his predecessors had acted; he exerted himself to remedy these mistakes, and he was to a remarkable degree successful. A change took place in the constitution of the government, and he found himself associated with men who, having no local knowledge nor experience to direct them had yet projects of their own to work out, one of which undoubtedly was to bring discredit on the whole system of the Company's administration, and by so doing to prepare the public mind for a transference of the territorial sovereignty of India from the chartered body by whom it had heretofore been wielded, to the Crown. From first to last Mr. Hastings had just cause to

complain, that on all hands, and by all parties, he was very unfairly dealt with. Though nominated by the King's minister to fill the highest office in the new government, no intimation was given to him of that minister's wishes; which, on the contrary, seemed to aim at nothing more, than that he should continue to act with the wisdom and the vigour which had hitherto characterized his proceedings. Meanwhile his Council was so constituted, that the parties, entrusted with the real designs of the Cabinet, were enabled always to command a majority. In the Court of Directors, likewise, the influence of Government was employed to form a party pledged to support that majority; not so much through any feeling personally hostile to Mr. Hastings, as because Lord North had his own ends to serve. Accordingly at the moment when Mr. Robinson, Lord North's secretary, was encouraging Mr. Hastings to hold his ground, Lord North was prompting his friends in the Direction to heap censures upon their Governor; every charge brought against whom told likewise against the authorities under which he acted, and more and more paved the way for the sentence which should in due time go forth for their overthrow.

It will be borne in mind, that at a period when his difficulties had risen to their height, when not himself alone, but his friends and dependents,

were driven from their employments and accused of crimes the least flagrant of which, if perpetrated, must have excluded them from the society of honest men, Mr. Hastings, apprehensive on various accounts that the main-spring of all this hostility lay deeper than the breasts of his colleagues at Calcutta, determined on sending to England certain trustworthy agents, who might watch over his honour rather than his interests, and save him from being crushed, at least without a struggle. For this purpose he made choice of three gentlemen in particular,—Mr. George Elliott, the son of Sir Gilbert Elliott, a young man of rare promise and singularly matured judgment; of the Honourable James Stuart, one of the sons of the Earl of Bute, whom, because he was the Governor's protégé, the majority had removed from the chief secretaryship of Bengal; and of Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeane, to whose noble exertions and disinterested friendship I am glad that it has fallen to my lot to bear testimony. These, as has been shown in the course of this narrative, carried with them full powers to act for Mr. Hastings as if his cause had been their own, one restriction only being laid upon them, namely, that it was his good name, not his station or his pecuniary resources, of which they were the appointed guardians.

The proceedings of the majority had been so

flagrantly unjust, their censures were so sweeping, and their charges so extravagant, that indignation appears to have been for a while the only feeling which they excited in Mr. Hastings's bosom. Under the strong influence of that feeling he made up his mind not to continue one hour in office should their statements be favourably received at the India House; and he accordingly wrote to Colonel MacLeane the letter, bearing date March 25, 1775, which I have inserted in its proper place, and of which the reader has not, I dare say, forgotten the purport. A little reflection served, however, to convince him that an abrupt resignation could not, under such circumstances, redound to his credit. If he withdrew from public life, in consequence of any censure passed upon him by the Court of Directors, he would find it difficult to convince the world that these censures were not merited; he therefore resolved, let come what would, to retain his place in Bengal, and to trust to the chapter of accidents and to his own righteous intentions for an opportunity of proving, sooner or later, how cruelly he had been maligned. Hence the second letter, of the 18th of May, by which the discretionary powers entrusted to Colonel MacLeane are withdrawn; as well as his often repeated assurances, addressed to Lord North himself, that no efforts on the part of his enemies should ever prevail upon him to take a step which must be

followed by consequences fatal to his own honour, and highly mischievous to the interests of his employers.

The true nature of that series of transactions, which led first to the tender by Colonel MacLeane of Mr. Hastings's resignation, and subsequently to the refusal of Mr. Hastings to acknowledge the authority under which such tender was made, has never, I believe, up to the present hour, been brought to light. I am not at all surprised at the circumstance, for a more discreditable affair to all concerned, a more shameless case of corruption on the parts of those high in office, and of venality and meanness among others of whom they made use as their tools, has never, I freely confess, come under my notice. Indeed, so gross is the whole job, so dark the shade which it throws on the memory of more than one illustrious individual, that were not proofs of delinquencies in high places before me such as I find myself unable to controvert, I should be disposed, even as the biographer of Warren Hastings, to let the matter rest in the obscurity which has heretofore attended it. I believe, however, that the cause of moral truth itself requires that such tales should be told. For though it may be vain to hope that the time will ever come when statesmen shall go straight towards the objects which they seek to attain, and bribery, in some form or another, be repudiated

as an instrument in the conduct of public affairs, some check at least may perhaps be imposed upon all parties if it can be shown, that sooner or later their delinquencies will come to light. Let me then place the facts broadly before my reader; and lest he should suspect me of an undue bias either in favour of the great man whose historian I am, or against the parties that opposed him, let me do so in the words of the highly respectable individual, by whom Mr. Hastings's side of the question was supported throughout.

Colonel MacLeane appears to have reached England in the winter of 1775. He devoted himself, from the hour of his landing, to the business which he had undertaken to manage, and in various letters, some of which have been lost, while others do not seem worthy of insertion, he gave an account of the progress of affairs, as from day to day they went forward. Of the intelligence thus communicated the substance was shortly this: —that the minister, availing himself of the hostile spirit which had dictated the Court's memorable letter of the 15th December, made a grand push to obtain from the Directors an address to the Crown for the removal of Messrs. Hastings and Barwell from their respective stations; that a meeting of the Directors was held; that the question was brought forward, and thrown out after a warm debate, by a considerable majority; and

that nothing could exceed the chagrin of Lord North and his colleagues at the defeat. For their object was to place General Clavering at the head of affairs, not only because they anticipated from his mode of conducting them results every way in accordance with their own motives, but because General Clavering's parliamentary connexions were powerful; and it was a point of vital importance just at that moment to ensure their support of Lord North's policy. And now I turn for the further elucidation of this tale to Colonel MacLeane, whose letters I insert at length. They seem to me to bear upon their face the stamp of truth; and must, till contradicted on good authority, be accepted as a clear vindication of the whole tenor of Mr. Hastings's proceedings.

London, 25th June, 1776.

My dear Sir,—My last letter, dated 25th March, and the few lines I got forward in April, would inform you of the very hostile intentions of administration towards you, and of the critical state of your affairs here. But when I wrote those letters, I had no idea of the very great lengths it was determined to proceed for your removal.

During the latter part of Mr. Harrison's year as chairman, every step was taken by administration that could tend to ensure success when Roberts should become chairman. James was gained over by the promise of being deputy. He was also promoted to every thing he could wish in the Trinity House. Six contracts were given to as many directors. Two, as I have

already mentioned, were promised seats in the Supreme Council. Many principal proprietors were tampered with, and the most injurious calumnies industriously propagated against you. At length, in the first week of May, it was determined to bring forward again by surprise, the motion that had been before negatived in the Court of Directors, for "addressing the Crown to remove Messrs. Hastings and Barwell from their respective stations in Bengal." I got notice of this intention about an hour before it was to be carried into execution. I went to the India House, and by accident met Mr. N. Smith in the lobby. I told him I was glad I had met him, because it was but fair I should let him know that he had signed a very unjustifiable protest, and that Mr. Hastings's attornies had it in immediate contemplation to prosecute the three gentlemen in the Supreme Council for defamation, in which case he and Mr. Gregory would be subpœnaed as evidences. A long conversation ensued, in which he endeavoured to palliate what he had done; but he could not deny that he had proceeded on partial grounds, taking assertions for proofs, and entering only into one side of the question. He said, there were no accusations against the majority. I denied the fact, asserted that your letters were full of accusations, but that the best place for proving whether he had done his duty impartially as a director, would be in a court of law. The effect I proposed from this conversation was to give an alarm in the court-room, and to gain time for convening your friends. Luckily at this instant Mr. Sykes came into the India House, and, as he approved much of the step I had taken, it gave me courage to proceed. In a few minutes after Mr. Smith left me, Mr. James threw himself into my way. He carried me into one of the committee rooms, and entered into a detail of the "evils that must attend the continuance of the dis-

putes of Bengal; that one of the parties must give way; that administration could not desert their own system, they must support the men they had sent out; that the idea of removing Mr. Hastings for *criminality* was entirely dropt, it was for *expediency* only that the motion would be made, and there was a majority of Directors for expediency;" to this he added a great deal more that I shall not repeat to you. I replied shortly, that the Directors might act as they pleased; Mr. Hastings's friends would take care that the nation at large should judge who was right and who was wrong, by a thorough discussion of the matter in a place where the whole truth must ultimately appear. The Directors, I added, had a great, conscientious, and responsible trust to execute, and I made no doubt, when such a question as I now understood came to be put, they would attend to it, and if they did, I was certain there could not be a majority; for nothing could be expedient that was unjust. "Will you," says he, "see Mr. Roberts? I wish," he added, "any expedient could be fallen upon that would content both parties." Mr. Roberts came. The same conversation passed over again. At last Roberts said, "How can accommodation take place?" I replied, "Mr. Hastings desires not to hold the Government of Bengal on account of its emoluments; he has acquired a moderate, a very moderate fortune, and he is content; but he never will part with his honour. This motion, couch it in what terms you will, is intended to fix a stigma upon him, and to deliver up all his friends into the hands of his enemies. If fair play is meant, let some honour from the Crown be conferred upon him, and let the displaced servants be restored, and all hostilities cease." To this Roberts replied, "My wishes go along with you; but have you powers to answer for Mr. Hastings's compliance if the terms were granted?" I replied I would be responsible;

and with the more confidence, because I knew Mr. Hastings would not hold the government if he did not receive the most cordial support; but I also knew he would never relinquish it, but from violence, while any attempt was made to dishonour him. The conversation ended in a truce for a week, secrecy on both sides being promised. I did not lose a moment in convening all your friends. Mr. Pechell readily agreed to take the lead: I cannot say enough in praise of him and General Caillaud. A direct negociation with Lord North, through Lord Hyde, now Earl of Clarendon, was proposed by Mr. Pechell, while Mr. Pechell himself and I should discuss matters with Mr. Robinson and the two chairs. Lord Hyde readily undertook it: he wrote to Lord North, but the week passed and he received no answer. I saw Robinson and the Chairman often. I thought, till the last, that matters would have been accommodated; but I was deceived. The fact is, a plan is formed for reducing the Company to the simple transactions of commerce, and for taking possession of all its territorial rights and acquisitions; and General Clavering has undertaken the execution of this plan. The K. is bigoted to him, and will not hear of any thing that thwarts him. And it seems, nothing short of your disgrace will satisfy his friends. Unless you and your friends are given up to his vengeance, *he will return in the first ship*, et magna res manebit *infecta*.

In this situation of affairs we considered that we had nothing to lose by a defeat, we therefore determined to stand the test of a General Court. Our adversaries attributed our moderation to apprehensions. They depended on the vast weight of administration thrown into their scale, and they made sure of victory. We, on the other hand, placed our dependence on the voice of the Company, nay, of the public, which had been so loud in your favour; we trusted that the sense of your

great services could not be so soon obliterated; we trusted that the real designs of the majority would be seen through; in short, we put the decision of the question for your removal to the test of a ballot, which was taken on the 18th May, and ended in your favour by a majority of 106. In the Court preceding the ballot, Mr. Pechell spoke two hours and a quarter on your merits and those of Mr. Barwell, and the late administration. He set the conduct and views of the majority in their proper light, and carried conviction along with him. Mr. William Elliott seconded him, and they were ably supported by numbers of good speakers: scarcely a man entered the lists against them. Mr. Gregory and Mr. Wombwell, among the Directors, made a feeble attempt: they were silenced by Mr. Rumbold. Among the Proprietors, nobody spoke against you except the Solicitor of the Treasury (Mr. Chamberlayne), and the Index Maker for the Journals of the House of Commons (Mr. Moore). Mr. Holford, a Master in Chancery, who has lately veered about, and who seems to act entirely from a mean jealousy of Mr. Pechell, attempted to take a part against you, but he was immediately silenced. My desire to put you out of doubt as to the issue of the ballot and the transactions of the General Court has, I perceive, led me out of the natural course of relation. I have told you the issue of the ballot before I have told how it came to be taken. I must entreat your indulgence, and go back.

At the expiration of the truce, I waited upon the chairman, at his own house, by appointment: he asked me the issue of Lord Hyde's good offices: I told him Lord North either had not time or did not choose to see him, for he had not yet given him a hearing. Roberts replied, that he lamented it much, "for the Directors must proceed in their own way; the dissensions

in Bengal were very detrimental to the affairs of the Company, and must be put an end to; nay, they had no choice left, for both parties *insisted* on a decision between them, and Government could not, at least would not, give up their own system." These few words were a volume: they could not have been plainer spoken by Lord North himself. I took my leave with putting him in mind, that for ten months Mr. Hastings's friends had given every proof of their moderation. He had ever been a friend of Government, General Clavering could not be more so, and it was very unaccountable that administration should take a part so very decided for one friend against another. But it was still a more extraordinary matter if the majority of the Directors took the same part: for one had served them long and faithfully; him they sacrificed for the other, who had never served them in any shape, but, on the contrary, had shown on every occasion the utmost contempt and disregard for their orders. The nation at large must judge between them.

The Court of Directors met a few hours after. Woodhouse, who had been so steady for you till this day, was absent, either from illness or the pretence of it. I speak tenderly of him, for he still professes that he would have voted for you in the Court of Directors, though he thought himself obliged to support the act of the Directors at the ballot. Moffat took the same part, he was *lame*. Harrison spoke for an hour in the ablest manner for you; and then, to the surprise of all present, concluded, that though he would never acquiesce in your removal for criminality, yet it was necessary to do it on the ground of *expediency*. Here the clue is unravelled. Welbore Ellis had been in a course of constant visits to Mr. Harrison for some time before, and, by some ministerial influence that we have not yet discovered, the three gentlemen that I have

just mentioned were gained over. They thought the whole depended upon them, and I am myself surprised how we have made so successful a stand after their defection. Just in this situation, Rumbold, who had hitherto kept his mind pretty much to himself, and who was suspected, from being so much in the power of the ministry, took up the cause where Harrison laid it down. In a longer speech than Harrison's, he went over the same ground, recapitulating and praising him for his arguments, but expressing the utmost astonishment at his conclusion. Becher seconded him ably. And at length the ballot was taken, and declared from the chair to be *eleven* for your removal, *ten* against it.

This passed at four o'clock, 9th May. Before twelve that night I got a letter signed, for calling a General Court, by Mr. Pechell, Palk, Brett, Boulton, Sumner, Boldero, Motteaux, Boehm, and Lushington, which letter was delivered in next morning when the Directors met to confirm the ballot of the preceding day. The letter disconcerted them much, for it was intended to carry up the address directly, and for the business to be expedited without a moment's delay. Their disappointment at this step was so great, that they debated near two hours whether the Proprietors had any right by the late Act to interfere. At last, they were pleased to grant a court; and Mr. Pechell, who delivered the letter, with Messrs. Boehm, Brett, and Palk, brought them to declare that they would not proceed farther till the sense of the General Court was known. The Court met on the 16th, and was exceedingly full. *Forty-nine* privy councillors, peers, and men high in office attended on the part of administration; treasury letters were sent to almost all the Proprietors, and Lord Sandwich conducted the operations. Near midnight we divided on a question of "adjournment till next day;" you will not be surprised that this shoal

of ministers rushing out of court in the moment of division carried the question against us, at that late hour, 108 to 97. We demanded the ballot, which was fixed for Friday the 18th, and carried, against every effort of administration and the chairs, by the majority already mentioned.

A curious incident happened at the ballot. Eleven gentlemen claimed the honour of having voted for you in the Court of Directors. Manship proposed to make the matter clear by signing a paper to that purpose. He began it and was immediately followed by Messrs. Becher, Cuming, Hall, Rumbold, Wier, Freeman, John Smith, Savage, Peach, and Sparkes. This extraordinary affair made and still makes much noise. Roberts expressed so much uneasiness, that the paper has been burned, but this only strengthened the fact.

Sir Gilbert Elliott and his sons came together to the ballot, and gave in their papers open. Sir Gilbert took this opportunity of declaring his sentiments against the violence and injustice of the proceedings against you; "there were only two places," he said, "in which it became him to discuss this matter,—the India House and the House of Commons,—and he should take the same line in both." This has given great offence to administration. I have never known them so sore on any defeat. So great a majority has stunned them. Lord North cannot bear the least mention of the India House, directors, or proprietors. He "will have nothing to do with India matters out of Parliament. The Company must be restrained to its commerce. Territorial acquisitions are beyond their abilities to manage, and must be taken from them without waiting for the expiration of the charter. For this purpose Parliament must meet before Christmas. In the mean time the proprietors may do what they please; the more violent and absurd their actions

the better." This is now the language of the ministerial party, and they have held it uniformly since their defeat. They have ever acted conformably to it; for though we called the quarterly court *special*, there was not the least effort made to oppose us. We did in that court, and can do in the subsequent ones, just what we please. The enclosed slip mentions the transactions of that court; and I kept the express till it and another court to be held to-morrow (on Mr. Verelst's business) should be over, that you might receive a true state of your affairs here up to the last moment we could wait. In all probability I shall have occasion to despatch another express towards the latter end of next month; for the Eagle packet is countermanded, "there being no intelligence agreeable to the majority ready to send."

I need not say how anxious I am that my conduct here may meet with your approbation. I have kept your instructions constantly in mind, and have seized every opportunity to act up to the spirit of them. My former letters have informed you of the reasons why we recommended your continuing steadily in your station. What was then a matter of choice is now become a matter of necessity. Your cause is now become the cause of the Company. You stand and fall together; and this renders any compromise now, should it be offered, very difficult: it will be thought a dereliction. Nothing but the utmost violence can effect your fall, and in that case honour will attend you.

But before this we have many chances in our favour. General Clavering, I think, will be so disgusted that he must retire. The latter part of my letter will explain this. The times may not be suitable for violence. I *know*, but dare not say *how* by this conveyance, that the three Secretaries of State are against

the measure, and wish Lord North would change his opinion. I *know* also that the Chancellor and Attorney-General are of the same opinion. Here you would expect that I should name Lord M., but I have had my doubts of that quarter for some time past. *Chambers and Dow are his correspondents.* Above all, the affairs of India have gone, and still seem to be going, so very ill since the demolition of your system, that I fancy, nay, hope and expect, it will be found necessary to restore you to full power, as the only means of retrieving them. I do not think there is one independent proprietor against you. The Indians, as they are called, are also united for you, Walsh alone excepted.

As the maxim of your adversaries now is, *Give them rope enough, &c.*, it behoves us to be doubly circumspect. The motion intended for the next General Court on your affairs is, "that all such servants of the Company as have been dismissed by the Supreme Council, contrary to the *positive printed instructions,* or *appointment* of the directors, be *restored* to their respective offices." This question can scarcely be opposed, and, if carried, it must lay the majority flat on their backs. It will be my care to give you speedy intelligence of it. We cannot say precisely when this motion will be made, but most probably about the middle of July.

Nothing has alarmed me so much as the defection of friends. I live in constant dread of the operation of loaves and fishes. The danger, I hope, is now pretty well over. Government are disgusted; they have reaped no benefit in proportion to the good things they have given; and those who got nothing are irritated. Old Elliott asked Wheler, "whether, when he gave his ballot as a director, for the removal of Messrs. Hastings and Barwell, he did not know that

he was intended to succeed one of them? If so," says he, "the act is vitiated and rendered null by your suffrage." He got no answer. But Wheler has fallen into the utmost contempt. He will *never* be a counsellor. It is hard to say whether he or Roberts, Gregory or N. Smith, are fallen lowest in the estimation of the public. This leads me to an anecdote which I must not omit. It was thought that Gregory took his line from Lord Rockingham, and that N. Smith took his from Lord Camden; consequently that both administration and opposition were hostile. Wier told this to Lord Rockingham, and entreated him to come to the ballot. He did so, and told Gregory that he could not reconcile his conduct to his principles or to justice. Gregory has been crest-fallen ever since. The effort he has made was to attack his brother protestor, N. Smith, at the last General Court. He takes his departure for Ireland this week; I shall not be sorry if he spends his Christmas there, though he can do us little more mischief. Lord Rockingham's explanation with him has reduced him to the mere *agent* of Nundcomar.

I do not write a separate letter to Mr. Barwell, I consider you as one; and the harmony and union between you gives universal satisfaction, and does you both the utmost honour. I write by this conveyance to nobody else in Bengal.

I will not attempt to tell you now who are the friends that have stood most steadily by you, nor what they have done, because to do them justice I should swell this letter, even if I had time to do it, beyond the proper bounds. Poor Graham is, I fear, beyond the chance of recovery. He is gone to Lisbon. Elliott has had bad health since his return. He is now better. His father at first seemed dissatisfied, but Goordass's late appointment has set all right again. I really

believe chagrin at the little service he was able to do you with Lord North, who not only received him very coldly, but has been very cold to his father ever since, has had some share in his illness. The only effect this coldness has had on Sir Gilbert, or is likely to have, is, that it will make him much more determined. Frederic Stuart behaves very well. I think his family are, and will continue, cordial friends. They thought, however, that we should have been *beaten.*

In a former letter I complained of Lawrell. Justice demands that I should tell you he has taken a direct and warm part for some time past.

Sir Elijah Impey will expect a letter from me. Be good enough to assure him that I watch over his cause with the same unremitting care and zeal as over yours. Intentions were very hostile towards him at first. He is, I am pretty certain, in no danger. *Magna est lex, et prevalebit.*

I have had a long interview with Lord North since the ballot. It was very curious. I cannot trust it to this conveyance. But it confirmed, by its purport, everything I have said in this letter, and a *great deal more.*

The defence of Quebec, and the raising of the siege, have been very gallant. It continued six months. Carleton and my kinsman have distinguished themselves much, and got great honour. Matters did not go so well in other parts. We were obliged to abandon Boston in a manner rather precipitate. But as we have now 40,000 men landed, or about to land, in that country, I should imagine much may be done for the entire reduction of America before winter. The system of Europe continues peaceable though all the powers have armed. France has lately augmented her army with 70,000 men, and talks of more. Spain has been armed some time. Sweden, Russia, Austria, and

Prussia the same. What all this will end in I believe none of our politicians know. I am, with the utmost truth and affection, my dear Sir, your faithful and obliged humble servant.

London, 10th August, 1776.

P.S.—This letter being returned back to me I have opened it just to add a short postscript relative to the conduct of the Directors on the question for rescinding their former resolution. They thought that, by separating Mr. Barwell from you, and putting a question on him first, they would, by gaining this question, be enabled to attack you to more advantage. The numbers were equal, and fortune decided by lot in favour of Mr. Barwell. Having lost this, they adjourned the ballot on you to a future day, and in the interim sent a case to all their counsel, whether you were liable to a prosecution on the charges brought against you. The opinions of counsel were all against a prosecution at common law. The Attorney-general's was manly and decided in your favour; "they had no grounds," he said, "for attacking you, unless they chose to file a Bill in Equity; but before they did that, he submitted to them whether that would be a proper return for the Governor-general's long and eminent services." The Solicitor-general's was the most unfavourable. The account of the General Court in the newspapers I send states this matter at large. When the Directors took their ballot, on rescinding the resolution relative to you, there was a majority of *two* in your favour. Rumbold, Stables, and Moffat distinguished themselves for you. Rumbold and Harrison tied off in this question, being obliged to go to Spa. Woodhouse was at Spa and Gregory in Ireland. Five Directors entered a protest, much in the language of the former protest, viz., Roberts, James, Wheler, Tatem, Wombwell, and Pigou afterwards.

Portsmouth, 10th November, 1776.

My dear Sir,—My despatch of the 25th June (which lost its passage from Marseilles, by the ships for Cairo sailing a week sooner than the day mentioned in Mr. Graham's letter to me from that place) will inform you how matters stood here at that time, and for two months after, without variation. The hostility of General Clavering's friends could rise no higher, and continued without remission. Parliament was announced to meet in October, principally for India affairs, and all its terrors held out against us. In the mean time, an appeal was made from the India House to the public at large, by a paper war conducted under the immediate orders of the Treasury. This business was managed by the person employed in it (a Mr. Kelly) with the most illiberal scurrility, but with very little ability; the reply fell to the share of Mr. Pechell and myself. Our antagonist was silenced, and as soon as that was effected we let the contest drop; but we had the last word. Mr. Macpherson (Fingal) was applied to on this occasion, but he positively refused to take any part against you; he offered to draw an impartial state of the case from the papers on both sides, but this did not suit the purpose of your opponents. The newspaper attack (which I transmit to you) being dropped, a pamphlet for the information of Parliament was prepared for the press under the same auspices; and we were busy in getting forward a counter pamphlet on the occasion, when overtures were made on the part of the administration, which at first brought on a cessation of hostilities, and ultimately a compromise on the ground of your resignation, in the manner we had before negociated for when it was rejected. Before I proceed to a detail of this business, let me assure you that the same unabating zeal, and the same tender regard for your honour

which actuated me in every part of your defence, stimulated me to profit of the only occasion which could offer to prevent a dangerous conflict in a place where we had no support that had the smallest chance of being effectual, and where the questions of justice and right were the very last that would be put. I do not mention this under the least apprehension that what we have done will not meet with your full approbation, but because it has occasioned me a torrent of abuse from men whose views in supporting you were very different from those of your real friends, and who would not only see me break your instructions with the utmost indifference, but be very regardless of the consequences to yourself, provided we could be made an instrument of their own views. At the head of these stands Mr. George Johnstone, with two or three of the Directors.

While I was busy in my little retreat in Essex, about eighteen miles from London, where I had gone to digest the materials for the pamphlet in your defence, I was surprised by an unexpected visit from Mr. Elliott, unexpected on account of the motive, an overture for a renewal of the rejected negociation. This happened in the beginning of August, a time that all your friends were in the country, and London in a manner deserted. The overture was made directly from Lord North through the channel of Mr. Eden, the under secretary of the Northern Department. This gentleman has since married Sir Gilbert Elliott's daughter, but the courtship had not then commenced. I knew he was the bosom friend of Mr. Wedderburne, and therefore I was suspicious that some deep plot lay under the proffered negociation. I thought it strange that it did not rather come to me through the medium of Mr. Robinson with whom I had before negociated, or to Mr. Pechell through Lord Clarendon. These

suspicions I imparted to Mr. Elliott. He replied, that if there was any foul play intended, it lay deeper than with Mr. Eden, for his father knew him to be a man of the strictest honour; that he himself had lived very much with him lately, and could not entertain an idea that he was capable of treachery. We agreed that it was necessary to be cautious; that I should return with him directly to town; and that he should inform Mr. Eden that he still found there was an opening for negociation, but that a few days would preclude all possibility of compromise, because we were preparing materials, and calling to town our friends for a decided attack on the gentlemen who had been sent out from England. That this was, in fact, the throwing away the scabbard, a measure that we were most unwillingly forced to, having ineffectually tried every conciliatory method in our power.

The more I considered the employing of Eden in this business the more I was at a loss. I knew that in case Mr. Robinson had died when he was ill, Lord North had determined to take Mr. Eden as his confidential secretary; but at the same time I saw Robinson so all-powerful in his department that I could not suspect he had lost any part of Lord North's confidence. A letter I received from Mr. Pechell, then at Weymouth, served to give me some light into this mystery. It contained a letter from Mr. Woodhouse the director, then at Spa, to Mr. Pechell, and the answer to it, which I was desired to forward after I had read it. This letter of Woodhouse's bore such strong marks of the treasury, that I was not a moment at a loss to guess who dictated it. It convinced me that Lord North had opened a battery against me through Woodhouse conducted by Robinson, at the same time that he opened another through Elliott conducted by Eden. I communicated my suspicions to Elliott, and he was of

the same opinion. But neither of us could guess whether any of the parties knew of this double negociation except Lord North himself, and on this head we continued till the very close of the negociation quite in the dark. Mr. Elliott saw Eden that very evening on our return to town; he communicated to him my answer, and at the same time told him frankly the suspicions we both entertained, that a trap was laid to lull us into security, and to spin out the time till the meeting of parliament that we might be attacked to greater advantage. The terms in which Eden replied to this suspicion evidently proved that he would spurn at so dishonourable a commission, and if there was anything unfair intended he at least was not a party in it. The arguments made use of both by Woodhouse and Eden were exactly the same, except in one point, which served to confound us, as in that they differed *toto cœlo*. They held out "the powers of government, and the absurdity of thinking we could overturn the administration. The danger of incurring the resentment of ministry (which never meant to hurt Mr. Hastings), by pushing matters to the last extremity. The obligation the minister was under to support his own system. The indisposition of the House of Commons to all East Indians, and the necessity there would be of treating the subject rigorously but summarily there in case we proved obstinate." The point in which they differed was an honour to be bestowed upon you from the Crown. Mr. Eden set out with saying that nothing of this sort could be done on account of the acrimony and violence with which the contention had been carried on; and Mr. Woodhouse in direct terms offered to negociate for an Irish peerage. On mature deliberation Elliott and I (Stuart was not arrived) agreed to return this answer to Eden: "that matters were much

changed since the first negociation; that many friends who had taken a part since that had no right to be consulted then; that although Mr. MacLeane had the ultimate power, yet he had always communicated confidentially with Mr. Hastings's particular friends, and therefore it was necessary they should be consulted on the occasion; that in respect of an honour from the Crown, the same reason which made it necessary to demand an honour before Mr. Hastings had undergone the discussion of a General Court rendered it necessary now to decline it; before this public discussion it was the only mark that could be given that no stigma remained on Mr. Hastings for his resignation; but now that his constituents had acquitted him in the most honourable manner, if an honour was granted, the censorious world would construe it into a bribe for relinquishing his station; that in case a negociation took place it ought to be conducted on the most liberal ground; administration should remember the declaration made by Mr. MacLeane to Lord North on his arrival, and repeatedly mentioned by him in the India Courts, which was that Mr. Hastings wished to be supported as a friend to Government in managing the great system of the East; but in case he could not hope for effectual support (for he would not be a cipher), then he wished to come home a friend to Government also, because though he was conscious his own system was better than that adopted, yet any system was better than a divided system. But above all things he was determined his question should never become a question of faction, and he had instructed Mr. MacLeane accordingly." When this answer was delivered by Elliott to Eden, he appointed him to meet him the day after. When they met, he mentioned that "it was lucky the honour from the Crown was not made a stipulation, because it could not at *that*

time be granted: he said it was also lucky no stipulation had been made on Sir E. Impey's account. As to the necessity of consulting friends, provided it was confined to two or three, there could be no objection, but administration would never consent to such a promiscuous communication of this matter as might endanger a discovery. He wished earnestly to know the extent of our demands, and how far they differed from what had been proposed before." Mr. Elliott, startled at the unexpected mention of Sir E. Impey's name, broke off the conference under pretence of consulting me, saying "he would return immediately." I was much alarmed at this because I had intelligence that the confidential cabinet had determined to supersede Sir Elijah; I was struck with Elliott's penetration, which has been conspicuous in all his conduct here, and we agreed instantly on the following answer, "that we had not presumed to mention Sir Elijah's name, because we had never conceived him to be a party in the subject of discussion; but as his name had been mentioned, it alarmed our fears lest he should suffer on Mr. Hastings's account, and therefore, till we had those fears removed, it would be highly dishonourable in us to proceed a step further in the business." These fears were removed, and it was agreed that I should go down to Mr. Palks in Devonshire, where Mr. Pechell, General Caillaud, and Mr. Vansittart were assembled. The outlines were settled, in which *nothing* was stipulated for Mr. Hastings, but *every thing* for his friends. These outlines became afterwards the agreement, and therefore need not be mentioned here. We also took Mr. Eden's word that no delay was intended; that the secret would be as confidentially kept on the part of administration as on ours, and that in case matters were not settled before the quarterly Court, by which time

the Directors had pledged themselves to restore Mr. Stewart, and to do Mr. Playdell justice, then everything was to be understood as broken off, and an entire end put to any amicable termination of the dispute. All this passed in the last weeks of August and the first week of September; the General Court was fixed for the 25th September.

I set out for Haldon-house, and returned to town on the fourth day. I found Mr. Pechell confined to his bed at Haldon-house ill of a dangerous fever which threatened his life, and in case of his recovery left us no hopes of his assistance for months to come. This was the loss of our right arm in General Courts. We could not replace him. I forgot to mention that just before I set out for Mr. Palks, Mr. Stewart arrived, and approved of all Elliott and I had done. Mr. Sulivan came up from Tunbridge, and approved also. There was no man else in town whom I dared to' consult except Mr. Woodman, who from the first knew, and approved of everything I did. He cautioned me not to mention the matter to Mr. Sykes till it should be nearly concluded, in terms which left me no room to hesitate. I followed his advice implicitly.

The gentlemen at Mr. Palks approved unanimously of all that had been done, and the outlines on which the agreement took place were corrected by Mr. Vansittart. I had some doubts whether the honour from the Crown might not be stipulated for at your return, but on considering Mr. Vansittart's arguments, and being fully convinced that it will take place, of course I gave them up. The light thrown on many things that gave me disquiet, by Mr. Vansittart at this time, gave me much ease of mind, but determined me, if possible, not to let the discussion of the subject come into parliament. I left Haldon-house with strict and unanimous injunctions to close the negociation on

even worse terms than those agreed to; the deviation was intrusted to myself and the few friends in town for the saving of time. Before I got back to town Lord North was set out on an excursion to Oxfordshire, Somersetshire, &c., and did not propose to return before the 15th September. Eden did not choose "to *write* on the subject; he, for the first time, expressed his fears of offending Robinson by meddling with a business of *his* department; he was afraid Lord North might think his connexion with Sir G. Elliott (for he had now got his consent to marry his daughter), might render him partial to the side of Mr. Hastings." I passed an uneasy time till the 16th, nor did Stewart and Elliott pass a pleasant one. Poor Stewart had everything at stake, and Elliott was miserable on Eden's account as well as his own. At the same time his father was hastening to the grave by long strides, an irreparable blow to our cause. At length Lord North returned, and Eden acted like a man of honour. He informed Elliott that "he had acquainted Lord North with all that had passed, putting into his hands a paper containing the heads of an agreement drawn up, from the paper I brought from Haldon-house, by Mr. Elliott in his own hand; but that Lord North had given him no answer from whence he could collect either approbation or disapprobation. He frankly confessed that he had reason to think Lord North, who expected daily to have news from America, wished to avoid giving any answer till he heard from that quarter." Mr. Elliott exclaimed against the unfairness of this proceeding, but Eden exculpated Lord North by declaring that he did not mean to take any advantage by the delay; and he added that he had put his Lordship in mind that we considered *no answer* as a denial. All this time the conferences with Eden were managed by Elliott, there was no third person; Eden

and I met more than once, but we conversed on indifferent matters. In this situation things remained till the last day on which the Court of Directors met before the quarterly Court (the 18th). Elliott called upon me early in the morning, and desired me to take my own course, for Lord North evaded giving any answer. There was no time for hesitation or further delay. I went directly to the India House, and desired to speak to the Chairman. Elliott stayed in one of the outer rooms. I taxed him abruptly with "breach of his word, and unfair dealing. Having pledged himself at the last General Court to restore Mr. Stewart, and to redress Mr. Playdell, we had, I said, depended upon his honour, and ceased hostilities; but that it was clear fair play was not meant us, otherwise he would not have omitted to call the Court of the 25th special." He replied, that "he would advise Mr. Stewart to let his affair *sleep* for some time, and that Mr. Hastings's friends would do well not to push matters to *extremities*." I answered, that "we were very ill used, and my visit to him was meant as an attention due to the Directors before we proceeded to what he was pleased to call extremities; but which he would find to be only a demand for a fair and impartial hearing. They had been pleased to consider the dispute hitherto *ex parte*, but by their duty they were bound to hear and determine upon both sides of the question; that hitherto we had contented ourselves with defensive measures; that these had brought a solemn decision in Mr. Hastings's favour. Still, however, his persecutors were not satisfied, and it became necessary for us now to attack them in turn, and force a decision on *their* measures also. That he, I hoped, would do us the justice to allow, for no man knew it better, that we had avoided this as long as we could with any degree of honesty, and if we went to sleep now we never deserved to awake."

He was much agitated. I recalled to his mind our former friendship, and asked him "whether he would call the Court special, or oblige me to call it by requisition of nine Proprietors." He desired me to return in two hours; it was then one o'clock. Elliott and I returned to the other end of the town. By half-past one Mr. Eden was sent for to Lord North, who told him in words of surprise that Mr. Hastings's friends had called the General Court *special;* were we not, said his Lordship, in negociation? "Yes," replied Eden; "but I always told your Lordship that *no answer* after the 16th would be considered as a denial, and consequently a termination of the negociation." This, and many other confidential parts of this letter, I had, with strict injunctions of secrecy, from Mr. Elliott. At three o'clock I returned to the India House, and was told by the Chairman that he had communicated my request to the Court of Directors, who had returned for answer, that, having no special business to transact at the next quarterly Court, they had determined not to call it special, but by requisition of nine Proprietors. I bowed, and retired without reply. It was the answer I wished to receive, for we were totally unprepared to manage a General Court; they, however, thought the letter of requisition was ready, and I encouraged that idea in the secretary's room where I went to find Elliott. We retired with heavy hearts, sensible of the little chance we had to carry any question of violence against the majority in the Court of Directors, whatever chance we might have in a Court of Proprietors. How to bring our friends together from the distant parts of the country was the dilemma, and how to keep the discordant branches of our support together when they were met in a direct attack on administration was the danger. But we were relieved from this anxiety in some measure next morning. Whether

administration thought we were well prepared for the conflict by the warmth with which we attacked Roberts, or whether Lord North had no other cause than his natural indolence and love of procrastination for not returning an answer, it was thought right to renew the overtures for a compromise. Mr. Macpherson was sent to me on the part of Mr. Robinson to desire an interview. The message he brought me was curious, and disclosed that he knew of what had past between Eden and Elliott but very imperfectly; I afterwards discovered that he was not informed of it regularly till he had got scent of it some other way. A meeting was fixed for the next day, and as he allowed a third person to be present, I had well founded hopes that it was now intended to treat and conclude in earnest. Mr. Macpherson and I went to Mr. Robinson's country-house at Sion Hill on the 21st September. He began by repeating the substance of what Mr. Macpherson had related to me the day before. I put into his hand the articles determined upon at Haldon-house, which I found he had never seen before; and whether he was piqued at the attempt to negociate through any other channel than himself, or was instructed to close with us I know not, but he behaved with unusual openness, and great candour, agreeing with very little opposition to our terms, provided Lord North and *a certain person* ratified his agreement.

The terms consisted of five propositions, viz.:—

1. That such servants of the Company as had been displaced for attachment to Mr. Hastings be restored; but, as it is not intended to lay any difficulty on administration, the specific offices will not be insisted on, only *adequate* offices.

(John Stewart, Playdell, Nat. Middleton, and Fred. Stuart, were named under this head.)

2. That some mark of favour from Government be

conferred on such black servants as have been dismissed for the same cause, that they may not appear disgraced in the eyes of the natives.

(Rajah-bullub, Cumaul o'Din, Deleel Roy, and Gunga Govind-Sing, were specified by name.)

3. That Mr. Hastings's friends shall on all occasions receive promotion and favour adequate to their rank in the service and merit, and this to be a point of honour binding on the majority.

4. That all *retrospect and prosecution* prior to the late Act of Parliament appointing the Supreme Council cease and determine; and in case any informer infringe this article, administration shall give their aid to quash and defeat it.

5. That Mr. Hastings shall be well received on his return, vote of thanks promoted if moved for, and *nobody to be displaced.*

Mr. Robinson observed " the necessity of keeping these articles secret, lest opposition should get hold of them, and attack Lord North in Parliament for collusion, and for stipulations which he could not come to legally. For this reason he said it would be necessary to put ostensible answers opposite each head, and then the paper might be sealed up under both our seals. What he meant should make no difference in the essence, for he pledged himself that the entire secret aid and influence of Government should be honourably exerted to fulfil the letter and spirit of the ageement." I agreed to this, there being a witness present, without hesitation. The paper I will transmit to you if it takes place, but as I have heard nothing of it since, and as the Parliament has been met some time without the mention of India affairs, and with a stronger majority to support Lord North than he has had since he was a minister, I imagine they do not think this comment necessary. The proposed alteration on the

margin was that where I said, "Government shall support," they said, "if the Directors do this, Government will not oppose," and other similar alterations, or rather terms of assent.

Matters being thus settled, secrecy was enjoined in the strongest terms. I stipulated for leave to inform Mr. Sykes and Mr. Sumner, that the gentlemen from India might know the care that had been taken to free them and their friends from vexation. The secret has been wonderfully kept, and opposition are in despair that they can find no plausible ground or handle for attacking what has been done. But to return: when matters were settled as above with Mr. Robinson, he said he would send for the chairman and deputy and prepare them for a meeting. I saw him again on the 25th, the day of the quarterly Court, when we took measures that nothing should pass at that Court, and that an adjournment *sine die* should be carried. The Court met and broke up without any business being proposed, except a factious proposition relative to accounts by Mr. Fitzgerald, which bore no relation to Bengal matters, and in which he met with no support. The adjournment *sine die* was carried. Not forty members attended this Court, another proof that our measures were well timed; for what with the thinness of the town on one hand, and the indignation of the ministry which had been liberally poured forth upon all those who had supported you on the first question, and whom they thought they could terrify, had we been obliged to proceed hostilely at this Court, we should, I fear, have made but an indifferent figure. Mr. Stewart attended this Court to declare his being perfectly satisfied to let his question rest upon the honour of the Directors, in case they had been attacked for having omitted to call the Court special, but nobody taking up that ground, nor indeed any other, there

was nothing said upon your or his subject. I do not claim any merit for the success which attended your defence farther than zeal and diligence. Many of your friends equalled me in these, and exceeded me in abilities; none could in affection. But without being on the spot, there is no conceiving of what heterogeneous and unstable materials our majority was made up, how difficult it was to collect, and how much more difficult to keep them together. Stewart and Elliott, who were in the interior of every thing, and who acted with a zeal and disinterestedness that I cannot do justice to, are good judges of this matter. Stewart, whose business was done to his hand before his arrival, in a manner that could not be evaded, would not let it be mentioned or brought forward till the final settlement of your affairs, lest it should embarrass or impede. Elliott would not allow his name to be mentioned, When the General Court broke up, I saw Mr. Roberts; he told me that every thing had been communicated to him and the deputy, and that they, Mr. Macpherson, and myself were to meet on the Tuesday following at Mr. Robinson's house in the country to take our measures. "For my own part," says he, "I am exceedingly happy at what has passed, and Mr. Hastings may depend on every exertion in my power, and on every occasion, that can prove the sincerity of my wish to serve him; I have the utmost respect for his abilities, esteem for his character, and opinion of his services. But my situation was critical and embarrassing." The deputy also made the warmest professions; and hitherto both have acted up to them. In the interval between Wednesday the 25th September and Tuesday the 8th October, I wrote such an account of what had been done as I could trust to the post, to Messrs. Pechell, Palk, Vansittart, Caillaud, Dupré, Sumner, Lord Clarendon; and I

endeavoured to procure an interview from Messrs. Sykes and Becher; not finding them, I left letters. But Mr. Sykes was much hurried with business at the time, and Mr. Becher did not come to town. I wrote also to Mr. Stables and Mr. Wier. Rumbold was in France, from whence he did not return till the 14th of October. Mr. Woodhouse's bad state of health had carried him into Herefordshire after his return from Spa; I wrote to him, although I knew he heartily approved of everything that was going on, for Mr. Robinson acknowledged to me that the correspondence between him and Mr. Pechell had been entered into by his (Robinson's) desire, as indeed I had before suspected.

When the chairmen met Mr. Macpherson and me at Mr. Robinson's on the 1st October, Mr. Robinson stated what had been agreed upon (as above related) in the fairest manner, and they promised their most cordial support. It was then agreed that I should deliver in a letter signifying Mr. Hastings's wish to resign, to the Court of Directors on Wednesday the 9th October. Having said that, "I found it somewhat difficult to word this letter, because on the one hand I found it necessary to give the true reason for Mr Hastings's declining to continue longer as Governor-general, and on the other as a compromise was to take place, I should be sorry to say anything that would tend to sour the majority, or indispose them to that cordiality for Mr. Hastings's friends which made so considerable a part of the agreement,"—Mr. Robinson answered that he saw the difficulty, but imagined he could word the letter without displeasing either side. Accordingly he wrote a draught which, with a slight alteration or two by Mr. Roberts and myself, was approved; it ran in the following words:—

"Gentlemen,—Mr. Hastings, seeing the necessity

of unanimity in the Supreme Council of Bengal for conducting the affairs of the Company there, and for establishing any permanent system of Government for the good and prosperity of that country; and finding, from the unhappy divisions which have subsisted in the Supreme Council, that such union is not likely to subsist; and having anxiously on every occasion studied to promote the welfare of the Company, a conduct which he will ever continue, has from these motives authorized, empowered, and directed me to signify to you his desire to resign his office of Governor-general of Bengal, and to request your nomination of a successor to the vacancy which will be thereby occasioned in the Supreme Council.—I have the honour, &c."

About this time I was seized with an attack upon my lungs and sore throat, to which I am liable in this climate; it confined me to my chamber for some days, and incapacitated me from making those visits which I should have done if I had been well and at liberty to communicate, prior to my delivering in the letter. The omission of these visits has given much offence, and has indisposed many of your pretended friends against me, and one or two of your real friends. The latter I have taken great pains to set right, I hope I shall succeed. The former I do not spend a thought on. About this time Mr. Vansittart came to town; I carried the draught of the letter to him, and I wrote to Mr. Sykes, that Mr. Vansittart and I would wait upon him in the morning, as they both lived in the same quarter of the town. Elliott accompanied me, Mr. Vansittart approved highly of every thing, and we set out for Mr. Sykes's, but met his servant at the door (of Mr. Vansittart) with a letter purporting that he was obliged to set out for Basilden, but that he was perfectly at ease, as the affair could not be in

better hands. This day, the 8th October, the news of the taking of Long Island and the defeat of the Americans arrived; next morning the letter was given in. How an affair of this consequence, and in so many hands, could have been kept secret for more than six weeks is extrardinary, only two Directors, exclusive of the chairs, knew it (Harrison, to whom I asked liberty to mention it, as I had transacted so much of your business with him the preceding year; and Wheler, to whom the chairs communicated it two days only before it took place); out of doors it was suspected by nobody. My letter to Mr. Becher lay, without my knowledge, at his house unopened. The 11th was appointed to take the letter into consideration; on which day I was desired to attend. I did so, when the chairman acquainted me the Court wished to ask me some questions relative to my instructions, and the nature of my powers. I answered that, "I hoped the Court knew me too well to suspect me capable of taking a step of the nature I had done without authority for it. That however, if the Court would be satisfied with my explaining my authority to three of their body, I was ready to do it, but I did not hold myself at liberty to make a public official communication of the papers I had to show, as they contained, among other things, some confidential matters." The Court unanimously agreed to this proposition. Mr. Becher was appointed to attend the two chairs. I showed them in confidence the two papers in your own hand; and told them the reasons why I had so long broken your instructions, and why I thought myself bound to obey them now. I was asked if I thought you had not resigned before this time. I answered, that all your friends had written so pressingly to you not to do it while it was endeavoured to pass a censure upon you, that I hoped you had not. Mr. Becher replied, "Since the spirit of

resigning is so strong in him, I am sure we have given him reason enough to put it in execution by our letters of last season. But," said he, "have you no instrument, saying, I, Warren Hastings, authorize you, &c." I answered, "No; I believe neither Mr. Hastings nor any of those who were present thought it a matter of so much formality; if certain things were not obtained, I was ordered to signify Mr. Hastings's wish to be relieved; if they were obtained, I was ordered not to make this signification. But these orders were so strict and positive, that I entreated and with difficulty obtained some latitude as to the time and mode of notifying this intention. I have now notified to you Mr. Hastings's wish to have a successor appointed, and no blame can lie with me now but that of having ventured so long to delay it." Mr. Becher asked who was present; I replied, "Mr. Graham and Mr. Vansittart heard me receive my instructions; they were communicated to Mr. Stewart next morning." I was desired to withdraw. In a few minutes I was called in, and told the Court of Directors wished to see Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Stewart on the Wednesday following, when I was requested to attend again. I forgot to mention, that before I gave in the letter to the Court of Directors, I wrote to Mr. William Elliott and to Mr. Lushington, informing them of my intention, and that I would wait upon them to explain my reasons. The former wrote me an uncivil answer; the latter sent no answer at all. Every man thought he had a right to communications which were due but to very few; and I was taxed with leaving men in the lurch whom no consideration or persuasion could draw into the front of the battle. When Mr. Becher went home, he found my long-written letter, and returned a very polite answer. On Wednesday, 16th October, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Stewart, and I again attended

the Court of Directors. The chairs and Mr. Becher, as at first, carried us into one of the committee-rooms, and after ascertaining what I had before related, we withdrew till they drew up a paper containing the substance of what each had said. This paper was read to us, and we took our leave. The same day a letter to the Secretary of State, signifying that Mr. Hastings, for the reasons contained in it, had intimated a desire to resign, and praying that his Majesty would be pleased to appoint Mr. Wheler to fill up the vacancy that would be occasioned in Council when Mr. Hastings resigned the chair, &c. This letter was signed by all the Directors present, twenty-two. I had learned with surprise, that among the number of those who arraigned my conduct on this occasion, Mr. Sykes was one, and that his friend Mr. George Rous was remarkably acrimonious. I desired Mr. Vansittart, who, as well as I, had excused himself from dining with the Directors, to go with me to Mr. Sykes. I told him the cause of our visit, and, recapitulating every thing that had passed, begged of him to point out the part of the negociation, or of my conduct, that he condemned. He replied that "I was misinformed; that he highly approved of every thing that had been done, and thought it was not possible to do better." Mr. Becher, he said, was hurt for want of communication. I answered that I was not in fault, and Mr. Becher was now convinced of it.. As these gentlemen were real friends, it gave me great pain to incur their displeasure. Others there are, who, when it was told me they taxed me with treachery, and doing what I had no authority for, gave me no pain; I knew their motives, and only answered, "Then Mr. Hastings will disavow me, his resignation is in his own hands."

You will observe that, in the articles of compromise, I did not let the least thing enter foreign to the dispute

in Bengal. This at first gave offence to many friends; they have since seen the utility of it. "Why," said one, "did you not take the opportunity of getting Mr. Sulivan one of the chairs?" "Why," said another, "did you not turn the opportunity to advantage for the Nabob?" "Why," said a third, "did you not stipulate something for yourself." One answer served all these questions; "Because it would have been dishonest, and a breach of trust to Mr. Hastings."

I can now see the ground on which you stand in this country clearer than during the contest. The public have the highest sense of your services and respect for your character. This was evident from the first; but it was not so evident that you stood on very near the same ground in the closet and cabinet also. The lengths to which Clavering has gone were neither expected nor approved; but he had obtained such promises of support, and from such quarters before he left England, that they held themselves bound to carry him through, though his measures were displeasing to them. His whole conduct in the Mahratta affairs has given great discontent. The particular friends of General Clavering, who are all leaders in the House of Commons, are prejudiced against you and stand in a different predicament. The General's misrepresentations both of your character and actions to these men have been so gross and acrimonious, that there is no length to which they were not ready to go; and even now they disapprove loudly of the compromise, and say the General will come home. Mr. Robinson foresaw this while we were negociating, for when I mentioned to him the difficulty which I should have to content such friends as were not in the communication of what was doing, he replied, "Don't imagine that it is smooth water with us either, for we have two parties to manage on our side; the particular friends

of General Clavering, who will not be satisfied with any compromise, and the country gentlemen, who insist upon this as the properest time to decide the question of territorial right."

Thus, my dear Sir, have I given you a plain, and I fear, tedious account of the most difficult and delicate transaction of my life. If what I have done meets with your approbation, I shall be happy; if not, even the approbation of my own breast (which tells me I have not let my nearest or dearest connexions or concerns warp me a moment in my endeavours to serve you) will not give me comfort; I shall be miserable; but always with the utmost truth, respect, and affection, my dear Sir, your faithful and obliged humble servant,

S. MacLeane.

I subjoin to this an extract from a letter written by Mr. John Stewart, the gentleman of whom I have already spoken as having suffered for his personal attachment to Mr. Hastings; it is at least curious as conveying a picture of the times, and bringing us into more intimate familiarity with some of the great actors then in vogue.

London, 31st October, 1776.

Dear Sir,—The packet by the Talbot is just arrived, and brings us tidings of you up to the end of March, but no letters for me except from Donaldson. I am, however, not without hopes of finding some trusted with private hands when the ship comes round. This is the first opportunity I have had since my arrival of addressing you. MacLeane, who writes at the same time, will give you the exact relation of what has passed in your affairs, and of the conclusion of them. I arrived late in the day when the insidious attempt

against you in the India House had been so triumphantly baffled, and when government were talking openly very high of their intended hostilities against you, and privately negociating a compromise with you. I judged that, in such circumstances, it was left for me to lie by. The whole was in the hands of MacLeane, who, I must own, has in the management shown an activity, address, boldness, perseverance, and knowledge of mankind, beyond even what I, partial as I am to him, could have conceived him to possess. It is undoubtedly he who first gave a turn to the cry that was getting up against us in public; it was he who, in spite of the direction, in spite of the ministry, and in spite of all the friends of our adversaries, brought up all our forces, composed of many different *nations and tongues*, to act like one man for us, and gain the signal victory of the of May; and finally he who has made, in my opinion, so honourable a retreat for you.

I have only seen Lord North once, but have had several conversations with Mr. Robinson. You may believe me that the first interpretation I put on his L——p's letter to you, which made poor Graham so angry, was the true one. The professions of courtiers are always to be mistrusted. In your case be persuaded they were all false, from the highest (higher than I choose to put in words) to the lowest, and that there never existed among them kindness, goodwill, or esteem for you, capable to counterbalance the smallest dirty consideration of policy which might come across you. The —— would have pocketed your white St——, and turned you out. N. would have praised your abilities, and moved the House to prosecute you upon the evidence of Nundcomar, and Lord M. would have cried up your code of laws, and mustered all his forces (as he actually did) to go down to the India House to vote against you. In short, it

was certainly adopted as a measure of Cabinet, as they style it, to support their own three councillors, and it would have been carried in Parliament as easily as a vote of credit or a turnpike bill. In that situation an easy and honourable retreat was all that could be thought of for you; and we knew it was perfectly consonant to your wishes to retire if you could not be put in the possession of that consequence in administration which your station required. I declared to the Directors, when called on by MacLeane, that you had always held that language; that you had written in these terms to ministry, to Directors, and to all your private friends; and lastly, that you had instructed Mr. M. to act conformably. That at the same time, although you were determined not to remain a cipher in the administration, or subscribe to measures of which you disapproved, you never meant to embarrass the Company's affairs, or oppose the views of Government; that you was a real friend to both, and could not show it better than by withdrawing from a situation where you had it no longer in your power to serve either.

After having given you so freely my opinion of the sincerity of ministers, and the reliance to be put in them, I must observe, that at the bottom they had no personal dislike to you, rather, indeed, an esteem for your public character, which hampered them not a little, but that now they really must have a feeling of kindness for you. You have freed them from a confounded puzzle, you have saved them the disagreeable task of a parliamentary discussion, and you leave them quietly to blunder on in the affairs of Bengal during the remainder of the term fixed by the Act; therefore when you come home you will be caressed by them, and it will be your business to meet them half way. No doubt of it you might have been taken up as a good cudgel to buffet administration with. My friend

G. J. would have brandished you about in the House, and given perhaps Lord North a broken head or two, but you would not have felt less sore, and then who was to find you a plaster? Mac will no doubt tell you who were your friends among the great in all these affairs.

Had matters gone on in the channel which appeared to have been thus marked out for them, Mr. Hastings, honoured by some mark of royal favour, would have doubtless retired from public life, and India might or might not have been at this moment "the brightest jewel in the British crown." But it can scarcely surprise us to find that men who were capable of entering into this species of compromise were likewise capable of violating their own engagements. The obvious end which Colonel MacLeane sought to attain was, that Mr. Hastings might resign his trust with an untarnished reputation, which was to be accomplished only by a careful abstinence on the part of the minister from any outward show of favour to his rivals. The simple fact, indeed, of leaving General Clavering at the head of the Bengal government would have been sufficient to prove that against him no charge of culpability lay; and there would have been other opportunities, supposing him to have retained office for ever so short a period, of distinguishing him by more direct proofs of royal favour. But the Cabinet saw

things differently; and in the very next Gazette, after Mr. Wheler had received his nomination to the Council, General Clavering's name appeared in the Gazette as nominated to the honour of the Bath. Colonel MacLeane and Mr. Stewart, whose credit Mr. Hastings is accused of having sacrificed to his own ambition, instantly wrote to their friend and patron in the following terms:—

Portsmouth, 13th November, 1776.

Dear Sir,—We have been here several days attending the despatch of the Rippon. Our separate letters, and your other advices, by this opportunity, will leave you nothing to desire on the head of information of what passed in your affairs previous to our leaving town; but a circumstance has occurred since our arrival here, which has given us matter of serious reflection, and determined us to give you our joint opinion in this manner upon it; that being possessed of the ideas of two of your friends here nearest the head of affairs, and of whose zeal and fidelity we are persuaded you entertain no doubt, you may be enabled more easily to come to a decision in your own mind as to how you are to act.

The circumstance we allude to is the appointment of General Clavering to the Order of the Bath, announced in the Gazette of Saturday last. We cannot but regard this as a breach of, or at least a gross deviation from, the spirit of the compromise lately concluded, and we deem you at full liberty, on that ground, to delay your resignation till you have authentic accounts from England of some equivalent honour being bestowed on you, capable of counterbalancing its pernicious effects in the eyes of all the world and the hearts of your friends. The line we would presume to

suggest for you is to receive Mr. Wheler with great politeness and civility, and even with the other gentlemen, to mark the strongest disposition to fulfil on your part what your agent had engaged for you, but to declare that, when you consented to give up your office for the sake of peace, you never meant to give up your honour, and that you were determined now to hold the one till the other was perfectly secured, since, in your judgment, this was a fresh attack upon it. By this conduct you will be master of your place (if you choose to retain it, and the ministry remain obstinate on the point of the equivalent) for at least three years, or indeed till the end of the charter, for it is next to impossible that the ministry can take up this matter in Parliament on the old grounds, after having committed themselves so far as they have done in the late compromise.

The part that will be now taken by your friends on our return to London will be to represent their feelings on this occasion in the strongest terms, to treat it as a breach of engagement, and to demand for you either an Irish peerage or a title of baronet as an equivalent. This will be managed as usual by your acting agent, L. M., and you will be regularly advised of the success. In the mean time, we remain convinced that this (General Clavering's ribbon) is not a measure of those ministers who were parties to the compromise, but a compliance from another quarter, with the earnest solicitations of Clavering's friends, who are discontented and clamorous on the subject of the resignation. Every syllable of this is the joint opinion of, dear Sir, your affectionate humble servants,

S. MACLEANE,
J. STEWART.

Portsmouth, 13th November, 1776.

My dear Sir,—Although the letter you receive in Stewart's hand contains our joint sentiments relative to General Clavering's ribbon, yet I cannot be contented without once more stating our sense of this matter in concise terms with precision. I therefore entreat "that you deliver no opinion upon what has been done here till you hear from me again; for I look upon the honour conferred on General Clavering as so direct a breach of the spirit of the compromise, that unless an adequate honour is conferred on you, *you ought not to resign.* And it is further my opinion, that your taking this step will be so far from reflecting dishonour either on you or me, that it is the only measure which can save us both from appearing in the light of dupes." I am, my dear Sir, with unalterable affection, your most devoted and faithful humble servant, S. MacLeane.

I approve most heartily, and think it necessary for your complete satisfaction, as his reputation is as much connected with every part of this business as your own.
J. S.

The conduct of Lord North throughout the whole of these transactions was quite unworthy of a great man. He seems, while earnestly desiring the accomplishment of a project, to have lacked nerve enough to dare the issue; and hence intriguing and stopping short, raising his arm yet forbearing to strike, he placed himself in a point of view of all others the least creditable to a minister of the Crown. The same spirit of wavering appears, moreover, to have continued with him to the end. Mr. Hastings's return became to him

a subject of at least as much apprehension as of desire; indeed, the last act of his secretary and representative, Mr. Robinson, previous to the departure of Mr. Wheler for Bengal, would seem to imply that he neither expected nor even wished it. I must again refer to my authority, Colonel MacLeane, whose candid statement of facts will serve as the best explanation of points which remain yet to be stated.

London, 12th May, 1777.

My dear Sir,—I hope you will attribute my not writing to you by the latter ships of the season to no other causes than the inexplicable uncertainty in which everything was involved here at the time of their departure, the weight of urgent business under which I was near sinking, and the certainty of conveying you full and material intelligence, by more eyewitnesses than one, of everything necessary for you to know, by a speedier conveyance over land than letters would have found by the later ships.

Elliott, the *faithful Elliott*, who is the bearer of this, renders a long despatch now unnecessary, because he has either seen everything or learned everything from me. He, and he alone, had my full confidence, because he alone deserved it. Be not, I entreat you, startled at this declaration, as if I meant to insinuate that you have not very many steady, faithful, and valuable friends; for I never knew any one man that had so many. But permit me to say that Elliott is the friend whom I have found actuated by the most disinterested motives; never endeavouring to clog your wheels by the additional weight of any personal impediments. This was not always the case with others; and it has been impossible for me to content all those who

wanted to have made their own affairs a common cause with yours, most of whom I thought had no right to it. Those who blame me on opposition principles, would blame an angel under similar circumstances. But the approbation of the first part of my conduct contained in your despatch by the Syren, the conviction in my own breast that the latter part of my conduct has been the best that could have been pursued for your true interest, and the firm reliance I have on your approbation of the whole, render me perfectly content under the unmerited abuse that I meet with from the last, or the negative commendation that I receive from the first of these classes.

I could wish to write you a long letter under three heads: the affairs of Bengal, the affairs of Madras, and the affairs of India at large. But the pressing business of the hour, the state of my health, worn down by unremitting fatigue, and the shortness of the time, will not permit it. I expect Elliott here to-night; I will discuss these subjects with him at large, and to his faithful bosom I must commit them. You will not, I hope, find them unworthy of your attention, being drawn from a close and attentive observation of that part of administration in whose management the India department lies, and with which I have had of late more than ordinary connection, if not some share of their confidence. During this intercourse I have had two points continually in view: to learn the ideas of administration relative to India, and to instil the most favourable opinion of your plan and of your abilities for the government of India. Whether General Clavering's recovery deprives you of the government of Bengal, or whether the reins continue in your hands by his death or leaving the country, I venture to prophesy that something like your plan will take place before the expiration of two years, and I trust that you

will be called forth to execute it. Your letter to Lord North, left to my option as to the delivery, I have not yet given to his Lordship, for reasons drawn from what is contained above. It is very probable, as the Nabob of Arcot's concurrence will form a principal part in support of whatever system shall be adopted, that I shall be sent over without loss of time to negociate with him on the spot, and to return immediately. I have had more than one conversation with Mr. Robinson on the system at large, after many conversations on the benefits, in detail, which might be expected from India; and the result of them is, that if he remains in his present confidence with Lord North (of his losing which I see not the least probability), it is my firm opinion he will next year endeavour to carry it into execution, as a matter which must do the administration of Lord North the utmost honour, while it will personally recommend himself to the King's favour. I must not omit to tell you that in these conferences I have never introduced your name in direct terms, but I have described the system itself so pointedly as yours, and have dwelt so strongly on the necessity of a tried and experienced man to derive all the benefit from the East which it is capable of affording, that I am certain I have been perfectly understood. To Elliott alone have I ever opened myself on this subject. Had I gone farther with Mr. Robinson, he might have attributed my motives to self-interest or intrigue.

Since the receipt of the Syren's despatches I have more than once endeavoured to learn Lord North's opinion of what he wishes you to do in consequence of General Monson's death, but I have not yet got any clear lights to form an opinion upon; though I am at no loss to guess that, however he may wish, he dreads the consequences of your return from India in the

present critical state of affairs. An incident will enable you to judge on this head, in case Mr. Robinson does not speak out to Elliott to-morrow, or to yourself in a letter he writes to you by him. The incident I allude to is this: When the Syren arrived, Wheler was at Portsmouth ready to sail; he posted back to London, obtained a fresh appointment to succeed to General Monson's vacancy, and directly returned to Portsmouth. Mr. Robinson inquired whether Mr. Wheler had surrendered his first appointment for succeeding to you on your resignation; he found that Wheler had not made this surrender. He immediately sent an express to Portsmouth, that Wheler might send his surrender in form; but he had sailed. Mr. Robinson then got it clearly settled and ascertained in the Secretary of State's Office, that Mr. Wheler had vacated his *first* appointment by the acceptance of the *second*. Thus you now stand without a successor, for Sir Eyre Coote has *not accepted*; and, till a successor arrives, how can you resign? This is my opinion, upon the most mature consideration; and, unless Lord North speaks out, I must, from what has passed, think it to be his, as well as Mr. Robinson's, opinion also. This much I know for a certainty, that they are in no hurry to clear away Sir Eyre Coote's doubts and difficulties. Seeing things in this situation, I brought about a measure, unknown to any one, that will prevent Lord North's being under any embarrassment by Sir Eyre Coote's refusal to accept his appointment in the present state of things, or in the event of General Clavering's death or resignation; for I have prevailed on General Monckton to write to Lord North, that, in case Sir Eyre Coote declines going to India because he is not to be appointed second in council, he, General Monckton, will accept of the command of the army in India, to prevent any impediment in His



Majesty's affairs, *without being in council.* In case Lord North speaks out, what I have written on this head can be of no use; but I think it is very probable his situation with General Clavering's friends will prevent his doing this; for I am certain *his* wishes and *their* desires are very different. It became the more necessary for me to be thus explicit on this head, because it is one of the few subjects on which Elliott and I have any difference of opinion. He thinks you are more bound by the resignation than I do, or (from what has been said) than either Lord North or Mr. Robinson thinks you. Your own feelings must be the arbiter on this occasion. At the same time I must tell you how far I have taken upon me to pledge you; and as nothing has come of my offer, it is another proof that all I have said on this head is sound doctrine. At Lord North's last levee, he asked me what change I thought General Monson's death would make in your conduct, or way of thinking? My answer was, "My Lord, Mr. Hastings is a man of the strictest honour, and one of the warmest friends of the King's government; if your Lordship will honour me with the confidential communication of your wishes on this occasion, I will pledge myself to you that, barring unforeseen accidents, your desire shall be conveyed to Mr. Hastings in three months, and that he will cheerfully comply with it. Mr. Hastings has no wish but to facilitate the measures of government, and to prove himself the most faithful servant of the Crown." His Lordship expressed the utmost satisfaction; treats me with uncommon civility on all occasions; but has never since renewed the subject or explained himself, though a fortnight has elapsed.

Nothing ever gave me more satisfaction than the support you have afforded the Nabob of Arcot in his distress; for, as I was obliged to give your affairs a

preference to his on my arrival, it has proved to him how much you deserved that preference. Without your aid he must have sunk under the malevolence and injustice of his enemies. I am at the same time happy beyond expression that the protection you have afforded the Nabob has recommended you in the strongest manner to the King and ministry, particularly Lord North; for the Crown is so pledged for the support of the Nabob, and the administration are so enraged at the proceedings of Lord Pigot, which are all attributed to opposition principles, as being personally offensive to His Majesty, as well as to his ministers, that any defeat relative to the affairs of the Carnatic, either in India or here, would have been felt by the government as the severest mortification. Though our victory of last Friday is very complete, my opinion is that it must ultimately come into Parliament. All the heads of opposition united in fighting Lord Pigot's battle; they are very sore under their defeat, for they had collected their friends from every quarter of the kingdom, and made sure of a victory. It gave me much uneasiness that I could not persuade many of your friends to give their assistance, or to think you were anywise concerned in the issue. I cannot account for this. The public papers and the publications on both sides will show you to what a pitch of animosity matters were carried, and how personal to me the conduct of the directors became ultimately. But this is a subject not worthy to trouble you with, when I have been obliged to omit matters of real consequence. Elliott, however, can divert you at a leisure hour with the oddity of my situation, *proscribed* and *caressed* at the same time by the same men. Refused *everything*, and held at the same time not unworthy of *anything*. The India House is become a riddle not worth the trouble of solving. The Company, says the Public Advertiser, is "a cor-

poration of madmen, entrusting the management of their affairs to fools."

I entreat you to pardon the omissions and shortness of this letter. I have got thus far with much pain, for I write under the accumulated torture of rheumatism in all my joints, and a severe sore throat, with pains in my breast, which have worn me to a shadow by the fever attending them.

I need not say that this letter is for your own eye only; whether time shall verify the predicting parts of its contents or not, I shall always wish them to remain secret.

I am, with the utmost truth and unalterable attachment, my dear Sir, your faithful, obliged, and most affectionate humble servant,

S. MacLeane.

CHAPTER IV.

Mr. Hastings's efforts paralysed—Troubles at Madras—Death of Colonel Monson—Mr. Hastings recovers his influence—His temperate proceedings and gigantic plans—Arrival of Court's Letter, and attempt of General Clavering to usurp the Government.

WHILE the management of these transactions engrossed the time and attention of the friends of Mr. Hastings at home, Mr. Hastings himself continued at his post, powerless, indeed, in almost every instance when actual good was to be promoted, yet infinitely useful in this, that he operated as a check upon evil. For in all the most common details of business his colleagues were absolutely dependent on him. Thus it was his personal influence with the judges of the Supreme Court which alone hindered them from coming to an open rupture with the Council; while his wisdom and moderation were never more conspicuously displayed than in the part which he persuaded the Supreme Government to take in the disputes which at this time prevailed at Madras. With these, as well in their progress as in their results, I have in this place no particular concern. They originated, as every reader of history must know, in the determination of Lord Pigot to pursue a line of policy in reference to the Rajah of

Tanjore, of which a majority in his Council disapproved; and they ended in the imprisonment of the Governor at the instance of that majority, and his subsequent removal, still under arrest, to England. Now though this was a strong measure, which no plea, except that of necessity, could justify, Mr. Hastings did not feel that, as the head of the Government in a sister presidency, he was called upon to denounce or resist it. The Legislature had given to a majority in the Council of Madras privileges similar to those which the majority claimed and exercised at Bengal; and it was not for any power inferior to that of the Legislature to determine the limits beyond which they should not be permitted to pass. Mr. Hastings accordingly acquiesced himself, and persuaded his colleagues to acquiesce, in the new arrangements, and recognising the government of the majority as legitimate, averted at least the hazard of a civil war from British India.

I have stated elsewhere that when the results of the five years' settlement came to be determined the device proved to have been in some degree a failure; that is to say, the amount of revenue actually realized fell short by a considerable balance of the estimates that were formed at the outset. None of his colleagues could be more forward to acknowledge this failure than Mr. Hastings himself, though the grounds on which they respectively

accounted for it were distinct; yet, after all, in the pecuniary affairs of the colony a great improvement was perceptible. Thus in 1776, thanks to the arrangements which on his first accession to office Mr. Hastings had introduced, not only was the bonded debt paid off, but there was a surplus of cash in the treasury amounting to a crore and a half of rupees, out of which an investment was provided for all the tonnage that could be procured. Again, the provinces of Bengal, in spite of the dissensions that prevailed at head quarters, and the laxity which these occasioned in all the subordinate departments, enjoyed upon the whole the blessings of abundance and prosperity as well as of peace. The government, indeed, literally conducted itself, inasmuch as time was not afforded for the effects of those changes to be felt, which the majority, in an evil hour, had introduced into its organization. But Mr. Hastings knew that this was a state of things which could not last. The five years' settlement was drawing rapidly to a close. It would terminate in the year 1777, yet no steps were taken to meet the emergency. What could Mr. Hastings do? He explained the danger of permitting such an important matter to be forgotten; he offered more than one suggestion as to the measures which it would be prudent to adopt, but he might as well have been silent. All his propositions were opposed; all his plans rejected;

especially those which had become to a certain extent favourites with their author; and he was reduced to the humiliating necessity of sitting still, while the fabric which with so much care he had founded and reared, seemed tottering to its fall.

So passed the time till an event befel, which, restoring to Mr. Hastings his legitimate position in the government, enabled him once more to apply his talents and great experience to the public service. I allude to the death of Colonel Monson, which took place, after a lingering illness, on the 25th of September, 1776. As I have heretofore done, so I will again permit Mr. Hastings to speak for himself, in order that there may be no mistake as to the sort of feeling which that event excited in him, nor any misapprehension relative to his designs, had the rancour of his enemies permitted him to act upon them. Of the following letters, one addressed to Lord North is, as may be expected, official and grave; the others, written with the freedom of a confidential correspondence, keep back from us no secrets, and are therefore, as a picture of the writer's mind, much more valuable.

To Lord North.

Fort William, 26th September, 1776.

My Lord,—It is my duty to give your Lordship the earliest information that Colonel Monson departed this life at Hugly yesterday evening, after a severe illness of more than two months.

This event has thrown me into a situation which, while our disputes in England remain undecided, I could have wished to avoid. It has restored to me the constitutional authority of my station; but without absolute necessity I shall not think it proper to use it with that effect which I should give it were I sure of support from home. Thus circumstanced it is my wish to let the affairs of this government remain in their present channels, and to avoid alterations which in the course of a few months may possibly be subject to new changes, and introduce weakness and distraction into the state. This line I am resolved to follow as far as it depends upon myself, but much will depend on the incidents of business, and on the temper of my associates. I should dissemble with your Lordship were I to pretend to be insensible of the injuries which I have received. These, however, shall not break in upon the line of my public duty. The long course of business in which I have been engaged, and the various, and often divided councils in which I have sat, have taught me moderation, and I believe few men can easier govern their resentments than I can, or totally sacrifice them to the interests of the public.

Having received advices from England by land as late as the 25th May, which is posterior to the latest period of the Company's annual despatches, I cannot expect any further orders from England before the ships of next season. This in one instance will compel me to depart from the passive rule which I have prescribed to myself, and I think it necessary thus early to apprize your Lordship of it.

The present leases of the province of Bengal will expire, with very few exceptions, in next April, and it is essentially necessary, both to the security of the public revenue and to the quiet of the country, that the ensuing settlement should be previously formed

so that it may instantly take place of the present. Mr. Barwell, who has had much experience of the revenue of this country, concurs with me in opinion that the new settlement cannot be delayed, and I have an entire reliance on his good sense and honour, that he will cordially join with me in the prosecution of it.

Before there was any strong probability of the change which the death of Colonel Monson has occasioned in the Council, I declared in a minute entered on our public records that I would not be concerned in framing "any plan for the future settlement and administration of the revenue without the authority to support and even to command the execution of it." Being now in possession of that authority, I cannot dispense with the duty annexed to it on an occasion of such consequence to the Company's interest. I can neither allow that my associates possess a greater degree of zeal for the service, nor that the experience of two years, consumed more in disputes than in business, can have furnished them with a superior knowledge of the Company's affairs. Yet I cannot help regretting the necessity which I foresee will oblige me to take the lead in a measure involving such great and remote consequences, while I remain uncertain to whose hands the future execution of it may be committed.

In the other departments of government, expedients may be found to obviate the necessity of new measures, and this your Lordship may be assured shall be the studied rule of my conduct, both from a conviction that it will be agreeable to your wishes, and that the national affairs of this country will be better promoted by a quick administration of them in their ordinary course than by attempts at improvement in the present uncertain and divided state of this government.

It is not without the last degree of mortification

that I suppose the possibility of a case so inconsistent with your Lordship's assurances and the justice of my Sovereign, and with the conscious sense which I feel of the long labours of a life devoted to the aggrandizement of his power, and to the interest and honour of my country, as my dismission; but I shall wait with patience and submission for the declaration of his will; and whatever may be my fate, I will meet it with the consolation of having persevered to the last in the discharge of my duty, and supported a life of unremitted toil and humiliation, under which I must have long ago sunk had my dependence been placed on a less powerful protection. I have the honour, &c.

To John Graham, Esq.

Fort William, 26th September, 1776.

My dear Sir,—An event which has been expected these three weeks is at length come to pass, and has occasioned a kind of revolution in our Council. Colonel Monson, after an illness of ten weeks, died last night, and a letter has been written to the Court of Directors to advise them of it. They, I suppose, will receive it in the month of March, while the Parliament is sitting, and in the height of their own despatches. Of course I conclude that an immediate choice will be made of a successor to fill up the vacancy, and I much fear, from its being made at such a time, that it may prove equal to a decision against me. It will be impossible to nominate a neutral man, and I have no ground to hope that the appointment will fall on any friend of mine. If it should, there will be an end put at once to all contention, the majority being so clear on the side which ought constitutionally to take the lead. If a friend of Clavering's is sent out to reinforce his party, I must in that case either quit the field, or resolve to remain and have a new warfare, perhaps more violent

than the last to encounter. The first is a wretched expedient, which I will never submit to. Having gone through two years of persecution, I am determined now that no less authority than the King's express act shall remove me, or death.

Having had some time afforded me, by the strong probability which there was of Colonel Monson's death for some time before it came to pass, to deliberate on the consequences of it, I have already drawn the line of my conduct, with the concurrent opinion and advice of Mr. Barwell and Sir E. Impey, and have written to Lord North to inform him of it. In this place, men's minds are so heated with the multiplied instances of rancour which have passed before their eyes, that they will expect to see me ride triumphant on the new authority which I have acquired. In England they will be better pleased that I acted a firm and decided, but temperate part, because an opposite conduct could only prove successful by my continuance, and must throw affairs into inextricable confusion if I am removed; and I should be sorry to furnish my enemies with a pretext to say that I sought to involve the ruin of the Company in my own fall. I have therefore told Lord North that I should endeavour to leave everything in its place, and equally avoid innovations and disputes, while the present state of suspense and indecision remained. But with one exception. I have declared to him that I would not delay the new settlement. In a minute of the 30th of August, I declared that I would not propose any new settlement unless I had power to enforce, and "even command the execution of it." Colonel Monson was then thought to be on the recovery. But now the case is altered. Barwell agrees with me in my opinion of the necessity of entering early on the new settlement, and will heartily support me in the execution of it. My objection, therefore, no

longer remains, and it would be criminally mean to give up my opinion to the crude and confused ideas of General Clavering. This measure will oblige me to new model all the provincial councils, for I will not leave such wretches as Goring, Rosewell and James Grant (names that I blush to write) in the power to render my designs abortive, but shall think it incumbent upon me to choose my own agents for the charge of my own plan, especially as so much will depend upon it. If I am restored to my authority, there will be so much good time saved by this measure. If Clavering is destined to be the scourge of God for the correction of this miserable people, he will need no aids to his own malevolence and ignorance for accelerating the ruin of this country. So much for the revenue.

In the province of Oude, if it is not invaded this next season, it may be left to itself.

On the affairs of Madras we are all of one mind—thank God!

Bombay may afford a new subject of contest. The ministers whose names appear to the treaty, Succaram Bobboo, and Ballajee Punt, have solicited passports from us to retire to Benares, and, improbable as it at first appeared, it seems now past a doubt that they really intend what they profess. The administration at Poona will then devolve (so Upton says, and so of course it must) to Maraba Furneess, *an avowed partizan of Ragobah*, and one of the ministers present during the late negociation of Colonel Upton, *although he refused to take a share in them, and to sign his name to the treaty*. The treaty, therefore, will have no owner when the two subscribers to it are gone, but will become null of course. This Colonel Upton is weak enough to acknowledge, for he writes that if Sudaba succeeds, the treaty must be confirmed by him, because the Rajah is a minor.—V. P. S.

This Sudaba is, or pretends to be, the famous chief of that name, who was missing after the battle of Ponniput, and now makes his appearance with his identity authenticated with an army of 20,000 men, and the possession of the country of Concan, all the sea ports and marine belonging to the Mahratta state. He will most probably be victorious, for he has no one to oppose him, and he surely will not be bound by a surreptitious treaty made by men whose authority he will not acknowledge. The Company, too, have eagerly adopted the measure of an alliance with Ragobah. So that I think Carnac, on his arrival, will have a new war on his hands, or at least a strong temptation to it. On this point I cannot form my own line. I will not break the treaty, nor will I break the peace, but if both are broken, circumstances must direct me to the means which will be most proper to save the Company's new acquisitions from suffering in the tumult.

The General is sick, being covered with boils, but he has no symptom of danger.

To Mr. Elliott.

Fort William, 23rd November, 1776.
(Duplicate per Alexander.)

My dear Elliott,—I have lately created a new office for preparing materials to form the new settlement. The papers which relate to this subject you will receive. They are voluminous, though they contain only the history of the new office to the period of its nativity. Francis, you will perceive, has promised in one minute to give his support to it, though he says he disapproves of the principles on which it is founded, yet in another in reply to mine, thanking him for that assistance, he retracts his promise. The movements of this man of levity are difficult to foresee, or comprehend. His interest is the only steady principle in his composition, and operates in him as powerfully as in any man I ever

knew; yet even this cannot always concentrate him, but by fits he flies off from it. I have wished, and Mr. Barwell has been equally desirous, to gain his concurrence in public measures, not only for the sake of quiet, but for the more quick despatch of business. He, too, has appeared equally solicitous for such an accommodation. For some time past he has quietly concurred in all points of mere current business, and but faintly opposed such as were of magnitude sufficient to attract public notice, or of a nature to excite the bitter spirit of the General. That is, he assents to measures of no consequence, concurs in appointments proposed by me of persons whom he wishes to serve, and in all matters of moment either opposes in mild language, or acquiesces with reservations intended to exempt himself from a share in the responsibility. This temporizing conduct he calls moderation, and makes a merit of it. Yet, such as it is, I would avail myself of it if I could, having too much at stake to hazard by contending with a man whose character I despise, and whose friendship and enmity I should view with equal indifference, under any other circumstances.

For these reasons, and for another very powerful one which I shall not now mention, I have hitherto deferred what the world, I believe, expected to see made the first act of my authority, for the retrieval of the first wound which was given to it, the restoration of Nat. Middleton to his station. Many circumstances concur to render this politically necessary; and many require the suspension of it. One of much weight is the present uncertainty of my own fate. But the greatest is that which I first alluded to. Francis dreads it worse than death. I apprized him of my intention some months ago. I resumed the subject lately, expressing my wish to accommodate it if it could be done to his views in favour of Mr. Bristow. He vehemently

opposed it, pleading for his continuance till the month of May, at which time it would probably be decided either that I should have the power to fix Mr. Middleton there, or he must look to a different interest. We have not met since, but Mr. Francis has been labouring to interest every friend I have, even Middleton himself, to persuade me to agree to a compromise, offering to enter into engagements (as I am assured by good authority) to promote Middleton's pretensions, whoever shall be in power, at the end of the time which he wants to prescribe. In the midst of these manœuvres he pens his last minute, retracting the promise which he before made me of his support in the only business in which I want it. And if Mr. Barwell does not oppose it, I shall no longer hesitate in concluding Mr. Middleton's appointment. At least I think this ought to be my determination.

I have thought it necessary to give you this circumstantial explanation of the motives of my conduct, lest it should be misunderstood, and improper causes assigned for it. Yet the facts themselves I give you in confidence. They will furnish you with the proper conclusions from them, which is all the use I wish you to make of them.

Great dissensions have arisen between the judges. They first arose from a difference of opinion in the cause of Cumal o'Din, concerning the legality of the powers exercised by the Calcutta committee. Why this should have created a personal misunderstanding between them I cannot tell; but it has lately broken out with great violence on the occasion of an application made to the Court by the Company's advocate for a rule to prevent the debtors of government in revenue cases from eluding its authority by collusive suits in the Supreme Court. This rule could not be granted without a virtual acknowledgment of the right of the

Company to imprison their dewanny debtors in the town of Calcutta. It passed with the casting voice of the Chief Justice, who was joined by Mr. Chambers. The other two judges have protested. They have communicated to me their objections, which consist of twelve articles. I am not a judge of the legality of the rule, but I am certain of its necessity. What may be the issue of this affair in England is of little consequence. The Bill which I sent home, if it passes, will remove every doubt of this kind, and if it does not, no partial remedy will. I am only concerned for the personal disagreements which this affair has occasioned, and have laboured, though ineffectually, to remove them.

Against the creation of the office alluded to here both General Clavering and Mr. Francis strongly protested. They pronounced the act illegal in itself, as well as wholly uncalled for, inasmuch as the five years' settlement was understood to have been formed after a minute investigation into the capabilities of the country. But of their protest Mr. Hastings took no heed: "I rely on you," he says in one of his letters to Mr. George Vansittart, "to defend me if I am censured at home on account of the new office. The objections to it on the grounds of illegality are not worth a refutation. Yet the Court of Directors, who asked the opinions of able lawyers concerning a former pretension of mine, and in the mean time decided it by their own, may, if the same men are my judges, pronounce this act illegal. But if it

is, my commission, when I went to Benares with unlimited powers; the appointment of the committee of circuit; every other committee, composed either of the late, or the present Council, or of others; the provincial Councils; the superintendent of the affairs at the presidency; the auditors of the week; all the inquisitors sent by the late majority into the Mofussul, with powers independent of the provincial Councils, and authority undefined;—in short, every delegation of the powers of the Board were all illegal acts, usurpations of the powers of government, and breaches of the former or present Acts of Parliament and charters." Still, though he went gallantly forward with his own arrangements, Mr. Hastings was far from being at ease. He knew not on what ground he was standing. He could not tell whether or not even his most obviously judicious measures would be approved of at home, and his letters to his friends breathe in consequence a mixed spirit of hardihood and despondency. Take the following to Mr. Stewart as a specimen:—

To John Stewart, Esq.

Fort William, 21st December, 1776.

My dear Stewart,—By this time, I suppose and hope, that it is decided either that I am to join you in England, and become a country gentleman for life, or you to return to Bengal. I have thought it most for my own ease and credit to act by the latter supposition, and have therefore begun to apply the accidental

authority which has fallen into my hands to measures which belong only to a fixed and permanent government, and shall go on, piano, piano, to others, as necessity or occasion shall throw them in my way. In this conduct I have consulted also the credit of my friend the General; for as he had laid it down, from the moment of Colonel Monson's death, to protest against everything that was done even in the ordinary course of business, his protests would certainly have more dignity, when applied to subjects of magnitude, than wasted on the regulations of Colonel Stibbert's army bazaar, or the facing of Redans.

It was my intention, Stewart, before Colonel Monson's death, which was expected some time before it happened, to have left matters as they were, and to avoid making changes, till I could receive such advices from England as would justify me in taking a more decisive lead, except in preparing the business of the new settlement; and this design, with the advice of the most judicious of my friends, I communicated in a letter to Lord North, with a proviso expressed in it, that the General and Francis would let me act with the moderation which I had prescribed to myself. I am clearly of opinion, that as a servant of the public, I followed the strict line of my duty; for I cannot reconcile it to my sense of integrity to embark in hazardous undertakings which no immediate occasion calls for, and which I am not certain of being allowed to carry through their last effects, although I might justify such a proceeding by alleging that I was to do the best for the present, and leave those who succeeded me to answer for the future, and that I was not to suppose that any change in the government would take place that would make any deviation in the regular progress of it. This kind of reasoning may not be

approved in this intriguing age; but you, my friend, with whom I have never observed any reserve, and who have had the opportunity, in a daily intercourse of four years of official and social acquaintance, to know my real disposition, will readily yield me the credit when I ascribe my actions to a preferable regard to the public service, though in opposition to motives of policy or private revenge. I could, if I pleased, change every part of the present system, and make my own continuance in the government necessary almost to its existence; but I would not wish to hold it on such terms, nor, indeed, do I think such a policy very necessary, for it must be very apparent, and universally seen, before this time, that General Clavering is not qualified to hold the reins of a government like this, if vexation does not kill him before they can be put into his hands. *As to Francis*, like your *gunpowder*, he is not worth wasting words about.

I hope it will be seen, or that my friends, who are in possession of the means of making it visible, will show it, that in the preparations which I am making for the ensuing settlement I do not bind this government to anything. I collect materials for future application which will be of use to me if I remain, which any new rulers will be glad to find ready for their use, and which, if General Clavering is to have the rule, he may totally reject, or adopt my plan if he pleases, just as if he had lain idle or asleep in the interval preceding it. But in spite of rancour, obstinacy, and ignorance yet more gross than his, he would find himself, in that case, even compelled, by their incontestable utility, to employ them.

N. Middleton is returning to his station. He sets out post to-morrow. By his means I hope to ripen matters for reformation in that quarter. Major Hannay

still waits at Chunar to prosecute his negociation with Nudjif Cawn, as soon as Sumroo is removed. I am not displeased with the delay as he is so near.

Francis Fowke is removed from Benares, I mean to send Thomas Graham in his stead.

Beneram Pundit, the Berâr Vackeel, is returned, and strongly bent upon bringing about the long projected alliance between that province and Bengal, which the success of the Poona ministers against Sudaba will greatly forward, and fresh despatches from Moodajee Boosla are now on the road for that purpose.

All these are preparatives, and if their natural effects should not coincide with the views of those who may have the government a few months hence, they will create no embarrassment, nor impose the slightest obligation to employ them.

The General has declared upon record that he shall call every provincial counsellor to account that submits to the authority of the new office which has been created for collecting the accounts of the revenues, and has verbally declared that he will prosecute them, and that he has written to the Attorney and Solicitor-general for their advice and opinions upon this subject. I think myself, therefore, more than justified in removing his creatures from the provincial Councils, that I may not be opposed by authority in a business of such nicety and importance. But *you* have hampered me a little in this point, for I am already threatened with one prosecution. Fortunately, on examining the list, I find the greatest part of them very good, able, and honest men, and not half a dozen Gorings, James Grants, or Rosewells amongst them. Such as these I shall certainly recall, and all others that shall hereafter prove themselves like these. God be praised, there are few such in the service.

In spite of the querulous opposition of the Ge-

neral, and the clever though shallow protests of Mr. Francis, Mr. Hastings followed out his plan of a commission, and sent it forth under the general superintendence of Messrs. Anderson and Bogle, to perform its office. The information collected by these means was invaluable; yet he to whom the Company was indebted had the arrangement charged upon him as a crime. In the Court's Letter of July 1777, the whole measure is denounced as a flagrant job. "How," say the Directors, "can Mr. Hastings pretend ignorance of the capabilities of the country, seeing that his minute of 1772 declares, that inquiry had been pushed to the utmost? and by what motives actuated, save the meanest and the most corrupt, could he dream of employing in so important a transaction, persons who had been found guilty of gross fraud, and dismissed from their offices under government?" It is somewhat singular that it should never have occurred to the writers of this epistle, that for all purposes of finance, the country had undergone a prodigious change. Since the inquiry of 1772 was instituted, which had, by the way, for its object the ascertaining the value of the lands occupied or managed by each particular zemindar, these lands or estates had repeatedly changed hands, some in whole, others in part; so that the apportionments determined upon at the commencement of the five years' set-

tlement were, in 1776, quite inapplicable. It had been proved, moreover, that the rents imposed upon each district were exorbitantly high. How was justice to be done to all parties, except after a fresh survey? or a permanent system established, unless such survey were conducted with extraordinary care? And as to the employment of unfit persons, unless youth could be accounted a legitimate ground of objection, there were not at the disposal of government two gentlemen better qualified, both on account of their talents and their business-like habits, than Messrs. Anderson and Bogle. But there was a native, one Gunga Govind Sing, of whom it was alleged both then, and afterwards, that he was a convicted defrauder of the public revenues, and as such totally unfit to be trusted. Never was charge more entirely without foundation. Gunga Govind Sing, a man of rare talents as an accountant, had indeed been employed by Mr. Hastings in the management of certain salt farms, situated in a district over which he likewise presided as Dewan. In the latter capacity it was his business to exact from the farmers their yearly rents; in the former to make to the salt manufacturers such advances as from time to time they might require;—and finding one of these, the occupant both of a land and a salt farm, fall into arrears, he balanced the account against him in his capacity of land farmer,

by deducting the sum due, 26,000 rupees, out of the advances which he would otherwise have made to the fabricator of salt. But Gunga Govind Sing, like Mr. Stewart, and Mr. Maitland, and many more, was a firm friend and protégé of Mr. Hastings. Therefore this, a transaction perfectly fair and honest in itself, was worked up into a criminal charge, and being brought home to him without any attempt on his part to hide the truth, he was, by order of the majority, dismissed. I confess that I do not see why, on such grounds as these, Mr. Hastings was bound to deprive himself, and the commission, of the acknowledged talents of a man, whose real and only fault was that he had held office in the earlier part of the Governor-general's administration; and earned, while so employed, the Governor's approbation.

In the conduct of this important affair, and the general arrangement of public employment so as to render the whole machine pliable in the hands by which it was henceforth to be controlled, Mr. Hastings found it absolutely necessary to displace several of the functionaries who owed their appointments to his opponents in the Council, and to substitute in their room friends of his own. For this he has been severely censured, as if any blame could attach to him, who in no single instance did more than reinstate in his office some gentleman, who in the sheer wantonness of party triumph had

been originally set aside. In particular his re-appointment of Mr. Middleton in the room of Mr. Bristow as resident at the Durbar of the Nabob of Oude has been stigmatised as a paltry triumph of spleen, while the gentleness of his expressions when assigning a reason for the latter gentleman's removal is quoted as a testimony against him. I have merely to observe that it did not belong to Mr. Hastings's nature to do anything, even an act of painful justice, sternly. He spoke well of Mr. Bristow as a man of honour and of talent; but honour and talent, though essential ingredients in the character of a public servant, will not suffice if they stand alone. Mr. Bristow's views of the policy which it was necessary to pursue in dealing with the Nabob as a dependent ally, differed altogether from those of Mr. Hastings; and as the latter had determined on effecting some important changes, it was necessary that he should have upon the spot an agent who should be both able and willing to carry them out. Such an agent was Mr. Middleton, equal at least to Mr. Bristow in the qualities both of his head and heart, and greatly superior in this, that he had already been tried in very delicate situations, and always come out of them with credit. It is idle, therefore, to say, that either in this or any other arrangement of the sort, Mr. Hastings sought only to indulge his spite against Messrs. Clavering and

Francis. Mr. Hastings was not deficient in feeling; but he was too wise, as well as too good a man to indulge his own humours at the expense either of moral right, or of his country's interests. There was not one of these changes which had not a higher object in view than either the mortification of the Governor's personal enemies, or the advancement of the Governor's personal friends.

I say nothing of the substitution at Benares of Mr. Graham for Mr. Joseph Fowke; because the true motives which induced Mr. Hastings to effect that change will be best shown by and bye, when we come to another stage in our narration. Meanwhile I am bound to state, that no feeling of bitterness towards the father (Mr. Francis Fowke, of whose active hostility notice has elsewhere been taken) had the smallest effect in overclouding the fortune of the son. Mr. Joseph Fowke had never enjoyed, and was never likely to enjoy, any share of the Governor-general's confidence. He was pledged to a system diametrically the reverse of that which Mr. Hastings laboured to establish; and would have been worse than useless as an agent in carrying out Mr. Hastings's designs. And so it was throughout. From Mahommed Reza Cawn down to the humblest native scribe, whom, in the prosecution of his magnificent devices, Mr. Hastings found it necessary to remove from office, there was not one who owed his ap-

parent depression to any other cause than an irresistible political necessity. But it is time that I shake myself free from these minute details, and resume once more the thread of my general history.

The correspondence which I have interwoven into the preceding pages will show, that not even when sunk in the lowest depths of personal mortification was Mr. Hastings forgetful of the great interests over which he had been appointed to watch. Aware, indeed, that no project of his would receive common attention on the spot, he spoke but little to his colleagues of schemes by far too gigantic for their comprehension; yet his letters prove that of these schemes he never for a moment lost sight, even when the hope of seeing them fairly discussed was feeblest. No sooner were the shackles removed by the death of Colonel Monson, than his mind began again, with its accustomed activity, to exercise itself. He saw that the British empire was already become the pivot round which all the states of India were moving. He felt that to the native powers it was an object of extreme jealousy, and that could they but succeed in smothering up, for a while, their mutual animosities, they would, one and all, combine for its destruction. Moreover, he knew that obedience to the letter of the Company's instructions in the matter of foreign alli-

ances, and the wars which might be expected to arise out of them, was impossible. The English were precisely in that situation which was incompatible with a state of rest; they must either go on extending their influence till it should embrace the whole of the continent, or they must look to the hour as not very distant when they should be driven from it entirely.* What was to be done? The authorities at home clamoured only for increased investments. They were urgent in their injunctions to practise economy, and to realize from the provinces, with as little cost as might be, the largest attainable amount of revenue. They reprobated all interference with foreign states, and believed that they were obeying, on these things, the dictates both of wisdom and of moderation. Mr. Hastings looked at the subject before him through a different medium. He was far from underrating the importance of peace and an isolated position, if they could be preserved; but he could not shut his eyes to the truth, that isolation, in this case at least, was quite out of the question, inasmuch as the whole atmosphere around breathed of nothing but its opposite. He cast his eyes over the map, and beheld three detached tracts of country, all of them considerable, and one at least a thickly peopled empire, subject to the sway of a handful of Europeans. Watching these, and eager to overwhelm them, yet rendered comparatively

innocuous, by reason of their lack of confidence in one another, were the Mahrattas—a confederation of principalities; Hyder Ali, now sovereign of Mysore; Mahommed Ali, Nizam of the Deccan; with many other states of less importance when regarded singly, yet very formidable if drawn into combination, or induced to act under a common head. Nevertheless the home authorities desired him to hold entirely aloof from these states, and to maintain no communication with them, either friendly or the reverse. It was very easy to issue these orders, yet how were they to be obeyed? seeing that the same authorities required him to exercise the most rigid economy even in the arrangements of their military establishments, on the efficiency of which the existence of their power depended. But this was not all; Mr. Hastings knew that all the resources of all the provinces, if applied exclusively to one end, would not suffice to keep together such an army as would enable him, single handed, to maintain his footing in India, were he seriously attacked. Let the French, whose hostile intentions were already beginning to be suspected, send but an adequate force round which the native powers might rally, and under the very first cordial junction of these against him he must fall. How did he proceed? With the farsightedness which is never found except among statesmen of the highest order, he conceived the idea of that subsidiary

system, out of which all our greatness in India has arisen. He resolved, if possible, to contract close and intimate alliances with the minor states contiguous to his own, and to maintain at their expense such a force, as should at once protect them from both foreign and domestic violence, and place him in a position to cope with any or all of the greater powers, should they move against him.

There were many causes then at work, particularly in the relations which subsisted between the English and the Mahrattas, which rendered the adoption of this plan urgently necessary. The peace which had been concluded by the treaty of Poonah nobody expected to continue. Both the ministers at Poonah and the Bombay government were dissatisfied with it, and each was ready and eager to seize the first convenient pretext for appealing once more to the sword. Moreover such symptoms of union in the great Mahratta confederacy had recently shown themselves, as were calculated both to surprise and alarm the lookers on; and against the effects of this, as well as of other contingencies more remote, perhaps, but not therefore by him unobserved, Mr. Hastings was anxious to provide. I do not know that the following letters stand in need of any explanation, to him at least who knows even imperfectly the outlines of Indian history; and as my business is

to describe rather the individual, than the theatre on which his fame was acquired, I am bound to assume that of such knowledge my reader is already possessed. I therefore transcribe both them, and the masterly plan which accompanied them, without one word of commentary.

To Mr. ALEXANDER ELLIOTT.

Fort William, 12th January, 1777.

My dear Elliott,—This letter will comprise one connected subject; and to render this intelligible, I shall take it up from a very early period.

After the famous defeat of the Mahrattas at Ponniput, Sudaba, the second officer in command, and the first cousin of Ragonaut Row or Ragoba, the late Peshwa and competitor of the ministers of Poona, was missing, and supposed to have been slain. About three years after, a man disfigured with wounds made his appearance, under the name of Sudaba, with a small force; was attacked and defeated, made prisoner, and exposed as an impostor by the ruling Peshwa. From that time he continued a prisoner till the month of April last, when he escaped from his confinement, collected a considerable army, and even made himself master of all the country called Concan, which lies between the hills and the sea. On the 27th of October he ventured on an engagement with the forces of the actual government, was totally routed, put to sea in a small vessel, and sailed to the island of Bombay, where he demanded protection. Unfortunately for him, the governor and second in command were both absent at Salsette, and Mr. Draper, who had charge of the fort, sending two persons of inferior rank to receive him, the devoted fugitive construed this into an insult, and in a fit of ill-timed pride instantly departed, threw himself

into the hands of a Mahratta chief named Ragoojee Angria, who delivered him up a prisoner to the ministers at Poona. Ragonaut Row, more fortunate, escaped to Bombay, where he was received, and probably continues there. It is said that Mr. Hornby, on the first news of Sudaba's confinement, sent a deputation to Ragoojee Angria to demand him, with a declaration of war in case of a refusal. Such, at least, is the representation of this affair which we have received from Poona, where both this measure and the asylum granted to Ragoba are treated as acts of hostility against the Mahratta state and direct infringements of the treaty. We too have taken up the charges as such, and sent peremptory orders to the presidency of Bombay to dismiss Ragonaut Row. In the meantime Colonel Upton continues, notwithstanding our repeated orders for his recall, at Poona, whether by his free consent or by constraint is uncertain. The style both of his letters and those of the Peshwa seems to confirm the common report of his being detained by force. This is not the only suspicious circumstance. All the letters from Poona, both before and since the ratification of the treaty, are filled with reproaches for the hostile acts which preceded it, and even strong indications that the authors of them did not regard the treaty as binding but on the persons only who signed it. Their last letters, which were written immediately after the overthrow of Sudaba, contain a demand in behalf of the King of Tanjore, whose name never before appeared in any papers of their correspondence or the negociation with Colonel Upton. These are, at best, but doubtful symptoms; and, added to the indisposition which the presidency of Bombay have all along shown to the late treaty, portend but a short duration to the peace concluded by it.

By the overthrow of Sudaba, the intestine troubles

which have so long disturbed the Mahratta state appear to have been so far appeased as to leave them at full leisure to prosecute remote undertakings. The same letters that brought us the news of this event also informed us that the ministers had set on foot an expedition against Hyder Ally. By other channels we learn that Nizam Ally Cawn and Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, have been invited and have agreed to join their forces on this occasion.

So sudden a revival and reunion of the powers of this great empire, and so sudden an application of them immediately on the close of a long civil war, indicate a degree of vigour in its constitution which cannot fail to alarm the friends of the Company, if the subsequent appearances shall warrant this conclusion. I think they will not, but persuade myself that the present conjuncture is no less favourable than any of the past (always excepting the ill-fated treaty with Ragoba) for advancing the interests of the Company, and extending their influence and connexions. I will tell you why.

In the first place, a confederacy formed between the Peshwa, the Subadar of Deccan, who has plundered the Mahrattas of a great part of the Poona state, and the Chief of Berar, its nominal vassal, all possessing mutual claims on each other, and swayed by opposite interests, cannot hold long together. In the second, the government of Poona is weak in itself, by want of constitutional authority in those who possess the rule of it, and by want of unanimity among themselves. Nana Maraba Furneess, one of their principal members, has openly separated himself from the rest. Their chief, Succaram Babboo, is old and infirm; and both he and Nana Furneess, who are the only parties to the treaty lately concluded with us in the name of the Mahratta state, lately demanded and received

passports from the government to retire to Benares, with the avowed design of passing the remainder of their lives there in devotion. This design, though probably suggested only by the personal dangers to which they were exposed by the rapid successes of Sudaba, must diminish the confidence and respect which are the natural attendants of a fixed and regular authority. And thirdly, the government of Berar possesses in it the seeds of civil discord, which are at this time ready to spring up on the first occasion that can favour their growth. This is a subject that requires me to be more explicit than I have been on others, and this too I must take up *ab ovo*.

Ragoojee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, the same person who invaded Bengal, and subjected it to the Chout in the time of the Nabob Alliverdy Cawn, dying, left four sons, Jannoojee, Shabajee, Moodajee, and Bimbajee. Jannoojee succeeded him. He, having no child, adopted the son of Moodajee, who was called by the name of his grandfather, Ragoojee. On the death of Jannoojee, Shabajee, the second brother, succeeded to the government, but held it in the name of his nephew, the legal heir. This was the cause of continual dissensions between the two brothers—Shabajee holding the government in right of primogeniture, Moodajee claiming it on the behalf of his own son, though the legal affinity between them was changed by his elder brother's adoption. In the late dissensions between Ragonaut Row and the ministers of Poona, Shabajee took part with the former, and Moodajee with the latter; but their own affairs calling them home before those were decided, they came to an open rupture. Shabajee was slain, and his brother assumed the government in his stead.

Here I must go back to relate another transaction more immediately connected with the subject of this

letter. Shabajee, a little before his return to Berar, sent a Vackeel, named Beneram Pundit, to Calcutta, with a letter containing professions of friendship and a desire to be on terms of alliance with this government. I thought this an occasion not to be slighted, and returned such an answer as was most proper to encourage the wishes of Shabajee without expressing too interested a solicitude to meet them; and I sent the Vackeel back big with the project of uniting the province of Berar to this government on terms similar to those which had been formed with Sujah Dowla by the treaty concluded at Benares, and which I may venture to say were such as afforded the Company every advantage that could be derived from such an alliance without derogating from the dignity or credit of our ally.

While Beneram was on his return, the revolution took place which I have mentioned above; and as he was known to be the confidential servant of Shabajee, some time elapsed before he ventured to return to his new master. Being at length, however, invited to come, he went and was well received. Moodajee read the letters, and answered them as addressed to himself; and after some time, thought proper to send him back in his former character, with handsome professions, but general, and with no declared object or instructions. A very friendly, and in some sort confidential, correspondence, however, has continued between us ever since. From Beneram Pundit I learn that the same feuds which formerly divided the two brothers while Shabajee was living, are now likely to break out between Moodajee and his son, who is now about nineteen years of age, and begins to look upon his father as the usurper of his rights. In these sentiments he has been confirmed by a man who has been the successive minister of the three brothers, named De-

waugur Pundit, who finds himself of too little consequence with his present master, and naturally concludes that he shall acquire a greater ascendant on the mind of his young pupil, if he should succeed in obtaining his advancement to the possession of the government. By the intrigues of this man, Nizam Ally has been induced to invite Moodajee Boosla to his court, for the purpose of concerting measures for their common interests, or to send his Dewan if he should be prevented from attending himself. To the last proposition Moodajee has consented, as he mentions in a letter I have lately received from him; and I understand that it is proposed that Ragojee shall accompany him, with the secret design of gaining the support of Nizam Ally in the prosecution of the projects against Moodajee. Whatever may be the issue of these measures, a proper attention to the circumstances as they arise might put it easily in the power of this government, were it duly authorized, to convert them to the advantage of the Company without any sacrifice of their faith or hazard of their interests.

We have a battalion of sepoys already stationed in the districts bordering on Berar, and another added to it would be sufficient to answer any purpose for which they might be wanted.

It is impossible to foresee the circumstances on which our interposition may be demanded, or on which it could be honourably given, and therefore impossible to anticipate the mode of it.

You are already well acquainted, however, with the general system which I wish to be empowered to establish in India, namely, to extend the influence of the British nation to every part of India not too remote from their possessions, without enlarging the circle of their defence or involving them in hazardous or indefinite engagements, and to accept of the allegiance of

such of our neighbours as shall sue to be enlisted among the friends and allies of the King of Great Britain. The late Nabob Sujah Dowla, who wanted neither pride nor understanding, would have thought it an honour to be called the Vizier of the King of England, and offered at one time to coin siccas in His Majesty's name. Nor was this a mere visionary project; the credit of such a connection with the sovereign of a power which has for a long time past made so considerable a figure in Hindostan would of itself be a great advantage. But I am afraid that his chief inducement arose from a great defect in our political constitution of which he had severely felt the bad effects; I mean the rapid succession of persons entrusted (under whatever name or character) with the rule and administration of the British affairs in this part of our Indian possessions; the consequent want of consistency in their measures, and even in their attachments and engagements; and the caprices to which he was often exposed on the same account. Had he possessed the spirit of foresight, he would have had severe cause for these reflections in the miserable state of penury and servitude to which his son has been since reduced, ineffectually to our interests, as every excess of power beyond its proper bounds will ever defeat its own purposes. Nor indeed has the son much cause to complain of an injury which he has scarce sense or sensibility to discover; although it must be redressed whenever that state has a more worthy ruler, and the sovereignty restored with all its rights unimpaired to the lawful proprietor. But I wander from my subject. My intention in this digression is to show the advantages which would be derived both by Government and its allies from a direct engagement with them, made with the sanction of the King's name, which would secure it from wanton and

licentious violation, and render the objects of it more certain and durable.

On this footing I would replace the subaship of Oude. On this footing I would establish an alliance with Berar. These countries are of more importance to us than any others from their contiguity to ours, and therefore it is of consequence to settle their connexion with us before that of any other. But the same system might be rendered more extensive by time, and the observance of a steady principle of conduct, and an invariable attachment to formal engagements.

I will not here enumerate all the advantages which may be derived from this plan to you especially, to whom I have long ago explained personally my views and sentiments upon this subject. Indeed, except a short and rather obscure intimation of it in one of my letters to Lord North, I have communicated it to no person but Colonel MacLeane and yourself; and that is my principal reason among others for having written to you rather than any one else upon the various points contained in this letter. To enable me to carry it into execution, I must be released from the restrictions which I at present lie under; I must have discretionary powers, and a fixed channel of correspondence.

I shall follow the subject no further, but leave it here to your discretion to make such use of it as you shall judge most likely to prove effectual to its execution, or to suppress it. I am aware that I tread on dangerous ground, exposed to the ill-will of the Company, if they look to the renewal of their Charter, and to all the popular and rooted prejudices which are entertained against the expensive projects of military enterprise, and the injustice of disturbing the peace of our quiet neighbours; for this construction will be given to it. To answer these and the other objections

to this plan would require much time and argument; but though this might be necessary to the support of a proposition calculated for the public eye, it will not be wanted on this occasion, as I hope it will be only seen by those who are to adopt it, and to whom its obvious consequences will need little explanation. I trust it to you in confidence, and desire that you will impart it with the same caution, that I may not suffer by the attempts to raise the power of my country, and to extend the influence of the King's name among nations to which it is yet unknown, if the means which I have recommended should be judged inadequate to such laudable ends, or impolitic with respect to other circumstances. Of their justice and moral propriety I have no doubt. I am ever, my dear Elliott, your most affectionate friend.

To Alexander Elliott, Esq.

Fort William, 10th February, 1777.

My dear Elliott,—The accompanying letter was written and intended for the last despatch. It contains the particular application of a system with which you are already well acquainted. Whatever my own conviction may be of its expediency, I am tied down from acting directly, nor can I employ even influence with the rod of authority hanging over my head.

Nor is this my only difficulty. I cannot communicate a subject of this nature through any official channel. If I write to the Secret Committee, they are too many to be entrusted with it. They may not all be disposed to receive a proposition from me with candour; and bodies of men, however small, are always indifferent to the business which is brought regularly before them. I cannot write to the Chairman, because, in the first place, I know not who he is; and in the second, because both the gentlemen who hold the first stations

in the Direction at this time, are, as I understand, my professed enemies, and would be therefore more likely to draw conclusions from what I wrote to my disadvantage than to adopt my recommendations. Neither can I approach the King's minister on such an occasion without some preparatory caution, in which his leisure, his inclinations, and the ability of the times should be consulted.

It is impossible for me to foresee what may be the dispositions in England when this letter shall arrive. It is equally impossible to reconcile the different orders which the Court of Directors last year gave us for our conduct towards the powers of India. They desire us upon no account to enter into any wars, however advantageous to the Company, and they at the same time direct us to co-operate with the Presidency of Bombay in keeping possession of the lands which Ragobah ceded to them by treaty. The first is an absolute prohibition to interfere in the politics of India. The last is a positive order to interfere, and to engage in a war with the first power in India.

Being thus at a loss to judge of the views of the Court of Directors, I am still more so to judge of those of the King, to the knowledge of which I have no access. I must therefore leave it to you to consider well the dispositions of the times, and of the ministers. If you have reason to believe that such a system as I have recommended will be approved, I trust to you to make use of such means as you shall judge most likely to promote it. If, on the contrary, men's minds are adverse to the extension of our influence, you had best say nothing about it, as it can serve no good purpose, and may be turned to my disadvantage.

These despatches I shall entrust to Captain Toone. You know his worth, and my affection for him. I have earnestly recommended his return if he can re-

cover his constitution; and if your interest can promote his views you will oblige me by serving him. I am ever, my dear Elliott, your most affectionate friend.

P. S.—Sudaba, who is mentioned in the accompanying letter, has been put to death, having been beaten with clubs till he expired. This, you know, is not murder, but simple manslaughter by the doctrine of Abbi Haneefa; but seems to have been done by these Hindoos to avoid the shedding of sacred blood; an argument in favour of Sudaba's cause.

For a fuller explanation of the design, which is contained in my letters of the 12th ultimo, I have drawn it up with as much accuracy as my time would allow in a methodical form in the enclosed sheets, which I trust to your discretion to make such use of as you think proper. It is yet incomplete, as I could only venture to propose what I saw a moral certainty of accomplishing. In the natural operation of such an influence once established many important objects will start up which it is impossible to foresee, and many which, though within the reach of conjecture, would appear visionary if formally detailed. I have no fear of its failing to produce the good effects which I have described, nor even much greater. The only danger which I should apprehend would be from the attempt to make the most of it that could be made. The rapacity of individuals, and the emulation of those in actual power to surpass their predecessors, will ever prove the greatest evils of our political system. Our alliance with the Nabob of Oude is a striking illustration of this. It was in the beginning an unprofitable charge to the Company. It was placed on a footing of mutual advantage to both. It is now become an oppressive burthen on that province, which must soon fall with increased weight on the Company. The late Vizier paid to the Company a tribute of 25,20,000

rupees, and cheerfully paid it. It was optional, because he was at liberty to dismiss the brigade when the exigency of his affairs no longer required it; and he could safely dispense with it. The present Nabob has yielded up a revenue of twenty-three lacs in the cession of Benares; he pays, or rather ought to pay, 31,20,000 rupees a year for the subsidy; and we have added to his expenses an extravagant military establishment which, at its estimated amount, is an annual charge of above forty lacs. So that we are in fact the distributors of a crore of rupees drawn from his treasury, which is already exhausted, and that part of his army which still remains under his own direction is rendered a useless and even a dangerous incumbrance, because he cannot pay it. Our brigade, therefore, must continue a fixture to that province, which would be a prey to the meanest invader the instant that it was deprived of its support.

Many of the propositions in this scheme require explanation. This you can give, but I have not time, and I have already made it too long. Nudjif Cawn's pension is due in justice to him, as he quitted us unwillingly, and followed the King at the express solicitation of the commander-in-chief of our army. He has ever proved faithful to us, and possesses such resources in his military talents, and in the credit of them, that while he lives he will be our best shield against the only enemy which we have to dread in that quarter, the Mahrattas. He has no money, and can therefore pay no subsidy, and whenever he dies, we must look to other means of defence on that frontier of our possessions and those of our ally.

If peace is to be our object, I cannot devise a more likely way to ensure it than to command all the means of war, and this is the only use I would wish even to make of the plan which I have proposed, if it is

adopted while I remain here. This, I suppose, will not be long. I wish it not, unless I possess power and confidence, and shall be better pleased to be recalled at once than to remain with a doubtful authority till the short time is passed which has been allotted me by parliament, and then go out of course. I would not accept of an empire on such terms. If I must give the place to General Clavering, he will revenge the injustice done me by it, if I could seek such a revenge; and if a new member is added in the room of Colonel Monson, I shall expect the renewal of the same violences which I have already experienced, for I cannot hope that the choice will fall on a friend of mine. Besides, it is not in nature for five men to share the same power, and not to divide into factions, when one man can always make a majority.

Enclosed in Mr. Elliott's Letter, dated the 10th February, 1777.

The superiority which the English possess over the other powers of India is derived from two causes, the authority of their government, and their military discipline. It is by these advantages only that they can improve or maintain it.

Every political measure ought to be carefully avoided that may have a tendency to weaken either.

An extension of territory beyond certain bounds is dangerous, and must in the course of time prove fatal to both.

Remote military expeditions are liable to the same effects; but these may be obviated to a certain extent by proper regulations, and by an undeviating adherence to them.

The province of Bengal (in which I include Bahar), though nearly equal in dimensions to Great Britain itself, is capable of being defended against any power which may invade it, so long as it can be supplied with

recruits sufficient to preserve the superiority of its European soldiery to the number of native troops which must be necessarily joined to them for its protection. That proportion seems to be well ascertained in its present military establishment, which, if such a conclusion may be drawn from past experience, is equal to any occasion which is again likely to call it forth to action. Nature herself has furnished the best defence of this country, in the unmilitary genius of the people, the absolute security of its north and eastern frontiers, the difficulty of access on the other borders, and the multitude of rivers which intersect the most valuable parts of it. These altogether form a powerful protection against foreign invasion and a complete security against internal danger.

But I presume that a mere provision made for the common vicissitudes of political affairs will not be deemed sufficient to ensure permanency to the British dominion, which we have thrice seen near the edge of ruin; although it had no European enemy opposed to it. Let the case be put, that the French, joined with a numerous Indian army, and strengthened by other alliances, were to enter Bengal. Such a case is not unlikely, for it is scarce to be conceived that they will ever make the attempt without such a support. Will three brigades be sufficient to encounter such an armament, to repel other invaders, and to maintain the dominions of our ally the Nabob of Oude? I believe that with good conduct, and that fortune, which has hitherto supported us in all our greatest emergencies, it may. Yet it will be impolitic to trust our whole stake to an equal hazard, if a more ample security can be obtained. To effect this purpose on the principles already laid down, the following plan is suggested:—

1. Let one complete brigade (including the garrison of Chunar) be appropriated to the defence of the pro-

vince of Oude. Let the British officers be recalled from the Nabob's service whenever it can be done with safety.

2. While Nudjif Cawn lives, let his pension be confirmed to him, on the condition of his furnishing this Government with a body of 5000 horse whenever demanded.

3. Let a treaty of defensive alliance be formed with the Rajah of Berâr. Let such a number of our battalions of sepoys, but without any European infantry or artillery, as shall be necessary for his protection, be stationed with him, and annually relieved. Let him pay a fixed monthly subsidy for these, of rupees for each battalion.

4. Let the alliance with the Nabob of Arcot be confirmed by treaty, and on the conditions recommended in my letter to Lord North of the 1st of September, and let the Nabob be put in full possession of the zemindarry of Tanjour. Let him pay a monthly subsidy for the British troops and sepoys on that establishment.

5. The political connexions of the Presidency of Bombay cannot be prescribed under the present uncertain state of their affairs. The treaty lately ratified with the Poonah government is not formed for long duration, and the breach of it, whenever it happens, will either produce a state of lasting hostility, or lead the government of Bombay to new and surer engagements.

6. Let every treaty be executed in the name of the King of Great Britain, expressing the reciprocal conditions of protection and fidelity, and with his express sanction.

7. Let it be lawful for the Governor-general and Council of Bengal, and for the Presidents and Councils of Fort St. George and Bombay, with the consent of

the Governor-general and Council of Bengal, to enter into temporary agreements with any other princes or states for a term of two or three years only, and renewable after the expiration of that term.

8. If among these any should desire to be bound by perpetual ties with the King of Great Britain, and their situation and consequence shall be such as will admit of it, such may be received into his alliance and protection, on terms similar to those of the treaties already prescribed, varying only as their wants and means may proportionably require it.

9. Let three complete brigades on the present establishment be kept up for the defence of the province of Bengal, and the dependencies of the province of Oude, as above described, two of which shall always remain in the former, and relieve that stationed in the latter once in two years.

10. Let an additional number of battalions be added to the brigades for the purposes of furnishing the aids required in other stations beyond our own provinces.

This system will be attended with the following advantages:—

1. It will provide an increase of our military and political strength without an addition of expense, which may be employed to co-operate in all its parts to the defence of our own possessions, and whenever the occasion shall be so urgent as to demand it, may be united for the same end.

2. It will prove an immediate security to our own borders.

3. It will be the means of securing the friendship and support of those powers, who might otherwise be won to the French interest, if that nation should ever attempt the invasion of Bengal, or of the other presidencies, and be a check upon others whose territories lie contiguous to them.

4. It will afford the controlling government of Bengal a complete knowledge of the strength, connexions, and designs of all the powers of Hindostan, and may enable it to prevent connexions against any of the British possessions, or those of its allies.

5. It may eventually draw a portion of the wealth of India into Bengal, not only by the means of subsidies paid by the States in alliance with it, but by opening new channels of commerce.

6. It will afford employment and support to the middle class of the subjects of Great Britain, whose services are less required at home than those of the lower rank of life.

7. To these may be added, though but as negative advantages, that it will require no addition of recruits from England, and that the external influence of the British power in India will be extended without any diminution of its internal strength, or the dangers usually attendant on distant military operations.

I foresee many objections which may be urged against this system, but none which may not be obviated by the establishment of an active and permanent form of government here, and a fixed channel of correspondence at home. The present constitution is in its nature incapable of vigour or unanimity. It is loaded with business in detail, and it wants both confidence, authority, and consistency, because the primary orders under which it acts are dictated by a variable body of men, who have power neither to reward nor punish; who possess no interest, and can derive no credit from the success of the affairs which they superintend, who are charged with no responsibility, and are subject to a continual fluctuation of measures, both from the want of progressive knowledge, and the change of opinions inseparable from a change of persons.

These defects obviously point out their own remedies.

It would lead me into too wide a field, nor is it within the sphere of my province, to prescribe them.

I shall conclude with one observation which I think necessary to obviate the charge either of levity or artifice, which may be imputed to me for the multitude of plans which I have at different times recommended (should this ever go beyond the hands to which it is immediately directed) for the various departments and operations of this Government. In this attempt I have only trod the path which it was equally the duty of my predecessors to trace; but which they left unnoticed. On my arrival in Bengal I found this Government in possession of a great and rich dominion, and a wide political system which has been since greatly extended, without one rule of government, but what descended to it from its ancient commercial institutions, or any principle of policy but such as accident or the desultory judgment of those in actual power recommended. It was necessary to restore the authority of Government to the source from which its powers originated; to assume the direct control, instead of allowing it to act by a concealed and weakened influence; to constitute an uniform and effectual mode for the management and collection of the public revenue; to establish regular courts for the administration of civil and criminal justice; to give strength and utility to its political connexions, and to transfer a share of its wealth to Great Britain, without exhausting its circulation. This, aided by the abilities and superior knowledge of my associates in the Government, I attempted, because it was essentially necessary in itself; because it was my particular province, and because I was expressly enjoined to do it: and, if I may judge by the present state of Bengal, notwithstanding the distractions which have prevailed in it for more than two years past, the measures which were adopted for

these ends were as effectual as the means with which we were supplied could enable us to make them. To render them more so, to render the changes which were introduced by the late Act of Parliament more subservient to the purposes for which they were ordained, and to supply the radical defects which it either created or left unremedied, I have recommended an additional plan for the administration of justice. I have proposed rules for arranging the powers of Government, and both particular and general systems for our external policy. The same duty which prompted and compelled me to point out the means of reformation in one instance, equally enjoined it in all where it was wanting. And whether I have erred in my endeavours, or they shall be judged deserving of the public attention, still they were such as appertained to my trust and station, and such as I could not have withheld without a crime; and whatever part I may leave deficient, my successors must supply, or they will prove themselves unfaithful ministers, and the State which they serve will suffer through their neglect.

I am far from supposing that any general measure of Government, however formed, will completely answer all the ends for which it was projected, much less do I presume to aim at that degree of perfection in those which I have ventured to recommend. The dominion exercised by the British Empire in India is fraught with many radical and incurable defects, besides those to which all human institutions are liable, arising from the distance of its scene of operations, the impossibility of furnishing it at all times with those aids which it requires from home, and the difficulty of reconciling its primary exigencies with those which in all States ought to take place of every other concern, the interests of the people who are subjected to its authority. All that the wisest institutions can effect

in such a system can only be to improve the advantages of a temporary possession, and to protract that decay, which sooner or later must end it.

Such was the state of affairs at Bengal, and such the gigantic schemes which Mr. Hastings was maturing, when an event befel which threatened, at one time, to involve both the Government and the province in greater confusion than ever. On the 18th of June a ship arrived from England, bringing with her despatches from the Court of Directors, in which were detailed the results of that extraordinary intrigue of which I have been happily enabled to lay before my reader all the particulars. Of the effect produced by these despatches on the Supreme Council, and the part played by General Clavering and Mr. Francis, it is not necessary for me to speak. The usurpation by the former of the powers of the Governor-general, as well as the process by which his plan was countervailed and defeated, have long been matters of history. But Mr. Hastings's view of the case is still worthy of attention, and I am glad that it is in my power to make it public. The following letter contains a summary of all the transactions that occurred, as well as the sentiments of the chief actor in them. It is a curious document, and cannot fail, when read in connexion with Mr. MacLeane's communications, to satisfy every impartial person, that Mr. Hastings's

conduct was throughout both judicious and honourable.

To Mr. Sykes.

Fort William, 29th June, 1777.

My dear Sykes,—The shortness of the period in which I must close my despatches for Europe has obliged me to employ an auxiliary hand to acquaint you of the several wonderful revolutions which have occurred since the arrival of the Rippon's unlucky advices. And the present imperfect abstract shall be filled up and explained by the first future occasion. On the 19th instant this mysterious packet was opened in Council. To the general letter was annexed a postscript with information, that Mr. MacLeane had addressed the Court of Directors, acquainting them that he was authorized, empowered, and directed by me to intimate my desire to resign; that the Court had unanimously resolved to accept of my resignation, and had appointed Mr. Wheler to fill up the vacancy which would consequently be made in the Council. The general letter enclosed copies of Mr. MacLeane's address, of the Directors' petition to the king for his approbation of Mr. Wheler's appointment, of an official assent from Lord Weymouth, of the instrument of approbation under the Royal Sign Manual, and of the Court of Directors' Commission to Mr. Wheler. The Council broke up after reading the despatches. Friday the 20th was regularly appropriated to the Revenue Board, which I summoned as usual. But the General, about ten o'clock in the morning, issued a summons in his own name as Governor-general to the other members for an extraordinary General Council to be held that day to receive from me the charge of the Government, the keys of the Fort and Treasuries, &c. and at the same time wrote me a letter to inform me

of his intentions, and absolutely requiring that my resignation should take place that day. About eleven o'clock he and Mr. Francis met at the general council table, Mr. Barwell and myself at the Board of Revenue. The General immediately proceeded to take the oaths as Governor-general, and to deliberate and preside at the Board in that capacity. As soon as I was fully informed of this, I requested that the judges would attend at the Revenue Board to consult upon the subject, and to give me their opinion. They met me immediately, but to no purpose; for the General had previously gotten possession of the Europe despatches, and refused to deliver them up, though twice required by our Secretary in public letters, and afterwards by Mr. Barwell in person, who was informed by the General sitting as Governor-general that he might take his seat as a member of that Board and hear them read, but that they should not be put into his possession. I however assured the judges in writing, that if, upon inspection of the papers, they should judge that any act of mine had passed from whence my actual resignation could be deduced, I would immediately vacate the chair. The General and Mr. Francis, sitting as a complete Council, and delivering opinions and forming orders and resolutions as such, after having notice that our requisition of the Europe despatches was for the purpose of enabling the judges to form an opinion upon the subject, wrote a joint letter to the bench, in which they stated their own claims as indubitably and immovably grounded on the several authorities contained in the general letter, copies of which they inclosed; and, though not by any means referring the matter to their decision, or offering to abide by their determination, agreed to suspend the execution of their orders as a Council till the judges had given their opinion; expressly requesting

that they would deliberate by themselves apart, and not in conjunction with Mr. Barwell or myself. The judges met the same evening, and were most decisively and unanimously of opinion, that any assumption of the chair by General Clavering would be illegal. This opinion they delivered in a separate letter to each party; but in the same strong terms and in the fullest manner to both. Upon this the General and Mr. Francis wrote them a letter, agreeing to acquiesce in their judgment. On Monday we continued to meet by adjournment from Friday, but without Mr. Francis, who had been twice summoned on the 20th, but neither came nor apologized for his absence. After perusal of the whole proceedings and minutes of General Clavering's illegal Board, held on Friday, we were clearly of opinion, that the General, by taking the oaths as Governor-general, and by his several other acts and declarations as such, had actually vacated his seat of senior councillor, and his post of Commander-in-Chief, and we entered it accordingly in separate resolutions to each point, causing immediate notice of these resolutions to be given by our secretary to the General, and a copy of our whole proceedings as soon as it could be made out. He and Mr. Francis now addressed the judges again in two successive letters, one on the same day, attempting to refute the arguments which had been used by them (the judges) to prove my non-resignation; and another early the next morning, desiring our judgment upon our resolutions concerning the vacation of General Clavering's offices. This latter address met a more favourable answer than their first letter, and the judges offered it as their opinion that we had no legal power to declare this vacancy, and advised a compromise. We met in Council the next day, and agreed, in the words dictated by the judges, to recede from the execution of our resolutions of the

preceding morning; referring our several claims to England for decision, but not acting here in consequence of nonconformity to those claims, but consented in the mean time to leave every thing in the same state as it stood before the arrival of the packet. I shall continue by the first opportunity to put into your hands the whole proceedings of this extraordinary Board, as the best comment upon the nature of the action and the temper of the actors.

What the future line of my conduct will be, it is not possible for me to determine until I shall have received the information which I hourly expect by the Princess Royal, as that ship left England two months after the Rippon; but from all that is at present before me, I think myself clearly absolved from abiding by Mr. MacLeane's offer of resignation. I shall, however, act with the utmost caution and prudential regard, both to my own public duty and to his honour. At all events, it is impossible I should resign in favour of General Clavering, who, having vacated his own seat to thrust himself unwarrantably into mine, has certainly, at the present moment, no legal title to be a member of the Board, as the act has made no provision for his returning to his seat, nor can the king himself give him the government in prejudice to Mr. Barwell, who is now the only legal successor to the chair upon my quitting it.

30th June. Since the above was written, the Rippon public packet has arrived, and I received by it your letter, dated the 31st October last.

I am as little pleased as you are with the offer of my resignation. It was contrary to all the letters I have written to Colonel MacLeane and my other friends since his departure, and to my letters to the Court of Directors, which all call out for a decision, either by my dismission or confirmation, and all vow

that I will not resign. I will enclose two passages in my last letters which were received from me at the time of this unfortunate accommodation, and of another to MacLeane, &c., which indeed had not then been received, which mark in the strongest and most intelligible language my resolution. In a letter to George Vansittart, I call it *the vow which I have repeatedly made,* and say I will never depart from it. To all my friends here I have studiedly made the same declaration, and I am mortified to the last degree with the appearance which must be against me, of so much duplicity of conduct.

I cannot distinctly remember what instructions I gave to Graham and MacLeane, and if I kept a copy I have mislaid it; but I well remember, and it agrees with Barwell's remembrance of it, that *I expressed my apprehensions of being made an instrument of party, and especially of ministerial opposition; that I warned my friends against it, and said that if nothing else would support me, and the Government and the Company were resolved on my removal, that they should give up the contest, and leave me to defend myself with the public, if it should be necessary, when I came home.* I believe and think it obvious, that I gave them an unlimited discretion to act for me as they thought best, for my confidence in them was, as it ought to have been in such a trust, unbounded.

But I never could mean, at least I think not, that when they had committed me in a public contest, and had engaged a whole people in my support, that they should make me quit the field, and decide the victory against myself. Nor can I conceive how the Court of Directors, possessed of a solemn declaration from me, that *if I lived I would persevere to the end,* should think themselves authorized to receive my voluntary resignation from the doubtful hands of an agent.

I acquit Colonel MacLeane, and I am certain that Elliott acted from the most generous motives and a conviction that the measure was a right one. But it is past. I have avowed it, and would have carried it into execution if I had been permitted. The General's violence hath defeated both my intentions and the act itself; and unless some very material change shall be produced in the future orders from home, I will still maintain my ground, though I have but few friends left to support me; and I will maintain it if I have the same motives, though I should not have a friend in the world.

Were I to submit to such indignities as have been offered to me, even my enemies would hold me in open derision. I will make them ashamed of the man whom they have protected. I shall expect to be recalled, and with disgrace, and I expect that my recall will be followed by prosecutions, and they may prove what they will against me, even rape and murder, if they are disposed to it when I am gone and Clavering in possession, yet I care not. What a reward, my friend, is this to the services of a man who has devoted the labours of twenty-seven years of his life in the support of the Company, and the national interests in this country!

I am congratulated on the happy issue of this negociation, in the preservation of my honour and my fame, and on the complete victory which I have obtained.

I subjoin to this a letter on the same subject, addressed to Lord North. It is worthy, from the manliness of its tone, of him, who through evil report and through good report persisted in doing his duty, and reaped as his final reward persecu-

tions such as are without parallel in the history of modern times.

To Lord North.

Fort William, 29th June, 1777.

My Lord,—If I am not yet utterly consigned to that oblivion which the means lately taken for my removal seem but too avowedly to threaten; if I may still hope that my public station will be a warrant for my approach to your Lordship, though unequal to my adversaries in personal interest and powerful connexions, I may still flatter myself that this letter will be read with attention; and though from past events I should draw the melancholy conclusion that no merits I may claim from my King and country by a life successfully devoted to their service, no obedience to your Lordship's express commands, without which I should neither have entered, nor continued in this disgraceful scene, can save me from the fate which has long been impending, yet it is my duty to address your Lordship on an occasion in which above all others your justice, and the safety of the British empire in India, demand your impartial interposition.

By letters received from my confidential friends in England, I have been informed that Colonel MacLeane had made a declaration in writing to the Court of Directors of my desire to resign the government, that this offer had been accepted, and that Mr. Wheler had in consequence been nominated to succeed to the seat of youngest councillor whenever it should become vacant by my actual resignation, and that this nomination had received the final sanction which the law required of his Majesty's approval. It was added that one condition of this accommodation, made with your Lordship's knowledge and participation, was that the time of my resignation was to be left to my own choice.

The letters received two days after from the Court of Directors, and from the secretary of the India House by the Rippon, confirmed this intelligence; but your Lordship may better conceive than I can express my disappointment and astonishment to find an instrument of peace converted into a brand of civil fury by the unexampled and extravagant conduct of General Clavering on the receipt of it. Instead of waiting for the natural period of its accomplishment, and without any intimation to me of his intention, he at once attempted to seize the government by force, took possession of the council-chamber, demanded from me the keys of the fort and treasuries, took the oath of Governor-general, held a Council as such with Mr. Francis, and I presume would have proceeded to the last extremities of violence, had not the timely measures which were taken by myself and Mr. Barwell entirely disabled him; for he had written and signed a letter to the commandant of the fort requiring his obedience, a proclamation was written and formally recorded on their proceedings notifying his admission to the government, and a resolution to send them with circular letters to all the commandants of the military stations and to the Provincial Councils.

But Mr. Barwell and myself, who were then met as usual in the Revenue Council-house, immediately took the necessary precautions to guard against the effect of these rash measures, and I submitted my title to the judges, promising to abide by their opinion. Upon this the General and Mr. Francis broke up their council without issuing the orders which they had so decidedly passed, leaving them suspended, as expressed in their minute, *for the present*. These orders remain yet suspended, and they remain yet in force, for they have not been revoked, and both the General and Mr. Francis still avow the principle under which they were made.

The judges gave a decided and unanimous opinion against the pretensions of General Clavering. Mr. Barwell and myself continued our meeting by adjournment, and as we had no legal power to readmit General Clavering, nor he to reassume the place and office of senior councillor, which he had so solemnly quitted, we passed a resolution to that effect, which was immediately notified to him by our secretary.

On this occasion the General and Mr. Francis solicited the mediation of the judges, who having no other materials to form their opinion, but the state of the case, as those gentlemen had formed it, expressed a disapprobation of what we had done, recommended a present accommodation, and a reference of our claims to our superiors in England.

This, my Lord, is an epitome of the transactions of this Government during a convulsion of four days, which might have shaken the very foundation of the national power and interests in India; nor is it yet safe. The spark of sedition, though latent, will break out, and with a blaze, which the same prudence, the same vigilance and moderation may prove ineffectual to extinguish.

My Lord, I was not pleased with the engagement made for me by Mr. MacLeane; I will candidly own it. But I held myself bound by it, and was resolved to ratify it. This was my resolution; but General Clavering himself has defeated it, by the attempt to wrest from me by violence what he could claim only as a voluntary surrender, by persisting in asserting his pretensions to all the rights and functions of my office from a time already passed, and independent of my option; and by his incapacity to possess the government, after having by his own acts and declarations vacated the place from which alone he could legally ascend to it.

Thus circumstanced, I think myself not merely absolved from this obligation which has been imposed upon me, but bound by every tie of duty to retain my ground, until I can honourably quit it; still hoping that the next advices, which are daily expected by the Princess Royal, may furnish me with that opportunity.

When your Lordship and the Court of Directors found it expedient to remove me from their service, not, I will presume, for any misconduct or incapacity, but because it suited better with the interests of the State that I should make way for another, it was your intention that I should be allowed an honourable retreat, and every circumstance of delicacy and tenderness which might alleviate it. I assert this from an internal conviction. It was impossible that your Lordship could have made an accommodation of peace the lure to drag me into the power of my most rancorous enemy, and to make me a sacrifice to the most brutal outrage and indignity; nor is it possible that your Lordship should expect from me a tame submission to such treatment.

Exalted as your Lordship's station is, and though the world gives you the credit of having filled it with abilities equal to those of the most able of your predecessors, yet if I am rightly informed, neither the integrity of your character nor the wisdom of your measures have exempted you from the malignity which is the inseparable attendant on eminence; and it has been your greatest praise, that your constancy, firmness, and moderation of temper have not only repelled all the shafts which have been aimed at your reputation, but have converted them to the means of increasing its lustre. Do not, my Lord, condemn in me the qualities which do yourself so much honour, nor deny me your approbation for a conduct which you yourself

would have pursued under circumstances like those which have been the guide of mine.

I do not expect to be confirmed in this Government. I have long since given over all hopes of it. Let me be removed from it, but suffer me not, my Lord, to be dragged from it like a felon, after the labour of seven and twenty years dedicated to the service of the Company and the aggrandizement of the British dominion.

And now forgive me, my Lord, if I may appear to have expressed myself with a warmth either unbecoming an address to your Lordship, or inconsistent with the temperance of my own character. What I have written, I have written from my heart, not heated by resentment, but warmed with the conscious sense of my own integrity, and with a respect for your Lordship which I shall ever retain, because I am assured that if I must suffer injustice from the hands of others I shall yet obtain every relief from you, which it shall be in your power to afford me. I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, my Lord, your most obedient and most humble servant.

However reluctant I may be to overload my pages with an excess of correspondence on any one subject, I am sure that justice would not be done to Mr. Hastings's character or principles were the following withheld. As a piece of reasoning it is unanswerable, as a testimony to the disinterested temper, and high and honourable feelings of the man, it is invaluable.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 29th June, 1777.

My dear Sir,—On the 14th instant a Mr. Mackintosh, who left the Rippon at Madagascar, brought me several letters from Mr. MacLeane, and my other friends. Amongst them was a short one from you, dated the 1st September, 1776; from the former I learnt the first news of the accommodation concluded in my name by Colonel MacLeane, and its effects. On the 19th the Rippon packet arrived with a letter from the Court of Directors, and other letters from the secretary of the India House, confirming the intelligence of the last sanction given to that act by the King's approval of the appointment of Mr. Wheler. These were read in Council, but nothing passed upon them.

On the 20th, while I was in the Revenue Council Chamber, to which the Board had received the usual summons, Mr. Barwell joined me, and showed me a summons which he had received from the secretary of the other department, to attend at a meeting of the Board in that department by order of General Clavering, styled Governor-general.

Before I had recovered from the surprise occasioned by this unexpected intelligence, I received a letter from the General by his Persian interpreter, requiring me to deliver to him the keys of the fort and of the treasuries.

By this time I understood that the General and Mr. Francis had met in the general council chamber, where the General took the usual oath to discharge the duty of Governor-general, and passed several resolutions, in conjunction with Mr. Francis, formally recorded as the acts of the Governor-general and Council.

Mr. Barwell and myself sent instant orders to Colonel Morgan, the commanding officer of the gar-

rison of Fort William, forbidding him to obey any other; and similar orders to the officers commanding at Budge Budge and the Cantonments of Barrackpore.

Our next step was to desire the presence of the judges, who came; our mutual claims being referred by both parties to their judgment, we parted.

At four next morning the judges delivered their opinion, that General Clavering had not the shadow of a claim to the Government; and that his assumption would be illegal. He and Mr. Francis acquiesced, Mr. Barwell and I continued our Council by adjournment, and after much, and, I am sure, most temperate deliberation, we resolved, that as General Clavering, by the assumption and usurpation of the place and office of Governor-general, and other acts, had vacated his own, he neither legally could return to it, nor hold any longer a place in the Council.

Of this we directed the secretary to advise him on the 23rd, on which day we closed our meetings which had been continued by adjournments to that day, and a summons was issued to Mr. Francis, who had refused, though repeatedly summoned on the 20th, to attend at a Council to be held next morning. He attended accordingly. Nothing passed, but an ineffectual motion of Mr. Francis to repeal our resolutions, as we were informed that the judges were at the same time met in consultation on a second appeal made by the General and Mr. Francis against our late acts; and we broke up to wait the effects of it. In the afternoon we received a letter from the judges addressed to the Governor-general and Council, containing their opinion, that we had no right to declare the seat of any member of the Council vacant, and advising us to recede from executing the resolutions; to reserve our claims to be decided in England; and in the meantime to agree

that all parties should be replaced on the same footing on which they were before the receipt of the late advices from England.

In this advice we found it necessary to acquiesce, and on the next morning we met the General in Council, assembled as usual. I moved for the suspension of the resolutions in the words dictated by the judges; and it being further resolved to transmit copies of all the proceedings to Madras, with a short letter to the Court of Directors to be forwarded by the Hector and Salisbury, we agreed to break up for the remainder of the week.

These are the heads of the long history of the last fortnight, or rather six days of it; and perhaps a series of more extraordinary events never occurred in the annals of any government under the British empire.

For the particulars of these transactions I refer you to the consultations, of which I have sent one copy to my brother-in-law, Mr. Woodman, and desired him to get others taken from them, one of which he will send you. Though comprising a very short space of time, they are very voluminous, but they very well merit the time which you may bestow on the perusal of them. I hope and believe you will find no circumstance contained in them inconsistent with the temper and moderation which have hitherto distinguished my public conduct in the course of a very long service, and especially in the last three years of it.

I own I was greatly dissatisfied with the offer which Mr. MacLeane had made to the Directors of my resignation, but my regard for his honour, and the sense which I entertained for the undoubted zeal and attachment which he had so long manifested to me, left me no choice. I resolved to ratify his act, and resign at the time which should be pointed out either by the subse-

quent advices from the Court of Directors, or from my friends, who in their last letters had desired me in a particular manner to suspend every thought of resigning, until I should hear from them again. The following anecdote is a proof of this intention.

On the 13th instant I had moved and carried the removal of Mr. Shakespear from the Council of Dacca, and his appointment to that of Burdwan, with a special commission to carry into execution certain orders of the Board passed many months before, respecting the accounts and management of the rajah's household. At the next Revenue Council, held on the 17th, the first meeting in that department after the receipt of my private letters by the Rippon, I moved for the repeal of this measure; alluding in my minute to the approaching change of Government as my motive for it. The General and Mr. Francis agreed to revoke the appointment of Mr. Shakespear, but refused their assent to his restoration to his former seat in the Council of Dacca; and Mr. Barwell on that day having absented himself from indisposition, they formed a majority, and the question was decided by their opinion.

While I quote this as a proof of my intention, I think it no less an indication of the vindictive spirit which governed theirs, and of the persecutions which were prepared for all my friends and adherents whenever I should abandon them. Yet it made no immediate change in my resolution. I felt the ties of MacLeane's engagements, and wished, I may truly affirm, that I was fixed in my determination to abide by them. But the extravagant behaviour of General Clavering caused a total change of the question. It made my resignation, which our superiors had left optional, an effect of violence and compulsion, to which I could not submit without a total forfeiture of every principle of duty, and without a baseness of spirit

which would have rendered me the derision and detestation of all mankind. The minds and passions of the whole settlement were all agitated by these movements, and if I may trust to the information of all who have approached me since, the whole settlement (a very few individuals excepted) trembled with the apprehension of falling under the immediate rule of a man, of whose violence and rancour they had already seen so many instances, and who by this last act showed how regardless he was of every law but his own will.

The early precautions which had been taken by Mr. Barwell and myself at once deprived him of the means of carrying his plan into execution. He had written and signed an order to the commandant of the fort, but before he could send it, he must have heard that we had already secured the fort, and that the gates were actually shut against him. The judges were sitting with us in Council. He knew that he could not proceed against the authority of their opinion, against the fidelity and even attachment of the whole army, against the wishes and integrity of the civil servants. He desisted, therefore, because he was unable to go on. But was this a reason for me to desist? Was he to be allowed to make a trial of acts of the most illegal and unwarrantable violence; to recede from them with impunity when he found that he could no longer support them; to repeat the like attempts, submitting with every defeat, until he should catch a favourable moment to seize the government, and involve the country in a state of anarchy and civil bloodshed? Read the minute which he and Mr. Francis have written in reply to the first opinion of the judges, and you, my friend, will be convinced that this is yet their intention; but I am prepared to meet it, and confident to defeat it.

From the 20th to the 23d, Mr. Barwell and myself were inseparable. We fortunately lived under the same roof. Here I must stop for a moment to indulge myself in acknowledging the gratitude which I feel for the unremitted support which I have received from his friendship, which never exerted itself with a greater warmth of attachment than on this trying occasion. With an associate of less equality of temper, or more susceptible of the little jealousies which are too common attendants of political friendship, I could not have sustained the shocks and vehemence of a contest like that which I have been now almost three years engaged in. The proofs which I have had of his steadiness and honour, have inspired me on all occasions with a confidence to undertake even the most difficult measures in the certainty of receiving every aid which I could wish both from his concurrence and from his abilities. In the late transactions we had scarce a momentary difference of opinion. Our resolutions of the 23d were proposed, weighed, and taken, without any participation of advice, and without even the knowledge of our secretary till they were recorded.

Perhaps it may be suggested that we ought previously to have taken the opinion of the judges, or at least to have had some assurance that they would not again interfere to defeat the resolutions. This precaution did not escape us. We had received their clear and decided opinion that the assumption of the government by General Clavering would be illegal. He had incontestably assumed it, and by that act and the many others done in consequence of it, and by the declarations accompanying them, he had quitted his place and office of a member of the council. He could not hold both the office of governor-general and councillor at the same time; they are incompatible. The Act of Parliament marks them with the strongest lines of dis-

tinction; it has made no provision for the return of any member of the Council to his seat once vacated, but has irremediably precluded General Clavering from the succession by the rights now vested in Mr. Barwell, who has legally succeeded to the place which he originally held, and quitted to make an illegal seizure on mine.

When they had so decidedly pronounced the first act of General Clavering illegal, we had no conception that the judges would again interpose their authority to replace him in his former office. Besides, the indecent terms in which the General and Mr. Francis had combated their first opinion afforded so strong, and in some respects authoritative, grounds for the belief that the judges would refuse to answer any more references. There was no occasion for it. The state was in peace, and the measures which we had taken were the most likely to secure it. A mediation which left all parties in possession of their places in the government with doubtful rights was the surest foundation of future discord.

We could not have made the reference to the judges in any terms which would not have been highly indelicate. To have asked them whether we might legally exclude the General, would have been equivalent to a requisition of their participation of our act, of the legality and necessity of which we had no doubt, but wanted the courage to venture on it without associates. If they were of opinion that General Clavering had forfeited his seat, as they were bound by no duty to declare it, such a declaration from them would have been construed officious, and perhaps incendiary.

If they were of a contrary opinion, they would no doubt have told us so; our hands would have been immediately tied, and we should have incurred the public discredit, myself especially, of having permitted

the most flagrant and daring violation of the powers of government to pass, without an attempt either to defend our personal rights or repel the invasion of the constitution, of which, under the most sacred trust, we were now the sole guardians.

As we wanted no advice, we applied for none. We resolved on the measures which our duty prescribed, and we took upon ourselves the entire responsibility of them. At the same time that we passed them, we ordered them to be instantly published, in the most authentic manner, as the decided acts of an authority well ascertained and established, and we trusted to the known integrity of those on whom they were principally binding for their complete effect. The resolution had already been communicated to the commanding officer of Fort William, and known (though not copied in the orderly books) to every officer in it. The letters to the other officers commanding military stations, and to the provincial councils were written, and (I think) signed; and would all have gone forth that evening beyond the reach of government to recall them.

The judges interfered; they condemned the measure and recommended an accommodation. We submitted as to legal authority, or, at least, to an authority which would turn the scale of popular opinion against us here, and leave us inexcusable if their condemnation of our acts should be confirmed by a condemnation of them at home.

Except the immediate suspension of our resolutions, we have lost nothing by the declaration of the judges. In other respects it is as favourable to our rights as we could have wished it to be made. It expresses that we have no legal power to dismiss. We assumed not such a power. It expresses that we have no legal power to declare the place of any member of the council vacant; that is, as I suppose, that our declaration was not a legal

sanction, nor a confirmation of any vacancy, which the Act of Parliament itself had not declared to amount to one; for they could not mean these words in an absolute sense. The Board might surely declare the seat of one of their members vacant, if he himself, in formal terms, resigned it. The judges gave their opinion on the very imperfect state of the case submitted to them by General Clavering and Mr. Francis. They had not seen our proceedings; they had not even our resolutions before them. If they had, they would have found that our declaration was not simply that the places and offices of General Clavering were vacant, but that they were vacated by his own acts,—that he himself had resigned them. Their opinion does not really condemn since it does not apply to any act of ours. Their object seems to have been solely to promote peace and to prevent a change in the state which might have been ascribed to the effects of their own doctrine. Even their advice implies a doubtful right, and is a warrant for my continuance in the government, since I cannot resign it without forfeiting by that act all my claims which have been reserved by their advice for a decision in England. But though I mention this as a natural deduction from their letter, I am far from intending to make it the ground of any resolution which I may take to remain in the government.

To this point I now proceed. Though I shudder at the consequences of departing from the letter of Col. MacLeane's engagements, and dread equally with death the thoughts of entering into a new scene of indefinite contention, yet I scarce see an option left me to avoid it. One condition of that engagement was, that the time of my resignation was to be left to my own choice; but that condition has been broken by the attempt made by General Clavering to wrest the government from me by force, and by persisting to assert his claim to the

government in despite of it. My resignation, therefore, can neither be accepted by him as such, nor can I ratify it but under every appearance of a timid submission to violence. He has not even a pretext to exact it, because he avowedly stands in no need of it, grounding his rights on acts already passed, and independent of my will.

I cannot resign the government in favour of the General, because he has disqualified himself from accepting it; and by yielding it to him, whether by a direct surrender or merely by leaving it vacant, I should either deprive Mr. Barwell of his right of succession, and be the abettor of an usurpation, or sow the seeds of a civil war, if Mr. Barwell should be inclined to assert his own pretensions in opposition to it.

On these grounds I consider myself not only as absolved from the obligation to resign my place, but as bound by every tie of duty and honour to retain it.

Though these are my present sentiments, they are not my final resolutions. My last letters from MacLeane promised me some important intelligence in his next, in consequence of some equivocal and alarming appearances. The Princess Royal sailed from England near two months after the Rippon, and they left the Cape together; so that she must be at Madras, at least, by this time. By her despatches I expect to learn all that I can require to form the future line of my conduct.

If these contain no new obligation on me to resign, I certainly shall not. In these sentiments I am confirmed by the opinions of my two friends, the Chief Justice and Mr. Barwell; and they are so just that I think even Lord North must approve and applaud them. It is impossible that he should avow the brutal outrage offered to me by General Clavering, under cover of an act which had the sanction of his approbation, and peace and kindness for its professed objects.

I have written by these despatches to Mr. Dunning, with whom I beg of you to consult on the means which may be necessary for my defence.

I have now no channel to Lord North, nor encouragement to write to him; yet I wish it were possible to make him acquainted with the late proceedings, especially those of General Clavering and Mr. Francis on the 20th instant. Whatever inducements he may have to show such extraordinary marks of favour to General Clavering, it will be impossible for him to read such a series of gross misconduct without feeling something like shame for the unworthiness of the man whose cause he has in so extraordinary a manner espoused.

Sir Elijah Impey has been greatly affected by the late events, more, I think, than myself. I was at one time alarmed for his health; but I thank God he is, or appears to be, very stout again. My constitution, not naturally a strong one, has held out to my own astonishment, and I hope I have enough of it yet left to last another twelvemonth, at least.

To your friendship, which has been my constant resort in all my difficulties for these ten years past, I most earnestly recommend myself, and am ever, with the most sincere gratitude and attachment, &c.

CHAPTER V.

Progress of Public Affairs—Death of General Clavering—Arrival of Mr. Wheler—He joins Mr. Frances—Deposition of Mahommed Reza Cawn.

FROM the date of this letter up to the month of August following, there occurred no event, bearing either upon the foreign or domestic politics of British India, which it is necessary in this place to notice. The casting vote gave to Mr. Hastings absolute sway in the council, and he exercised it to promote, as far as circumstances would allow, the best interests of his employers. Not that he was permitted to do so in peace. The hostility of General, now Sir John Clavering, and of Mr. Francis, at once his leader and his shadow, continued as violent as ever; and they indulged it in acrimonious minutes,—in a steady yet unprofitable opposition, and in the still more objectionable practice of working, both publicly and privately, on the minds of all whom they found it practicable to approach. But of them, and of their proceedings, Hastings took little heed. In self-defence he replied to their minutes; he continued likewise, in his correspondence with his friends at home, to express himself fully and freely, and he seems to

have anticipated, from day to day, that the sentence of recall would go forth against him. Yet never, on that account, did he cease to labour for the public good, and the results were, in every respect, satisfactory. Vigour returned to all the departments of the government, and, in spite of itself, the province flourished.

At length General Clavering, whose irritable temper the mortification of finding himself worsted in such a struggle had grievously inflamed, sickened and died. The event produced no change, either in the present policy or future intentions of Mr. Hastings, who still determined to retain his office till finally superseded, and to carry out, as far as he might be able, his own masterly views. But it was followed by consequences singularly favourable to the interests of the Company. Of what nature these were, the following letter will show :—

To John Purling, Esq.

Fort William, 22nd November, 1777.

Dear Sir,—The death of Sir John Clavering has produced a state of quiet in our councils which I shall endeavour to preserve during the remainder of the time which may be allotted me. The interests of the Company will benefit by it; that is to say, they will not suffer, as they have done, by the effects of a divided administration. The unsettled state of the government is a great impediment to its operations, and weakens its influence, especially in the management of the revenue. The lateness of the settlement, and the short

period for which we have been allowed to make it, will, I fear, have an ill effect on the collections, but not so bad as under any other situation of affairs might have been expected. The season has been unusually favourable to the cultivation, and we have a sure prospect of peace.

The only measures of consequence which have been taken since the death of Colonel Monson are the addition made to our military establishment by the transfer of the disciplined troops of the Nabob of Oude to the service of the Company; and the establishment of the temporary office for ascertaining the value of the lands. This last of these arrangements has been, as I am informed, totally misunderstood at home, although I have taken great pains to explain it. But it is not the only instance which I have experienced of the little use which is made in England of official documents, where people seem to draw all their knowledge from private information; and I make no doubt that the new military plan will be equally misrepresented and equally misunderstood.

This is in effect little more than a change of form, not of substance. The late majority took an early opportunity (a very early one indeed, for they had not been three days in Calcutta) to censure me for having carried the Company's arms beyond the prescribed line of the dominions of the Nabob of Oude. To be consistent they confined the brigade rigidly to that line. They soon discovered that this would prove the loss of the Nabob's possessions beyond it, unless we still defended them. For this purpose a new military corps was raised, which was to be formed upon the principles of our own, and disciplined and commanded by our officers, but paid by the Nabob, and called his. This distinction, which consisted only in the name, did not prevent it from becoming a charge on the Company, if

the Nabob could not pay it, or (which was in reality the same) if he could not pay it without increasing the debt which he already owed to the Company. Both consequences were produced from it; for his debt had grown to fifty lacs of rupees at the period in which that corps was dissolved, and the resident was obliged to advance a large sum from the Company's cash in his charge to pay a part of their arrears, and to prevent their mutinizing. This was not the worst effect of miscalling it. Like all ostensible and covert systems, it served as a screen to private rapine and embezzlement. The Nabob had no power to check their accounts, and we left them uncontrolled that we might not encroach on the Nabob's authority. Rapid fortunes were made, and the Nabob's debts increased by loans made to him of the profits of these undue acquisitions.

I have been well assured that the difficulty which the Rajah of Benares has met with in obtaining bills for his monthly kists has been solely occasioned by the drafts made on Calcutta for payment of bills granted to English gentlemen in the Nabob's service, which have exhausted the funds kept there by the shroffs, and prevented them from dealing with the Rajah at a rate of exchange considerably below that which they received for the new remittances. You will hardly believe, that in a public account transmitted to the Board of the Nabob's expenses for his disciplined troops, the enormous sum of twenty-one lacs is set down for money lent or advanced for his service by the servants of the Company.

I proposed to abolish this corps, first drafting from it three battalions of sepoys, one company of native artillery, and one regiment of cavalry for each of our own three brigades, from which again they were to be detached in their turn to form a distinct brigade for

the defence of the Nabob's dominions in Doaub and Rhohilcund. In truth it is the same corps, but we pay it, we command it, and it is subjected to all the rules of our service. The Nabob furnishes the sums required for its subsistence, as he did before, but these are paid immediately to our agents, and passed to the Company's credit. This brief explanation of the measure will, I hope, be sufficient to refute every objection made to it as an addition to the Company's military expenses, since it is truly a reduction of them.

The Aumeenee office was an institution formed for investigating, with a minute exactness, the rents legally due from every division and subdivision of the province; for the purpose of ascertaining the respective and reciprocal rights of government, the zemindars and riats, and forming the future settlements by equal assessments on the lands. This work has been effected, and clear accounts obtained of every district into which the Aumeens were sent, except one of the principal divisions of Rajishahee, where the influence of the zemindar and the encouragement which he received from the members of government prevailed against the slender power of the Aumeens. Part of these accounts will be sent home by this ship, and the whole, with proper explanations, in the course of the season. If I am permitted to complete this investigation with the account of the few districts which remain, I am sure of being remembered with lasting credit by the people of this country, however the work may be estimated or understood by my employers. I hope you have read the minutes which have been written on this subject. If you have not, I entreat that you will. You will find them in the first despatches of last year.

Among other objections to this institution, which I hear have gained belief in England, it has been said that I had taken the whole management of the revenue

out of the hands of the Board. Nothing can be more untrue. The office does not concern the management of the revenue, but is merely an office of account. The officers were appointed by the Board, their orders were issued by the Board, and all the power distinctly given to me, was that of issuing my orders for the execution, and in aid of the orders issued by the Board. It is a fact that I have done no more, or little more than sign the orders which were sent to the Aumeens, and which were literal translations from the minutes of Council.

In addition to what I have said respecting the officers lately employed in the service of the Nabob of Oude, I think it proper to obviate any construction of it to their disadvantage, by observing that I do not mean to cast any blame on them, for I do not think them altogether deserving of it, but to show, by its effects, the pernicious tendency of the system. It is not possible that a body of men should refrain from illicit advantages, when the means are easy, not expressly forbidden, no penalty or disgrace annexed to them, and, falling within the reach of all, receive the sanction of general practice.

I consider my own destiny as already fixed, or that it will be determined, even long before the present despatches will have arrived in England. It shall be my care in the interval which remains, to keep the council free from dissensions, and I shall lay claim to some merit in the attempt, whether I am successful or not, as there is no other instance in which I can so effectually serve the interests of my employers.

I am with much esteem, dear Sir, your most obedient and faithful servant.

I do not think that the following ought to be omitted. It is as creditable to the Christian temper as to the good sense of the writer.

To John M'Pherson, Esq.

Fort William, 23rd November 1777.

My dear Sir,—My last letter was dated the 26th of July. With it I sent a letter to be delivered to Mr. Woodman, containing my request that he would show you all my despatches,—to you my confidential friend; —and I introduced him at the same time to you by the same title. The same packet enclosed an introductory letter for you to Mr. Dunning, expressed with the warmth peculiar to the generous feelings of the writer. At that time General Clavering was living, nor had I any expectation of his death, though it followed so soon after. The principle of my political conduct was therefore very different from what his death occasioned, but the effect of both is precisely the same, as you will have discovered by recollecting what I told you in that letter, and comparing it with what I have since written to Mr. Dunning, and now to Mr. Woodman. This I consider as the close of my political contests, as I have left myself no more to do in them than to receive *æqua mente* whatever may be their issue. The man whose rancour I dreaded, from a certain knowledge that he would have made no other use of power, but to persecute every man who had ever shown any thing like attachment to me, and to undo all that remained of my doings in this country, is no longer my rival; and as it will be impossible to find his equal, I am indifferent, or nearly so, about my future fortune. Do not think I speak from an impulse of resentment. May God forgive him all the injuries which he has heaped upon me, and me, as I forgive him!

In this breathing time, after a hard struggle of three years, I feel no small pleasure, and even a degree of vanity, where few people would think of applying it, in the reflection that I have never experienced an hour of sickness, nor ever absented myself from

council, once only excepted, when I was obliged to give my attendance at a meeting of the justices for the examination of Mr. Fowke. Yet my constitution is rather infirm, and my temper naturally quick and irritable. Is it a virtue, or must I admit it to be the effect of an accident, that the first has never failed me, no rthe last forsaken me, in my severest trials ?

Mr. Wheler is not yet arrived. and the season being so far advanced, I do not suppose that he will be here before January, if so soon. I shall make it a point of public duty to be on quiet, if I may not be on confidential terms with him; and as our mutual squabbles can do us individually no good, it shall be my care to prevent or appease every disorderly spirit that may rise up to disturb our councils, and impede business. I have already followed this line, and with good effect; and if I can succeed in pursuing it, I shall take credit from it.

I hope you will read the papers which I have sent home relating to our last contests. Those which principally merit your attention are on the subjects of the Aumeenee office, and the new brigade; both in my judgment the best measures of my government (always excepting the treaty of Benares), and the most abused.

Adieu! Believe me most affectionately and truly yours, &c.

Mr. Hastings counted at this time on a permanent escape from the contests in which, for the space of three years, he had been engaged. The following will show that he was at least premature in the anticipation, and is, besides, well worthy of perusal.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 31st December, 1777.

My dear Sir,—I hope that my endeavours to introduce the spirit of concord into our council will do me credit with my friends, though with the public I may bear my share of blame for the division which is still destined to subsist in it. Mr. Wheler has already taken a decided part with Mr. Francis, and was weak enough to expect that I should, notwithstanding, regard him as a neutral man, and his opinion as the result of his unbiassed judgment. Of this be you the judge. I am afraid I shall have a long story to tell you, but I must entreat you to give it a patient attention, because I lay great stress on the propriety of my present conduct, as it must necessarily influence all my future measures. On a false report of Mr. Wheler's arrival in the river in the beginning of November, I deputed my aide de camp, Captain Cockrell, a gentleman of good sense and address, to meet and conduct him to town. This I intended as a public compliment, due to his station. Willing to guard him against prepossessions, I at the same time commissioned my friend Elliott as my private agent, to give him assurances of my earnest desire to meet him on a footing of friendship, and to request that he would at least suspend his intentions until I should have the pleasure of seeing him, and conversing personally with him. The point which I desired Mr. Elliott to insist on principally was, that I did not require him to be in a party with me, but that he would not join in a party against me; and as I knew the difficulty of adhering to a perfect neutrality, I offered to second, and more than meet his endeavours, if he would be the mediator of our differences, and prescribe the terms of an accommodation, to which he would find me entirely disposed from inclination, and Mr. Francis from necessity, if he himself was determined on the measure.

The report of the Portland's arrival proved premature. My friends returned, and when it was afterwards more certainly known that she was in the river, they again went down to meet her. Mr. Elliott succeeded in his commission beyond my expectation. I repeated to Mr. Wheler at the visit which he made me when he came ashore, the assurances which had been given him before in my name, and expressed my satisfaction to find him so ready to answer my wishes. For some days after, I had no opportunity of a private conversation with him, as he was confined by an indisposition; but in that time he continued steady to his first declarations, and even proceeded so far as to say that he would assure Mr. Francis that if a perfect conciliation could not be effected, he was determined on no account whatever to join Mr. Francis in an opposition against me. I drew out the plan of an accommodation, in which I gave up every point in which I knew Francis to be personally interested, stipulating for little more on my own part than some measures of a public and official kind, and the concurrence of the Board in the general despatch of business, which was of course to be left to my chief direction; and in the distribution of places which it was not so easy to appropriate by any fixed line, I left it to the option of the other members to allow me such a preference as my station and the usages of every service entitled me to expect, and to share the rest between them. These offers were communicated to Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis. The first received them without approbation or objection, which was natural, for such parts of them as were personal he could not understand, and the rest might have had a personal tendency, though he had no clue to lead him to discover it. Francis seemed to approve them, and to think them moderate beyond his expectation; but declined an immediate declaration of his intentions. The next day he declared to Mr. Wheler

his refusal to assent to them, or to join in an avowed accommodation, pleading that it would mark his character with the reproach of inconsistency amongst his friends at home, if he was at this time formally to unite with men whom he had invariably opposed and abused for these three years and upwards.

This declaration Mr. Wheler communicated to Mr. Elliott, and as he seemed to waver in his resolution, I thought it proper to come to a personal explanation with him. I accordingly went to him. I urged to him every argument which the state of this country, exposed to a continued state of faction, and the consideration of his own personal ease and interests, suggested. He heard me without interruption, said little in reply, but made general professions, and assured me of his immovable resolution to observe a perfect neutrality in any disputes which might arise, and to give his opinion on every measure which should be debated without regard to persons or parties. I left him; convinced that he had engaged himself to Francis. A private circumstance, in itself of little consequence, and too long for detail, left me without a doubt. But I was resolved to put his neutrality to a public test.

The restoration of Rajah Rajebullub to the office of Royroyan, and the prolongation of this year's settlement to such of the zemindars as were punctual in the discharge of their engagements to the next, were two of the conditions of our proposed accommodation. The Company's orders, written with the participation of Mr. Wheler himself, afforded more than a plea for the former, since they declare that the dismission of Rajebullub was unjust, and that they were withheld from issuing a positive order for his reinstatement by the single consideration of the injury which it would do to the influence of this government, or, as was certainly their meaning, to that part of the government

by which his dismission had been effected. Mr. Wheler might, and ought in consistency with his own principle, to join me in restoring Rajebullub. He could not oppose it but in opposition to his own principle, and by a declared avowal of a party.

The measure of prolonging the leases of this year to the end of the next was merely of a public nature. It was not possible that I could have a private interest in it, and it was the only way which could possibly be devised in the present state of the Company to prevent the losses with which the revenue was threatened by a six months' settlement. Mr. Wheler opposed both propositions. He called upon me to tell me his intention to oppose that of restoring Rajebullub. He assured me that I had totally misconceived the meaning of the Court of Directors, in supposing that it alluded to the late majority of our Board; that they never had an idea of the kind, but were impelled only by a regard for the credit of this Government, and the consistency of its measures, in the reluctance which they expressed to annul any of its public acts. Such assertions are unanswerable. I contented myself with expressing my concern that, with such good dispositions as he professed, he should be under a necessity to give so early an occasion to the public to conclude that he was already bound by the ties of a decided party; and though I avoided a direct explanation of my own sentiments, yet as I felt, so I think it probable that he may have seen, that I resented the attempt to impose upon me by so shallow a pretext, and that I myself thought of him what I said the world would.

I had not at that time seen his other minute, which is written in the pure spirit of opposition. Both were yesterday read at the Board, and furnished occasion for others upon the subject of the settlement, in one of which I chose to declare what I thought of this new

association. I will send you copies of all these minutes. They are not long, and will prove with better authority than my assertion the spirit which animates our new member. I yielded to a sense of duty when I took the pains to gain his assistance. I exacted no sacrifice or unbecoming concession from him. I desired only that he would support the authority of Government, that he would give it peace, and share its influence and advantages. This was certainly the line which prudence required, whatever his future designs or views might be; for I think it beyond a doubt now that I shall be either recalled or confirmed, and in either case it was for his interest and ease to act in conjunction with the members possessed of the actual rule, while they possessed it. Neither his personal views, nor those which his duty might suggest to him, can be advanced by his writing minutes of dissent, and leaguing himself in an ineffectual opposition; for Mr. Barwell and I can effect any point by my casting voice as completely as if Francis and he united in it; and he must be grossly misinformed indeed if he entertains any hope of change in Barwell's conduct, after the proofs which he has given of his steadiness and fidelity. He has hitherto been my friend from principle, and is more likely to continue such with inclination added to it. I have a pleasure in saying that I am perfectly satisfied with him, and only regret that the second place in the Government is not as optionable to him as the first is to me. But to return to my subject.

I had strong motives to declare my opinion of Mr. Wheler's having committed himself. It is the only excuse which I can have for measures that aim only at the support of my own influence. It cuts off the rights which he would still possess if I allowed him to temporize, and affected not to see it; and he will be the sooner sensible of the *faux pas* which he has committed.

It is surely a gross one. He might have gained the highest pitch of credit here by making himself the bond of peace, he would have had a share in every public measure of Government, and his friends in its emoluments. He is now, and must be, a mere cypher and the echo of Francis, a *vox et præterea nihil,* a mere vote. I am not the least afraid of any consequences from this confederacy. I shall propose the same measures as I should with an united council, and some yet stronger, nor will it be in their power to deprive them of their effect, for there is a wide difference between the opposition of General Clavering, supported by the King, destined to the chair, and invested with a badge of honour; and of men who have no known pretensions but in being the partizans of a cause which was his while he lived to animate it.

Mr. Francis has not been idle, whatever may be his object in keeping alive the opposition. His talents are of a peculiar kind, and he makes most use of those in which his greatest strength lies, in inventing false rumours, and giving them circulation, in exciting opposition to Government, secret suggestions, and in setting friends at variance by secret and incendiary whispers. These are his acts, and remember that it is his enemy who adds, without one generous or manly principle in his whole composition.

I have seen a letter written by him to a gentleman of one of the provincial councils, and by the style it seemed a circular one, which covered a copy of the letter of the Court of Directors to Sir John Clavering, and pointed out the promises contained in it of future changes:—and I have in my possession a translation of the same letter into the Persian language, which I am told, and my authority is good, has been sent to the Rannies of Burdwan and Rajeshahee, to Mahmud Reza Cawn, to Rajah Cheit Sing, and even to Nudjif Cawn.

But people have been too deluded with false promises and menaces when a power existed capable of realizing them, to trust to such feeble artifices at this time.

In a word, Sir, since I could not succeed in my wish to obtain a Council made up of the men of my own choice, I could not desire it to be better composed than it is. The two junior members may tease, but they cannot impede business; and I will venture to promise you, that even the collections of Rajeshahee and Burdwan, where Francis has the greatest influence, and the rannies whom he patronizes have been most active in disturbing and embarrassing them, shall be equal at least at the conclusion of this year to the amount of the last.

We shall assist the Board of Trade with an addition of twenty-five lacs for the article of raw silk in the ensuing year's investment.

Middleton has obtained assignments for 124,00,0000 rupees, a sum exceeding the Vizier's present debt, and all the demands of the year; and as these assignments are unincumbered with other demands, and placed under managers of his own—I mean the resident's own—appointment, I have no doubt of their being nearly realized. By the last ship I will send you a progressive account of the liquidation of the Vizier's debt, and that will afford you sufficient grounds to judge of the future progress of it.

In a Government uncertain as this is in its duration great exertions cannot be expected; but it possesses great internal vigour, and will flourish in spite of faction, so long as those who have the rule of it attend to the currency of its ordinary and regular operations, and no foreign enemy disturbs it.

You will wonder when I tell you, and send you our accompts, estimate of resources, and disbursements to

prove it, that this Government is at this period in a more prosperous state than it has known since its first existence. How far I may attribute this to my own care of it it may not become me to say; but I believe it is well known, that what little was done in the despatch of current business, while the late majority ruled, was dictated by me alone, nor was this part of my prerogative, even in the most violent times, ever denied me. And while I continue in charge of the allowed rule, I trust the Company's interests shall not decline under my management of them.

I must take another time to answer your letters, though I have received but few, and those very short, in the course of this season. I thank you for your advice, and shall provide all the materials of information which you recommend, whether I stay or go.

I am, and shall ever remain, with the truest sentiments of respect and attachment, my dear Sir, your faithful and affectionate friend.

P. S.—I beg of you to show this letter to Colonel MacLeane, General Caillaud, and such other of my friends as you may see. I fear I have not time to write to them.

The Aumeenee Commission, of which so much mention is made in the preceding correspondence, went forth and executed its purpose. It was impossible, however, within the space of time then at Mr. Hastings's disposal, to turn the information thus acquired to any permanent account, so he contented himself with granting for one year more a prolongation of their leases to the zemindars and tenants on the terms which were already in force.

In this he was opposed of course; yet he carried his point by virtue of his own casting vote, and the temporary settlement was completed. Meanwhile there were other arrangements, particularly those which had placed the Nabob of Bengal under the heel of Mahommed Reza Cawn, that greatly troubled him. The Nabob complained bitterly of his own degradation. He was now legally of age, yet within the very precincts of the palace he was powerless; while the Naib Nazim, whom the majority had set over him, treated him with the utmost indignity. Mr. Hastings, after maturely considering this point, determined, in the face of the Court's sanction of the appointment, to reverse it. He has been accused of acting in this case, as in every other where a question of patronage arose, from motives at once corrupt and unworthy. The following letter will, I think, convey a very different impression, and I therefore insert it.

To Francis Sykes, Esq.

Fort William, 23rd April, 1778.

My dear Sykes,—You have already shown so much unmerited kindness to Mahmud Reza Cawn, that I must expect that you will be dissatisfied with the late treatment which has been shown him, until you are acquainted with the motives of it.

My behaviour to him while he was under the displeasure of the Company was as kind as it was possible to be, while I rigidly conformed, as I was obliged to do, to the orders which I received, and those orders, Sykes, were accompanied with private intimations of a sus-

picion that I would not obey them, and even with denunciations of public disgrace if I did not. I received the informations which were produced against him, but I neither sought nor encouraged them beyond the first publication of the Company's orders: I allowed him a fair trial; I showed him every public mark of respect: I permitted him to retain his jagheer, and even employed the influence and powers of Government to assist him in securing the rents of it. In this last instance I went so far as to cause his aumil to be arrested, and kept him a prisoner in the Khalsa, for embezzlement of the collections. At that very time he connected himself with General Clavering and his party, and he did it in the meanest and most adulatory manner, by the unsolicited offer of useful informations to be admitted only to the presence of the General.

What his services have been I cannot with certainty pronounce, but he has been most liberally rewarded for them. To have acted in an open and declared manner against me suited not with his policy, and it at the same time afforded me a decent ground of accommodation with him.

It was not my desire to draw upon me a fresh host of enemies by a vindictive treatment of Mahmud Reza Cawn, when he came afterwards into my power, nor am I vindictive in my nature. But some restitution was due to the Nabob and his family, especially Munny Begum, for the sufferings which they had sustained on my account, and my own credit and influence required it. I could not do this without affecting Mahmud Reza Cawn. All that I meant to do was to give the Nabob the management and control of his own household, and leave Mahmud Reza Cawn, as his Naib, in charge of the public offices of the Nizamut, with the same allowances as he has hitherto enjoyed. This was not taking much from Mahmud Reza Cawn,

nothing ostensible ; but as it required his consent, if he was to be a party in it, and as prudence required that while I allowed him to retain so enormous a power, I should be certain that he would not employ it to hurt me, I suspended my intentions till I could know his on both these points. For that purpose I commissioned Mr. Anderson, who was his friend, to make him an offer of the continuance of the offices which he then held, excepting only the management of the household, with his jagheer and allowances, if he would declare himself satisfied with this arrangement, and solemnly promise to entertain no political connexion which was adverse to me, nor to engage in any intrigues or plans against my interest or authority, while I remained in the Government. I took particular care to distinguish between his connexions of friendship and policy. The former I declared that I freely allowed, but insisted on his relinquishing the latter.

Mr. Anderson executed his commission faithfully to me, and fairly and honourably to him, but without effect. Mahmud Reza Cawn rejected the propositions, affected the tone and dignity of oppressed worth, and even made use of the insolent pretext that I had not written to him a formal letter on the occasion, and therefore he could not give the writing which I demanded. This, indeed, was true, but not strictly true, for I had furnished Mr. Anderson with a paper of credentials written in my own hand. I do not now recollect whether he produced this, or only informed Mahmud Reza Cawn that he had such a paper, but the enclosed paper will show whether he did.

Mr. Andersen having written a very circumstantial narrative of this transaction in three letters, two addressed to me from the city, and one delivered to me in Calcutta, on the occasion of some misrepresentations which Mahmud Reza Cawn had made of him to Mr.

Pattle, I shall enclose them with this, and earnestly recommend them to your perusal.

I must add another weighty reason for the line I took in this affair.

It has been the policy of Mr. Francis, and a most unjustifiable one, to inculcate every report, true or false, by which my influence may be weakened, and people discouraged from confiding in the acts of Government, and excited to oppose them. For this purpose he himself circulated copies of the letters written by the Court of Directors to the late Sir John Clavering, and caused Persian translations of them to be sent to the Ranny of Rajeshahee, the Ranny of Burdwan, Mahmud Reza Cawn, Rajah Cheyt Sing, and even to Nudjiff Cawn. I have in my possession copies of a circular letter written by him with the former, and of the translation. He has his dependants and other instruments everywhere. Mahmud Reza Cawn was the most powerful of his agents, and therefore it was more especially incumbent on me to deprive Mr. Francis of his aid. The first means which I used to effect this you have heard. These having proved ineffectual, and Mahmud Reza Cawn having in effect declared by his refusal of my advances that he would be my enemy, I had no alternative left but to disarm both by the same act; by investing the Nabob himself with the management of his affairs, and divesting Mahmud Reza Cawn of the Neâbut.

I have given you this detail, and I shall do the same to Mr. Becher, to whom I request that you will communicate the enclosed, because I wish to convince both, that I have not been wanting in deference to your inclinations in this instance, and that I have been compelled by unavoidable necessity and in my own defence, to act the part which I have acted towards a man whom you have both distinguished with public marks of your friendship.

CHAPTER VI.

Movements of the Mahrattas—French Intrigues at Poonah—March of Colonel Leslie's Detachment—Preparations against a War with France —Account of the Mahratta States.

INTERESTING as to Mr. Hastings these domestic arrangements might be, and highly important to the Company's welfare, events were already in progress, which were destined to turn the attention of the Governor-general into a new channel, and to open out a wider and a nobler field for the exercise of his great abilities. The state of the Company's relations with the Mahratta powers had again become exceedingly complicated, and a new enemy, as yet indeed disguised, but not on that account the less formidable, was already in the field. Of all these sources of embarrassment, as well as of the intrigues of M. St. Lubin, an emissary, at Poonah, from the French Court, Mr. Hastings was kept regularly informed; and in a series of letters, some officially addressed to Lord North, others written with the freedom of personal confidence to various friends at home, he describes at length both the apprehensions which they excited, and the measures which he judged it expedient to adopt, in order to avert the threatened dangers. It is not necessary that I should transcribe the whole of these letters in the order in which they were composed. Yet as I

am anxious that Mr. Hastings should, as much as possible, tell his own story, I will endeavour to make from them such a selection as shall at once carry on a connected narrative, and place the habits of thinking peculiar to the man in a right point of view. The following appear to me to serve these purposes; and I give them preference to the more formal despatches of the same date; because they at once pass lightly over matters of official routine, and enter into motives and particular transactions, more than could be done in papers intended for the perusal of the King's minister.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 18th August, 1778.

Dear Sir,—Our political history is a very long one. I will give you an abridgment of it if I can.

The treaty of Poorunder was executed the 1st of March, 1776,—I disapproved it. I would have prevented it from being concluded if I could; but I have most scrupulously adhered to it, as I can prove by all the letters written from this Government to that of Bombay, since the death of Colonel Monson, and even since that of Sir John Clavering. Not one article of it, to this day, has been accomplished. Two years passed in appeals from each party to the Governor-general and Council, and in ineffectual though earnest endeavours on our part to reconcile them. In the mean time the Chevalier de St. Lubin arrived at Poona. This was about the month of May, 1777. He brought letters and presents from the King of France to the young Peshwa, appeared at once in the character of a public minister, and was received with all the honours

due to the representative of a great King. The administration was then in the hands of Succaram Bobboo, and Ballajee Pundit, commonly called Nannah Furneess. These are the same persons who signed the treaty of Poorunder. Nannah Furneess immediately attached himself to St. Lubin, gave him the use of the port of Choul, and entered into private engagements with him, in virtue of which St. Lubin was to bring a military force and stores to Poona, and Nannah Furneess offered the alliance of the Mahratta state to the French nation in return.

This was in effect the only way by which the French could hope to gain their former consequence in India. Their discovery of it, and their success in this first essay of it, were so alarming that I thought it my duty to propose a plan for obviating the consequences in a long and elaborate minute which I laid before the Board on the 26th of January. While this was under consideration, a letter arrived from Bombay, informing us of overtures made to them by Succaram Bobboo, Morabah Furneess, Buchaba Poorunder, and Tuckoojee Holkar, for the restoration of Ragonaut Row, if that presidency would afford him a military escort to conduct him to Poona. To this the presidency readily agreed, requiring only as the previous condition that the confederates would make the requisition in writing under their seals, that of Succaram Bobboo being indispensably necessary to absolve them from the obligation of the treaty with respect to Ragonaut Row. Of this resolution they advised us, requiring our sanction for it, and pleading the urgency of the occasion for engaging so far on their own authority. I instantly proposed that we should authorize the design, and that we should promise them our assistance both in men and money to support the execution of it, and I at the same time sent Mr. Hornby a copy of the pro-

posed resolutions, to prevent the effects of the delays which I expected in passing them. They were passed on the 2d of February, Mr. Barwell supporting them, and Messrs. Francis and Wheler dissenting and protesting.

Ten lacs of rupees were sent to Bombay by bills.

On the 23d of February, orders were issued for forming a detachment, consisting of six battalions of sepoys, and one company of native artillery, to which was afterwards added a regiment of cavalry, and a body of Mogul horse belonging to the Nabob of Oude, for the service of the presidency of Bombay. These were ordered to assemble near Calpy, and to march when formed by the most practicable route to Bombay. Colonel Leslie was appointed to the command. Mr. Barwell, whose advice I have taken in all my measures, concurred in this, Messrs. Francis and Wheler opposed and protested. To avoid repetitions, it will be sufficient to say in this place that all the subsequent measures received the same support and the same opposition.

It was not till the 19th of May that the detachment was able to move. It met with a feeble resistance in passing the river Jumna from the chief of the Mahratta districts dependant on Calpy, named Ballajee. This man has since engaged Aumrood Sing, the young Rajah of Boondelcund, in an opposition to it, and the means they made use of for this purpose were to harass the camp, and interrupt the supplies of provisions; but a spirited and successful attack made on their principal post, at a place called Mow, not far from Chatterpoor, disconcerted their measures, and compelled them to retire to a greater distance. This action happened on the 10th of July. Colonel Leslie was presently afterwards joined by Sernaut Sing, the elder brother and competitor of the Rajah, and since by two other chiefs of that district. The rest of the march will be

easy, and creditable if Colonel Leslie does not entangle himself in the domestic contests of the two brothers, to which his inducements are strong, and his provocations great. He was on the 30th of July at Chatterpoor, where he had been some time detained for the repair of his carriages. He writes that he was then on the point of leaving it. I wish he had. I shall be satisfied if he advances. I do not wish him to be in a hurry. His road lies through Raagegur in a south direction to the Nerbudda. You will find these names in Dury's map.

The presidency of Bombay soon convinced us that they had overrated their own abilities, or wanted constancy to prosecute the design which they had formed. They no sooner received our resolutions, which ought to have inspired them with confidence, than they immediately sent an order to Colonel Leslie to suspend his march, alleging to us their apprehensions of the risk and expense, which were surely not their concern, and the dissents of two of their members from their original plan, a strange reason for a majority. Two or three days after they sent another order, revoking the former, but took no steps either to avail themselves of the influence of this expected aid, or of the distractions at Poona, which they might have converted to any purpose that they had chosen.

The projected revolution took effect, but without their aid or participation, and without any benefit to Ragonaut Row. Moraba Furneess assumed the executive charge of government, by the exclusion of Nana Furneess, whom he soon after consented to readmit in an inferior station, and a letter was written to this Government by the Peshwa, formally notifying that the ministry now consisted of Succaram Bobboo, Moraba Furneess, and Nana Furneess.

Moraba Furneess, adopting the policy of his prede-

cessor, renewed the connexion with St. Lubin, who gave him assurances of the arrival of a French force before that expected from Bengal.

Despairing of any effect from the irresolute acts of the presidency of Bombay, I turned my attention to another quarter, to which I had looked as a resource from the beginning of these movements. This subject I shall take up from an early period.

In the year 1773, a Vackeel was deputed to me by Shawbajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, with distant overtures for an alliance with the Government of Bengal. Finding the Vackeel intelligent, I sent him back with instructions to propose to his master the conditions of an alliance similar to that which I had just formed with the Nabob Shuja Dowla, which I have reason to believe was regarded universally as honourable to him, and advantageous to both parties. While the Vackeel was on his return, his master was slain in an engagement with his brother Moodajee who succeeded him. This put a stop to the negociation, and the revolution which followed it in this Government compelled me to desist entirely from the prosecution of it. An intercourse of letters subsisted between the two Governments, and I privately encouraged the Vackeel to keep the plan alive, reserving the execution of it to a more favourable opportunity.

At length he returned with similar offers from Moodajee Boosla to those which he had before brought from Shawbajee, but these were general and unapplied, and I was not in a condition to act upon them.

When the troubles in the west of India began to show themselves, foreseeing that we should be drawn in to bear a part in them, I resolved to take such preparatory measures as might secure the assistance of Moodajee on such an event. He had been adopted by the former Rajah of Sitarra, Sâhoo Rajah, and de-

signed for his successor in the sovereignty of the Mahratta state, to which he had also pretensions by blood. Ballajee, the actual Peshwa, or minister of Sâhoo Rajah, defeated this disposition, and raised Ram Rajah, the late Rajah, to the musnud in his stead. Râgoojee, the father of Moodajee, a man famous in the history of these provinces, instantly marched a powerful army to Poona, in vindication of his son's rights, but relinquished them in consideration of many valuable concessions which were made to him by Ballajee, still, however, reserving them for a future occasion. It was stipulated that Râgoojee should be allowed to continue the use of the deceased Rajah's name on his public seal, which practice is continued at this time. From that period the family of Ballajee has exercised the sovereign authority of the state, the Rajah becoming a cypher; and the Boosla family have held their vast territories, which extend from the bay of Bengal to the defiles of Berhanpoor and Poona, in their own right and independent.

In the month of January, news arrived that Ram Rajah, whose health had been some time declining, was dead. Moodajee's Vackeel immediately wrote to the Dewan of Moodajee, with whom he was in confidence, advising him to engage his master to assert his pretensions to the succession, and to solicit our assistance. I wrote to the same person a letter containing intimations to the same effect. These despatches were dated the 14th of January, a fortnight before the receipt of the plan formed at Bombay in favour of Ragonaut Row.

As soon as it was resolved to send a military force to Bombay, I wrote a letter to Moodajee, desiring his permission for its passage through his territories. To this I received an early reply, expressing his hearty consent, and informing me that he had signified the same in a letter to Colonel Leslie, and had sent a

person of consequence with a body of horse, and a large store of grain for the use of the detachment, to the banks of the river Nerbudda, with orders to escort it through his territories. There the escort and stores have been waiting these three months. Letters received at the same time from the Rajah and his Dewan to the Vackeel pressed his speedy return to Berar. I accordingly gave him his dismission, with orders to accompany the army on its route, and since to leave it, and return forthwith to his master, who has repeatedly written for his attendance.

While the detachment continued on this side of the Nerbudda, there was no occasion to change the original order for its destination, nor to enter upon any measures for employing it on a new service. It was still on the road to Bombay, and might proceed if its presence should yet become necessary there: it would be on the spot to execute any plan of operations that might be formed in concert with Moodajee, if the first design should totally fail: and if that object also escaped us, it would be happily nearer in that situation to our own frontier, and nearer even to Calcutta, than it was in its point of departure at Calpy. I therefore resisted the almost daily importunities of the two junior members of the Board for its recall, and I waited for a clearer disclosure of the events on which its final determination should be concluded.

But when the news arrived of a war actually declared between Great Britain and France, it was no longer a time to temporize, but to take speedy and decided measures. The French had laid the foundation of an establishment in the heart of the Mahratta state, and might soon acquire the command of all its powers and resources, unless means were early taken to dislodge them before they were in a capacity to act with vigour in the prosecution of their designs.

To you, Sir, I am sure it will be unnecessary to mul-

tiply arguments to prove that if St. Lubin should succeed so far in his views as to bring 500 European soldiers, or even a less number, to Poona, with arms and stores, and officers to discipline a corps of native troops, and time were allowed them to accomplish it, that party, which soever it might be, that had possession of the Government at the time of such a junction, would soon be in a condition to reunite all the dissipated parts of that great empire, to command peace and obedience at home, and to spread terror over all Hindostan. Conducted by its new ally, what could hinder it from carrying its ravages into the province of Oude, or even from attempting to dispute with us the possession of Bengal?

If the presidency of Bombay was before unable to execute the design which it had so eagerly formed, less was yet to be expected from them on the eve of a war which threatened it with its first effects. This was an additional motive to look for other resources. I resolved, therefore, to propose an immediate negociation with Moodajee Boosla, for an offensive and defensive alliance. It passed with the usual division, and Mr. Elliott was appointed with unanimous consent to conduct it.

I will not abstract his instructions. They are a number in the packet, and I wish you to read them.

Mr. Elliott left Calcutta on the 20th of July, and I expect that he will arrive at Naugpoor, the residence of Moodajee Boosla, by the middle of next month at farthest. I wish him to be there before Leslie passes the Nerbudda. It is an anecdote worth relating, that at Cuttac, Elliott overtook Mr. Chevalier, and prevailed on the Naib to assist in seizing him. Though the effect of much address, this is a proof both of the sense which Moodajee's dependants have of his attachment to our Government, and of that attachment.

By very late advices from Bombay we have been informed of another quiet revolution at Poona, which has replaced Nana Furneess in his authority, and new overtures have been made in consequence to the presidency of Bombay, which they had unanimously resolved to accept, and to carry into execution in September. It is a long story, but it will come to nothing, and is not worth telling.

I return to Elliott's commission. It is proposed that a stipulated number of battalions, and perhaps a company of native artillery, shall be maintained for the service of the Government of Berar, and paid by a monthly subsidy; and that this force shall be stationed on our own frontier, ready always for immediate service. These may be considered as in effect forming, with the Berar troops, a strong and complete army of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, (the latter reputed the best in India,) in the very centre of all India. I wish you to look at Naugpoor in the map for the best illustration of this. They will prove a vast augmentation of our military strength without an addition of expense. The residence of such a concourse of people as will be formed by the troops and their followers on our frontier will bring the western division by degrees into cultivation: it is now little better than a desert, though equal in fertility to the best peopled lands in Bengal. It will open a communication by land with Bombay, and it will finally complete the defence of our possessions by an insurmountable barrier on that side of them.

These, my dear Sir, are not reasons forcibly collected to defend a desultory measure; but the original motives on which it was projected, and confirmed by the reflection of four years in which this subject has occupied my attention; and I hope this consideration will give them the greater weight.

Add that an extension of our military influence not effected by a diminution of internal and domestic strength, is exempt from the great and only objection to which such remote exertions of power are almost always liable.

I shall here close the subject, and shorten the remainder of my letter by enumerating what we have done for the security of Bengal, in the event of a war, in distinct heads :—

1. On the 7th of July we received intelligence from Mr. Baldwin at Cairo, that war had been declared on the 18th of March in London, and on the 30th in Paris. The proofs of this came so well attested that we ventured to proceed upon them as a certainty. We on the same day wrote to the Governor of Fort St. George to prepare for the immediate attack of Pondicherry, and we set them an example on the 10th by the capture of Chandernagore.

2. On the 20th, Mr. Elliott was deputed to Naugpoor with offers of alliance to the Government of Berar, as above recited.

3. We have empowered the presidency of Fort St. George to enter into a treaty of alliance with Hyder Ally, who had solicited it. This will at least divert him from engagements with the French.

4. We have ordered a provision of military and victualling stores equal to three months' consumption to be laid up in Fort William.

5. We have ordered the works at Budge Budgia to be completed, and additional works constructed, not merely such as may retard the approach of an enemy, but such as may enable us to oppose their whole force.

6. We have ordered our army to be augmented with nine new battalions of sepoys, of which I reckon three by this time completed; and expect the others to be fit for service by the month of February at the latest.

7. We had before augmented our battalions with eighty rank and file in each battalion, with a view to replace the troops detached to Bombay. These may be reckoned a fund, supported at a small expense, of sepoys capable of being drafted at once into nearly four ready disciplined battalions on the old establishment of 700 men in each.

8. We have required the Rajah of Benares to contribute, as his share of the burthen of the war, the maintenance of three battalions of sepoys, computed at five lacs of rupees yearly; and he has consented.

9. We have agreed to augment the artillery corps with two companies of Europeans, and with four battalions of native artillery men. This is rather a new arrangement of our present strength. The first are a deduction from the regiments: the last will be composed, with some addition, of the Lascars, with the advantage of discipline given to their former laborious duties.

10. The following is the distribution ordered of our military force:—

At the presidency two complete brigades, with all the artillery corps, except one company of Europeans, and three of natives.

On our south frontier, three battalions of sepoys to form an army of observation.

At Cawnpoor and Chunar, for the defence of the province of Oude, one complete brigade.

At Tuttehgur, for the defence of the Doaub and Rohilcund, the temporary brigade, consisting at present of nine battalions of sepoys, two regiments of horse, and two companies of native artillery.

11. We have agreed to form a marine establishment for the protection of the river. It will consist of a frigate and three cruisers as a permanent force, to

which other vessels will be added for occasional services. This force will be of great use in repelling the almost annual incursions of the Muggs, a contemptible enemy, but the scourge of this province from time immemorial.

12. We have manned and armed two fine vessels of forty guns each, to reinforce the little squadron under the command of Sir Edward Vernon. These will sail within this month.

13. We have embodied the militia to the number of 1,000 men. Their services will be employed in the defence of the garrison in case of an invasion, and will be of great importance, as they will enable us to detach a proportionate number, or to employ the whole of our regular troops in the field.

14. I will close this enumeration of what we have done by a reference to the enclosed estimate of our resources and disbursements for what we are able to do, if more should be necessary. Our extra expenses will come much within twenty lacs by the close of the year, and will leave us a certain excess of at least two crores.

I shall make no other comment upon the above, but that if the means which we have provided are insufficient for the protection of Bengal against any enemy, or combination of enemies, none can protect it. Mr. Francis affects to regard them as insufficient, our resources already exhausted, a French invasion as certain and impending, and the country incapable of resistance. On the first intelligence of the surrender of General Burgoyne's army in America, he delivered a minute to the Board, strongly urging the recall of the detachment intended for Bombay, lest it should undergo the same fate, intimating that the one was portentous of the other. The detachment had suffered much from the heat of the weather, but not so much as a soldier would murmur at, nor more I am certain than I myself

have undergone on many former occasions, though not on military duty; but some miserable sycophant (not an officer of the camp I am certain, because he has given a false description of the soil) wrote a letter in which he painted the effects of the march, and the errors to which he attributed them, in the most frightful colours, adding that 300 sepoys had fallen victims to them. One circumstance of truth served to give an air of authenticity to the representation, the death of Captain Crawford, one of the best officers of the service. From this letter, Mr. Francis extracted what I suppose must have been the grossest part of it, and recorded it without a name in the consultations. You will see the whole of this anecdote in the consultation of the 22d June, in which the anonymous extract was introduced, and in the consultation of the 6th July, which contains a refutation of it. I speak from memory, but I think it appeared that not a single sepoy had lost his life by the march; and from the returns of the same month since received, it is proved that only —— sepoys died in the whole month, though this exaggerated affair happened on the 2d.

Such are the artifices by which this dangerous man supports a sinking cause, and his agents disperse and improve his inventions. It is a fact, nor will he dare to deny it, that he sent copies of the letter written by the Court of Directors to General Clavering, in circular letters to the provincial stations, and translations of it to the Rannies of Burdwan and Rajeshahee, Mahmud Reza Cawn, Rajah Cheit Sing, and even to Nedjif Cawn, and to the Court of Shah Aalum. I have copies of both in my possession. What was this but an invitation to the world to place no confidence in the present Government, and to its subjects to disobey its authority?

In all our distant military quarters, and civil sta-

tions, I find it currently believed that a French armament is actually on its way to Bengal, and I suspect that this persuasion owes its birth to the same fruitful brain.

I am for my own part confirmed in the opinion which I have long entertained, and I conclude that some of my letters to you must have expressed it, that Bengal is incapable of an invasion by sea. The season of the year in which an army must begin its operations in this country; the season of the year in which the winds will allow it to arrive; the number of which it must consist to encounter such a force as we possess with the resources of the country at our command; the number of ships of force and transports requisite for such an enterprise; the unavoidable length of the voyage occasioned by the necessity of their sailing in concert, and, of course, retarding each other; the sickness and deaths which must be expected to affect such numbers confined in crowded ships, and exposed on their landing to an unwholesome climate, and at the worst season of it; the want of cattle, artificers, and coolies, and fifty other wants with which I want time and recollection to complete the catalogue; all render the attempt improbable, and if made, reduce it to a certainty of miscarriage. They will, if they ever attempt the invasion of Bengal, make their way to it by an alliance with one of the powers of the country, and the only power with which that is at present capable of being effected is the Mahrattas. I will not lengthen my letter by entering on other subjects, nor apologize for the length of it, because I think it contains much useful information. I am ever, with the sincerest friendship and attachment, my dear Sir, your most faithful and obedient servant.

The preceding letter seems to me upon the whole abundantly intelligible, that is to say, it

describes very fully the nature of the writer's position, as well as of the plans which he was forming; but there are frequent allusions made in it of a succession of revolutions at Poonah,—which, without some explanation, might puzzle the ordinary reader. On his account I therefore insert the following. Repetitions it doubtless contains; but then it places the history of the events in a distinct and connected point of view, and will hinder the necessity of a great deal of explanatory remarks hereafter.

To LAURENCE SULIVAN, Esq.

Fort William, 23rd August, 1778.

Dear Sir,—I desire you will not be alarmed at the bulk of the accompanying letter. It contains the history of our late transactions with the Mahrattas, the appointment of Colonel Leslie's detachment, and Mr. Elliott's embassy to Naugpoor; and will give you a succinct and comprehensive view of our political state which you will with difficulty collect from our general letters, and the diffuse materials of our consultations.

I have added a recital of the measures taken for the defence of the provinces.

Some time ago I drew up a brief state of the Mahratta constitution, and have since added, as they happened, the changes of the ministry of Poona, and other events in our own government which have a relation to theirs. I send it enclosed, and recommend it to your perusal. It is a necessary introduction to the history of the Mahrattas, and will enable you to read the accompanying letter without confounding your attention and memory with unretainable names.

I also send you an account of our quick stock. It is

less than the last by twenty lacs. You will observe that we have sent that sum in extra supplies to Bombay and Fort St. George. I believe on recollection the Bombay remittance was accounted for in the last.

I have left no time for other letters. Will you be so kind as to let Mr. Dunning and Mr. Pechel see the accompanying letter?

I know that I may expect from your friendship every thing within the compass of your power. I require no more than your protection against the illiberal strokes which are aimed at my character in the general letters. I solemnly declare that I would cheerfully resign my place, let a man of worth and honour be my successor. But you hurt yourselves and your own affairs, by treating with indignities the man whom you leave in charge of your interests, and of the national credit in India. I am, my dear Sir, your faithful humble servant.

P.S. Once more let me beg of you to read the enclosed with attention. I know I shall be censured. All new and untried measures must expect general disapprobation; and I do not doubt that there are many who will laugh at my apprehensions of a French invasion from Poona. When the Shahzada first entered Bengal, and fled from the approach of Colonel Clive, I wrote to the Colonel an opinion that the prince might renew his attempt the next year, and waiting for the near advance of our army, pass it, and enter Bengal through the hills. I received a friendly letter a few days after from Scrafton, advising me to be more guarded in venturing to give my sentiments on public affairs, assuring me that my last suggestion had exposed me to much ridicule in the colonel's family, it being notorious (and he wondered that I should have been inattentive to it) that the mountains were an impenetrable barrier to Bengal. The next

season the Shahzada did pass our army, did enter Bengal through the hills, and in the course of six months after, different detachments of our army traversed this impenetrable barrier in four different tracks. Such is the lot of speculative conclusions not agreeing with common experience.

While you form your judgment on my political conduct, allow these two reflections to have their weight in deciding it: 1st. The invention of man cannot discover any private interest which I can possibly derive either from the extraordinary efforts which have been made by this government for the support of the presidency of Bombay, or from the alliance offered to Moodajee. Accepted from him it might have been liable to the suspicion of a private bias. 2d. No man in England or in India has more studied the political state of India and of its different powers than I, nor has possessed equal opportunities of knowing it; and as a proof that my judgment is not lightly led, if ever your curiosity should incline you to read a paper of reflections which was sent with one of our general letters from Fort St. George, in the year 1771, you will find an inference which I therein drew from the state of the Mahratta government at that time, most accurately verified by the events which have since befallen it.

The following narrative was enclosed in the above letter:—

A short View of the Mahratta State, and a Narrative of Occurrences relating to it, begun and continued at different periods.

1.

FEBRUARY, 1778.—The constitution of the Mahratta government is despotic.

The sovereign has the title of Rajah and is hereditary.

The first officer of the state under him is styled Peshwah, a title answering to that of visier in the Mahommedan government, the whole executive administration being conducted by him under the authority of the Rajah.

The next principal officers of the state are the Dewan, the Ferd Nuveess (called contractedly Furneess) and the Buxy Seena Saheb.

The Dewan is invested with the general charge of affairs under the Peshwah; the Furneess with the charge and collection of the public revenues; and the Buxy Seena Saheb with the accounts and pay of the army.

All these offices, which we may suppose to have been originally temporary, and dependant on the will of the sovereign, have been for some years past hereditary. The Rajah lost his authority, and the Peshwah assumed virtually the place of the sovereign, leaving only the show and name of sovereignty to the Rajah. In the present state of the government there are two gradations of power between the real and nominal possession of it. The Rajah is a cypher, and a prisoner in the fortress of Sitarra. The Peshwah is an infant, and the government is administered wholly by the Dewan and Furneess.

The following are the names of the persons composing the present government.

Ram Rajah	The Rajah.
Mhadew Row Narrain. .	The Peshwah.
Succaram Bobboo . . .	The Dewan.
Bullajee Pundit, or Nannah Furneess . .	The Ferd Nuveess.

Succaram Bobboo has the charge of the infant Peshwah, concerns himself but little in the ordinary affairs of the state, resides constantly in his strong fortress of Poorunder, and is very aged and infirm. His

credit is high in the general estimation of the Mahratta nation.

Nannah Furneess is about 50 years old; has the sole direction of all current affairs, and aspires to the first command, which must devolve to him of course on the death of Succaram Bobboo. His private character and credit have suffered by his connexion with the widow of Narrain Row, who is generally believed to have been with child by him, and to have lost her life by some medicines administered to her by his direction. He has given protection to the chevalier St. Lubin and Mr. Bolts, and has entered into formal engagements with the former, to whom he is said to have granted the port of Choul; and the chevalier in return has promised to furnish the minister with an European force and military stores.

It may be necessary in this place to mention Ragonaut Row,* who, although not a present member of the Mahratta state, has a considerable influence on its movements. He is the uncle of the present Peshwah, and was himself raised to that dignity by the present ministers, and dispossessed by the same persons, after a variable war, in which he was latterly assisted by the presidency of Bombay, and which terminated in his final exclusion by the treaty concluded between the Governor-general and Council of Bengal and the ministers, called the treaty of Poorunder. He has since been allowed an asylum in Bombay.

The policy of the original constitution of the Mahratta government forbad the extension of their territorial dominions, which were very contracted. Notwithstanding the successes which attended their arms, and the incitements of ambition too common to conquerors, this political law continued long inviolate,

* Or Ragoba.—The names are equally used in reference to the same person.

their views never leading them beyond the exaction of an immediate imposition of a tribute called a chout, or a fourth part of the estimated revenues of such countries as were subdued; and this in the course of time became general from most of the states in India.

Their resources of wealth by such means were simple, and unembarrassed with territorial arrangements. Their own country was easy of defence, because it was compact and contracted in its boundaries; and their armies numerous in proportion to their immense revenues.

By degrees they departed from this policy, and, urged by the ambitious and interested views of individuals, began to extend their territorial possessions. From that time the decline of their state may be dated; their government no longer retaining a consistent system of measures, but becoming a disjointed union of different interests and dependencies.

The present state of the Mahratta dominions is as follows:

The ministers are in possession of Poonah and the districts lying round it.

The Booslah family possess Berar and Nagpoor, totally independent. Mhadajee Sindia and Tuckoojee Hoolkar hold the countries extending from Candaish and Guzerat to the banks of the Jumna, tributary, when the government is in a state to exact it, but at present independent. Futty Sing Goicwar possesses half of the province of Guzerat, also independent. The other moiety belongs to the Peshwah, or his ministers.

The three last chiefs are known by the appellation of the Jagheerdas.

There is a third person of great influence in the present constitution of the Mahratta government, Miraba Pundit, the nephew of Ballajee Pundit, and

distinguished like him by the title of Furneess. He is reputed to be a man of prudence and abilities, and to stand the next in succession to his uncle. In the present contests he has avoided all concern and interference with either party, professing an attachment to Ragoba, but declining to take any active part in his behalf.

In the month of May, 1777, the chevalier St. Lubin arrived at Poonah, with a letter and presents from the King of France to the Peshwah. Nannah Furneess, finding him a fit instrument for his designs, entered into a close engagement with him, promising him the alliance of the Mahratta government with the crown of France, and granting him the immediate use, with a promise of future possession, of the port of Choul; and St. Lubin on his part has engaged to assist the minister with a military force and stores. A gentleman of St. Lubin's suite was despatched to France with letters to this effect by the way of Bussorah. Whether this, or any other cause, alarmed Succaram Bobboo, who had for a long time been on ill terms with Nannah Furnees, or whether other appearances made him apprehensive of the danger of persisting in the form of government established by him and his colleague, is not certainly known. For some time past Mr. Mostyn* seems to have seen the symptoms of a revolution impending, and to have prepared the government of Bombay to bear their part in it. Accordingly on the 10th December, Mr. Hornby received a letter from Mr. Lewis, Mr. Mostyn's deputy at Poonah (himself being then at Bombay) advising him of a confederacy formed by Succaram and others to remove Nannah Furneess from the administration, and to restore Ragonaut Row to his authority, if the English would join them. Mr. Hornby communicated this propo-

* The resident deputed from Bombay.

sition to his council, and they unanimously resolved to accept it, if it came properly authenticated by an invitation in writing under the hands and seals of the confederates. Mr. Lewis was directed to signify this to them, and a letter was written dated the 12th December, to the Governor-general and Council of Bengal, to inform them both of what had passed, and of the design which was in agitation.

The parties in this confederacy are Succaram Bobboo, Miraba Furneess, Tuckoojee Holkar, and Butchaba Poorunder, a man of considerable note and influence. Mhâdajee Sindia, the associate of Tuckoojee Holkar, as a paper of news mentions, was at the distance of 60 coss from Poonah, but is probably in the same interest. Each of these chiefs commands a force of about 10,000 horse. It is not said whether there are any other troops in the neighbourhood of Poonah. Hurry Punt Furkia, the Commander-in-chief of the Mahratta forces, was on the borders of the Carnatic at the distance of 450 miles from Poonah with an army of 40,000 horse, engaged in a war with Hyder Ally; between whom we have been since informed that a battle has been fought, in which the Mahratta general was totally routed.

Such was the state of affairs in the west of India by the last advices. The Governor-general and Council of Bengal have declared to the presidency of Bombay their approbation of their plan, and have promised to support it, if it is carried into execution.

2.

20th April, 1778. The preceding statement was drawn up in the beginning of February. The events which have since intervened or been made known to us up to this time, being the 20th of April, are few, and have occurred in the following order.

On the 14th of December news arrived at Poonah of

the death of Ram Rajah. The succession is yet uncertain. It is said that the ministers intend to bestow it on a youth who was adopted by the late Rajah Moodajee Boosla, formerly adopted by Rajah Sâhoo, the predecessor of Ram Rajah, and a descendant of that family by blood; has strong pretensions, a powerful influence, a revenue of 150 lacs, and an army of 30,000 men to maintain them.

The confederacy has produced nothing. Its operations remain suspended, with little appearance of its existence, but in the division and intrigues of Nannah Furneess and Moraba.

Hurry Punt Furkia, the Commander-in-chief of the Mahratta forces, has been defeated with great loss, and the defection of a part of his army, in two engagements with Hyder Ally.

The chevalier St. Lubin remains at Poonah with the same influence, and is admitted to long and secret conferences with Nannah Furneess, who has placed guards in the house of our resident, and treated him, as the resident complains, with other indignities.

Mr. Belcombe, the governor of Pondicherry, has sailed with a large suite, 100 European soldiers, and a large quantity of military stores to the Malabar coast; professing only the design of examining the French settlement and fort of Mahé.

On the 23d of February orders were issued here by the Governor-general and Council to form a detachment, consisting of six battalions of sepoys, and one company of native artillery, under the command of Colonel Leslie, to rendezvous near Calpy, and to march to Bombay. It has not yet marched.

3.

Continuation of events from the 20th of April, to the 16th of August, 1778.

16th August, 1778. On the 26th of May, the con-

federates, suddenly assembling their forces, proclaimed Ragonaut Row's authority in the city of Poonah, and excluded Nannah Furneess from the administration, placing Moraba Furneess in his stead. Nannah Furneess was soon after readmitted in an inferior character, and a letter was addressed to the Governor-general of Bengal by the Peshwah, formally notifying the accession of Moraba to the administration, now consisting of Succaram Bobboo, Moraba Furneess, and Nannah Furneess.

This quiet revolution made little alteration in the Mahratta affairs. Ragonaut Row, whose name had been used as its first sanction, seemed to be totally forgotten. Moraba, succeeding as well to the politics as to the place of Nana, gave the same countenance to St. Lubin, who received his dismission in form, but still remained, renewing the engagements with Moraba which he had before made withhis predecessor, namely, that he would bring a regiment of Europeans with its complement of guns and stores, which he promised should arrive before the English detachment from Bengal.

On the 19th of May the detachment began to move, the first division passing the river Jumna at Calpy. It met with a feeble opposition from a body of Mahratta horse on the other shore. These were soon dispersed, and an accommodation concluded with their chiefs.

On the 22d of May the detachment left Calpy, taking the route of Boondelcund and Berar Its progress has been slow. The young Rajah of Boondelcund, instigated by Ballajee, the Mahratta chief of Calpy, assembled a considerable force to oppose its progress, endeavouring principally to intercept its supplies of provisions. This made it necessary to treat them as enemies. They were attacked and de-

feated with great slaughter, the loss on our side being only five sepoys killed, and twenty-seven persons of different ranks wounded. The action happened on the 10th of July at a fortified town called Mow, near Chatterpoor.

The detachment lay at Chatterpoor on the 24th of July, the date of our last advices, and was preparing to proceed, having been necessarily detained there for some considerable time to repair its carriages, and other necessary operations of the camp.

The rest of the march to the river Nerbudda is not likely to be attended with much difficulty, the rainy season being as favourable as the violent heats have proved adverse to the troops.

The Rajah of Berar, to whom an early application was made for his permission for the detachment to pass through his country, and to assist it with provisions, has long since caused a store of grain to be prepared for it on the banks of the Nerbudda, where his territory begins, with a party of cavalry, and a man of note to escort it.

On the 18th of July Mr. Elliott was deputed to Naugpoor, the capital of Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, with instructions to negociate a treaty of alliance with that prince. It is expected that he will arrive there before the middle of September.

Orders have been sent to Colonel Leslie to halt within the dominions of Berar. His future progress and operations will depend on the issue of Mr. Elliott's negociation.

On the 15th of August, advices arrived from Bombay, reporting that Nannah Furneess, having recovered his influence through the means of Mahdajèe Sindia and Tuckoojèe Hoolkar, had compelled Moraba to surrender to him the ensigns of his office; Moraba had in consequence applied to the govern-

ment of Bombay to afford their immediate assistance to conduct Ragonaut Row to Poonah, with sundry articles subscribed by himself and Butchaba Poorunder, one of the former confederates, Tuckoojee also agreeing by a separate declaration in writing to the same. These proposals were carried to Bombay by Mr. Mostyn, the Company's resident at Poonah. The select committee approved of them generally, and unanimously resolved to conduct Ragonaut Row to Poonah, but to defer the execution of their design till the month of September, expecting by that time to receive our authority for it, and the latest advices from England.

The Governor-general and Council have authorized them to execute it, provided it do not endanger their own immediate safety, nor prove contrary to the engagements which may have been formed with Moodajee Boosla by Mr. Elliott, through whom this answer will be transmitted, that he may apprize the presidency of Bombay at the same time of the state of his negociations.

The following needs no introductory observations from me. It tells its own tale, and carries on the thread of the history.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 29th November, 1778.

Dear Sir,—I have suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Mr. Elliott. It happened while he was on the road to Naugpoor. It was impossible to supply his place by a new commission. At the same time the wild conduct of Colonel Leslie deprived me of every hope of effecting any useful purpose with the detachment, while he had the command of it, and the presidency of Bombay had in effect abandoned us, and even their own cause, from the day in which they

were informed that we had espoused it. Judge, my friend, how mortifying my situation was in this disappointment of the three capital points on which I had rested my expectations of success. The first step to be taken was to recal Colonel Leslie. Instead of pursuing the route which had been prescribed him, he loitered away four months in Boondelcund busied in the paltry work of accommodating the domestic contests of that government, and making treaties of alliance with the Rajah and his mean dependants. These were direct infringements of his positive instructions.

On the 7th of October I proposed, and it was unanimously resolved, to recal him. Lieut.-colonel Goddard, his second in command, was appointed to the chief command, with the rank of full colonel for that service only, and letters were publicly written to the Rajah of Boondelcund and his competitors, disavowing the acts of Colonel Leslie, and declaring his treaties invalid.

On the 19th of the same month we were informed of the death of Colonel Leslie.

I waited to hear from Naugpoor before I ventured to decide on the line of our future operations. On the 12th of November I received letters from Moodajee Boosla, written on the first knowledge of Mr. Elliott's death, earnestly pressing me to commit the negociation to his secretary, or any other person by whom it could be executed without loss of time, at the same time intimating that, besides the desire which he before had to be engaged with us, it was now become necessary to his personal security, as a packet from me directed to him had been intercepted and sent to Poonah, and he had been threatened in consequence with hostilities both by the Poonah ministry and Nizam Ally. The letters from his Dewan, who has the chief direction of his affairs, and his Vackeel, a man in my own confidence,

were expressive of a more eager desire to join our detachment, and of the most sanguine hopes of success.

This was all I wanted. I immediately proposed that Colonel Goddard should be empowered to treat on Mr. Elliott's instructions, which was agreed to, Messrs. Francis and Wheler as usual objecting, and Mr. Barwell, with whose advice and hearty concurrence I had made the proposition, confirming it. A few days after, it was agreed to release Colonel Goddard entirely from the authority of the presidency of Bombay, which might interrupt, but could not promote his success. Besides, as the plan which we had adopted had no connexion with theirs, or their government, and required no assistance from them, it would have been as imprudent as unnecessary to afford them the means of defeating it.

I have every reason to be satisfied with Colonel Goddard. He is one of the best executive officers in the service, remarkably lively and enterprising, sensible, and the very reverse of the sordid disposition, and morose and disgusting manners of his predecessor. His only faults are a too great pliancy of temper, and negligence of expenses, and of these he is conscious, and I hope will be guarded against them.

He immediately quitted the detested land of Boondelcund, and without experiencing or expecting any of the many impediments which his predecessor had so long complained of, continued his march in peace, with ease and plenty. Where he is now I know not, but shall be able to inform you of the latest advices of his progress before I close my letter.

I am yet unacquainted with the expense which has attended the detachment, as Colonel Leslie would never suffer an account to be sent to us: but he carried with him ten lacs of rupees, and we know that these are consumed.

I earnestly recommend to you the perusal of Mr. Elliott's, now Colonel Goddard's instructions, and look at Dury's map for the city of Naugpoor while you read them. You will find it the exact centre of all our possessions and connexions in India.

The expulsion of the French influence from the Mahratta state, and the establishment of our own in its stead, were our objects in our first adoption of the Bombay plan; and they equally form the grounds of this. I hope it is no longer necessary to vindicate it against the imputation of a breach of public faith. The ministers of Poonah were the aggressors by the engagements formed by them with the chevalier de St. Lubin, and of these we have evidence that would convict them by the verdict of a petty jury if they could be tried by one. Trust me, the design cannot fail, and if it should be attended with no other advantage than the subversion of the present administration at Poonah, even that will be worth more than the expense and risk of it. But I hope it will be attended with the most solid and lasting advantages. If I continue in this government it shall. I will at least leave it with credit, if the end answers my expectations, and with the conscious satisfaction of having shown what the powers of this government could effect if properly supported by what they have done under all the discouragements of a divided government, and the means which have been used both here and at home to weaken the hands which held the executive management of it.

I do not write on other subjects. Nothing else has lately occurred worth the relation of it.

I am, with the most unfeigned regard and attachment, dear Sir, your most obliged and faithful servant.

The death of Mr. Elliott was a severe blow to Mr. Hastings,—he mourned the calamity both

upon public and private grounds: on public grounds, because the service of the Company never brought forward a young man of more promising abilities; on private, because Mr. Elliott was to him dear as his own soul. Yet it was not the only misfortune which threatened at this period to overtake him. Just as Colonel Leslie's feebleness seemed to have put in danger the success of a great enterprise, Mr. Barwell, through whose co-operation alone he had hitherto been enabled to carry on the Government, avowed his determination to return home. There was no coolness between him and Mr. Hastings; they never differed in their general views, they were as familiar and confidential as ever. But Mr. Barwell, having acquired a moderate fortune, expressed himself anxious to retire from public life; a wish which was earnestly, and not unnaturally, fostered by a sister to whom he was greatly attached. I find among Mr. Hastings's papers, a long letter addressed to that lady, in which urgent reasons are set forth why she should abstain from pressing her brother's return; and rather use her influence to keep him at his post, at all events till Sir Eyre Coote, the new Commander-in-chief, should have arrived. I think, however, that the following to his friend Mr. Sulivan deserves more than this to be inserted, because it speaks more plainly than the writer could do to a lady, and touches besides on other subjects of importance.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 9th December, 1778.

My dear friend,—The packets of the Calcutta and Gatton arrived yesterday, and brought me your welcome letter of the 20th of April, the first that I have received from you, or indeed from any of my friends, this season. I fear that my letters by Mrs. Thomson have all miscarried, as I gave Mr. Woodman particular injunctions to send expresses to me by the way of Suez immediately, and as often as anything occurred which it might be useful for me to know; and to consult you both as to the times and materials.

The most comfortable circumstance in your letter is, that you find your seat in the direction easy. You must have an ascendant in it with the knowledge that you possess, and which your other colleagues certainly want. Is it to the first growth of this influence, or to a veering of the wind, that I am to ascribe the wonderful change in the two last general letters which, instead of the gross abuse lavished upon me in all the former, contain not a word that has any relation to me. good, bad, or indifferent?

Coote's declarations to you accord with those which he formerly made to my poor Elliott. They are sincere I doubt not. I shall give him no cause to retract them; on the contrary he shall have all he wants. and more than he probably expects. I only fear the aptitude of his temper to yield to incendiary impressions, and Francis is the vilest fetcher and carrier of tales to set friends, and even the most intimate, at variance,—of any man I ever knew. Even the apparent levity of his ordinary behaviour is but a cloak to deception.

I owe much to Barwell, and to his steady friendship, and I believe he is convinced of the sense which I have of it. But I fear that his friends are not so reasonable as he is, and that they will prevail to destroy all the

fruits of our connexion. It has been an unfortunate one for our common enemies, and I do not wonder that they should seek to dissolve it. I think I see the symptoms of such a change in his friends, though not in him. He has been hard pressed to go to England. He has been told that his importance suffers by his being only the second character of a party; that people impute his attachment to me to the necessity of screening his conduct from inquiry; that all persecutions and prosecutions against him would cease, and the fairest prospect open to him of future advancement on his return to England; and that if he stays he will be precluded from all possible chance of the Government. And that I never will resign it to him. These are arguments most likely to pique a man of pride, and he feels them, though he does me justice. He knows that I have no intention of resigning the Government to him in the heat and crisis of contention; that it would avail him nothing; and that for me to make a pitiful retreat from such a station on the eve of a war, would render me infamous. Besides, my friend, for what have I suffered all my past troubles, and exposed my character, fortune, and constitution, in so unequal a contest? That I might abandon the field as soon as I was master of it. Were I to resign my place it would avail him little, for Francis would possess all the power of it, and Coote when he arrives would be obliged to join him, or forego the command of the army.

Yet shall I tell you that he has declared to me his intention of resigning the service? He says his determination is fixed. Yet I doubt it. I have once stated to him all the consequences of it, but left him to decide for himself, assuring him of my hearty acquiescence. I shall not urge my objections a second time; but if he goes, he shall carry my consent and my friendship with

him undiminished. If the consequences of it should prove bad, he will suffer for them more than I shall. I will stay—no consideration on earth could induce me to depart at this time, while I have set so many and such great points at stake. I am certain that the first use that Francis would make of his authority would be to recall Colonel Goddard, and to revoke his commission, and I would rather suffer death than yield to it. Let me but see the end of this affair, I care not what may afterwards befall me.

I hear that the Stafford sailed from the Cape for Bombay about the time that these ships left it. Sir Eyre Coote then must be before this arrived, and I have many fears that the gentlemen of that presidency will engage him in some design to thwart the expedition.

You must not be surprised to find our treasury less abundant than it has been. Our expenses have been augmented, and we have lost some of our resources—great additions have been made to our military establishment—our marine is an entirely new charge. We have sent ten lacs to Madras; we are about to send ten more to China. We are ordered to send an extraordinary supply of twenty lacs to Bombay. The Nabob of Oude's debt, the payment of which afforded an annual income of near a crore and a half, is almost cleared off; and we are deprived of our annual allowance of bills, which was fifteen lacs. These reasons have induced us to declare our resolution of reducing our future supplies to the Board of Trade, allowing them a crore and forty lacs for the next year, to answer the provisions of tonnage which will probably be made for us. We certainly could go on some years longer, but not many at the same rate; but it would exhaust the resources which the Government of this country may require for the extraordinary emergencies

of war, and I think you will see with me the impropriety of regulating our annual investments by casual means, instead of proportioning its amount to our certain and natural supplies. I am, my dear friend, your most faithful and affectionate servant.

The most pressing of the apprehensions under which Mr. Hastings laboured when the preceding letter was written were happily allayed. Mr. Barwell consented to remain a little longer at his post; and the means of carrying on the government were not, at so critical a juncture, taken out of the hands which were alone competent to wield them. Yet was Mr. Hastings not without other, and these serious grounds of uneasiness. The Bombay government not only gave him no aid, but they protested against the march of troops from Bengal, and sent orders to their leader that he should halt. Moodajee Bhoosla, likewise, taking advantage of Mr. Elliott's decease, assumed a doubtful tone in reference to the proposed alliance, and would hardly consent either to see Colonel Goddard, or communicate with Mr. Anderson, to whom the Governor-general referred him. Nor, indeed, all things considered, was this greatly to be wondered at, inasmuch as Ragoba's claims had never by him been admitted; and to establish Ragoba in the high office of Peishwah was the avowed object of the movement from Bombay. Mr. Hastings, however, by assuring him that what-

ever the plans of the subordinate presidency might be, those of the Supreme Government took of Ragoba little heed, prevailed upon the Rajah, at last, to re-open the negociation. It was conducted with much reserve on both sides, Moodajee taking care not to commit himself, while Colonel Goddard and Mr. Anderson asked for little more than a safe conduct for the troops through the Berar dominions; and this they so far obtained, that so long as their route lay through Berar, Colonel Goddard's corps suffered no molestation. Beyond Berar, however, they had nothing to depend upon, except their own courage and the judgment of their leader, and in these there was happily no deficiency.

It belongs to the historian of India, not to the biographer of Warren Hastings, to describe the military operations of this period in detail. My purpose will be adequately served, when I state, that the Bombay government, though informed of the proposed co-operation, not only did not wait for the coming of the force from Bengal, but reprobated its coming. Eager to win all the credit for themselves; jealous, too, of what they conceived to be a wanton interference on the part of the Supreme Government; they hastened to equip and put in motion an army of their own, which, commanded by Colonel Egerton, and controlled by certain field deputies, after the manner of the

Dutch of old, had it in charge to conduct Ragoba in triumph to his capital. The results were eminently disastrous. After advancing unopposed to a point within eighteen miles of Poonah, a sudden panic seized the commanders, and the army retreated to a place called Wargam, where they laid down their arms on capitulation. By the terms of that capitulation it was agreed that Salsette, Baroach, and all the other places which they had acquired from the Mahrattas since 1765, should be restored; that Ragoba should be surrendered to his enemies; that the detachment then on its march from Bengal should be ordered to return, and two Englishmen of distinction left in the hands of the enemy, as hostages. Never had so disgraceful an affair occurred since first the English established themselves as a substantive power in the East; and its effects were instantly felt in all quarters of India. A spirit of dissatisfaction on the part both of the Nizam and Hyder Ally, which had long been suspected but heretofore concealed, began to show itself. The Rajah of Berar hung back more and more from the projected alliance. The party among the Mahrattas which was hostile to the English took fresh courage, and the most dependent of all their tributaries and allies put on, in some degree, a change of bearing. Moreover, ample use was made of the reverse by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler,

as well in the council chamber as in their communications with the authorities at home. Mr. Francis, indeed, declared that he had all along been opposed to the war. He required, in a formal minute, that Colonel Goddard's army should be recalled, and predicted that the results of a perseverance in the existing line of policy would bring utter ruin upon the Company's affairs in every part of India.

To say that Mr. Hastings was not affected by this unlooked for calamity would be to speak of him as wanting in the common feelings of human nature. Standing, as it were, on the very brink of a precipice; knowing that his enemies, both among the Directors and elsewhere, were as active as they were powerful; ignorant whether or not he should be continued at all, or if continued, upon what terms in the government, of which the term settled by Act of Parliament was just about to expire; he could not but feel, that independently of its injurious effects upon the best interests of the country, the disaster of Wargaum might, and probably would, be used as an instrument wherewith to work out his political ruin. For Mr. Hastings was not ignorant, that wherever the spirit of faction has gained an ascendency, men seldom pause to inquire into the real merits of a case ere they condemn. There was a clear *primâ facie* charge against him. In the war, which he

was supposed to have promoted, a signal defeat had been sustained; and though the true cause of that defeat was to be sought for in the refusal of the Bombay government to act according to the spirit of his instructions, he, not they, would be sure to reap the blame.

Mr. Hastings was annoyed, but not disheartened. He refused peremptorily to change his plans; and Goddard, pushing on, achieved by his skill and great courage successes which more than made amends for the defeat at Wargaum. Meanwhile fresh armies were organized; one under Major Carnac at Cawnpore, with orders to threaten or invade the dominions of Scindia and Holkar; another under Captain Popham, which should march in pursuit of Goddard, and make good the casualties which he might have suffered during the campaign. This latter detachment, to be sure, was almost immediately diverted into a new line of operations where, much to the surprise if not disappointment of Mr. Hastings's colleagues, it did excellent service; and as the merit of that service may fairly be divided between the head that planned, and the hands which executed the enterprise, it is just that I should give of it a brief account.

Interposing itself between the territories of Scindia and the Nabob of Oude there is a district of hill country, through which runs the river

Jumna, and which was known, at the period of which I am now writing, by the name of Gohud. It was governed by a Hindoo prince, called the Rana, and in the formation of his subsidiary system had not been overlooked by Mr. Hastings. In fact he had entered with the Rana into a treaty of alliance, by which they mutually bound one another to oppose the Mahrattas; and for which Mr. Hastings, as indeed was the case in all his projects, failed not to incur the censure of his colleagues.

Though the Rana of Gohud was quite incapable of resisting, single handed, the feeblest of the Mahratta chiefs, his country, from its position and the natural obstacles which it presented to an invading force, formed a good outwork to the kingdom of Oude. Mr. Hastings, therefore, felt that he was fully justified in taking it under his protection; and when in the winter of this year intelligence reached him that the Mahrattas had broken in, and were distressing his ally, he determined to support him. With this view Captain Popham's corps, instead of following in the steps of Goddard's army, marched upon Gohud. The idea was scouted as a matter of course, for Captain Popham had but a handful of recruits under his orders, and was all but destitute both of cavalry and guns; yet Mr. Hastings persevered, and the end fully justified his anticipations. Captain Pop-

ham, an active and daring soldier, drove the Mahrattas from Gohud, crossed the Sind into their country, laid siege to Lahar the capital of the district of Cutchwagar, and carried it by assault. Having secured these conquests, he turned his attention to Gualior, a fortress planted on the summit of a perpendicular rock, and so strong as to be accounted impregnable, even to an army supplied with a regular battering train. Of this, also, he obtained possession, for his spies having discovered to him a single point where ladders of thirty feet in length could be used, he boldly took advantage of it, and carried the place by escalade. It is impossible to describe the effect produced upon all the powers of India by this achievement. They began to believe that resistance to the English would be useless; and when Major Carnac in like manner moved on, and in spite of himself gained victories over ten times his own numbers, their dismay became complete. Had there been but common prudence elsewhere; had the government of Madras been careful not, at this juncture, to involve itself in a quarrel both with Hyder and the Nizam, Mr. Hastings would have enjoyed the triumph of concluding his Mahratta war on his own terms. Unfortunately for him, however, the case was otherwise, and at the very moment when his hardihood was on the eve of reaping its re-

ward, he found himself suddenly called upon to engage in a new struggle, not for the aggrandizement of the British empire in India, but for its very existence.

Before I carry my reader's attention to the causes and course of the struggle in the Carnatic, it will be necessary to show him, from Mr. Hastings's correspondence, what was the state of that great man's mind during the period now under consideration. For ample as were the sources of uneasiness—occasioned by an extensive war, a divided cabinet, an insecure tenure of office, and the necessity of counteracting the views of a hostile faction at home,—he found, both in the state of the country's finances, and in the constitution and working of the courts of law, very serious grounds of anxiety. Moreover, Mr. Barwell, though he had postponed for a time his wishes to a high sense of duty, could neither be expected nor required to make so serious a sacrifice for ever. No sooner, therefore, was Sir Eyre Coote established as a member of Council, on a footing, as it appeared, of candid and fair dealing with the Governor-general, than Mr. Barwell resumed his project of retirement; being confirmed in the idea by the recollection, that as often as General Coote might choose to declare against them, he and Mr. Hastings were powerless; whereas, whenever it

should be his pleasure to support the Governor, the casting vote of the latter would throw all power into his own hands.

These were great, and, if the expression may be allowed, public grounds of anxiety. There were others scarcely less biting; though, regarded in connexion with the general conduct of the government, of very trivial importance. The party in the Direction which bore no love for Mr. Hastings, though incapable of obtaining against him a sentence of recall, possessed influence enough to harass and torment him on the subject of particular appointments to particular employments. Mr. Hastings, as has been shown elsewhere, removed from their situations Mahommed Reza Cawn, Messrs. Bristow, Fowke, and others; with whom, as avowed and bitter enemies to his person and government, it was impossible that he could hold any confidential intercourse. The Court of Directors insisted that they should all be replaced, without pausing to consider, that supposing, on such points, the head of the government be in error, you cannot thwart his proceedings without at the same time ruining his influence. Moreover, the Court, blinded by prejudice, seemed to forget, that unless there be a perfectly good understanding between the Governor-general and the individual employed by him as resident at the court of a native chief, such resident must, for all the pur-

poses expected at his hands, be worse than useless. For the Indian chiefs neither are, nor were then, unskilful after their own fashion in diplomacy. They were always clear-sighted enough to know how the licensed spies about them stood with their own governments, and they took care either to deceive, or to neglect, and therefore to reduce to the condition of ciphers, those to whom they had reason to believe that their own superiors gave but a limited share of their confidence.

Having premised all this, and stated in few words that General Coote arrived at Calcutta in March, 1779; that he was a wayward and capricious man, dissatisfied with the amount of his allowances, and so full of crotchets, that it was a hard matter to deal with him at all; I go on to make such extracts from Mr. Hastings's correspondence as seem to me best calculated to serve my purpose; in other words, to carry on the narrative of Mr. Hastings's proceedings in something like regular order, while at the same time they bring to light the very motives which swayed him in all his undertakings.

The following extracts from a long letter to Mr. Baber will I think be read with great interest. I cannot venture to print the whole, for it would form a moderate sized volume by itself; and a large portion of it is taken up with reasonings on the propriety of measures which have been

sufficiently noticed elsewhere. But Mr. Hastings seems to me to desire that his real sentiments on every point of disputed policy should be known, and I feel that so soon as this end shall have been accomplished, there will be but one opinion entertained both of his honesty and his wisdom. After pointing out the weakness of the Court's reasoning on the subject of his supposed resignation through Colonel MacLeane, and expressing his anticipations, for fears I cannot call them, that to his door every misfortune which had occurred, even shipwrecks at sea, would be laid; he goes on to argue the question of Mahommed Reza Cawn's reinstatement, and shows that as the measure would be most unwise, so till other reasons for its adoption be pressed upon him more cogent than the Court's arbitrary command, he shall, for their sakes, not less than for his own, resist it. He thus continues: "Hitherto I have confined myself to a very narrow line. I have conformed to the letter of the Court's orders, but rejected the spirit of them. I have proposed, and it has been agreed to, to notify to the Nabob their pleasure. He has refused to comply with it, and I will not force him." Thus the return of the Nabob, now twenty-three years of age, to a state of pupilage is kept in abeyance; not for the gratification of any personal feeling on the part of the writer, but for the following just and statesman-

like reasons :—"To the first executive membe. of their government," continues Mr. Hastings, "the King and parliament have granted a fifth share in the civil administration of these provinces, and a salary of £25,000; on Mahommed Reza Cawn, an alien to the actual government, and equally with myself a foreigner with respect to the country, possessing no natural or acquired rights, nor even the pretensions of service, the Court of Directors have endeavoured to bestow the whole criminal jurisdiction of the provinces, the whole, without participation, control, or responsibility; the guardianship of the Nabob, a man of twenty-three years of age, with an estate in trust of £160,000 per annum, and a salary, including his jagheer, of almost double the amount of that of the Governor-general. Before I will submit to so shameful an imposition on the constitutional dignity of this government, or allow such a prostitution of the trust which the Directors have received for the advancement of the interests of their constituents and the national honour, I will make my appeal to those very constituents, and to the nation."

From this he passes to the consideration of another order, which the Court's letter had contained.

With respect to Bristow and Fowke I shall avow a more liberal principle. I consider the orders respecting

both as attempts to defeat the choice of my constituents and the act of the legislature, and I will declare my resolution not to obey them. Mr. Barwell will support me. In matters of government, in all measures which regard the interests of the Company, I follow implicitly, as I have ever done, beyond any of my predecessors, the line prescribed to me by the instructions of the delegates of the Company. But when they abandon the line of their duty, leave me uninstructed on every point of business, and fill all their letters, which are volumes, with gross invectives against me, and with orders which have no object but to gratify partial favour and personal rancour, they forfeit their title to my obedience. They may prosecute me, and I will defend myself as I can. They may obtain my dismission, and I shall rejoice at my deliverance, if I cannot hold my office but without the means of discharging it. These are my sentiments and my resolutions on the order of the Court of Directors, and I beg the favour of you to communicate them to all my friends, and to whomsoever besides you may judge it for my interest and reputation to make it known.

He next adverts to the subject of his projected alliance with the Rajah of Berar, which had been condemned on the ground that were he raised to the dignity and power of Ram Rajah, the office of Peshwah would fall to pieces, and the Mahrattas, being united under one head, would become again a formidable empire. He says:—

Your objections to the proposed treaty with Moodajee are judicious, and warranted by the obvious view of such a subject. It was my fault that it was not

better and more explicitly detailed to you. It is now unnecessary, and would prove but a work of barren speculation, since the plan and all the fine hopes which I had built upon it are blasted, and I fear beyond the possibility of revival. Yet allow me briefly to say, and with a persuasion which in my own mind amounts to a moral certainty, that the consequences which you apprehend could not have happened; that the same hand which had raised him to the sovereignty of the Mahratta state would have been equally necessary to support him in the possession of it, and even of his existence; that this conclusion may be peculiarly applied to the state of the parties which divide the Mahratta state, and to the present influence which rules it; but that, as a general position, I will venture to pronounce it as an infallible consequence, that the English power in India will never, nor ever can, be employed to raise one superior to itself; and that in every instance the reverse is most to be apprehended, that we shall commence as allies and end as tyrants and despots.

After explaining what were now his own views, namely, to excite against the Mahrattas all such of the ancient Rajahs of Hindostan as still retained their independence, and by giving them constant employment at home to hinder them from making predatory inroads into the territories of their neighbours, he proceeds to say,—

My influence has deserted me where it was essentially wanting for the execution of such a design, and where I had the least cause to apprehend a failure of it. The story is long, let me shorten it as I can.

The General and I parted with mutual professions

of confidence, friendship, and promises of mutual support. I pass other matters. I communicated to him the first overtures from the Rana of Gohud. These contained the same conditions in substance as were afterwards digested and improved into the treaty. He approved the alliance; he approved the treaty; he approved of all the conditions but one, which I, remarking the same exception, had in the meantime corrected, and gave it the very form which he recommended. As soon as this treaty was agreed to, before its execution, I sent him a copy of it, and another in form went from the Board. I wrote a short letter purposely to inform him of Captain Palmer's deputation, the real objects of which I told him were foreign from the professed purpose of it, and I promised him a full explanation of them in a future letter, being then pressed for time, and my head and hands filled with other matters. He received my letter in a fury, answered it with a complaint of the indignity offered to him by delegating such a trust to any other person, which could be better performed by one of his family, and insinuated (assuming the world's opinion, the usual cover in such cases to a man's own) that Captain Palmer, who was a gentleman of mine, could have been deputed only for some mercenary purpose.

Two days after arrived a letter from him to the Board, repeating the same resentment at the deputation of Captain Palmer, and inclosing a protest in form against the treaty, declaring every article of it exceptionable, the whole teeming with certain destruction to the Company; and that any treaty whatever with a man so inconsiderable as the Rana of Gohud was disgraceful and dangerous, &c. Yet I have letters from him containing the completest approval both of the design of the treaty and of the proposed terms of it.

I forgot to tell you that I regularly advised him of

the progress of this business from the beginning to its conclusion; all but my instructions to Captain Palmer, which now remain for Captain Palmer himself to show him—perhaps not.

Mr. Barwell insisted on my keeping back the General's letter and protest till means were taken to bring him to reason; and on my objecting, has taken it upon himself. He has written to the General, stating the fatal consequences of so declared an act of hostility, and entreating him to withdraw them both. In the meantime, they remain in his hands. Mr. Barwell's letter was written on the 3rd instant; the answer may be received by the 20th. I expect it to contain a refusal, and to be accompanied with another letter to the Board, with a charge of suppression. If the influence which rules him, and with which I am well acquainted, should dictate a different conduct, still I can hope for no good from so capricious a man; and the next flight may embarrass me in the very crisis of my projects, and compel me to withdraw them. In either case I shall hesitate before I can resolve on the part which I shall take, for I foresee infinite evils if I recede, and I cannot advance without him.

Lest you should suspect that I have given him some secret cause of disgust, I assure you on my honour that I know of none. I have invariably supported his authority and enforced his regulations, though these are not all conformable to my own opinion, and some against my own practice. I have avoided every kind of interference in the military department, even to private recommendations, and endeavoured by every mark of public attention and personal kindness to secure his confidence. My letters have been all friendly to him, his to me all petulant and suspicious; I know not why or for what. I bear with him, and will bear, for I am lost if he abandons me, my influence,

even with his support, being unequal to the difficulties and dangers which daily grow around me.

The suggestion contained in his last letter to me hurts me too sensibly, because I expect it to be conveyed to England, where it will be implicitly credited; nor shall I descend to refute it, except to my friends, by whom I cannot submit to be regarded in an ungenerous light. To you and to them I expect my affirmation to be accepted for proof. You have the whole of my motives and expectations from Captain Palmer's deputation in his instructions. I have no expectations of any pecuniary advantage from the Rana, nor have I intimated to him or his Vackeel, nor to Captain Palmer, nor to any other, a thought of the kind, nor has any such been ever directly or indirectly suggested to me. I am incapable of selling the Company's alliance, and the man whom I have employed bears too honourable a character to be an agent of so paltry a bargain. But I have no doubt that the wretch who instigated the General to his unworthy treatment of me was himself instigated by the disappointment of some mercenary promise which he had secretly made to himself by being employed in a similar commission.

12. My friend Barwell steadily adheres to me, and has promised to remain in the service so long as his support shall be necessary. My knowledge of his firmness is as useful to me as the application of it; for I can venture, with that reliance, on measures which I should not dare to undertake if I was liable to be thwarted by the caprices of a man of levity. At the same time he possesses much experience, a solid judgment, much greater fertility of official resources than I have, and his manners are easy and pleasant, which I am sometimes inclined to consider as the first accomplishment of a man of business.

13. I shall now proceed to a subject which will require all my skill to confine it within the reasonable compass of a communication by letter. We are upon the eve of an open war with the Court.

Some time in the month of October a summons was granted by one of the judges of the Court against the Rajah of Cossijura, who applied to the Board for instruction. We referred the matter to our Advocate-general, who delivered it as his opinion that the Rajah should be told that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and should not pay obedience to its process. We conveyed this opinion as our answer to the Rajah in a literal translation of the Advocate-general's words.

On the 30th of November, information was made to the Board that a sheriff's officer, with a large body of armed men, had marched to the Rajah's house, of which they had taken possession, seized, sequestered, and sealed up all the effects. An order was instantly sent to the officer commanding at Midnapoor to apprehend all persons answering to the description which had been given of this detachment. A party of sepoys was accordingly sent on this service, and made the whole posse prisoners, consisting of two Court serjeants, two jematdars, fifty-two peons, seventeen men habited and armed as sepoys, and thirteen sailors, also armed with muskets and bayonets as the latter; the whole number was eighty-six. These by a second order were brought to Calcutta, and on their arrival instantly discharged, the Board deeming what they had done sufficient for the preservation of the peace of the country, and for checking the assumption of a new military power independent of the established government. The Rajah complained bitterly of the violation of his zenana, and of his religion, the former having been forcibly entered, the women and children having indeed been

conveyed away upon the first alarm; the door of his temple broken open and his idol taken and packed like a common utensil in a basket, and sealed up with the other lumber. These outrages were verified by an examination which the Board caused to be made on the spot and avowed by the serjeants, who do not appear to have conducted themselves with more violence than men of their rank, unacquainted with the delicacies which the difference of manners and religion requires, might be supposed liable to commit in the literal execution of a writ of sequestration in which these attentions cannot be comprehended; a third order was sent to the commanding officer at Midnapore forbidding him to allow the officer, or any other person employed in this affair, to be apprehended on virtue of any writ of attachment, and notice was given to all the zemindars by an advertisement literally translated from the Act of Parliament, that they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, nor compellable to appear before it, unless they had rendered themselves such, by the cases specified in the Act. This publication was made on information of other writs having issued against the Rajah of Dinagepore, Burboom, Tirhoot, and many other zemindars of less note, the consequences of which we dreaded as no less dangerous to the public revenue and the quiet of the provinces, than the writs themselves appeared irregular and illegal. God knows how far we are right on the last conclusion. I am sure of the former, nor do I believe that the people, who will bear much, would suffer without resistance the outrages to which they would be exposed by such an innovation on those rights which their natural affections, their peculiar sense of shame, and notions of honour, and their ideas of religious purity, render most dear and sacred to them, and which for these reasons have ever been respected

by all, even the most oppressive of the Mogul rulers. For the legal grounds of our proceedings the following are our justifications:—

1. The Act of Parliament and charter give the Court no jurisdiction over any but British subjects, and natives who are or have been British subjects.

2. Zemindars are neither British subjects nor the servants of British subjects.

3. The judges have variously in their opinions, and once in a formal decree, declared that zemindars were not within the description of persons liable to their jurisdiction.

4. They formed an early rule that no summons should issue against any native of the provinces, unless the plaintiff would swear that such native was subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and add in his affidavit circumstances which rendered him so subject. But the affidavit which was taken on the complaint against the Rajah of Cossijura did not state him to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and simply expressed that he was the zemindar of Cossijura, employed by the East India Company in the collection of the revenues of his own zemindarry, which is precisely the definition of a zemindar, every zemindar in the country (with very few exceptions of incapacity) collecting his own revenues, of which a large portion is of course paid to the Government, and of course every zemindar may be said to be employed by the Company in the collection of the revenues of his own zemindarry. Yet against this rule of the Court, established for its own process, against their own repeated opinions, and against the plain sense of the Act of Parliament, the judge before whom the affidavit was taken (Mr. Hyde) did grant the summons.

5. The Company hath furnished us with an Advocate-general for our instruction and guidance in all

cases of legal difficulty, and to his opinion in these instances we have conformed.

I will not weaken the argument by multiplying its supports, and am doubtful of the rest. I doubt only the right of any power of this Government, but that of the Governor-general and Council, to form military establishments, to array them, and to detach them for whatever purpose, and under whatever sanction, into the country.

I doubt the rights of the Court to constitute a form of process for pleas to the jurisdiction, because I find no such process described or right expressed in the charter, and I understand that pleas to jurisdiction bear a different meaning in England, where they are expressly constituted, and are intended to mark the lines of separation between the different Courts which administer the English law, not to exempt any description of them altogether from the authority of the English law.

And I doubt the right of the Court to exercise any jurisdiction, or to perform any act as a Court, without an express sanction for it in the charter.

This is difficult and tender ground for me, and I own I walk with diffidence and with pain upon it. It is a service into which I have been pressed against my will, and I have exerted all my invention to avoid it. When the Board passed their first resolution on the first opinion of the Advocate-general I sent for Cossinant Bobboo, the plaintiff, stated to him the consequences of his persevering in the suit, by which he would be the instrument of a division between the Government and the Supreme Court, and I earnestly besought him to withdraw it. He solemnly promised to withdraw it, but did not.

In an early period of this Government and of the reign of the Court, I bailed the Rajah of Bissinpoor,

who had been, unknown to me, three or four months a prisoner in the common gaol. I bailed the zemindar of Meyhetty; and the Dewan of Rajashahee, an aged man who had survived his intellects. And on every occasion which was likely to involve the Board in contests with the Court, I have taken a moderate and conciliating part.

On the late occasion the Board has been unanimous.

I still hope, though faintly, that in the course of these disagreements, some expedient may be proposed to reconcile them; but this is very difficult, for whatever is done on one side is an indispensable duty, and on the other supposed purely optional. Of one thing I am pretty certain, that unless it is clearly proved that the Court may lawfully exercise such a power as they claim over the zemindars, this Government will never abet them in the practice of it, or be parties in dragging the descendants of men who once held the rights of sovereignty in this country, like felons, to Calcutta, on the affidavit of a Calcutta banyan, or the complaint of a court serjeant. And for these proofs I shall, for my own guidance, have recourse to a second reading of the charter. To that I shall most implicitly conform; but I shall pay no regard to rules of construction, or to precedents drawn from the practice in England.

Here I shall close my subject and my letter. I have much more to say respecting my own situation, but this must serve for another letter. Adieu, believe me ever, my dear Sir, your most affectionate and faithful servant.

While labouring under the pressure of these difficulties, and hopeless of relief from any quarter, an opening was all at once made for Mr. Hastings, into which, with his strong sense of public duty,

he felt that he had no choice except to enter. On the speedy and successful termination of the Mahratta war, he believed that the very existence of the British Empire in India depended. He had no power of carrying it on with vigour, for Francis and Wheler systematically opposed him, Sir Eyre Coote was not to be depended upon, and Mr. Barwell fretted to escape from the thraldom of a thankless office. What could he do? He shall again speak for himself. The following letters, written at the moment, while the impressions were fresh on his mind, and everything like an inducement to deceive was wanting, set at rest for ever, if indeed they be not set at rest long ago, all doubts as to the causes of his personal quarrel with Mr. Francis.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 30th January, 1780.

I think it proper, though rather premature, to advise you of an event which is likely to take place in the course of a few days. I have assented to an accommodation with Mr. Francis, the essential points of which are agreed on, and only two remain which I do not suppose will prove lasting obstacles; they will not depend on me, as I am bound by ties which cannot be loosened, and they are in themselves trifles. Why should I not tell them? I cannot recall Purling. It would render me an object of universal reproach. But Bristow must and shall make this sacrifice to the public peace. I will make some other provision for Fowke, or if the Company in their next letter decide

that he shall go back to Benares, he shall go; on no other terms will I allow it.

I am told, true or false, that the Commander-in-chief means to propose the recall of Purling, and Bristow's restoration. If he does, I am almost determined to yield to it as his act, as the appointment of Purling was his. But I cannot yet credit it, capricious as he is and unaccountable.

Mr. Barwell, on the strength of this negociation, has half taken his passage in the Swallow (our Suez packet), which will be despatched express to England, as soon as this point is determined, the squadron arrived, and we have some more decided or critical intelligence from Goddard, all which are events to be expected in the course of ten or fifteen days.

I hope that no man will blame me for making sacrifices of my own interests to those of the public, although I own, and have too dearly learnt, that my own involve those of the public. This occasion, however, it will prove a clear exception.

Perhaps James Boston, under whose charge I send this, and who is I believe much in Barwell's confidence, may be able to tell you more of this.

Our treaty expires with the remaining interval of this Government, as constituted by the Act of June last.

I almost tremble for the effects of this Act, as it seems unhappily calculated, and most perniciously, to annihilate the very Government which it was professedly made to constitute, without producing, even for a day, its ostensible purpose; for the 5th of April is already so near, that if the Act arrives within a month, there will not be time left for its promulgation, but it will proclaim the dissolution of the Government appointed by the Court of Directors, and I know that the legality of our acting as a Government will be a

doubt with many in high authority, though I believe that few will be disposed to dispute it; and in this state we shall probably remain from the 5th of April to the middle of August.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 4th March, 1780.

My dear Friend,—You will be surprised, perhaps, to hear that a reconciliation has taken place between Mr. Francis and myself. It was first urged to both parties by Sir John Day, who laboured to accomplish it with a solicitude that does honour to his public character, and entitles him to more than an equal portion of applause for the future successes which the Company may derive, if any shall be derived, from the effect of the union which his mediation has introduced into our councils. A continuation of the same warfare between the members of administration, when assailed by so many foreign and internal difficulties and dangers to which all our endeavours most cordially united are scarcely equal, would have proved our ruin.

The conditions of this agreement are as follows:—

1st. Mr. Francis will not oppose any measures which the Governor-general shall recommend for the prosecution of the war in which we are supposed to be engaged with the Mahrattas, or for the general support of the present political system of this Government. Neither will he himself either propose or vote with any other member who shall propose any measure which shall be contrary to the Governor-general's opinion in these points.

2nd. In the conduct of business, the Governor-general shall take the lead, and Mr. Francis will yield him his support.

3rd. Mr. Fowke is to be restored to the residency of Benares, and Mr. Graham recalled.

This condition has been fulfilled, Mr. Fowke has received his appointment, and is on his way to take charge of it, and Mr. Graham has received the order for his recall.

4th. Mr. Joseph Fowke has been formally advised of the licence granted him by the Court of Directors, to return to and remain at Benares, which leaves him a free option to make use of it, but Mr. Francis has promised to use his influence effectually to prevent it, and he will be provided for. This clause, however, is not a stipulation.

5th. The Governor-general will endeavour to effect a reconciliation between the Nabob Mobarck ul Dowla, and Mahomed Reza Cawn, and to obtain the Nabob's consent to Mahomed Reza Cawn's appointment to the office of Neabut, on such terms as shall be judged suitable, on the one hand, to the Nabob's dignity and rights, and to his youth and inexperience on the other. Mr. Francis will not require more.

This condition has been fulfilled even beyond the terms of it, and beyond the Company's orders. The Nabob's consent has been obtained, and the Board have ordered Mahomed Reza Cawn to be formally invested. The Nabob did indeed contend for the distribution of his own income, but he has been required to submit to the full restoration of all the offices which Mahomed Reza Cawn enjoyed in the year 1778, such being the intention, though certainly not the expression, of the Company's orders.

6th. The order for Mr. Bristow's re-appointment to the presidency of Lucknow is not to be enforced. The whole negociation remained for a long time suspended in the view of gaining his acquiescence to this concession, but the length of his stay at Madras, and the uncertainty which the advices from thence at length threw on the time of his arrival, obliged us to terminate this

point without him. It was agreed that he should remain as he was, and wait the issue of the new settlement of Government, and I undertook to satisfy him as far as I could undertake for such an event; not doubting of his assent even to make it his own act, rather than to assume the unwarrantable consequence of making his private interest the bar to the public peace, especially as it could affect him but a few months, of which three at least would be consumed before he could take charge of his office if it was agreed to replace him in it.

I have had some conversation with him upon the subject, but he comes hard bitten from the land of party, and I am not yet certain whether he yields or not. He has promised me his final answer in a day or two, which indeed are past, but I think he will yield. If he does not, the agreement is concluded without him, and must be maintained, though on less pleasant ground on our part, and less creditable on his.

7th. This engagement is to subsist till the 20th of October next, or till such time as the new settlement of this Government shall take place after the expiration of the present Act of Parliament; but it shall not be understood to preclude either party from entering such opinions, and using such other fair means as they shall think proper to obtain the future adjustment of these or any other points by higher authority.

It was proposed by me as an additional article, for I know by dear experience how much the temper of public business is influenced by the gratification or disappointment of personal attachments on such occasions, that in the distribution of all offices and other emoluments of the service, each party shall be allowed that participation which shall be judged adequate to their respective ranks, and the degrees of weight and responsibility annexed to their respective stations, but

Mr. Francis refused to listen to such a condition, lest it should subject him to the imputation of an interested or personal bias in the part which he took in this engagement, and declared that he should leave the nomination to all offices unconditionally, and without reserve, to the Governor-general, to whom it belonged as a constitutional part of his office. I consider it, however, as an engagement on my part, and have declared as much to him.

Mr. Barwell, who was privy to the treaty in all the stages of it, has determined to return to England in consequence, with my free consent, and release from any engagement as binding on him from his connexion with me to remain in the service. In this instance I have proved the sincerity with which I have acted, and my reliance on Mr. Francis's faith and honour, and I must add in testimony of both, and in justification of my own discretion, that he has behaved so openly, and with so little of the reserve and caution of a man actuated by indirect views, that I am certain, and venture to promise you, that I shall suffer no loss of power or influence by Mr. Barwell's departure, though I shall miss and greatly regret the want of that aid which I might have derived from his friendship, his judgment, and his official resources, had he staid, and that I shall find Mr. Francis both true to his engagements, and ready and willing to give me his support and assistance to the period destined for our acting together as joint members of this administration; I am not the least fearful of the reverse.

Mr. Wheler has on his part given me assurances of his support, and that he should consider himself hereafter as detached from every deed which should preclude his affording it in the most cordial manner, and I have promised him the most confidential conduct towards him on my part.

It was well for Mr. Hastings that just at this time a breathing space, however insecure, from party squabbles at the council board, was afforded him; for the disputes between the Government and the Supreme Court of Judicature became day by day more angry, till amid their turbulence the ties even of private friendship ran great risk of being broken. I find, for example, in Mr. Hastings's correspondence of this date many and grievous complaints of the conduct of Sir Elijah Impey. That he and Sir Elijah still loved each other at heart, and mutually gave and took credit on all occasions for sincerity of purpose, is indeed quite apparent; but it is not in human nature that, even on questions of public duty, men should dispute long and acrimoniously, without experiencing in the end the miseries of personal alienation.

"I suffer beyond measure," he says in one of his letters to Mr. Sulivan, "by the present contest, and my spirits are at times so depressed as to affect my health. I feel an injury done me by a man for whom I have borne a sincere and steady friendship during more than thirty years, and to whose support I was at one time indebted for the safety of my fortune, honour, and reputation, with a ten-fold sensibility. And under every consciousness of the necessity which has influenced my own conduct, and the temper with which I have regulated it, I am ready to pass the most painful

reproaches on myself on the least symptom of returning kindness from him. Such is my weakness, if this be a weakness." "We are both of us," he continues, after avowing his determination at every cost to oppose the mischievous encroachments of the Court, "we are both of us unhappily situated and associated; myself linked in the same cause with a man equally his enemy and mine; he with one man who has made no scruple to avow himself my enemy—God knows why—and another, who, though not personally indisposed to me, but governed by a harsh and petulant temper, and possessed of the most extravagant opinion of the omnipotency of his office, is the acting justice of the peace, and issues almost every preparatory process of the court, which his colleagues must maintain, or their authority and dignity suffer by a diminution of his. In him our present controversy originated, and from acts of which, however the Chief Justice may now think of them, I in my heart believe it impossible for him to have been the author."

I do not feel that I am required to dwell more at length upon transactions which have long ago taken their place among the details of general history. It is well known that matters came by degrees to such a pitch, that throughout the whole of the dominions subject to the Presidency of Fort William anarchy seemed to be at hand. The Supreme

Court issued its mandates, arrested and threw into prison whom it would, called upon the Governor-general and the members of his Council to answer as individuals for acts performed in their public capacity, and set both remonstrances and threats at defiance. On the other, the Governor and Council bailed the Court's prisoners, refused contemptuously to plead, opposed the sheriffs in the execution of their duty with regular troops, and meditated steps still more decisive. There was no time to wait for any decision from home, because the very springs of social life were poisoned; yet the ground of quarrel may be reduced to this, that neither the Supreme Court nor the Supreme Council knew how far the authority of the former was meant by the late Act of Parliament to extend. Under these circumstances Mr. Hastings, with as much of prudence as of liberality and fairness, determined to get rid of the difficulty by a compromise. He separated, in the first instance, the courts of Duanny Audawlut from the Provincial Councils to which they had heretofore been annexed; and leaving to the latter the entire superintendence of the revenue, he set up the former as separate tribunals, under the superintendence, in each provincial capital, of a covenanted servant of the Company. By this means the gentlemen who formed the Provincial Councils were delivered from a great deal of vexatious business, while to individuals the avenues to

justice in civil actions were rendered much more accessible. But from the courts of Duanny Audawlut there had always been an appeal to that of the Suddeer Duanny Audawlut, at Calcutta; and to the latter tribunal also he gave a new construction, by placing at its head the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the room of the Governor and Council. The results were, that taking entirely out of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court all questions affecting the revenue, he gave to zemindars, renters, as well as to every class of the Company's subjects, the full benefit, whatever it might be, of having their private disputes settled, should they carry them by appeal so far, according to the decisions of the first law authorities in the province. Moreover, as the office of judge of the Suddeer Duanny Audawlut was one of considerable labour, a handsome salary was attached to it, which was declared to depend on the good pleasure of the Governor and Council; a salve to the dignity of that body, with which the party accepting could not be dissatisfied, because it marked the readiness of Government to acknowledge, in every thing unconnected with the collection of the revenues, their sense of what was due to the principle of justice, as well as to the person of the individual by whom it was to be administered. It is scarcely necessary to add that Mr. Hastings's scheme was violently opposed by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, both of whom recorded strong

minutes against it. But Mr. Barwell, who had not yet retired, gave to it his support; and being carried, it restored at once peace and tranquillity to the province.

It may not be amiss to state here, that not in the Court of Directors only, but in the House of Commons also, the device was in a strain of unmitigated severity attacked. In the face of an opinion signed by three of the ablest lawyers of the day, that there was nothing contrary to the spirit of the Act in any part of the proceedings, both Mr. Hastings and Sir Elijah Impey were accused of gross corruption; and the latter, being recalled, was subjected to an ordeal not dissimilar in its nature to that through which, as the reward of his long and important services, the former in his turn was condemned to pass.

CHAPTER VI.

Continuance of disagreements—Alarms on the side of Carnatic—Duel with Mr. Francis—Correspondence.

It is necessary to a right understanding of the subject on which we are going to touch, that I should carry my reader back a few months in the order of time, and show him how, in the spring of 1779, that is, after the hostile designs of the French were ascertained, and the Mahratta war had taken an unfavourable turn, Mr. Hastings found himself circumstanced. The following letter, though a long one, tells the tale in clear and forcible language, and I therefore make no apology for inserting it :—

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 18th April, 1779.

My dear Friend,—I foresee that this will be a long letter, but I will comprise the subjects of it within as close a compass as they will admit, and treat of each distinctly, that you may easier retain them.

Sir Eyre Coote, after a very long stay on the coast, arrived at Calcutta on the 23d of last month. He was received with every military honour that could be paid to him, and more, perhaps, than he expected. On such an occasion I judged it best to exceed, rather than to incur the hazard of offending by doing too little. In my personal conduct to Sir Eyre Coote I have endeavoured to gain his friendship by an official support of his pretensions. by an unreserved surrender of the military

department, and by other more important concessions. I have consented to the removal of Mr. Middleton from the residence at Lucknow, and to the appointment of Mr. Hosca in his stead, a young man of lively parts, but not equal judgment. Mr. Middleton has the option to make the first his own act, and he will have no right to complain. This point I had preconcerted with Mr. Barwell long before the General's arrival. It will add greatly to his consequence and influence whenever he takes the immediate command of the army in that quarter, and in the present constitution and state of our government it will diminish little of my own. He proposed the appointment of an Adjutant-general for Bengal. I supported the motion by my voice, and by reasons that unanswerably justify the measure. For the proceedings on this subject, see the Enclosure No. 1. I have formed an establishment for his expenses in the field on a very liberal scale, viz., table allowance 7,500 rupees per month, being 50 per cent. above that allowed by the Court of Directors to Colonel (since General) Stibbert, and a discretional liberty to draw for boats, elephants, and other contingent charges, to the amount of —— more for himself and all his staff. This is not much, and incomparably less than the allowed and assumed charges of his predecessors in the military command of this presidency, General Clavering not excepted, because he never was in the situation to which these allowances are applied. No. 2 contains the debates on this subject. I hope my conduct in it will receive your support. General Clavering, who never intended to take the field, might content himself with a gratuitous salary of 60,000 rupees per annum; but you must be convinced that the Commander-in-chief could not possibly support the indispensable charges of his rank and command with so scanty a sum; and it is a dangerous maxim to connive at unauthorised

perquisites, the inevitable consequence of too close an economy. Sir Eyre Coote has a claim to the house and adjacent lands of Gheretty, in virtue of a sunnud which I formerly procured for him from Cossim Ally Cawn. He has applied for and obtained the renewal of it. No. 3 contains the particulars of this transaction.

These acts have all passed with opposition from Messrs. Francis and Wheler, and will no doubt be represented in the worst colours in their private letters to England, by Francis at least. For this reason I have dwelt so much upon them.

The General took a very early occasion to declare his resolution to act an independent part, to confine himself as much as he could to the line of his own department, and to regulate his conduct in all matters which were brought before the Board by these two principles, to which he vowed that he would inflexibly and undeviatingly adhere—an implicit obedience to the Company's orders, and an avoidance of all retrospections. Mr. Francis undertook to force him from this moderating plan by a motion to recall Mr. Graham from Benares, and to appoint Mr. Francis Fowke in his stead, in conformity to the Company's orders of the 30th, June 1778. This was intended to produce an irreparable breach between the General and me; and by a decision so well adapted to the understanding of the public, which had seen Joseph Fowke the original incendiary and the prime instrument of all our past dissensions, to hold out the General as the determined follower of the same party, Happily, though not at first aware of the snare, he was at length convinced of it, and refused to give an opinion upon the question, as a resolution had passed upon it before he had received his appointment to the service, and had been formally referred back to the Court of Directors, whose answer may be expected by the early ships of this season. See Enclosure No. 4.

The rule which Sir Eyre has prescribed to himself to decline all matters of former controversy will, if he can adhere to it, do him infinite credit. I will not be the cause of his departing from it. On the contrary, I have assured him that I will never bring on any business at the Board when he is present which can revive our past disputes, or oblige him to declare himself on the side of either party, and that I will apprise him whenever any subject shall come in Council before us which has such a tendency. In this respect I have been so delicate that, in the many and long conversations which I have had with the General, I have never mentioned the name of Francis, or alluded to the man, except on the occasion of the question concerning the residency of Benares, when it became necessary to warn the General of the design which it covered. And this reserve I shall continue to maintain, not so much on Sir Eyre Coote's account as my own, for I disdain to support my influence by means which I could not reconcile with the principles of honour. I know that Francis has no scruples of this kind, that he is a complete master of all the secret artifices by which confidence is allured and friends set at variance, and that he will not fail to practise them. But here, I think, he will miss his aim. All the eyes of our world were fixed on the General on the late occasion, and if I can judge, his decision has given universal satisfaction. I will also add, for his honour, that in a great political question we have been, for the first time, unanimous. Francis is miserable, and is weak enough to declare it in a manner much resembling the impatience of a passionate woman, whose hands are held to prevent her from doing mischief. He vows he will go home in November, but I do not believe that his resolution is so fixed as he pretends.

I have informed you in some of my former letters of the design of Mr. Barwell to resign the service. This

he intimated in a minute at the Board on the 11th of January, and assigned it as the principal reason for insisting on the immediate commencement of the prosecution, which the Court of Directors had ordered to be instituted against him. This suggestion, which was indiscreetly exaggerated by Mr. Francis's adherents, produced such an alarm, and I thought it so discreditable both to Mr. Barwell and myself that we should part so abruptly, with so short a period remaining of the present system, that I prevailed upon him both to relinquish all thoughts of departing this season, and even to avow his resolution to stay in a minute of council. His compliance was cheerful, friendly, and honourable, as has been the whole tenor of his behaviour. What passed at the Board upon this affair you will find in Enclosure No. 5.

The tide of popular opinion, which for a long time ran in favour of the judges, has lately turned against them. A mean fellow, one Creassy, being the defendant in a civil action before the Court, thought fit to demand a trial by jury, which the judges refused, not having the power (which I believe to be really the case) to grant him one. This excited the public attention, and a petition was presented by a large majority of the English inhabitants to the Court, praying to be allowed that privilege. At the same time another petition was prepared to be laid before Parliament, enumerating this and many other real or fancied grievances arising from the present constitution of the Court. The contents of this are as much a secret as a secret entrusted to 250 breasts can be; and I fear that it will be the source of much mischief, as the judges are greatly irritated at it, and I foresee many unhappy consequences of their resentment both here and at home, which I very much dread. Respecting the Court, I have my own personal feelings; but these, though they may influence

my resolution in the most critical period of my public life, I shall never suffer to pass my lips or my pen.
am hurt greatly at these petitions, and more so because many persons of my own family, or officially dependent on me, have been subscribers to them, and it will be obviously inferred that I approved and secretly promoted them. I hate things done in secret, and solemnly declare to you, and through you to my other friends, that I had no knowledge nor even the slightest suspicion of these performances till they were signed by almost the whole of the subscribers, nor of one till the morning on which it was presented.,

It is unnecessary to tell you that all my political plans have been blasted by the precipitate and miserable enterprise of the presidency of Bombay, the event of which will force all the circumstances of that transaction into the knowledge of the public. I regard it as a measure no less hostile in its design to this government than to that of Poona; yet if the humour lasts of heaping abuse on me, I shall not be surprised to find myself made a party in it. On the first intimation of the project at Naugpoor, Moodajee at once renounced all engagements with us. The distance of time between the letter written on the news of Elliott's death, in which he eagerly solicited the prosecution of the negociation entrusted to Elliott, and the letter to Colonel Goddard, in which he expresses his disinclination to it, could not be more than six weeks, if so much; but light and darkness could not be more opposite. The first must have been written about the middle of October. The last was dated the 23d of November. On the 12th of October the resolution of conducting Ragonaut Row to Poona was taken. It was certainly known within that month at Poona, and of course at Naugpoor soon after, the ordinary time of communication being about ten days. Compare these letters; you have them both. The first was enclosed in mine of the 10th of

December, and the last I sent to you by the way of Suez with a letter of the 31st of December. Read them together, and you will want no argument to convince you that Moodajee was as heartily and firmly bent on prosecuting the design which was proposed to him as I could wish him to be until he saw that he should have a competitor in Ragonaut Row, supported by the same power which had offered its aid to him, and by that part of it which had the executive charge of its political operations in its own hands; and that this was, as he professed it, the chief, if not the sole cause of the sudden and apparently abrupt change in his disposition to a connection for which he had before shown so great an impatience. I was strongly tempted, at the time of drawing up Elliott's instructions, to propose that an absolute restriction should be laid on the presidency of Bombay during the course of his negociation; but my friend Barwell, who, I believe, was equally aware of the consequences of leaving them a latitude to defeat our measures, was of opinion that it could not be justified against the positive orders of the Court of Directors in the event of a breach with the Mahratta ministry to renew the connection with Ragonaut Row, and either convinced me, or I wanted courage to take upon me so hazardous a responsibility against such authority, and against the certainty of being severely censured for it, although there was then no prospect or chance of executing the plan prescribed by them, and although the most splendid advantages had eventually attended that which I had projected. I have since received a fresh evidence of the propriety of Mr. Barwell's judgment in the heartiness with which the Court of Directors have expressed their approval of the first plan formed by the gentlemen of Bombay for the restoration of Ragonaut Row, and even gone beyond it in their orders, at all events, to prosecute it.

The defeat of the Bombay army has furnished Mr.

Francis with matter for triumph. He foretold it (he said) as the inevitable consequence of distant expeditions, and trembled for the fate of Goddard's detachment, which some kind friend from Futty Ghur or Cawnpoor had informed him was surrounded by multitudes of Mahratta cavalry, in the utmost distress for provisions, and two battalions of sepoys and the regiment of horse cut to pieces in a desperate engagement. Need I observe that the Bombay army was defeated (or rather yielded planet-struck) at the small distance of three days' march from Bombay, and that Colonel Goddard has conducted his detachment safe, and with its numbers complete, to Surat?

This resolution he wisely took on the final answer received from Moodajee, and a letter from Bombay earnestly pressing him to take that route. Moodajee continued to supply him with provisions to his own borders, and with ready money, taking a bill of exchange for the amount (I forget how much) which had been drawn on a capital house at Naugpoor in favour of Colonel Goddard, and of which the time of payment was not expired. Upon the whole, though I am exceedingly affected with the disappointment of the hopes which I had entertained of his alliance, I am pleased with his behaviour, which has been liberal, friendly, and consistent with the strictest honour and fidelity, and with respect to himself blameable only (if blameable) in an excess of caution. On the conclusion of the negociation with Colonel Goddard, he sent back the Berar Vackeel, Beneram Pundit, the man with whom I had originally concerted the plan of an alliance with that Government, and delivered to him a paper containing a series of propositions as the basis of a treaty, which he had orders to show to me, and return it; but the Vackeel had no powers, and the propositions were so wild, that I treated them (and perhaps they

were so meant) as an expedient intended to avoid the harshness of an absolute refusal to engage with us. I thanked him for his past kindnesses, which I enumerated, expressed my regret that he could not accept the offers which I had made him, and intimated that, if we were ever to treat again, he should meet the same friendly disposition in this Government which he had hitherto experienced, but it should be his turn to make the advances. Thus this affair rests, and will probably rest during Moodajee's life, which seems not likely to be of long duration, having had two attacks of a distemper which proved mortal to his father, in the short period which has elapsed since the death of poor Elliott. This infirmity in the Rajah, and the jealousy which exists between him and his son, the constitutional head; and again between him and his Dewan; may in part account for the timidity which has lately too manifestly prevailed in his councils, and which is by no means a part of his character.

If ever the house of Moodagee shall assert its pretensions to the ruje or sovereignty of Sittarra, and shall solicit our aid to obtain it, I hope it will be granted. It will prove the most fortunate connexion that was ever made by the British nation in India, and, properly managed, may ensure its lasting dominion over this empire, virtually, though not actually held. I never wish it to be otherwise; but this is a subject too extensive for the narrow bounds of a letter.

Before I quit this subject, perhaps for ever, let me furnish you with one observation, which I hope you will not suffer to remain useless in your hands, that however my superiors, or the world, may judge of the policy of the measure which I have thus unsuccessfully projected, it is impossible to ascribe it to any other motive than a zeal for the interest of my employers, and for the aggrandizement of the British name and

dominion. I could not have had a personal interest in it. The first design which suggested the measure of sending a military force across the continent was formed without my participation or knowledge by people with whom I scarcely corresponded, and with whom I had not the slightest acquaintance. When that failed, I had recourse to another, and I made advances to obtain it. This was not the way to serve myself, had I been capable of involving the Company's political interests in such extensive and possibly hazardous engagements on so base a principle. Pecuniary benefits are acquired by yielding, not by soliciting favours. That this design was not unadvisedly or precipitately formed, you know. You know that it was the sequel of a plan formed so early as the year 1773. The expectations which I entertained from the successive changes of our connexion with Moodajee were declared on our proceedings, and were all literally verified till the last and unfortunate measures of the Presidency of Bombay. These, I own, escaped my penetration. I could not conceive that the gentlemen of that Presidency would rashly undertake an adventure of such mighty consequence without a plan or associate, and at the very crisis of an affair in which they knew this government was at that instant engaged, when they had suffered so many opportunities to pass them of effecting the same purpose with the aid of ready and powerful friends, and with our full and unreserved sanction for it. In all the other parts of this complicated and unfortunate history, my conjectures will be found to agree with the events which followed them. To the world, the unprejudiced part of it, at least, I will acquit myself most fully if I live, and it shall be necessary for me to provide a public defence for my conduct. In the mean time I expect the same spirit of malevolence which has hitherto prevailed against me to involve my credit even in the measures which were undertaken

with a view to the defeat of mine, and in the infamy which has attended them.

When the Court of Directors received the first notice of the Rohilla war, they approved it. When it was reprobated by General Clavering and his colleagues, the same Court of Directors inveighed against it in terms of the utmost severity. Perhaps I am to experience the same duplicity on the present occasion. They were informed by advices received before the despatch of their last letters, that the gentlemen of Bombay had formed a plan in December, 1777, for the restoration of Ragoba, that we had authorized it, had given them instructions for the conduct in it, had sent them an aid of money, and had promised to supply them with a military force for their support in the eventual consequences of it. In their general letter of the 31st August last to Bombay, they express their entire approbation of the plan, urge in strong and in the most unequivocal terms the prosecution of it, and use these remarkable words:—"And we further direct that, in settling the terms of compensation to be made to the East India Company for their service on such account, you conform as near as may be to the propositions laid down by our Governor-general and Council in their letter of the 2d of February, 1778." They add that they had ordered their other Presidencies "to afford such immediate aid as may be requisite to enable you (the Presidency of Bombay) to re-establish Ragonaut Row." A more complete approbation of the part which we had in this transaction could not have been given to it, nor could I have wished for a more flattering encomium on my own conduct than to see it prescribed as the rule and means for the attainment of a favourite project by the Court of Directors in the same breath with which they extol the character of my late opponent, and obliquely contrast it with mine.

How they will contrive to change their judgment on

this transaction, I cannot guess; but I expect it. As to the march of Goddard's detachment, I will forgive them if they pronounce it a rash enterprise. It was new and hitherto untried. Its way was long, through regions unknown in England, and untraced in our maps; and I alone knew the grounds on which the facility of its success depended. Could it have failed from ordinary causes, Colonel Leslie would have defeated it. Colonel Goddard no sooner obtained the command than he proved that the difficulties which had so much impeded his predecessor were all illusions or impositions. He gained Berar with a continued but unavailing opposition. He there met with that hospitable welcome which I had promised him, and had he not been counteracted from that quarter, which in gratitude and in duty ought to have supported him, he would, I venture to pronounce that he certainly would, have placed its constitutional ruler on the throne of the Mahratta state, and rendered it a virtual dependency of the British empire. In this stage of our undertaking we were foiled by means which it was not in our power to control. Yet it has not, therefore, proved either a losing or an useless attempt. Its original and professed objects have escaped it; but it is certainly, in its present state, the most fortunate of any possible contingency which we could have hoped for in its influence on the safety of the Company's possessions on the other side of India, which I am convinced would be exposed to the greatest risk of being utterly lost, Bombay itself not excepted, but for the powerful protection afforded to them by the presence of Colonel Goddard's detachment.

On the 25th of February we received the first news of the defeat of the army at Futtegong. It was not till the 18th of March that we received the confirmation of it from Bombay in a very short letter, which said scarce

more than that the army had been defeated and was returned, and that a treaty had been made which they would disavow. We have heard no more from them since; but letters arrived yesterday (the 27th) from Poona, conveying a copy of the treaty, which almost made me sink with shame while I read it. It shall be sent after the ships which now carry our last despatches. The silence of the government of Bombay is inexcusable, though accountable. However it cannot do much harm, as we cannot give them, nor Goddard, any instructions that can regulate their conduct before the rains, and there is yet time enough to direct what they shall do six months hence, if they will inform us of their situation, and propose the means of extricating themselves from the effects of their late disgrace. Our latest orders are contained in the enclosure No. 6, which I recommend to your perusal as being important. It is also a curiosity, for it passed without a dissentient voice. The merit of this prodigy I ascribe wholly to the ascendant of our military commander.

I cannot part with this subject without testifying the entire satisfaction which I have received from Goddard's conduct. I cannot find a single error in it. His activity, his prudence, his address and temper, have been equally conspicuous and equally serviceable. In his march to Berar he was closely followed by a large body of horse, but his detachment moved in such order that they never durst approach it. He was so careful to conciliate the good-will of the inhabitants, and to prevent disturbances from the licentiousness of his people, that he would not suffer even an officer of his camp to enter the gates of Berhanpoor, though he lay many days within a mile of that city. The country people supplied him abundantly with provisions through the whole course of his march from thence, which was exceedingly rapid; and this circumstance alone is an

undisputable proof of his attention to the behaviour both of his troops and their followers. From Berhanpoor to Surat I understand that his route lay through the most fertile and best cultivated fields of Hindostan, and exhibited a scene hitherto unknown to those regions, a powerful army scattering the blessings of peace as it passed, and the people, instead of flying from its approach, pursuing their occupations, or thronging to relieve its wants by a traffic equally beneficial to themselves. All the private letters from his camp are filled with expressions of affection for its commander and of unbounded confidence in his conduct; nor is it a trivial advantage, or a speculative one only, that we have been able at such a time to exhibit to the people of Hindostan a contrast between the powers of the capital government of the British nation in India, and the feeble efforts (since they have so terminated) of an inferior Presidency. Be assured, my dear sir, that the successful and steady progress of a part, and that known to be but a small part, of the military force of Bengal from the Jumna to Surat, has contributed more than perhaps our more splendid achievements to augment our military reputation, and to confirm the ascendant of our influence over all the powers of Hindostan. To them, as to ourselves, the attempt appeared astonishing and impracticable, because it had never before been made or suggested. It has shown what the British arms are capable of effecting, and it has afforded a most seasonable aid to the Presidency of Bombay when it most stood in need of a foreign support.

What reward will our superiors bestow on the man who has been the happy instrument of retrieving the recent dishonour which had tarnished the English name? Let me receive my customary portion of censure for having projected the expedition; I expect it. But his conduct in the execution of it, which has no relation

to the principles of its formation, must surely entitle him to universal applause. A fortunate opportunity presents itself. The command of the forces on the Bombay establishment is likely to become soon vacant. It cannot be better bestowed than on Colonel Goddard. Such a retribution to his services would do honour to the Court of Directors, and place him in the station in which his abilities might be the most usefully and effectually exerted for the future advancement of their interests. I myself would recommend it; but I should fear that my suffrage would rather impede than advance his success with minds so long habituated to set their judgments against mine. Yet let me entreat that you, my friend, will use your interest to promote my wishes in this instance. You cannot do me a greater kindness, and you may do it without a supersession; for surely Colonel Goddard may lay claim to a common share in the rights of the service which he has so notoriously supported, and has added so powerful an addition to it; and next to Colonel Egerton, he is senior by commission to any officer on that establishment.

I shall now close my letter with the last subject which I wish at this time to communicate to you, my own situation and prospects.

I am told that the probable conjecture of the new settlement of this government is, that the present will be renewed, or rather continued, without any change either in its constitution or in the members composing it, and that I may be suffered to stand at the head of it merely to avoid the pain of removing me. On this footing I will not hold the government, nor would I continue the pageant that I am another year for all the rewards and honours that the King could give me. I am not Governor. All the means I possess are those of preventing the rule from falling into worse hands than my own, and for these I am an absolute dependant. I

came to this government when it subsisted on borrowed resources, and when its powers were unknown beyond the borders of the country, which it held in concealed and unprofitable subjection. I saw it grow into wealth and national consequence, and again sink into a decline that must infallibly end it, if a very speedy remedy be not applied. Its very constitution is made up of discordant parts, and contains the seeds of death in it. I am morally certain that the resources of this country, in the hands of a military people and in the disposition of a consistent and undivided form of government, are both capable of vast internal improvement, and of raising that power which possesses them to the dominion of all India (an event which I may not mention without adding that it is what I never wish to see); and I believe myself capable of improving them and of applying them to the real and substantial benefit of my own country.

It will be seen from this letter, that neither the reverses on the side of Bombay, nor the wayward temper of the Commander-in-chief, nor the continued hostility of Mr. Francis, nor the absence of a just support from the Court of Directors, were able, in his hour of greatest trial and difficulty, to depress the courage of Warren Hastings. Strong in the assurance that his policy was the wisest that could be adopted, he resolved to persevere in it; and that too in the face of another impediment, in some respects more formidable than all the rest. Mr. Hastings turned to his treasury, and found that it would soon fail him. The surplus which

it was his pride to have accumulated during a season of troubled peace the first demands of a complicated war had swept away; and in proportion as his enemies increased in numbers and influence and fresh exertions on his own part became necessary, the means of providing for these exertions fell short. Mr. Hastings pondered the difficulties of his situation with much anxiety. He could not increase the burthens under which the British provinces laboured, for they were already taxed to the utmost extent of their capabilities. He dared not withhold the Company's investments, except in the last extremity. He was very unwilling to re-establish again a bonded debt, his absorption of which had earned for himself so much credit, and proved so beneficial to his employers. Something, however, must be done, otherwise the ruin of the Company's affairs, if not the total loss of India, was certain. Under these circumstances he determined to make use of the privileges which the constitution of the country, and the usages of the Mogul empire, gave him; and to call upon his dependent chiefs, the rajahs and nabobs and greater zemindars, whom he protected, for such aids as the critical condition of the empire might render indispensable.

Had the Mahrattas stood alone as the enemies of the British name, it is probable that he would have made little use of this, his acknowledged

right. He did not hold them in any great respect, and the tone of his correspondence shows as much; but the Mahrattas by no means stood alone. A war with France was actually begun, and though success had attended its first operations, no one could tell how soon the arrival of a fleet and army from Europe might give a totally different aspect to the face of affairs. Moreover the worse than blundering of the Madras Government had given great offence both to Hyder Ally, the formidable sovereign of Mysore, and to Mahommed Ally Cawn, Nizam of the Deccan. Now a breach with Hyder and the Nizam, coming upon the back of the Mahratta and French wars, was a contingency on the possible occurrence of which he had not counted. When the peace of British India was first broken, the Mahrattas and Hyder were at variance. The Deccan, likewise, had been invaded by them, a measure certainly not calculated to conciliate its chief, so that the two greatest of the native powers were in some sort the allies of the Company. But should the grounds of this intestine quarrel fail, and a reconciliation among the belligerents be effected, then the situations of the English and their enemies would be exactly reversed. The latter would be supported by all the powers of India; the former would stand alone It must be confessed that the prospect was abundantly alarming, and that it was by no means

illusory, the following statement of facts will show.

I have purposely avoided taking any particular notice of the squabbles and contentions which for some years previously had agitated the presidency of Fort St. George. These were doubtless to be attributed in part to the delicate position of the Company in its relations with the Nabob of Arcot, for as yet the evils of a double government were in full force in the Carnatic, and the Nabob was by no means a docile pageant in the hands of the presidency. But a more direct and efficient cause of these difficulties may be found in the interested and grasping designs of individuals ; to the working out of which the weakness as well as the improvidence of Mahomed Ali gave ample scope. Unwilling or unable to provide for the military protection of the country, to the sovereignty of which the English had advanced him, he transferred the power of the sword unreservedly to his allies, and allowing them a sum out of his revenues proportionate to the expense, he placed himself in absolute dependence upon the Company. It soon appeared that his revenues were by no means equal to the demands that were made upon them. The country was oppressed by the severity of his exactions, and instead of being fostered, after the tedious sufferings of a war, it was scourged by all the evils of a government at once insatiable and

neglectful. When his revenues began to fail, he had recourse to loans. Money was advanced to him at exorbitant interest; frequently by Englishmen and servants of the Company. He paid them, generally, by a species of assignment called in India *tuncahs*, which entitled the holders to the revenues of specified portions of the territory, and authorized them to draw these immediately from the collectors. I need not go on to describe the results of a system so improvident and iniquitous. The Nabob's embarrassments increased from day to day; the remnants of his power went from him; his revenues were absorbed by greedy and merciless creditors, and he and the presidency became mutually discontented with one another. He accused the English of acting towards him with extreme injustice, they charged him with concealing the amount of the sums which he drew from the country, and of impairing its produce by his private extravagance, and by the vices of his imbecile and wicked government.

With the history of those transactions in which Mr. Paul Benfield played so conspicuous a part, I have no concern, neither is it necessary for me to detail at length the motives which led to the reduction of the state of Tanjore and its absorption in the common realm of the Carnatic. Tanjore, though as much independent as any other of the petty principalities which paid tribute to the

Mogul, through his representatives, the Nizam and the Nabob, had unquestionably been reckoned, during the vigour of the Mogul sway, an integral portion of the empire. It was managed, indeed, by a descendant from the line of its ancient Hindoo rajahs; yet his rank on the list of the Duan was that of a zemindar merely, and he was liable, like every other zemindar or manager of the revenues, to increased demands, as often as the exigencies of the state might require. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the rights of the Nabob of the Carnatic, considered as the representative of the Mogul, now a shadow, were, towards the Rajah, those of a liege lord, if indeed they approached not more nearly to those of direct and absolute sovereignty. But we may fairly question both the honesty and wisdom of the grounds on which the Nabob thought fit to exercise them. Still the measure was one, of the expediency of which the English either were not, or assumed that they were not, competent judges. Having been required, by virtue of their treaty with the Nabob, to assist him in the reduction of a refractory vassal, they marched an army against Tanjore; and carrying the town by siege, they put both it, and the territories dependent upon it, under the immediate control of the sovereign of the Carnatic.

The Rajah of Tanjore so far deserved his fate, that, lying out of the reach of immediate injury from

invasion, he had contributed neither money nor troops, proportionate to his stake in the country, for the defence of the Carnatic when harassed by Hyder and the Mahrattas. It was well known, moreover, that he had held with both powers friendly communications, and he was much in arrear with his peschuch or tribute, which, on one pretence or another, he refused to pay. He had besides made war upon certain chiefs who claimed protection both of the English and the Nabob; and by various other acts displayed the reverse of a spirit of obedience in quarters where it was expected: still the measure of his deposition was a harsh one, and the Court of Directors—who might have prevented it but did not—were compelled, by a decision of the proprietors, to order its reversal. Accordingly Lord Pigot, who in 1775 assumed the Government, proceeded, not without strong opposition on the part of his Council, to undo all that, in reference to this matter, his predecessor had done. Of the disputes to which his precipitancy led, some notice has been taken in an earlier part of this work. The Rajah was restored, and dispositions made to establish at his court a British resident,—a measure sufficiently easy of accomplishment one would think, yet, as the event proved, not so accounted of at the presidency. For out of that question, as well as of another affecting the

arrangement of a military command, animosities arose so bitter, as to threaten at one time the Company's possessions in the Carnatic with the horrors civil war. Finally Lord Pigot was arrested by order of a majority of his own Council, the majority was acknowledged as a legitimate Government by the Supreme Government at Bengal, and order was restored, if the term can with propriety be used in reference to a province where every man seemed to do exactly what was right in his own eyes.

The proceedings of the Courts of Directors and Proprietors with reference to these matters are, equally with the movements made in the House of Commons, foreign from the design of this work. The first mentioned body, wavering and unstable as usual, approved and condemned the same parties, for the same acts, well nigh in the same breath. They ordered Lord Pigot to be restored; desired that he should immediately resign; again, directed the majority to be suspended from the service, and forthwith recalled them. They then sent out Sir Thomas Rumbold to assume the helm at Madras, Mr. John Whitehill, second member of Council, acting for him till he should arrive, and nominated Sir Hector Munro as Commander of the forces, with civil rank as third member of Council. Of the whole of these gentlemen,

further notice will be taken in the course of the correspondence which follows; for the present I must briefly advert to other matters.

Annexed to the presidency of Fort St. George were certain tracts of country called the Northern Circars, which, in 1766, had been made over by the Nizam to the English, the latter agreeing to send troops to his assistance whenever they should be required, and to pay him annually a tribute, or quit rent, for the territory. One of these, however, called the Guntoor Circar, had been granted in jaghire, for the term of his life, to Bazalut Jung, the Nizam's brother; and over it and its resources, the Company had of course no claim, except in reversion. But in the year 1774, it was announced to the presidency by letters from the chief of Masulipatam, that Bazalut Jung had taken into his service a body of French troops, under the command of M. Lally, and to obtain the dismissal of them became forthwith an object with the English of the first importance. Accordingly, having treated the Nizam as a principal in the treaty of 1768, and a party consenting to all the agreements between the Company and Bazalut Jung, they now desired his co-operation in compelling his brother either to dismiss these Europeans from his service, and trust to the English for the defence of Guntoor, or to make over to them that Circar at a rent which should be de-

termined upon by amicable valuation. The Nizam replied, in friendly terms, that every article of the treaty should remain fixed to a hair's-breadth, and promised to send a person of distinction to procure the removal of the obnoxious foreigners from his brother's presence. Nevertheless from the beginning of 1776, up to the month of June, 1778, nothing effectual was done in the matter. The French corps continued to do duty in Guntoor, and the Madras presidency, anticipating a rupture with France itself, became exceedingly uneasy. They opened a negociation with Bazalut Jung himself, whom certain hostile demonstrations on the part of Hyder Ali had intimidated. They so far succeeded, that without any reference had to the Nizam, the French troops were dismissed, and the Guntoor district ceded; while the English, undertaking to protect Bazalut Jung against all his enemies, marched, in April, 1779, a force under General Harpur towards his country.

On the 27th of January, 1779, a gentleman was despatched from Fort St. George to Hyderabad, for the purpose of obviating any unfavourable impressions which the management of this treaty might have made, and of ascertaining, as far as possible, how the Nizam stood affected towards both the French and the native powers with whom the Company were at variance. Up to that moment the Nizam had avowed his determination of main-

taining a strict neutrality. He made no secret, indeed, of his distaste for Ragoba, and his preference of the infant Peishwa or dominant party at Poona; while he could not but regard with jealousy the projected alliance with the Rajah of Berar, confirmed, as it was said to be, by a promise on the part of the English to restore to him certain districts of which the Nizam had deprived him. Still his language was friendly throughout; and if he did afford an asylum to the French corps which his brother had dismissed, he accounted for the circumstance by declaring that there were no other means of preventing them from taking service under Hyder Ali. No sooner, however, was the treaty with Bazalut Jung laid before him than he expressed himself exceedingly indignant. The English had no right to negociate with one of his vassals, keeping him in the dark all the while. It was a direct infringement of the treaty of 1768; and he should be constrained so to regard it, unless the troops now on their march into Bazalut Jung's territories were recalled. But his ground of complaint was not confined to this. Mr. Holland, acting on the instructions conveyed to him from Madras, had the imprudence, in the name of his government, to require that the peschuch, or tribute, of five lacs, which the Company were bound to pay for the Circars, should be remitted. The Company were already two

years in arrear ; they did not choose to pay up the balance, and desired to be set free at once and for ever from the burthen. The Nizam could not brook so gross an insult, and made no disguise of his feeling before Mr. Holland. He declared his conviction that the English were seeking a pretext for the violation of the treaty, and added that no alternative was left to him but to prepare for war.

Whatever the infatuation might be under which his superiors laboured, Mr. Holland appears to have been fully alive to the delicacy of his own situation. He therefore opened a correspondence with the Supreme Government at Bengal, and solicited their advice on the matter. The Supreme Government condemned without reserve the whole series of transactions which had conducted the sister presidency to the brink of a war with the Nizam, and issued orders, based upon the authority with which the late Act invested them, for the immediate abandonment of such extravagant pretensions. Yet there were other grounds of anxiety for Mr. Hastings than these. As if they were bent upon involving themselves with every power in India, which was capable of doing them a serious injury, the authorities of Fort St. George chose this unlucky moment to provoke the jealousy of Hyder Ali. After the reduction of Pondicherry, which took place in October, 1778, there remained to the French in all India but one sea-port—

Mahe, an inconsiderable fortress and settlement on the coast of Malabar; of which it was resolved without delay to deprive them. Unfortunately for those who planned this enterprise, they did not take sufficiently into account that any attempt to reduce Mahe must inevitably excite the suspicions, perhaps draw on the hostile intervention, of the Mysore government; for Mahe, if not a portion of Hyder's dominions, was everywhere surrounded by them, and he, who had long been on friendly terms with the French, regarded it as placed under his especial protection. Accordingly the troops set out, nobody pretending ignorance that the first gun fired against Mahe might bring a swarm of Mysorean invaders into the Carnatic. The immediate object of the expedition was doubtless gained, for Mahe fell; but Hyder became forthwith the bitter enemy of the English, and, patching up his differences with the Nizam and the Mahrattas, prepared to join both in a great effort to drive these restless strangers into the sea.

It was while thus circumstanced, having his hands full of the Mahratta war, and threatened, most unexpectedly and most unnecessarily, with the wrath both of the Nizam and Hyder, while he was ignorant too of the designs of France, further than that an attempt would infallibly be made to re-establish a French influence in India, that Mr. Hastings felt himself called upon to make, upon

the chiefs who enjoyed the protection of the British government, a demand for such an addition to their subsidies, both of men and money, as the state of public affairs seemed to require and the constitution of the country had from time immemorial authorized. Among these there was one in particular, Chyte Singh, the Rajah of Benares, to whom he judged it expedient, in the first instance, to apply; and he was accordingly required to furnish a body of two thousand horse, as well as to increase his annual payments by five lacs of rupees. Of the family to which Chyte Singh belonged a full account has been given in another part of this memoir. He was the son and successor of that Bassalut Jung, who, by the treaty of 1775, became transferred from a state of immediate dependence on the King of Oude to a similar state in reference to the Bengal government; and as he held his province on very easy terms, and was known to have accumulated a vast amount of treasure, Mr. Hastings was not visited by any compunctious misgivings as to the propriety as well as the justice of demanding that the English should at this juncture derive some benefit from his superfluities. Nevertheless, he took care to advertise the Court of Directors of his intentions; he repeated that advertisement periodically for three successive years; and not receiving any hint that the measure was dis-

pleasing to his superiors, he pressed it on Chyte Singh with determined resolution. Chyte Singh, a man of an intriguing and avaricious temper, delayed, on various pretexts, to comply with the requisition. Mr. Hastings argued, persuaded, threatened, and prepared to strike; on which the Rajah so far yielded that the money was supplied, though only in part and by tardy instalments. The troops, however, were kept back, as the event proved, for a very different purpose; and the seeds of a rebellion were carefully sown in the provinces.

Mr. Hastings was exceedingly indignant with Chyte Singh on his first refusal to pay the sum required of him; and Chyte Singh was not slow in ascertaining the fact. He became alarmed, and following the usage of Indian chiefs in general, he sent a confidential Vakeel to Fort William with a sum of three lacs, which Mr. Hastings was entreated to accept as a mark of respect, and a peace-offering from one who had offended. I shall take occasion by and bye to insert a letter, in which mention is made as well of this circumstance as of the motives which induced Mr. Hastings to accept the present, as of the uses to which it was turned. In the meanwhile, it may be well if we resume at once the thread of our correspondence, which has been too long interrupted, and leave Mr. Hastings himself to carry on, as he is admirably qualified to do, the

history at once of his own mind and of the operations in which it engaged itself.

The following I insert because it entirely exonerates the writer from the charge of having reprobated a line of conduct in Lord Pigot precisely similar to that which he had himself pursued in the early part of his government. There was no more semblance between the proceedings of the two men, than between the natures of their powers, and the strength of their respective understandings.

To John Purling, Esq.

Fort William, 14th March, 1780.

Dear Sir,—I have had the pleasure to receive your favour of the 25th of January, 1779, and I beg you will accept my hearty thanks for the support you have given me at the India House.

There is one part of your letter to which I could wish to reply very fully, although the subject may probably no longer attract the public notice; I mean my letter to Mr. Stratton. You tell me I have been much blamed for writing that letter; that I have lost many friends by it; and you yourself wish that I had not written it; at the same time, that you blame Mr. Stratton for making it public without my consent.

The proceedings in England on the revolution at Madras have, I confess, filled me with astonishment. I did not conceive men's judgments could have been so much warped by party disputes as I find they were in this.

A president of a Council, the majority of which council is the government, by a most weak and flimsy device, attempts to get rid of two members, by giving

his own casting voice for their suspension, although he is himself the accuser. He thinks he has effectually suspended them, and governs with his minority. As this was a recent case, extraordinary and violent steps were of course to follow. The majority again get possession, confine their president, are obeyed by all orders of men, and send us an account of these transactions. What were we to do? It was absolutely necessary to support either the one party or the other. In this particular we all agreed, that the majority of the Council was the government, a fact indeed never before called in question. What would have been the consequence had we written to Lord Pigot and the minority on the one hand, and to Mr. Stratton and the majority on the other, that in certain instances each party had been to blame? We determined effectually to support Mr. Stratton and his Council. If we could have had any doubts, they were all removed by the letter we had just received from the Court of Directors. I did but attempt to dissolve the Council when they proceeded to the most unprecedented step ever heard of, and received an accusation against their president, the Governor-general of India, from the most abandoned of mankind. I was reprimanded for declining to be present when this wretch was called upon; and I was reprimanded for breaking up the Council, although the occasion might appear to justify it. We were informed that the majority of the Council was the government, and their orders were to be obeyed in every point. What were Lord Pigot's merits that I should submit to the humiliating measure of allowing him privileges as President and Governor of Fort St. George which were denied to me as Governor-general of India; or how could I venture, with the Court of Directors' sentiments so clearly before me, to support a man who had attempted by the lowest artifice to

subvert the government? For once, General Clavering subscribed to my opinion; and our resolution thus taken, it became my duty to encourage Mr. Stratton and his Council by every means in my power. I saw they were sinking, and apprehensive of personal safety. I dreaded the consequences of another revolution brought about by military violence. I dreaded, too, the danger from an invasion of the Carnatic by Hyder or the Mahrattas, while the Presidency of Fort St. George was torn by civil dissensions. There was another evil, too, which I dreaded: I plainly perceived, from the appeals which were before made to us, that the majority had personal interests to attend to, which might influence their public conduct; and I wished to guard Mr. Stratton against yielding to the importunities of individuals, meaning Mr. Benfield and others who had tunkas upon Tanjore. I believe many beneficial consequences followed from my advice; but it was unpardonable in him to publish extracts of my letter. My friends have since printed it: and I am informed it has been favourably received. Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive how I could be personally interested in the acquittal or condemnation of Mr. Stratton; but I will venture to declare that the Company are indebted to the firmness of the Supreme Council in supporting the government of Fort St. George for the preservation of their settlements on the coast. I hope by this time the heat of party has subsided; and in that case, I am sure my conduct, as well as the acts of our Board on the revolution at Madras, will be approved by all good and reasonable men.

Our despatches by the Swallow packet and the Ceres contain so full an account of public affairs, that it is unnecessary for me to mention them here. I sincerely lament our difference with the judges; but it was unavoidable. Let me entreat you to read with at-

tention all we have written on this subject; and in particular my minute in consultation of the 4th of March, and our petition to the House of Commons. I think you will support us; if you do not, be assured Bengal, and of course India, will be lost to the British nation.

On the arrival of the Swallow, you would hear of my accommodation with Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, and I dare say it will give you pleasure. Some months before this coalition took place, I had appointed your nephew resident at the Vizier's Court. He will probably, in his letters to you, express his apprehensions of being recalled; but I assure you they are without foundation. It was the first condition of our agreement that Mr. Purling should remain at Lucknow until the new arrangement of government took place; and I am sure his conduct will entitle him to my future support, on which he may depend.

By our last accounts from General Goddard, he had taken the first steps to procure a revenue of twenty-seven lacs per annum, and was pursuing his successes. The Mahrattas are at variance, and too jealous of each other to take the field. Peace is our object; and I have not a doubt but that we shall soon be able to accomplish it on terms honourable and advantageous to the Company. Our wish is to procure such a revenue for the Company on the Malabar coast as shall serve to defray the expenses of the Presidency of Bombay, and prevent a further drain of silver from Bengal.

I with great pleasure attend to your recommendation of Mr. Gilbert.

I am with great truth, dear Sir, your obliged and faithful servant.

One of the first results of the confederacy into which Hyder and the Nizam had entered with the Mahrattas was to detach entirely the Rajah of

Berar from his English alliance, and to unite him, at least in appearance, with the grand confederacy. The following, to Mr. Sulivan, sets forth the writer's views on this subject.

Fort William, 4th April, 1780.

My dear Friend,—I address this to you, and in confidence. I am informed, that if it were officially written to the chairman, it would not be in his power to hold back from such communication of it as would or might eventually bring it before the public; that I may not be the instrument of exciting popular alarms, and depreciate the credit of my employers, I choose to entrust the subject which I have to impart to you, my confidential friend, with the fullest latitude to make whatever use of it you shall think fit, knowing that you will not employ it in any way that shall affect either the Company or myself.

I have certain intelligence that Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, has completed an army of 35,000 men in pay, consisting mostly of new levies, besides 15,000 Pindarries, a species of Mahratta, whose only service is plunder, for which, instead of receiving pay, they pay a stipulated monthly sum to their government in the nature of a revenue.

This army is to be formed into two divisions; Chumma Babboo, the Rajah's second son, will command one, which is to march towards Orissa under pretext of quieting and adjusting the disorders of that province; the other division will be conducted by Moodajee in person, attended by his Dewan, Dewangur Pundit; his design is to employ it in the reduction of Mundela, a district situated on the northern bank of the Nerbudda, belonging to him in virtue of a late grant of the Peshwa, but not yet in his possession.

What may be the event of these movements it is impossible to foretell, but each will bring them so near to our borders as to require every resolution which prudence can suggest for preventing, or, if this cannot be effected, for repelling the danger with which they threaten these provinces.

From the character of Dewangur Pundit, whose councils have directed the affairs of the house of Boosla for many years past, I conclude, that whatever his design may be, it has not been lightly formed. I am, indeed, persuaded that nothing hostile is yet decidedly intended against these provinces, yet such may be the event.

The letters which I have received from the Rajah and his Dewan, but more especially one written by the latter to his minister at this place, and expressly designed for my perusal, both profess and strongly mark the embarrassment of that government, arising from the contending claims of the administration of Poonah, to which, besides the rights of constitutional supremacy, it is bound by the ties of a public treaty,—and of this government, with which it has maintained an uninterrupted friendship of twenty years, cemented by the stronger bonds of mutual conveniency and connected interest. The former has made a formal demand of the assistance of the Rajah of Berar against the English, termed the common enemy of the Mahratta state. This call has been repeated by Nizam Ally Cawn and accompanied with threats if rejected; Bengal is the prescribed scene of the Rajah's operations. This is the cause assigned, whether real or ostensible, to the Peshwa for the late military preparations in Berar; to the same cause they are assigned by the Dewan in his letter, but with a professed indecision with respect to their future objects. He confesses an uncommon solicitude to avoid a rupture with this government, and

has proposed, as the only practicable measure of reconciling the many difficulties with which he has at this time to contend, that I will afford him a meeting at Benares, to which the neighbourhood of Mundela may afford him a pretext for repairing as the effect of a religious obligation. I have encouraged the proposition, and intend, with the concurrence of the Board, to accept it, in the hopes that it may not only prove the means of averting the dangers with which we are threatened, but of converting them into the instruments of enlarging our political influence and strength. To me it appears most probable, and almost certain, that the issue of these appearances will be to this country the decided alliance or enmity of one of the most powerful of all the states of India. You will readily conclude what choice I shall make in such an alternative. The fair season is so far advanced and affords a prospect of quiet till the opening of the next. This is the sum of my wishes, for the distraction of this government at this time renders it unfit for enterprise, and, I am sorry to add, almost for resistance. I am, with the most unalterable regard, my dear friend, your faithful, &c. &c.

The following speaks for itself. Captain Palmer, alluded to in the opening sentences, was Mr. Hastings's aide-de-camp, whom he sent to Hyderabad in the hope that even yet the Nizam's anger might be appeased by a frank avowal of the condemnation by the Supreme Government, of the measures adopted under the Government of Fort St. George. For the rest, the letter is full of interest, and needs from me no introductory explanation.

Fort William, 30th August, 1780.

My dear Friend,—I have only received two letters from you since the first arrival of the ships of this season. These are dated the 6th of November and 5th February last

The first of these conveys something like a reproach which afflicts me much, because if I had deserved it I deserved the ignominy of a felon. I allude to your complaint of my silence concerning your son. Believe me, my dear friend, I have never felt an indifference to his interests or to your solicitude for them, nor am I capable of it. Mr. Barwell has it in his power to justify me most amply upon this subject. I have never mentioned him in my letters to you, because I have always found it difficult to do it. Professions of what I would do were I possessed of means I abhor even with strangers, and I believe, in my long and voluminous correspondence with you, I have not frequently if ever been guilty of them. Allow me on this occasion to instance Mr. Graham, whom I have considered as possessing a relation to you almost equal to the nearest tie of blood; yet I have neither neglected him, nor, that I remember, made him a subject of my letters.

With respect to your son, there was but one possible way by which my influence could be of use to him, and this intercepted by difficulties and hazards of a peculiar kind. The Nabob has always had traitors in his own family by whom his closet secrets have been revealed to the governor for the time being. I have never ventured to write to him any but guarded letters, knowing that they would pass his hands, and that the worst use would be made of them if they fell into those of the late president. I had no confidential friend through whom I could establish a personal communication with him, unless I except Mr. Ste. Sullivan, who was certainly disqualified to introduce such an intercourse by

the immediate subjects of it. An ostensible opportunity offered in August last, and I deputed my military secretary, Captain Palmer, a man in whom I place an uncommon reliance, for this sole and express purpose to go to Madras, though other less important points were added to his instructions. He took his passage in the Stafford which was lost, and he returned, having narrowly escaped with his life. Thus my design was defeated at that time. Other causes prevented my resuming it immediately and other expectations since. I did not choose to detail my plan to you, but waited the effect of it. I desired him to advise you of the issue of it, and, merely for the purpose of giving a credit to his letters, I remember, in a postscript of one which I wrote to you at the same time, I told you that I had sent Captain Palmer to Madras, and ordered him to write to you from thence.

One word let me add as it arises out of this subject. You greatly overrate the influence of the Governor-general of Bengal if you attribute to it the power of serving any man, except by availing himself of an opinion which the ideas obviously annexed to his title and supposed authority may excite in the minds of those who are too remote to view the nakedness and pitiful imbecility of his office. Yet could I see your son, I might derive some improvable means from the interview, and he has promised me that satisfaction, of which no doubt he will tell you.

I neither like the propositions which were made to Government nor those which were offered by Government. Bengal has been too much neglected in both. We cannot much longer subsist on our vital resources and with intestine contention.

The sentiments which you ascribe to the Governor-general and Council of Bengal respecting the future arrangement of the Carnatic differ totally from all

that I recollect to have ever been written by us even in our most discordant times upon that subject. On the 7th of December, 1775, I drew up a sketch, which the Board unanimously adopted and agreed to recommend to the Court of Directors, containing the outlines of a treaty to be formed with the Nabob of Arcot, and my opinion has unalterably and invariably been, that the Nabob has a right to the possession of the country of Tanjore. I am sure we have none. These opinions were fully conveyed to you in my letters written during the contest which arose between Lord Pigot and the Nabob, and more strongly in one which I wrote, perhaps too freely, to Lord North. The *right* is clearly the Nabob's, but if not his, the Rajah's. We have not a shadow of title. In *policy* the possession ought to be the Nabob's or Company's, if *policy* were to decide.

I am happy that Goddard's merits will be rewarded; he deserves all that you can give him and infinitely more than you have yet known. I hope that Captain Popham too will have his recompense: we shall give him a majority, which is not much, as he is now but two removes from it in the regular course of succession.

I now proceed to a subject which will startle you if this shall give you the first information of it. I have been compelled to meet Mr. Francis in the field in the odious character of a duellist. I will relate the occasion of it. My letter of the 4th March, which was written by the Swallow, contained the conditions of an engagement which passed between Mr. Francis and me, on the faith of which I yielded my consent that Mr. Barwell should leave us. Mr. Barwell will doubtless have told you how it was concluded. No formal instruments were interchanged between us; I regarded it as a deed of faith and honour, not of law, and I required none.

Yet, to prevent misconceptions and future cavils, I reduced it to writing and to separate articles. I showed the paper containing them to Mr. Francis. To the first article, which was the only one on which my heart was fixed, and for the sake of which I yielded to the rest, he without hesitation cheerfully assented, and without reservation, adding that he meant not to take any advantage of Mr. Barwell's departure, nor to attempt to carry any point which he could not effect were Mr. Barwell still present, or words to that effect.

To the articles which respected Fowke and Mahommed Reza Cawn he objected, and I gave them up; and a third article, respecting the distribution of appointments, was omitted or rather qualified in the manner which I have explained in my letter to you by the Swallow. All the other articles stood unchanged, that especially which I considered as the principal was most firmly agreed to. It engaged my whole attention, nor could I have been mistaken had I not committed it to writing, so strongly was I possessed of the necessity of obtaining it and so strongly was Mr. Francis's consent to it impressed on my mind.

I am told that he asserts that he only agreed to it conditionally; that it should be limited to the war on the other side of India and to measures already adopted. This I most solemnly deny, and as strongly affirm that his consent was unconditional. Besides, the treaty with the Ranna of Gohud, of which the measures proposed by me were the necessary consequences and provided for in it, was formed before Mr. Barwell's departure and before our accommodation, and so were the first orders to the Commander-in-chief to send a detachment in consequence into Gohud. The treaty was, therefore, a measure adopted in all its points. But I combat a phantom in the dark. When he delivers his vindication, I will reply to it: I conclude that he

will keep it back till these ships are gone, and therefore I have said thus much on the supposed contents of it. This is a grievous digression, let me resume the thread of my story where it broke off.

The only immediate use which I made of this engagement was to repeat the order to Sir E. Coote, to comply with the requisition of the Ranna of Gohud for a military aid. I had no other occasion to put Mr. Francis's faith to an early test, because the General's ill humour made me cautious of proposing any measure not absolutely and immediately necessary, lest he should defeat it.

When the General himself had reprobated the construction of Popham's detachment, and pronounced it unfit for the service in which it was employed, which it certainly was; when the complete successes which we had obtained in the prosecution of the two first points of the treaty left a fair opening for attempting the third, and Goddard's letters repeatedly urged a diversion on our side; I then resolved to take upon myself the part which the General had abandoned to the Board. I drew up my first minute, proposing the relief of Captain Popham by Major Carnac, and that Captain Popham's corps should be ordered to join Goddard according to its original destination. I communicated this disposition to Mr. Francis; he approved of the relief but not of the order proposed for Captain Popham, insisting on his being recalled and his corps returned to the battalions from which it had been drafted. I did not choose to contend for my right, but yielded. My intended minute was suppressed, and, I believe, destroyed. The order passed for the relief of Captain Popham and his recall on the 29th May.

Having given you a detail of these proceedings in a separate letter, I shall endeavour to confine the sequel of this narrative to those points which relate to my claims on Mr. Francis in virtue of his engagement.

On the 12th June I moved the Board to unite Captain Popham's corps to Major Carnac's and to allow them to march against the country dependent on Mahdajee Scindia, the extremes of which lay contiguous to Gohud. My motion was rejected, and a joint minute entered against it by Francis and Wheler; this was an aggravated breach of faith, but I took no notice of it.

I must mention an anecdote here, which will show how much I laboured to conciliate my colleagues to my views, and how much they were at this time confederated against me. When I had resolved on my plan, I commissioned Major Carnac, who was on a footing of great confidence with Mr. Wheler, to break it to him, letting him know that I would call on him and give him a fuller explanation of it in the morning. He did so, but Mr. Wheler received it with much agitation, doubted Mr. Francis's assent, and expressed an unwillingness to see me, fearing, I suppose, to commit himself before he had received his instructions.

The next morning I called on Mr. Francis, imparted to him my design, went through a long discussion of all the motives, objects, and probable consequences of it, and concluded by giving him my minute to read. He heard me with the cool and vacant attention of a man already informed, made his objections, and I left him. I ordered one of my attendants to run before to Mr. Wheler's and give him notice that I intended him a visit. The man, and half a dozen voices joined to his, informed me that Mr. Wheler was with Mr. Francis when I arrived at the house and was still with him, so that the poor man must have lain concealed during the whole time of my visit, which lasted a full hour and a half.

Thus foiled, I drew up instructions for Major Carnac, empowering him to proceed on the proposed expedition with his four battalions only. This motion was made on the 19th June.

To this appeared another and stronger reply, signed

like the former by Francis and Wheler; the motion was overruled, and even the prior order for the relief so qualified as nearly to make it adequate to one for withdrawing our aid altogether from the Ranna.

As the arguments of both the preceding minutes were drawn from the low state of our treasury and our inability to support the expense of a new expedition, I made use of a very new and perhaps such as will be deemed an exceptionable expedient to overthrow them. The objection of the expense could only apply to the contingencies. The pay and batta would be the same whether the troops remained in their original quarters or marched to Oojeen: the difference could not, on the most exaggerated computation, exceed two lacs: I offered to indemnify the Company for this expense. That my sincerity in this tender might not be suspected, I paid the amount into the treasury while I made it. Do not be surprised, nor misinterpret my intention. I had no secret view of catching the public applause by an ostentatious display of supererogatory virtue and the temporary sacrifice of my own fortune in the hopes of future repayment; the money was not my own—it was a peace-offering from the Rajah of Benares, which he had deputed his most confidential servant to Calcutta to make to me, and to solicit my pardon for all his past offences. I gave the man assurances of my forgiveness, but refused to accept the money, and he was on the point of returning when these debates in our Council began. It occurred to me to convert it to a public use; I gave him an opportunity of repeating the offer, and accepted it, directing it to be delivered to Mr. Croftes, our sub-treasurer, and him to receive it as a deposit in my name. It has been since recoined, and turns out about two lacs of Sicca rupees. I believe I shall communicate this fact to the Court of Directors; but if I do not, I give

you permission to make what use of the above relation of it you think proper, declaring upon my honour that I never will reclaim the money, and that I disclaim any title to it, as I should not have taken it but for and on the occasion which induced me to receive it, or one similar to it.

But this circumstance will show how nearly I had the project of the expedition at heart, and with what eagerness and solicitude I pursued it. I now for the first time took notice of the two joint minutes, reminded Mr. Francis, in language he would understand, but which could not be understood by those who were not before apprised of our treaty, of his engagements, and concluded with the offer which I have just recited. This minute I delivered on the 26th June.

Mr. Francis wrote a long, laboured, and, I think, uncandid minute in reply. Mr. Wheler signed it, as he had done the foregoing, and Mr. Francis added a postscript in his own name; it was dated 27th June, I received it on the 28th. I debated with myself a long time how I should act. I now saw plainly that Mr. Francis had deceived me, and that I had no alternative but to let him take the rule and laugh at my credulity, or to make it a matter too serious for derision, and to expose the fallacy which he had thus unworthily practised upon me. This I did in a very strong but deliberate and temperate charge, which I had prepared for the next Council-day, which was Monday the 3rd July. In the meantime, Sir J. Day, who had been the instrument of our reconciliation, hearing of our disagreement, and wishing, if possible, to prevent a total rupture, came to me and entreated me to allow him to talk with Mr. Francis, and that I would in the meantime take no decided resolution. I consented: he went, and returned with a proposal from Mr. Francis that I would agree to suspend Carnac's expedition till the receipt of the

expected advices from England, which were to decide the future arrangements of this Government, and which might be expected in the course of two months, solemnly promising to allow me to dictate what measures I pleased, if after that time I remained confirmed in the government. I abruptly and peremptorily rejected the proposition, both because it implied a dissolution of the passed agreement and because I had calculated the expedition into Malwa for the very season in which he wanted me to suspend it, in which we could act and the Mahrattas could not. Sir J. Day carried back this message to Mr. Francis, and supported it by a strong remonstrance against his conduct, stating the good faith with which I had acted in parting with my only support, and the ill appearance it would have in the eyes of the world if, under such circumstances, a rupture should take place between us. Mr. Francis defended himself for a little while, but at last said, that he should be obliged to absent himself for some time for the recovery of his health (being at that time seized with an epidemic fever), but that I might avail myself of that interval to propose and carry what resolution I pleased by my casting voice: all that he wanted was, not to be concerned in acts to which he could not consistently assent. Not choosing to disturb Mr. Francis, who seemed to be in pain, by lengthening the discourse, and having obtained what he thought would be effectual, Sir John returned to me with this answer, which he thought definitive. I thought otherwise, unless Mr. Francis would at the same time agree to withdraw all the minutes. This, he said, he understood; but to be certain, he returned and asked Mr. Francis whether he would consent to suppress the minutes. Mr. Francis replied, with all his heart; and this information Sir J. Day carried immediately to Mr. Wheler, and myself and Mr. Wheler with great

satisfaction assenting, the minutes were accordingly withdrawn, and I renewed my motion for Major Carnac's instructions as I had before proposed them, letting the first opposition stand. It passed without objection. A few days after Mr. Wheler received a letter from Mr. Francis, expressing his astonishment to hear that the minutes had been withdrawn, and that it had been asserted to have been done with his consent, absolutely disavowing it, and declaring that he had consented to withdraw the minutes on the express and only condition, that Major Carnac's operations should be confined to the province of Gohud until the arrival of the despatches from England notifying the future Government. Sir John swears that no such condition was either expressed or implied, and that he had precluded it by my peremptory rejection of it when it was first proposed, which he had conveyed in my own words. I do not pretend to judge between them; but this much I must observe, that this difference in the relation of the fact could not possibly have been a mistake on the part of Sir John Day. It must have been design, and it is scarce possible to ascribe a motive for such a design, because it must have been immediately and inevitably discovered. Look back to this part of my narrative and you will see the necessity of my conclusion.

The minutes were accordingly replaced, and I entered a short one claiming a place for that which I had prepared for the 3rd July, but which I thought not proper to record in Mr. Francis's absence. He was at Chandernagore, whither Sir J. Day followed him in expectation of convincing him, he said, that he was wrong. Mr. Francis did not choose to stay for this conviction, and proceeded upon his party up the river, which, I am since informed, and I trust to my authority, was not so much in quest of health as of a meeting

with Sir E. Coote, which he had appointed to give him at the distance of three days from Calcutta. Sir J. Day of course lost his labour; and the General not choosing, if such was Mr. Francis's design, to give him a meeting and intending to make some stay at Mongheer, Mr. Francis suddenly returned, and on the 11th or 12th of this month arrived in Calcutta. I was absent on a visit at Chinsura, and on the Monday following, which was the 14th, I also returned to the presidency. Judging it unbecoming to surprise him with a minute at the Council table, or to send it first to the secretary, I enclosed it in a note to him that evening. The next day, after Council, he desired me to withdraw with him into a private apartment of the Council-house, where, taking out of his pocket a paper, he read from it a challenge in terms.. I accepted it, the time and place of meeting were fixed before we parted, and on the morning of the Thursday following, being the 17th, between the hours of five and six we met. We exchanged shots at nearly the same instant; mine entered his side just below the right shoulder, and lodged in the opposite side under the left. He fell, and was conveyed to a house in the neighbourhood, and I had the satisfaction of learning in two hours after that he was in no manner of danger. He is now, as I am told, recovered from every effect of the wound but the want of strength.

I relate the following circumstance, of itself of no consequence, lest I should be censured by my friends in England, as I am told I have been here, on account of a misrepresentation of my behaviour to Mr. Francis since his confinement. On the same day on which we met, I sent Mr. Markham, my secretary, to visit him, and to intimate my desire to see him also, when he was well enough to receive me. A few days after Colonel Watson came to me with a message from Mr. Francis, to

the following purport:—"That Mr. Francis desired him to express the sense which he had of my attention to him on the late occasion of my daily inquiries after his health, and of the wish which I had expressed to visit him, for all which he made his acknowledgments; that he should always behave to me with every degree of respect, but must decline the offer of my visit and every kind of intercourse with me but at the Council table, desiring me to believe that this resolution did not proceed from any remains of resentment, but from the consideration of what he owed to his own character." To this unexpected message I returned a civil answer. I have not seen him since, of course, and have been blamed, I believe not generally, for not having visited him.

As to what has passed in this affair I expect to be blamed for it; I shall be taxed with imprudence in trusting to a verbal agreement. Mr. Wheler assures me that he has been much conversant in instruments of law, and has been a Director seventeen years; that he is qualified by such an experience to pronounce no engagement is binding that is not committed to writing and signed by the parties, and that every man in England, as well acquainted as he is with legal and official terms, will be of the same opinion. I fear he overlooked this requisite, and the necessity of inquiring for it when he examined the evidences of my resignation.

It will be imputed to me that I sought the issue which terminated our contest. I certainly expected it, but I did not seek it. My intention was solely to prefer a public charge against him, and to give him a fair opportunity of refuting it. For my other reasons I refer to my minute itself, which is undoubtedly strong and pointed, and I intended that it should be so. I never said or wrote anything in private against Mr.

Francis, so much against him; which, I fear, is more than he can affirm of his conduct towards me.

The only reproach which with any shadow of reason can be cast upon me for having hazarded my life in such a manner (for the two preceding objections have no other relation to me than as an individual) is, that I placed myself in a situation inconsistent with my public trust and the duties annexed to it. To this I can only reply, that if I were really possessed of that trust, no consideration or provocation should make me abandon it to the chance of a personal quarrel. This was a point which I well weighed before. I proceeded to the lengths which drew from Mr. Francis the defiance which he made me. I considered myself as a mere name, supplying, perhaps, the place of real substance; that I have no right to expect any essential change in my situation, having experienced in it for these six years past nothing but reproach or abasement, and that my removal would probably make room for some person less obnoxious who might be appointed to succeed me, and whom his employers might judge worthy to possess their confidence and the powers which appertain of right to the executive member of every government. In the meantime nothing would be lost. My antagonist could not have assumed the place which had devolved to him by such extraordinary means, and though I am not so humble as to place my own local qualifications below or even on a level with those of the gentleman who stands next in succession; yet his government would have been a quiet one, and his measures consistent. What I have done has been by fits and intervals of power, if I may so express it, and from the effects let a judgment be formed of what this state and its resources are capable of producing in hands more able and better supported.

My dear friend, be my advocate with my friends and

with the public on this occasion; if it requires one, and you approve my conduct. If not, let this vindication of it make its way to both, and take its chance for the impression which it may carry with it.

Mr. Francis is preparing a reply to my minute, and it is said that it will be temperately written. I shall rejoin, and with temper also; but it is not easy to qualify affirmations opposed to denials, or to soften the charge of a forfeiture of honour, and it is possible that I may be again summoned to the same disgraceful trial, for such I must confess it; but yet I must submit to it, and let the shame fall on those who have permitted, and on those who have excited, the intestine divisions which have so long preyed on the vitals of the first great body dependent on the British empire.

I hope Mr. Francis does not think of assuming any merit from this silly affair. I have been ashamed that I have been made an actor in it, and I declare to you, upon my honour, that such was my sense of it at the time, that I was much disturbed by an old woman whose curiosity prompted her to stand by as a spectatress of a scene so little comprehended by the natives of this part of the world, and attracted others of the same stamp from the adjacent villages to partake in the entertainment.

The papers which I have referred to in the course of this narrative I have thought proper to give you at large in the Enclosures.

I shall refer Mr. Pechell and my other friends to you for the above particulars, and request that you will communicate to them so much of this letter as contains this separate subject. I am, &c.

To LAURENCE SULIVAN, Esq., in continuation of the History.

Fort William, 27th August, 1780.

My dear Friend,—As it has ever been my practice to give you the most early and constant intelligence of

all events which happen in this part of the world, I take the opportunity of a Danish and Portuguese ships sailing to give you an account, such as the scantiness of my time will admit, both of public affairs and of my private situation as they now stand.

I shall begin by reciting to you the event of the greatest importance, as it is the subject uppermost and most agreeable to my own thoughts. You have received long ago an account of the alliance which we formed with the Ranna of Gohud, and an expedition, commanded by Captain Popham, in consequence of that alliance. This shall be mentioned in a regular detail. I now only mean to give you an account of an enterprise which most signalized his determination, and for which it is impossible too much to applaud his conduct. Indeed he is a noble fellow.

On the 4th of this month he undertook and accomplished the escalade of Guallior, and obtained possession of it without loss. I enclose, for your satisfaction, his letter to me of the 3d instant, as also his letter to the Board.

This is a success which I hope will prove decisive; I look upon it as one of the best concerted and most gallant enterprises that has ever been performed in India; nearly, if not equal in its advantages to the battle of Plassey. In Europe it cannot miss of its effect. The name of Guallior has been long famous in history. In this country its effect is not to be described. Other congratulations which I have received on the many important successes of our arms were but coldly offered, but scarcely a man mentions this without enthusiasm. The advantages which will result from it are obvious. It is the key of Indostan. It will entirely exclude the Mahrattas from that part of the country, and opinion, which in every region of the world has considerable influence on public affairs, and

in none so much as in this, will raise the credit of the English arms and strength beyond the effect of anything which has yet been achieved by them. That the consequence may be peace is my firm hope, but this will depend entirely on Mahdajee Scindia, whose country lies immediately open to our next assault, and whose neighbours will be all ready to join us in the prosecution of any plan against his dominions. Such a junction may perhaps make him fear for his own property, and this may induce him to consent to our terms of accommodation. If Mahdajee Scindia can once be brought to this point, the Poonah minister must necessarily comply, for he of himself is nothing.

I must now direct your attention towards Bombay and the Guzerat. Goddard's campaign has been as successful as I could wish it, though it will be generally accounted more splendid than attended with substantial advantages. But this is not a true state of it. Our first point was to retrieve our disgrace at Woorgaum. That has been most completely effected, and this was worth crores to purchase it. We have completed both the conquest and possession of Guzerat. Some revenue we must immediately get from it, and more as the gentlemen at Bombay attain the habits of a new business, and when we are less disturbed in the management of it. The loss of the enemy is total, and they can ill afford it. Their army, unused to the hard treatment it has met with, discouraged, reduced in its numbers, and what a Mahratta feels most sensibly, their horses all either killed or taken, or disabled, is returned to Oojeen, whence I have this account of them.

I hope to prevent their returning to disturb Goddard in the next season by a powerful diversion on this side.

The principal events of the campaign are the fol-

lowing:—The conquest of Ahmedabad, and consequent reduction of all Guzerat. The rapid march of our detachment to meet the army of the Mahratta state, consisting of 60,000 horse, which had taken the field under the command of Tuckojee Holkar and Mahdajee Scindia, to oppose it. The attack of their camp on the 3d April, a most spirited and well-concerted enterprise. The gallant and successful stand made by a little foraging party under Captain Campbell against 20,000 men, and their two principal leaders in person. The reiterated approach of our troops, and the retreat of theirs. The action of Captain Forbes, and lastly the incomparable behaviour of Lieutenant Welch. These transactions will, I hope, be followed by the reduction of Bassein, which Goddard has declared his intention to besiege when the violence of the rains is abated, and if he undertakes it I am confident of his success. For the particulars of the actions recited above, I refer you to the enclosed extracts.

The government of Berar continues still to temporize. A proposal was made to send Dewangar Pundit, the Dewan, to this quarter to negociate a peace, and an application was certainly made to the Poona administration for credentials, but it met with a positive refusal and a declaration that they would not consent to peace. Our professions were termed delusory, and if my letter was sent in its original form to Poona, the minister was right in suspecting that the negociation might terminate to the prejudice of his cause, if it did not in the conclusion, which was its declared object, as my letter expressed a strong expectation of the continuance of the friendship of Moodajee in any event. In the meantime Moodajee has levied a great force, and is increasing it. He has sent his second son Chimnajee with a body, said to consist of 30,000 horse, to Cuttac. Their real number does not greatly exceed

half of their reputed strength. There they have arrived some time, and there they lie quiet. What their destination may be I will not venture to conjecture. Moodajee and his Dewan, however, profess friendship and a determination to avoid a rupture with us. They have, with much apparent candour, informed me regularly and progressively of all their intentions, ascribing all their movements to the requisition of the Peshwa, backed with the threats of Nizam Ally Cawn and Mahdajee Scindia, and their apprehensions of their all joining to lay waste their country if, unprepared as they were for resistance, they directly refused to yield to their demands. They pressed Moodajee to march his forces early in the season into the province of Bahar. Much time was consumed, his Dewan says, purposely in the commencement of the march; much more in the way in the settlement of Sumblepoor, and otherrefractory zemindars, purposely, as he also affirms, to gain time for the expiration of the fair season, and for the plea of the rains to defer the prescribed operations till a more distant period, in the hope either that some accommodation might in the meantime be effected, or his government enabled to resume and support its independency. What the real views of that government may be, or what line they may finally make choice of, I cannot say; but its actions have not hitherto falsified its professions, and their troops, though they have been lying these two months within marauding distances of our borders, have been as quiet as a herd of cattle.

The confederacy against the English was originally formed by Nizam Ally Cawn. The design was this: The grand army, under Scindia and Holkar, to be opposed to General Goddard; Moodajee to invade Bengal and its dependencies; Nizam Ally the Circars; and Hyder the Carnatic. Scindia and Holkar have

performed their part of the engagement; Moodajee ostensibly his; and Hyder his with a vengeance. I shall say nothing of him, because you will have more recent and more authentic advices concerning the Carnatic from Fort St. George. I hear nothing privately from thence but what I am ashamed to hear, and publicly nothing. With respect to Nizam Ally, I have no doubt of his having been the projector of this alliance, and he had sufficient provocation for it. Yet I doubt his present disposition. He has not yet moved, or made any preparation for moving. We have promised him complete reparation for the injuries of which he formerly complained, and he would lose much more by the forfeiture of the effect of these promises than he could possibly gain by going to war with us. Mr. Holland was sent by the senior commander of Fort St. George, as resident at his court, to reconcile him to the negociation with his brother Bassaulut Jung, and to erase from his mind any suspicions which he might have formed of their designs. He was ordered to correspond with the Supreme Council, and give every information in his power. But, contrary to his first instructions, he was directed to propose to the Nizam the abolishment of the Peshcush and a rupture of his treaty with his brother Bassaulut Jung. This the Nizam declared to be equal to a declaration of war. Being informed of this, we wrote to Mr. Holland to suspend any further negociation, and to the Nizam that we would endeavour to accommodate the disputes between him and the Madras Council, sending them orders at the same time to desist from such an application. Upon this Mr. Holland was ordered to return to Madras, but he stayed at Hydrabad till he had informed us of his recall. We immediately wrote to Fort St. George desiring that he might be continued there some time longer, and to him to wait

their answer. But they immediately suspended him from the service on the accumulated charge of his having betrayed the secrets of his trust to the Governor-general and Council of Bengal; and deferring the execution of their orders for his recall on our request, that he would stay for the effect of our application to them for his continuance. On the instant receipt of this information we sent him fresh credentials, and appointed him our minister for the affairs of this Government alone, and gave the Nabob at the same time assurances that the Circar of Mortuzanagur should be restored to his brother, and the Madras detachment withdrawn from it. Of these resolutions we advised the select committee, in a letter dated 12th June, to which they have not replied, and perhaps expect to elude our authority by withholding the only evidence which a refusal under their hands could yield of their contumacy. I know not how my colleagues may take this. My line is determined, and I will adhere to it though single.

In the beginning of this letter I promised you a detail of our Gohud business, and of Popham's successes; and though I sent you formerly a copy of the treaty with the Ranna, I now enclose it to you, lest you should have mislaid, or perhaps never received it.

You will in this treaty observe three principal points, the first and greatest, the expulsion of the Mahrattas from the open country of Gohud, which they had entirely overrun, and the revenues of which they either themselves collected, or prevented the Ranna from collecting. The second, to make additions to his dominions by conquest of territory from them; and thirdly, to carry the war directly against them in conjunction with him.

Orders were sent by the Board to Sir E. Coote, to comply with the first requisition which the Ranna

should make for the aid of our troops. Against this measure he protested, but at the same time sent Captain Popham with a detachment of 2,400 men, four field pieces, an howitzer, and two squadrons of horse. This detachment had been originally formed for the purpose of recruiting Goddard's army, and consisted of the officers belonging to that corps, and of drafts made for it. By forced impediments and affected delays, it was prevented from beginning its march till the season was so far advanced, that the Board, in a reference made to them, as I recollect, from the Commander-in-chief, forbad, or offered an opinion to that effect, that it should proceed.

This force, though fully adequate for the service for which it was originally intended, was by no means so to this from the want of heavy artillery, nor was it indeed reconcileable to the treaty. The Ranna complained that he was charged with a force which was not supplied, 2,400 men not being equal to four battalions; and as for horse, he had neither applied for nor wanted any.

The two first points of the treaty Popham has amply fulfilled. He attacked and drove the Mahrattas from the country with great slaughter, and fairly cleared it. He attempted the fort of Lehar, which, though the walls were of mud, made such a resistance as to require a battering train to demolish them. He had none. But to avoid the disgrace of a repulse, he was compelled to assault it under every disadvantage. He mined the wall in two places; one of which was countermined by the garrison, the other had its effect, and made a breach scarcely practicable. It was stormed and carried, but with great loss, and the sacrifice of two most gallant officers, Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardiner, the latter a relation of mine, who insisted on leading the forlorn hope.

By the capture of this place, a district of no small consequence, named Cutchwagur, was acquired for the Ranna, and the Mahrattas were by subsequent pursuits totally expelled, excepting from Guallior, the only place which remained in their hands.

The General inveighed as usual against the treaty, abused the Ranna for drawing Popham into such a snare, and declared the detachment to be unfit for such purposes. We thought so too, but said it was of his construction, and as we were so far united in opinion we resolved to change the detachment for a better; in effect the impossibility of adjusting the treaty was with me a forcible argument, and besides, I wanted to improve the advantages which we had acquired by pursuing the war into the districts of Mahdajee Scindia, for which the detachment was not qualified, and Popham had shown so much fear of offending the Commander-in-chief, that I could not rely on him for a service in which my own reputation was immediately staked. Besides, all the army had exclaimed against such an unprecedented preference shown to a young officer, and as it now rested with me to form the succeeding plan, I did not choose to incur the obloquy of such an unpopular selection. I proposed that the new detachment should be formed of three regular battalions. Browne's light infantry added its complement of field pieces, the howitzer, and two brass twelve-pounders; and I recommended Major Carnac for the command.

Yet, unwilling to hurt Captain Popham, whom I esteemed, I recurred to his original destination, and in a minute which I drew up for the occasion, I proposed that he should be ordered, as soon as relieved, to march through Joudpoor to Guzerat to complete Goddard's deficiencies, to enable him to return the Bombay troops, and that presidency to reduce two battalions which

they had raised to supply their place; in this, I had a further view to engage the Rajah of Joudpoor [V. Meerta, his capital in the map] in the way; but it made no part of the proposed design.

I showed the minute to Mr. Francis, but he expressed so much reluctance to it that I suppressed it, and proposed only what I could easily carry, that is, the relief of Popham's detachment by Carnac's. It was insisted that Popham's should be disbanded; I yielded, greatly against my will and judgment. Soon after the army from Naigpoor arrived at Cuttac, Hyder was preparing to invade the Carnatic, and had declared this to be his intention. Other troubles were gathering all over India. I then proposed to unite Captain Popham's corps to Carnac's, and to allow them to march into the province of Malwa. My motion was rejected.

For the subsequent transactions, I refer you to my other letter. I am, &c.

6th September.

P. S.—Since writing the above, we have received advices of Goddard's further successes, which you will find in the enclosure No. 7.

I have been reduced to the mortifying necessity of proposing to open our treasury for loans at the usual rate of interest.

The General is friendly, and we are confidential. He is for vigorous measures, but we do not yet look the same way; some mischievous person having laboured to convince him that the first and most necessary measure was to drive the Naigpoor army from Cuttac. I have had the good fortune to remove the greatest part of these prejudices, if I have not entirely convinced him, and I have hopes that, while he is with us, I shall find him not inimical.

I have a letter from Dewangar Pundit, in which he tells me he has made a peremptory demand for creden-

tials from Poona, which he expected about the middle of last month, and should purpose to set off on the instant of their arrival, being resolved at all events to come to Bengal, and give me the long proposed meeting. Again, my friend, adieu.

CHAPTER VII.

Progress of the War—Great exertions of the Bengal Government—Correspondence.

IT is not my province to describe the progress of the war in the Carnatic, or to notice the gross blunders, both in the council chamber and in the field, that led to the misfortunes which in the earlier stages attended it. As slow to remedy their own errors as they had been prompt to incur them, the Madras government not only persisted in keeping possession of Guntoor, but discredited every report of the preparation which Hyder and the Nizam were making to invade the Carnatic. The results are well known. One hundred thousand armed men from Mysore broke like an avalanche upon the Nabob's provinces. Colonel Bailie's detachment was cut off. Sir Hector Munro was worsted at Canjeveram, and Fort St. George itself had well nigh fallen into the hands of the enemy, whose foragers plundered the very country houses of the European gentlemen within sight of its walls. In a word, ruin seemed to be at hand, which there was neither courage to face, nor means adequate to avert; and which certainly never would have been averted, had there

not been at the head of affairs in Bengal, one, whose energies seemed but to rise in proportion to the demands that were made upon them, and who never appeared so great as when the difficulties of his situation were at the highest.

I take it for granted that with the broad outline of Mr. Hastings's measures at this juncture, every reader of history is acquainted. I therefore transcribe the following letters without comment, not so much on account of the detail of facts which is contained in them, as because they bring the great actor himself in a distinct and conspicuous point of view before us. I beg to call attention to the concluding paragraph, in the former of the two, because it relates to the Rajah of Benares's gift, and the purposes to which it was applied. Yet Mr. Hastings was accused, among other high crimes and misdemeanors, of rapacity in the acceptance of presents, and malversation of the public money, of which he had the charge!!!

Fort William, 28th October, 1780.

My dear Friend,—A most distressing and provoking accident has befallen me, no less than the loss of all my despatches for the Tryall in a storm. To relieve it, I have set every hand to work that I could employ to make copies of the most material papers, of which the most material are the enclosures of this letter. These contain all our proceedings, from the first advices of the defeat of our army on the coast, which were received on the 22d ultimo, to the departure of Sir E.

Coote on the 22d instant. I have joined to these my correspondence with the government of Berar, because I think it the most essential of our political instruments, and have derived my best hopes of success from it. I have kept no copy of my letter to you, nor is it material, as I trust to your son for the fullest and clearest information that can be given to you: but I will epitomise what we have done, as this will best show, by bringing all the facts into a small compass, the diligence which has been exerted on an occasion which so much required it.

On the 23d September, your son arrived with public advices of the loss of Colonel Bailie's detachment, and the flower of the army, and of General Munro's precipitate flight from the face of Hyder.

On the 25th we met (I made it a point to defer our meeting on the recent impression), and I proposed that we should instantly fit out an armament of European infantry and artillery, to send to the relief of the Carnatic; that Sir E. Coote should be solicited to go thither and take the command; that we should send with him fifteen lacs, not for a civil supply, but for the sole use of the army; that we should offer peace and alliance to the Mahrattas, not by negociation, but by a treaty executed on our part with the guarantee of the Rajah of Berar.

These points were all agreed to. The treaty was drawn up, translated, and executed and despatched with all the voluminous letters which were necessary to accompany it, by the 12th instant; on the next day the General departed. On the 10th of October I moved that Mr. Whitehill should be suspended for persisting in keeping possession of the circar of Guntoor, after we had given our faith to Nizam Ally Cawn, and had ordered the Select Committee of Fort St. George to surrender it. It passed unanimously. In the mean

time we had formed three plans for raising money by loan, one simple at eight per cent.; the second at four per cent.; the interest, with one fifth of the principal, payable by bills on England; and the third on annuities.

By the 14th all our troops were embarked, I mean from Calcutta. This was the last of our measures; the rest depended on the winds, weather, and other natural contingencies: so that the whole embarkation, and all the measures projected for so great an occasion, were concluded in the exact space of three weeks from the day on which we received the notification which gave birth to them.

The General sailed on the 23d, and on that night and the succeeding day we had a violent storm; it blew from the north, and though it shifted after some hours to the south, yet the Deputy Harbour-master who attended the Duchess of Kingston, assures me that she was advanced into such fair sea room that she could not have suffered much by it. Two of the vessels had sailed on the 21st. They will all be at or near Madras by this time, for the weather has been clear and settled, and the wind due north ever since. The tempest was equally violent here and in the roads.

My packet was lost in the storm, and I shall send this by a sloop despatched on purpose.

Since the close of my last despatches I have received letters from Naugpoor, written on the knowledge of Hyder's first successes, in so liberal a style, and so decisive, that I know they will give you pleasure, and therefore I send you a copy of them, with the foul drafts of a minute which I delivered to the Board on the 13th of last month, which may serve as a preface to it. Pray read both with attention. My correspondence with that government has been principally carried on through the Vackeel and the Dewan. I have

dictated all the material letters written by the former to the latter, which has been the employment of many hours of my time, and the Dewan's answers to him have been in effect replies to me. This method has introduced a freer intercourse, without the stiffness of a mounshee's pen, between me and the instrument of the Berar government, without exciting the jealousy of the principal by an application passing him to his minister.

I have severely felt the mortification of being checked in the design which I had formed for terminating the war with the Mahrattas on very different terms, and be assured, my dear friend, that I should have accomplished them. But all my hopes of aggrandizing the British name, and enlarging the interests of the Company, gave instant place to the more urgent call to support the existence of both in the Carnatic; nor did I hesitate a moment to abandon my own views for such an object. The Mahratta war has been, and is yet called mine, God knows why. I was forced into it. It began with the acts of others unknown to me. I never professed any other design but to support the presidency of Bombay, if it had succeeded in the plans which it had formed, or to protect and save them if they failed. The world, even the Indian world, regarded the attempt with apprehension. You know how confidently I undertook it, and foretold all the successive events of it—all but the wild and precipitate expedition to Poona, and the infamous surrender at Wargaum. These were events lying beyond the reach of human foresight.

Perhaps, when I shall cease to be an object of persecution, the preservation of Bombay may be ascribed to me; and the part which I have taken in the concerns of that presidency may be well understood to have been no more than a salutary interposition of extraordinary

means for the correction of effects derived from the blunders of others.

A similar occasion has compelled me to bear a part in the concerns of the Carnatic. The war with Hyder may be in like manner called my war; but whatever may be the event of the war and of the measures which have been taken to convert it to our advantage, I shall have the conscious satisfaction to reflect that if the Carnatic is saved, it is saved by my exertions; and even in the worst event, that I did all on my part that could be done for its preservation.

It was yesterday moved and resolved to put in orders a detachment of six battalions of sepoys and one company of artillery, to march by the way of Cuttac to the coast. Lieut.-colonel Pearse, the commander of artillery, commands it. He is a man of bravery, and of great professional knowledge. Major Edmondson is his second, and has been nomiated by me without his knowledge or expectation. I shall expect a part of the Naugpoor cavalry which is at Cuttac to join this party. It will be ready to move at the farthest by the 1st of December, and long before that time I shall expect to know the result of our treaty, and its reception at Naugpoor.

I have professed to leave the detail of all the past transactions to your son, and here am I imperceptibly led into the midst of it myself. It is time to stop. To Mr. Pechell, to Mr. Barwell, and all my other friends, I beg that you will communicate the enclosures, and this to the Pechells. I can write to no one, nor indeed did my last letters contain much more than references.

I had written a letter to the Court of Directors, in which I told them the story of the two gratuitous lacs provided by me for the extraordinary expenses of Major Carnac's detachment, and another something like it, which notwithstanding my hurry, I must relate in brief

to you. You know that the army at Cuttac arrived there about the end of May. There it has been quietly ever since. It marched on the Duserra, on the 12th of October last. It has consumed all the money provided originally for its subsistence. Its resources are next to nothing, and the means of remittance from Naugpoor impracticable. The Rajah and his minister urged me to relieve them. I mentioned the subject to the General. He with some opposition promised his consent if I proposed. Mr. Wheler did not like it. I said nothing of it to Francis; but resolved, as the best expedient, to take it upon myself. I accordingly sent three lacs of rupees to the commander of the army, with a promise of more whenever I could propose it as a public gratuity, that is to say, when his father shall have either given orders for his return, or to join us. I have represented this both to him and to the Rajah as a private act of my own, and as such three lacs have the merit of ten, nor is the dignity of government committed by it, of which indeed I have no idea, even if it had been publicly done. I have borrowed two lacs of this sum, and supplied the other from my public cash: and I intend to charge the whole to the Company.

Fort William, 10th November, 1780.

My dear Friend,—Enclosed is a duplicate of my last and with it I shall send copies of the papers which accompanied the original. I wrote to you a separate letter of the same date, but I cannot give you a duplicate of it, not having copied it. It contained only one subject, namely, my views respecting your son. I am happy that I can now inform you of his being decidedly fixed with me by a formal act of the Board, and an application from them to the government of Fort St. George, to grant him their licence to remain here as my assistant. I cannot express to you how

much I am pleased with this arrangement, nor am I less in the belief that it is agreeable to him. Your colleagues have been so much habituated to pass their censures on my actions, and to discountenance those to whom I have shown any degree of confidence, or who have given proofs of their attachment to me, that it will possibly occur to them that in this instance I have been guilty of a flagrant breach of orders in seducing one of their servants from the station which they had allotted to him. Such is the treatment which I have experienced with respect to Elliott, Bogle, Belli, Richard Sumner, and Sir J. D'Oyly, men of eminent merit, and universally respected, but unfortunately known to have attached themselves to me.

Perhaps the spirit which dictated these malevolent acts may at length have subsided, and it may be allowed me at a time like this, and after the labours of so many years, performed almost with my own hands, to make one election of my own assistant in the first and most arduous department, under the superior administration of the British empire. Few are the privileges which I have hitherto received, or assumed. I have never called the members of another presidency to compose the government of this: my name has received no addition of titles, my fortune of jagheers, nor my person any decorations of honour. I was introduced into this government without any cost of ships to transport me, nor has any provision been assigned me of a domestic surgeon, nor a domestic chaplain. Neither my constitution nor religious principles have been a charge to the Company. These and other distinctions have been the lot of others my inferiors, nor upon my honour has my envy been excited by them. I only mean by this comparison to furnish you with an answer, which ought to shame those who require one.

Mr. Francis has announced his intention to leave us, and had engaged a passage in a Dutch ship, which I since hear he has left for one in the Fox. His departure may be considered as the close of one complete period of my political life, and the beginning of a new one. After a conflict of six years I may enjoy the triumph of a decided victory, and many are the congratulations which have been paid upon it: but what a victory! an exhausted treasury, an accumulating debt: a system charged with expensive establishments, and precluded by the multitude of dependants and the curse of patronage, from reformation; a government debilitated by the various habits of inveterate licentiousness. A country oppressed by private rapacity, and deprived of its vital resources by the enormous quantities of current specie annually exported in the remittance of private fortunes, in supplies sent to China, Fort St. George, to Bombay, and lately to the army at Surat, and by an impoverished commerce; the support of Bombay with all its new conquests, the charge of preserving Fort St. George, and recovering the Carnatic from the hands of a victorious enemy; the entire maintenance of both presidencies; and lastly, a war either actual or depending in every quarter, and with every power of Hindostan: these, and many more evils which I could enumerate are the appendages of that authority which is devolving to me, and the fruits of that spirit of discord which has been permitted—how unaccountably. It has prevailed in this government without an instant of remission, since the 19th of October, 1774, to the present hour. This assertion I could easily prove, but the application of it to every consequence which I have particularized would of itself exceed the proper bounds of a letter. Yet, to you, my friend, I will venture to affirm with proof, that if it had pleased the wisdom of Parliament to have

removed me from my office in the year 1774, and to have supplied my place with a man to whom the superior administration and Court of Directors could have given their confidence, had he but possessed a moderate understanding with experience and integrity, all the ills which have befallen the country might have been prevented. The treasury of Bengal would have continued to accumulate, until it had required a check to its exuberance; a regular and economical system of office had been established; the authority of this government had never suffered any diminution; easy and equal fortunes had been acquired by individuals without discredit to the service, or injury to any; the miserable expedition which terminated with the infamous convention of Woorgaum had never happened; Hyder Ally had not thought of invading the Carnatic; every state would have courted the Company's alliance, and the influence of the British name had been felt acknowledged and respected in every region of Hindostan and Deccan.

Yet though I have not the fairest prospect before me, Mr. Francis's retreat will certainly remove the worst appearances of it; I shall have no competitor to oppose my designs; to encourage disobedience to my authority; to write circular letters with copies of instruments from the Court of Directors, proclaiming their distrust of me, and denouncing my removal; to excite and foment popular odium against me; to urge me to acts of severity, and then abandon and oppose me; to keep alive the expectation of impending changes; to teach foreign states to counteract me and deter them from forming connexions with me. I have neither his emissaries in office to thwart me from system, nor my own dependants to presume on the rights of attachment. In a word, I have power, and I will employ it, during the interval in which the credit of it shall last, to re-

trieve past misfortunes, to remove present dangers, and to re-establish the power of the Company, and the safety of its possessions.

The principal springs by which these effects are expected to be produced are already in action. A very powerful reinforcement of military strength has been sent to Madras.

Sir E. Coote has been prevailed upon to accompany it.

A great detachment of native troops is forming to assist in the same service.

A capital supply of treasure—fifteen lacs—has been sent to Fort St. George, and appropriated exclusive ly to their military expenses. A treaty has been formed, executed on our part, and tendered for acceptance to the Mahratta state.

The Rajah of Berar, the principal state in connexion with the Mahrattas, has been solicited to become a party to it.

The Circar of Mortazanagar or Guntoor, forcibly taken by the presidency of Fort St. George, in violation of the treaty of 1768, has been returned to its proprietor, and other means taken to conciliate the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, who was on the point of declaring war against us, and was the original author and instigator of the confederacy planned for our extirpation.

We have opened our treasury for loans of money, the most mortifying act to me of my government, after having been instrumental in discharging a former debt of one crore and a half of rupees, and of filling their treasuries with near double that amount. The sum raised by this time is C. rupees 64,44,601.

To these I will add another domestic arrangement, calculated both for the effectual administration of justice, and for the prevention of future contests between the government and superior court, by the

appointment of the chief justice to the office of judge of the Sudder Dewannee Adawlut. This measure was received by the public with all the prejudices which might be naturally expected to influence the minds of men heated by the late acts of the body of which Sir Elijah was the chief, and who, regarding it as an accession of power to the court itself, conceived themselves exposed to the worst effects of its resentment; but the most intelligent, and many even of the most violent, begin already to moderate their opinion of it. Indeed, I should wonder if they did not, for it requires very little sagacity to discover that an exclusive advantage conferred on one member of the court is by no means likely to increase either the authority of the whole body, or to strengthen its animosities. The chief justice, whose heart, though warm in both extremes, is animated with as much natural benevolence as that of any man living, not having the actions of others to defend, but left to his own impulse, will soon regain in this office the popularity which he once acquired and lost. The court will find him a milder advocate for an extension of authority which certainly did not belong to it, and which is now rendered less necessary even on their own grounds, than it was when, by the terrors hung over our judicial as well as ministerial officers, the course of justice had in effect no free current but in the channel of the Supreme Court.

I must hasten the conclusion of this letter, that I may not miss the packet. Perhaps I may write another to follow it.

This is the 2d of December. Mr. Francis departs to-morrow. He has replied to my minute 3d July: I have answered him. He has written a third, and I have rejoined to that. He has made a surrejoinder, as I am told, which I suppose he will present at parting, and I suppose that will be the last, for he can say

nothing new, and will only attempt to draw the argument into foreign matter. My friend, I am ashamed of it, but unless I am mistaken, his own vindication will tend more to mine, in its impression on candid and unprejudiced readers, than to his. For the rest of this subject I refer you to your son.

Let me intreat you to support our recommendation of Mr. Holland.

In a letter which I have written to the secret committee, I have recommended Major Popham for some public testimony of your approbation. He deserves it. I beg you will promote it.

In my catalogue of good things done for the salvation of the Carnatic, I ought to have inserted the suspension of Mr. Whitehill. It has taken effect without trouble, though the creature made some show of resistance, and with the universal satisfaction and general joy of the settlement. I took special care to separate the real and legal cause of his suspension from the motives which might obviously be assigned to it: but that being answered, I may be allowed to rejoice, and I do most sincerely, that the government of Fort St. George has been, by whatever means, rescued from the hands of a man, who, if he had been allowed to retain it, would have completed its ruin; nor was his military coadjutor much better. This act of justice will, if any thing can, determine Nizam Ally in our favour; for he has complained in terms of great severity, and almost of contempt, that our professions were contradicted by facts, and that if we were sincere, we wanted the power to enforce them, since the only effect which our orders had yet produced, had been the vindictive dismission of Mr. Holland for having been instrumental to their being issued. The Circar of Guntoor has been since evacuated, but we had passed our sentence, the General, who signed it, had left us, and

we had before waited longer perhaps than we ought for the effect of our orders. For our reasons at large see our minute, and the letter to the secret committee.

Sir E. Coote in the Kingston, the last ship of our armament, arrived in safety at Fort St. George on the 5th November, in just fifty-two days from the return of Sir Hector Munro to the Mount after his defeat. Let us have credit equally for the substantial aids which we have granted to our sister presidency, and for the despatch with which they were furnished—a despatch unequalled but by the equipment of the Charlotte and Resolution,

Colonel Pearse's detachment will certainly move off in the course of the next week, and his artillery and stores will be transported to Balasore by sea, which will quicken as well as lighten his march. The roads are yet scarcely passable.

Sir E. Coote gives us a dreadful account of the state of the Madras army, and represents the sepoys to a man as unfit for service, from their despondency. He is too apt to view things in their worst light, but I fear much is too true. He estimates the monthly expense of the whole army at seven lacs and a half, which we must provide; for the Carnatic will not, he says, yield a rupee. Hyder is the complete and acknowledged master of it.

With our past drains of the current specie of this country, which I compute at one crore of rupees in each year; with both the presidencies of Bombay and Madras to maintain, and a heavy war to carry on for each with our own unassisted funds; with other enemies threatening these provinces, and the necessity of guarding against them by at least the replacing the battalions which we have sent to the Carnatic; it will be impossible to provide the investment. I know the personal consequences to which I shall expose myself by so general a disappointment, but I am without a

remedy. It will be no act of mine, but of a necessity arising from causes independent of me and of this government. I have neither engaged the Company in a war with the Mahrattas nor with Hyder Ally; nor has any act of mine encouraged the court of France to send a squadron and armies from Europe to assist in effecting our destruction. Pray see my letter. I would have kept back the notice, but Wheler, whose sentiments on this subject are literally the same as my own, has told me that if I do not apprize the Court of Directors of the probability of this event, they will have taken the ships for the next year, the month of August being the time allotted usually for that disposition. I had rather incur a personal risk, than keep back an unpleasant report to a greater distance of time, with such ill consequences attending it.

I intend to change the whole system of the collections, and bring them to Calcutta, according to the plan which I formed in 1773, but which my council then would not permit me to execute. I hope by this and some other arangements to make some addition to our revenue, and some retrenchments in our expenses.

I have also thoughts of visiting the province of Oude, which is most dismally wasted and disordered by the effects of the disjointed control which has hitherto prevailed in it. Its resources have already begun to fail us, and the Nabob himself, the vizier of the empire, has been at times destitute even of the necessaries of life. I will not go unless I am certain that I can relieve the distresses of the country. I will, if I can.

We shall immediately raise six new battalions in the place of those which compose Colonel Pearse's detachment, and hope to be able to accomplish this without much loss of time, and with a part at least not new recruits.

Mr. Wheler has written to his friends in favour of a

plan for keeping the Company's ships in employment by allowing individuals to freight their goods in them on the footing of the present privilege allowed to the captains and officers. This is what I have alluded to in my letter to the secret committee.

The wretch Bristowe is gone to Lucknow. If he attempts to do mischief there I will recall him. For God's sake help to rid me of so unworthy an antagonist, and to gain me the privilege of employing my own instruments, if the future salvation of the Company is to be left to my care. I will not employ Bristowe though my life should be the forfeit of my refusal.

I hope to effect the removal of Fowke from Benares with his acquiescence.

I can write no more. I am, most sincerely my dear Sir, your affectionate, faithful, and devoted friend.

There is but one more of Mr. Hastings's public acts at this period to which, before adverting to other matters, I find it necessary to refer;—I allude to his negociation with the Dutch East India Company for the hire of a body of troops, of whom a thousand should be European infantry, and two hundred European artillerymen. The negociation led to no satisfactory results, for the Dutch, as usual, procrastinated, and ere a treaty could be drawn up and ratified, there was war between Great Britain and Holland; but the measure was surely not deserving of the censure which was attempted to be cast upon it, seeing that the cry of the authorities at Fort St. George was for European soldiers, without a large addition to whom they declared that it would be impossible any longer to maintain

the war. I admit that the terms offered to the Dutch were somewhat extravagant. They included not only the pay of the troops while employed, but the cession, in perpetuity, of the province of Tinnevelly, together with permission to make conquests in the neighbourhood of Cochin, and an exclusive right to the pearl fishery along the whole of the coast south from Ramiseram. Nevertheless the case was so urgent, that Mr. Hastings would have agreed to the arrangement had not the Madras government refused its sanction; and the Dutch, as I have just said, defeated their own views by the delay which they exercised in working them out. In every other respect, however, they were Mr. Hastings's councils which prevailed to the salvation of the Carnatic. For he did not hesitate, by virtue of the authority invested in him, to remove Mr. Whitehill from the President's chair, or to throw the influence of that office into the hands of one, on whose hearty co-operation with Sir Eyre Coote he believed that he might with confidence rely. I need scarcely add that the struggle, though desperate, ended triumphantly for the British name, and that the bitterest of Mr. Hastings's personal enemies were forced to acknowledge that, by the vigour of his counsels he saved at that time the Carnatic to the Nabob and to the Company.

CHAPTER VIII.

Intrigues in the Cabinet—Deputes Major Scott to be his Agent—Exposition of his system of Government—Marks of decision of Character.

It is necessary to turn now, for a brief space, from a contemplation of the personal proceedings of Mr. Hastings, that we may inform ourselves of the manner in which his character and interests were dealt with at home, as well by such as loved the man and approved of his system of government, as by others who hated the one and utterly condemned the other. For Hastings belonged to that illustrious throng whose eminence never fails to excite as much of envy as of admiration, and whose views on all important subjects go so far beyond the comprehension of ordinary men, that by ordinary men they are uniformly distrusted. Hence, doubtless, not less than by reason of the political cabal that was against him, his course had been held, ever since the passing of the Regulating Act, through obstacles such as none but transcendant abilities could have enabled him to surmount; and though, so early as 1779, popular prejudices were in some degree softened, there were not wanting still both at Court and in the India House numbers who desired nothing more ardently than to bring about his

degradation. On the other hand, few public men have ever been supported by truer, or steadier, or more influential friends. Among these I may enumerate, in addition to the heads of his party in the Court of Proprietors, Lord Mansfield, Lord Bathurst, Dr. Markham Archbishop of York, with many more, whose support, as it was given on public grounds alone, so it did not for many years afterwards bring them into intimate or personal communication with the object of it. Moreover it is a striking fact, that though a prodigious mass of talent and of genius was arrayed against him, wherever experience happened to be added to these accomplishments he uniformly found a supporter. Thus in opposition to Edmund Burke, at that time an East India proprietor and a regular attendant at the meetings of the Court, were ranged such men as Mr. Pechell, Mr. Sulivan, General Caillaud, and others, who to strong natural sense added a knowledge of the matters under discussion, which they derived, not from books but from long and faithful service in India. Though the battle was, therefore, sharp, and seemed often to go against him, there was always some new ground on which he and his defenders could fall back, and from which not all the violence of party—and it never showed itself in more odious colours—succeeded to the last in driving them. Yet let the truth be told. Mr. Hastings certainly owed as much, in the end, to

the fears as to the good feelings of the minister, who ceased to intrigue for the possession of Indian power and Indian patronage only after he had virtually lost America to the British crown.

By the arrangement of 1773, the government of India, as therein constituted, was to continue both in its form and in the persons of those by whom it was administered, for the space of five years, unchanged. Individuals were indeed liable, by the joint will of the Company and of the Crown, to be recalled; whilst it was competent for them, at any period, to resign, should circumstances arise to require a resignation. But failing either or both of these accidents, the power of controlling the affairs of British India was for a space of five years secured by Act of Parliament to those whose names had been in 1773 submitted to the King, and by him approved. We have seen that more than one bold attempt was made between the periods of the passing of the Act and its expiration to deprive Mr. Hastings of his authority. Not succeeding in the endeavour to get up an address of removal to the Crown, his enemies took advantage of the precipitancy of Colonel MacLeane, and accepting a resignation which had never, in point of fact, been tendered, made dispositions to transfer the reins of government to other hands. But here again the personal firmness of Mr. Hastings withstood them; and they were too conscious of their own lack both

of right and of power to force matters to an extremity. It remained to be seen what part the King's minister would play, now that the time for which his authority was secured to Mr. Hastings was drawing to a close, and many and baseless were the speculations to which a consideration of the subject gave rise. For Lord North's hostility to Mr. Hastings was understood to be as determined as ever. He spoke of the policy pursued in India as ruinous, and did not scruple, when excited, to declare that Mr. Hastings deserved to be impeached for its adoption. Was it probable that he would permit the first opportunity of effecting the recall of so obnoxious a governor to pass unimproved? Was it within the compass of possibility that he would continue in power one whom he had so often censured, and thereby affix the seal of his approbation to all that individual's measures? The following, which I insert because of the picture which it draws of the state of parties at the time, will show that, according to the judgment of Mr. Hastings's warmest friends, the scales hung so evenly, that a trifle would turn them to either side :—

From Mr. Pechell.

London, 13th May, 1779.

Dear Sir,—As every act of yours which can afford the least doubt becomes matter of censure to your adversaries, it is not to be wondered at that your proceedings in sending the detachment under Colonel

Leslie, and your instructions to Mr. Elliott, have been so. Before your last letters arrived, the news had been spread that the detachment had been surrounded, mostly destroyed, and the remainder obliged to surrender to the Mahrattas, and the whole compared to the misfortune at Saratoga. Your disobedience of the orders of the Directors in regard to young Fowke has been magnified and made a pretence of dismission, but I hope that has been too bold a step for them to venture; but as Mr. Sulivan and Mr. McPherson will no doubt give you very full information upon these points, I shall drop them. In the beginning of the winter I wrote to Sir Grey Cooper, telling him that during Clavering's life, knowing his connexions with that family, I, out of discretion, would not talk to him upon India affairs; but that at present, as the scene was changed, I should be glad to renew our former freedom. He answered in a very friendly manner. We met and had a long conversation, the whole whereof was on your subject. I found my Lord North was totally averse to your continuing in the government, and I ended by representing that your friends made a considerable body, from which the minister might meet help or obstruction according to his treatment of you. This seemed to have more effect than anything I had mentioned. My friend Lord Clarendon advised me to see Lord North myself. Accordingly I asked an audience, and it was granted. I went at twelve and waited till three before my turn came. I began with representing the great services you had done, and from thence drew my conclusions of the necessity there was of your continuing to serve. He heard me, in the usual manner, with great attention, but all the while playing with a letter which lay upon his table. When I had done, he looked up, "I thought Mr. Hastings intended to resign." I answered, that whatever agreement Mr. MacLeane

might have entered into with his lordship, it could relate only to the succession of General Clavering; that now he was no more, it could not be expected that you should resign in favour of Mr. Francis, and I made some remarks on the manner in which advantage had been taken of MacLeane's imprudent step. He next complained that you had not stemmed corruption, but, on the contrary, had counteracted the efforts of your colleagues for that purpose. I then answered with some earnestness, that though great endeavours had been used to blacken your character, no instance could be found where they could fix the least bribery upon you; that I would put the whole on that point, and if any one instance could be produced wherein you had acted contrary to the strictest rules of honour, I never would act in your cause. I then represented the illiberal manner in which your enemies had acted, the date of their accusation, which was before they could know anything, &c. He told me, "You know I had a great opinion of Mr. Hastings, and that made me place him at the head of that government, and that drew on me the resentment of Lord Pigot, who wished to have been in that station." The rest of our conversation was concerning the plan that might be formed in renewing the charter. I mentioned the help Government had received from your friends; that but for that Mr. Clavering could not have gone out; and ended by representing the pleasure they would have in thinking that, whilst they forwarded the views of Government, they served you, and how disagreeable their situation must be if they were obliged to act otherwise. I asked another audience during the holydays; he granted it, and promised no hostility should be committed in the mean time. Accordingly, the Saturday in holyday week he appointed me at three, at Bushy, where I dined with him. Our conversation was much the same as before, only he

mentioned something of the manner in which territorial acquisitions should be arranged. I advised him to take care he did not make a *colony*. However, upon the whole, I could not find that I had made any impression on him. Two days after your last letters arrived, I thought it for your service to communicate the substance of them to the proprietors, if a General Court should be called. You will see the performance; the letters of which you will find copies herewith accompanied those I sent the Cabinet; and I am sure, by the mediation of a friend, that the King has seen one of them. I can add no more of importance. Be assured I am on the watch to prevent as much as in me lies the machinations of your enemies. I am, dear Sir, your faithful humble servant.

I omitted mentioning in my letter that I told Lord North that he lost the occasion of winning a man of honour, whom he might trust, and who was incapable of ingratitude. I insisted much on the advantage of such a friend. He made no answer; but when I mentioned the assistance he might have from your friends in General Courts, he seemed struck with it. He then complimented me on the assistance he had found from me; I used that as a ground of his befriending you. Some very civil messages have passed from Lord Sandwich to me. I will try if he is to be convinced, that he may find it his interest to espouse your cause. Francis's friends are working hard, and endeavour to prevail by throwing out a threat that he will immediately return if he is not governor. I have not heard from Robinson since I sent him the letter, of which you have the copy herewith. Mr. Stanley and I are become acquainted, and I have sent him one of the pamphlets. I was to have dined with him yesterday, but was prevented by an attack of asthma. I am better to-day. The aim of Robinson was to get the Directors to have made an

appointment of a new government upon the expiration of the Act of Parliament, in which you would have been left out and Francis made President; and I am sure something of that kind was in contemplation, for Wilkes, the secretary, who to me professes himself strongly your friend, told me it was apprehended that upon the expiration of the five years you ought to come home. The disobedience of orders was to have operated wonders, and perhaps if then it had been put immediately to the vote, something strong might have been the result; but that seems over at present. Sulivan has quieted my fears, which led me to call a General Court, and there move that it should be recommended to the Directors to continue you in the place you are in. Lord North told me all that would be done this year would be a short bill to continue the government as it was, till a provision should be made by Parliament, and that next year they would take in hand the charter, &c.

It would appear from this letter that Mr. Pechell's anticipations pointed to a continuance in Mr. Hastings's hands of the powers which he possessed at the moment; and the result showed that his calculations had not been lightly formed. In the early part of the session, a bill was passed through Parliament continuing the Company's privileges for one year, on the plea that so much time would be required to adjust the terms of a permanent renewal of the charter; and by that bill it was provided that no change should take place in the persons of those who formed the Governor-general and Council at Fort William. A similar measure was adopted in 1780, and again in 1781, though not without an attempt on the

part of Mr. Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, and the select committee, to remodel the entire plan of Indian administration. Yet though these several acts must be taken as evidences of Lord North's approval of the system on which Mr. Hastings conducted his government,—though they gave to his policy the stamp of a national approval, and placed him beyond the reach of inquiry, far more of censure, in after years, for anything done previous to their passing,—there is evidence before me, which I should consider it unjust to withhold, that the fears of the minister were at least as much effectual in producing them as any sense of what was due to a distinguished and meritorious public servant. The following quaint epistles place Lord North in no very elevated point of view, and are besides exceedingly curious:—

From Mr. Pechell.

London, 27th November, 1781.

Dear Sir,—Nothing material has happened in your affairs here since I last wrote to you, except the arrival of Mr. Francis, and I do not apprehend any real mischief from him. He was received by the King and Queen with that graciousness natural to both (the same I saw shown to the Duke of Northumberland the day after he had left the government to follow Lord Chatham), and thence he concluded he should carry all before him, and of course be thanked publicly by the Court of Directors; but he has had to do with a longer head than his own. Our old friend was upon the watch—*nec talia passus Ulysses.* He obliged him to write, refusing to carry any verbal message, or to take

upon himself to communicate to that Board anything imparted to him; upon which Francis wrote him a letter, desiring to have an admission to that Board. This Mr. Sulivan presented; and Gregory, not moving anything directly, but rather by way of conversation, mentioned his deserts, and threw out a question whether it would not be proper to receive him. This he prefaced with an assertion that he had no communication with him. He had received a letter from him that morning, which he owned to Sulivan, who, before the Court sat, carelessly showed him that he was to exhibit. This hint of doubt what might be proper to be done seemed to have some effect, till Sulivan put them in mind that Mr. Barwell had not received such honour, and that such a distinction was proper only to high rank. This called up Barwell's friends, and the issue was, that Miller moved the motion (which, no doubt, is transmitted to you), the effect of which was, that Mr. Francis was upon the same footing as any other person who, from his rank and service, was competent to give information concerning the affairs of the Company. He did in consequence attend and deliver in a memorial on those affairs, in which everything is represented in the worst light. The answer to this will be a clear statement of facts, without anything pointed to any particular part of his minute. The Nizam's letter to you of the 17th January, 1780, will be a full answer to the endeavour of throwing all the cause of the confederacy and Hyder's march on Elliott's instructions. As I suppose you will have copies of all papers transmitted to you, it will be wasting your time to write any more on this particular. Next General Court will probably show what they intend, for I reckon that General Smith will lead the band of your adversaries. If I continue as well as I am at present, I shall probably be able to encounter

them. I was poorly in the summer, but Bath has restored me. The Archbishop of York is an active and steady friend, and such as a man should be who is thoroughly grateful for the favour you have shown his son. Lord Mansfield, through him (if he was not so from his particular esteem of your abilities), will be so; and Lord Stormont is convinced that you are the only person who can, in the ticklish state of the Company's affairs, manage them to advantage. Indeed, I have likened the present crisis to the state of Turenne's army after his passage of the Rhine; he was sure of his adversary being worsted, and leaving him in the enjoyment of the fruit of his deep concerted scheme: when he was killed, the maréchals who commanded were happy to repass the Rhine without being destroyed. I am convinced the comparison is just. Fortunately, you are now free to execute your purposes, and I hope the consequence of it will be, that your opponents may be answered as the philosophers were who argued against motion—a plain man walked. Thus, a happy peace with the Mahrattas, by which Bombay will be in a situation of being a profitable instead of a costly settlement, the Nizam satisfied and depending on us, and Hyder reduced within proper limits,—this, together with the dependence of the princes of Indostan on the Company, established, will be a full answer to all their invective assertions. By the bye, as to Hyder, read 2 Kings xiii. 18 and 19.

I am very sorry you have had so obstinate and wrong-headed a man to deal with as Bristow. I cannot but approve the method you took to show him his insignificance, and I wonder not at your indignation. The treatment you met with from that set, and their correspondents in the Direction, was not to be endured. It is happy for the Company that the eyes of our governors are opened. I am informed by Lord

Bathurst that his relation, who bears his name, is a great sufferer by the change in Mr. Bristow's office. Your own friends think that he no wise merited to have his emoluments lessened. I ventured to assure Lord Bathurst that he would not long remain a sufferer; and that if he was, as represented, innocent of all cabal, you would soon find means to indemnify him. As Lord Bathurst is a strong friend, I doubt not but, if it still remains at your reading of this to be done, you will make good my assurance to my Lord.

You no doubt judge that, from the knowledge the world has of your friendship for me, I must be often solicited to give recommendations; and that, in most cases, they must be founded on the report of others. In some cases I cannot refuse; either a strong personal regard for the asker, or the use they or their friends may give to our cause, are irresistible arguments: but be assured it is with this salvo, that they prove deserving, and that their promotion does not require injustice to merit and well-founded claims. In this way I have recommended Captain Metcalfe and Captain Anstie; the first being espoused by Lady James, who, very deservedly, has a great ascendant over her husband, and for whom I really have a great regard; I imagined you would, upon Sir William's own recommendation, afford your protection. The Baronet hath been ever well inclined to our cause; and though, when ministry drove him the other way, he yielded to act for them, it was unwillingly; and I dare say his approaching chairmanship will be favourable to us; and I look on that seat as a very material thing. Mr. Anstie, the father of the Captain, is a man very much esteemed, and somewhat feared, having a turn for versification, which he may if he pleases wound with. My friend Mr. Sargent, who has been so these thirty-five years, was so earnest for the Captain that I

could not refuse him, especially as I could trust his representation of his good qualities. Introductory letters are of no further consequence than the degree of importance they give the bearer among his fellows.

I know not what conjecture to form on the melancholy catastrophe which hath just happened to Lord Cornwallis. Some among the ministry look on it as a decisive stroke, and probably will be for abandoning the southern provinces. 'Tis well, in the dejection it occasions, if we do not yield everything to France. Yet we are in the same situation as that from which Demosthenes drew comfort: our misfortunes are not owing to the real impossibility of success, but to our own mismanagement both here and abroad: the inactivity of a greatly-superior army for three years, when the enemy might have been crushed, and the continuing such a general because of the importance of his relation to the Duke of Newcastle. We want the spirit of your Pophams and Goddards. When Arnold got to the quarters of Sir H. Clinton, he could not forbear expressing his wonder that Washington should have been so long suffered to remain. It has been the reigning idea among the ministers to look upon the East as an indemnification for the loss we are likely to suffer in the West. I will not indulge in melancholy reflections. Probably Lord Cornwallis was injudicious in the plan of his campaign; but in the beginning of September he gave Clinton notice that the post was not tenable, and warned him that if he did not give quick relief, he (Clinton) must be answerable for the consequences; and yet you will see by the dates how much time was lost. Washington's march was unknown—chance discovered it—and not the least attempt to disturb it. If they mean to keep the East, they have a plain way before them, and they now know it.

From the same.

London, 28th November, 1781.

My dear Sir,—Mr. Dunkin having called upon me this morning, I add a few words to what I sent to the India House yesterday. The misfortune of Lord Cornwallis has had the effect that must be expected from such a stroke. The ministers, utterly dejected and not knowing what to set in compensation for the loss, have thought to show forth the East. Robinson sent for our friend, and told him this. The time was short, and the affair pressing. Francis's representations made the state of India appear very differently from that which was requisite to be deemed a counterpoise. Robinson owned that as yet not a paper had been read. Fortunately, the answer I have mentioned had been prepared by Wilkes. Our friend sent for him, and immediately they drew up such a statement of accounts and dates of letters as enables them, who are to undertake it, to answer very fully. It happened that whilst Wilkes (who was sent with this to Robinson that he might explain it fully) was at work, Lord North came in, not knowing which way to turn, and almost in despair. Robinson showed him Wilkes's work, and Wilkes explained to him. This revived him, he quickly took everything, expressed his thanks to Wilkes for his diligence and to our friend for his assistance; and after he was gone, Robinson desired Wilkes to tell our friend that it was an obligation never to be forgotten. This, I think, ties Lord North firmly to you. He is sensible that you are the only person who can conduct the affairs in India; and as such will, no doubt, stand by you. That part of the inquiry of the secret committee that relates to the Mahratta war is particularly under the examination of Mr. Thomas Ord, a very sensible, clear-headed man, who has got credit by his speech yesterday in the

House on seconding the address. I shall, I think, be of great use to him in his researches, in helping him to those very materials which Lord North was so happy in. I am to go to the India House on purpose; so that I doubt not we shall get the better of detraction and malice.

I hope the present system of ministry to support you will not make a revolution in those who supported you in the year 1776. Though one cannot answer for anything where the passions of men guide, the true interest of the nation is every day so much forgotten for partial views and party schemes, that I shall not be surprised to see Francis the darling of the minority. Be that as it will, our ground is firm: pure and untainted by any low selfish consideration, the truth will appear.

The great push of the opposition will be against Lord Sandwich. Charles Fox talks of impeaching him. Faulty as his administration may be, particularly in his partiality to his own friends, which it is probable there is some ground for, the sum of his acting will be found great: his spirit and activity have done more than could be expected; and where can they find a man equally knowing and capable? Lord George will be, no doubt, also struck at; but this will be but secondary. If the ministry are firm to each other, they will stand, notwithstanding their adversaries; but I doubt their courage in this, though the king will be so.

Lord Shelburn crossed the street the other day to thank me for the instruction he had received from the account of Bombay and the Mahratta war. "I know," says he, "you are partial to Hastings; so, in truth, am I." I replied, "I am partial as much as it becomes a friend to truth; and I assure your Lordship that that tract contains only truth." He allowed that. I added, "We have been uniform; they who were against us have at last been obliged to open their eyes

to the only means of safety; but, whoever espouses Mr. Hastings, the cause is still the same." He acknowledged this. I threw it in because I think it probable that party may interfere. Lord Shelburn and Barry have been remarkably moderate, whether looking to come in, or tired, time will show; some have suspected another cause: but, whatever their hearts wish, I dare say they have been cautious.

I know not whether you will receive any letters from Caillaud by this conveyance; probably you will by the ships. I have already written you my opinion and wish concerning his return in any light to India: ambition should not disturb a tranquillity so well established as his; and for my own, I confess I choose to enjoy him *now*. A few years must put an end to that; and, should he go abroad, I must naturally conclude our separation must be for ever. My dear Sir, you will now act freely, disencumbered from selfish and unjust misrepresentations, and you will not need his assistance. *Macte virtute est et vale.*

Business agrees with Mr. Sulivan; I never knew him in better health.

Meanwhile the return of Mr. Francis to England with a spirit chafed and fretted by the remembrance of so signal a discomfiture, threatened not a little to increase the difficulties of Mr. Hastings's position, by adding to the number and the virulence of his enemies. For Mr. Francis was a determined hater, and there were no measures at which he could be expected to stop short for the purpose of gratifying his revenge. Mr. Hastings accordingly resolved, after mature deliberation, to send home some person in whom he

could repose unlimited confidence, and to furnish him with the means of refuting whatever calumnies Mr. Francis might circulate against him, as well as of instructing both the Cabinet and such less prominent circles as it might be judged expedient to enlighten in the true nature and object of the system on which the Bengal government was conducted. Such a man Mr. Hastings found in Major John Scott, better known a few years subsequently as Major Scott Waring; and however the intimacy of these two gentlemen may have terminated, it is an act of bare justice to state that, as the agent of the Governor-general, Major Scott was indefatigable. But of the nature of his services, and of the results to which they contributed to lead, a better idea will be formed after we shall have traced up to a somewhat later date the progress of affairs in the country where Hastings's talents were exercised.

The year 1781 dawned upon Mr. Hastings in the midst of all the troubles and difficulties of which mention has been made in another place. Sir Eyre Coote, with 640 Europeans, all the disposable force at his disposal, a large body of volunteer sepoys, and fifteen lacs of rupees, was gone by sea to save the Carnatic from the ruin which seemed to threaten it. Colonel Pearse's detachment, organized and equipped, set out upon its arduous march. The corps of Colonel God-

dard, Colonel Parker, and Major Carnac, were recruited, supplied, and kept in motion; while at the same time an attempt was made to negociate, through the Rajah of Berar, a separate peace with the Mahrattas. Meanwhile, the neutrality of the Rajah himself was purchased by the advance of large sums of money, at a moment when a breach with him might have been fatal; for one of his armies lay in the very line which Colonel Pearse must of necessity follow, and another was ready to penetrate through Oude into Bengal itself. All this could not of course be accomplished without a heavy drain on the public resources, to meet which it became absolutely necessary that extraordinary steps should be taken. Accordingly, Mr. Hastings, with equal prudence and courage, stopped at once the whole of the Company's investments. He opened at the same time a book for loans, and raised by this means a very considerable sum; after which he prepared to exercise with a strong hand his undoubted right over the resources both of Oude and Benares. Yet, strange to say, neither the anxieties attendant on the progress of the war, nor the necessity under which he was laid of sketching out with his own hand every plan that was devised for its management, hindered him from devoting as much attention as was necessary to the improvement of the country, and the consequent increase of the revenue. The following long paper,

addressed by him to Mr. Scott, and drawn up for the purpose of enabling that gentleman to oppose with effect the designs of his enemies, gives an account so clear, and at the same time so honest, of his own proceedings, and those of his government of which he was at the head, that I cannot resist the temptation of inserting it. It is the work of a master hand. The Dutch treaty referred to I have already explained.

Fort William, 28th April, 1781.

My dear Scott,—I shall endeavour to methodize the subjects of this letter, and to keep it within the narrowest compass, avoiding as well as I can all unessential detail, for which I shall refer you to authentic papers. With this view I will arrange them under distinct heads; but as I must write principally from memory, and, as you know, with much interruption, many circumstances will, of course, be omitted in their proper places. These I shall add in a miscellaneous paragraph at the end: and this method I shall pursue in all my future letters.

Dutch Treaty.—You are already well acquainted with the motives of this project, nor could I wish for a stronger justification of it than that which you offered in the conversation which you had with Mr. Smith, of which I hope you kept notes. I am glad that it was rejected, because the necessity which gave birth to it has long ceased; but they should have been thankful for our endeavours, however exerted, to save them, not have treated them with reproach. The measure itself was the product of their despondency, and their judgment of it the effect of that levity with which little minds vibrate with every successive touch of adversity and prosperity. They had represented the Carnatic as

lost; their army unable to take the field, by reason of the unconquerable dejection of the sepoys, and the reduced numbers of their European infantry. Without a great augmentation of the latter, Sir E. Coote said he could not risk an engagement. Twelve hundred European soldiers were to have been added to our army by the treaty, and a territory ceded in return which could scarcely be called our own, and which I could easily foresee would have rendered the Dutch dependent on us, had they possessed it, instead of giving them a dangerous interference, in so remote a corner, with our own possessions. But it was tuncah land, and the interests of many would have been disturbed by it. This, I believe, was the real objection. As to the ostensible ones, the first I have answered; the second is, that the Dutch soldiery is contemptible, and would have proved of no use to us. This I deny for the best soldiers that we ever had in India have been Dutch, that is Germans, especially those who took service with us after their defeat in Colonel Ford's campaign. Their officers, indeed, are bad, because they have so scanty a pay that gentlemen will not engage with them, and therefore we stipulated that we should receive none of a higher rank than captains, and these had an honourable incentive to good behaviour in the prospect of promotion by commissions granted from our Government. A third objection is, that there was a prospect of an impending rupture with the Dutch; so much the better. I am no casuist; but I believe that, in such an event, their soldiers would rather continue to serve us than return to their own colours, and I certainly would not force them to leave us. We, therefore, in that case should have been doubly gainers by what we had, and what our new adversaries had thus lost.

I know no other objections. I forget whether I gave you a copy of the treaty: it shall be sent to you with this.

Colonel Pearse's Detachment.—As soon as the answers were received from Naugpoor to our proposals of a treaty with the Peshwa, through the mediation of Moodajee, and with his guarantee, we instantly gave orders for the march of the detachment, because we plainly saw that the refusal had been dictated by an opinion that our affairs were desperate; and that though our ruin might eventually prove the cause of much evil to the Government of Berar and the house of Boosla, yet it would be unsafe for it to join with us at such a time, in the improbable chance of averting the threatened destruction. Acts that proclaim confidence, and a determined spirit in the hour of adversity, are the surest means of retrieving it. Self distrust will never fail to create a distrust in others, and make them become your enemies; for in no part of the world is the principle of supporting a rising interest and depressing a falling one more prevalent than in India.

We ordered Colonel Pearse to march and to prosecute his way in defiance of all opposition, but to use every studied precaution that might prevent a rupture, which we still wished above all things to avoid with the Government of Berar. At the same time Mr. Anderson was deputed to Cuttac to notify these orders to Chimnajee Boosla, the commander of the army there, and to recommend the same caution to him. His negociations and their consequences shall be related in a separate detail. Colonel Pearse crossed the Soobanrecha in good order. Chimnajee very readily signified his assent to the passage, and by his authority Rajah Ram Pundit, the Naib of Cuttac, deputed a person of rank, named Morâree Pundit, to attend the detachment, and to minister to all its wants, which he did most abundantly, as their bazaar was always supplied with more than the consumption. Colonel Pearse, who is not apt to be pleased without reason, praises Morâree Pundit, and says that he is much of a gentleman. The march

to Gunjam was quiet and easy, but not without desertions. These had originated with Grant's battalion, which had been (improperly I think, and I thought so at the time, but submitted to professional authority) reduced to make up the other battalions of the detachment on their augmentation to regiments. Grant, when he drew out his battalion to make known to them the order for their reduction and incorporation, told them that it was a punishment for their mutinous behaviour. Resentment, or the dread of carrying such a stigma into other corps, produced the immediate effect of driving them from the service. Great numbers deserted that night. The contagion of this example seized the other corps, and they have continued to desert ever since, though the evil has gradually subsided. Grant has been tried for attempting to defraud his men of their pay, and for making false returns. He was convicted and sentenced to lose the service. I am resolved that he shall not return to it.

What follows is too horrid to detail; a contagious distemper seized the detachment at Gunjam, and threatened to annihilate it. It exactly resembled the disorder called Mordeche, or Mordecheen, in Europe Cholera Morbus; but seems to be a species of the plague, and to have been caused by exhalations from the rains, which have fallen almost incessantly, and with great violence, during two months. It has travelled since to Calcutta, where it made an alarming havoc for about ten days. By a report, which I ordered to be made to me, of the number and names of inhabitants who perished by the distemper between the 11th and 21st of this month, there appear to have died in all 879, multiplied by reports into many thousands. The weather has cleared and the mortality abated.

I do not recollect whether Colonel Pearse's letters mention the number that he has lost, but I fear that of

sepoys alone it has not fallen much short of a thousand. By the last advices he was near Vizagapatam, and his men fast recovering.

I hear that Sir E. Coote has sent General Stewart to take the command of the detachment. I hope it is not true, but it is too like the man.

Deputation of Mr. Anderson to Cuttac.—I have said that the subject of this deputation was to notify to Chimnajee, that the detachment had received its orders of march, and to request his authority for its supplies of provisions, and due precautions to prevent hostility by the too near approach of the two armies. This led to a negociation, which is so fully detailed in one of the enclosed extracts, that I shall not recapitulate it. The sum is, that we agreed to relieve the distresses of the army, which were indeed very great, by completing the sum which you may remember I promised as a gratuity to the Government of Berar for this purpose, namely, sixteen lacs of rupees, upon the condition of its complying with the propositions which were sent to it in September, of which sum I had myself privately advanced three lacs. Ten lacs more we lent to them, payable in two years, on the personal security of Rajah Ram Pundit, the Naib of Cuttac. Chimnajee has agreed to furnish 2,000 horse, to be under the orders of Colonel Pearse, their pay to be issued by us at the rate of one lac per month; and we have further agreed to assist the Government of Berar in the conquest of Gurra Mundela, which Nanna Furneess had given to Moodajee, and afterwards revoked the gift.

This accommodation, while it frees us from a very disagreeable suspense, is a double proclamation of the decision of that Government in our favour.

We have mutually termed it the preliminary of a treaty of alliance, which Rajah Ram Pundit has offered

to go himself to Naugpoor to promote. He is a fit person for it, and if good humour, perseverance, and persuasion can accomplish it, he will. I intend to depute Mr. Chapman on the ostensible commission. I regret that I cannot spare Mr. Anderson, whose abilities are certainly the fittest of any for such a trust, but I want them for one more important; and Chapman, inferior only in knowledge, language, and personal consequence, possesses as large a portion of integrity and of firmness as any man I know.

The result of this negociation I cannot foresee. I have endeavoured to excite the ambition of Moodajee to the acquisition of the Rahje; but I am apprehensive that he will not undertake any plan that shall be deemed hostile to the young Peshwa, to whom he considers himself attached by very sacred ties, which supersede even his own avowed rights. On the death of Râghoojee, Ballajee Pundit, who was at that time Peshwa, had it in his power to reduce the influence of the family and to reannex its possessions to the sovereign state; but he healed the divisions of the brothers, confirmed them in the possession, and was, while he lived, their protector. They cannot, therefore, in gratitude or justice abandon, much less assail, the interests of his posterity. Besides, when young Râghoo, the son of Moodajee, was with Dewangur Pundit a few years past at Poonah, Nanna Furneess (or Sachharam Bobboo, I forget which) placed the little Peshwa in his lap and declared him his protector. These instances are quoted as conveying, of course, obligations of the most solemn kind; and I like to repeat them, because they are evidences of a generous principle, so little known in our political system, that though I think I am as susceptible of the nicest feelings as any Mahratta living, yet I am not sure that I should venture to avow in all cases their operation.

Perhaps they may find a salvo to reconcile their scruples with their pretensions. Perhaps they may compel Nanna Furneess to accede to a treaty on our terms, which will not be hard, though we shall certainly keep Bassein, and to join us against Hyder. Perhaps they may content themselves with making conquests, through our means, on Mahdajee Sindia; and for their encouragement in such a design I have offered to send our forces against Burhampore and Asseer, the two capital fortresses of the province of Khandeish, and with concluding a treaty of defensive alliance with us. Either way we shall be gainers, but my great aim is to unite the whole Mahratta state in one common cause with us against Hyder Ally, whom I will never quit, if I have the power, till the war is ended with his extirpation. Would to God that I had better instruments.

General Goddard.—The reduction of the fort of Arnall followed that of Bassein, and seems to have completed the conquest of the territory dependent on the latter. It lies about twenty miles north of Bassein, and on a point projecting into the sea.

General Goddard marched immediately after to the pass of Boorghaut, which opens to the plains of Poonah, and got possession of it after a repeated but feeble resistance. There he was on the 6th of March, which is the date of the last letter received from him. Hence he appears to have made overtures to the minister for peace on the terms which we had prescribed in October. The minister's answer was received on the 6th of March, and contained a refusal which may be considered as definitive, since the 9th was the period fixed for their acceptance of it, nor was it in Goddard's power to treat beyond that term. This I am not sorry for, as it enables us to mend our offers, and to withdraw that of Bassein. I am inclined to let all the rest stand.

I understand that General Goddard got possession of the Ghaut about the 7th of February. The latest intelligence on which I can place any reliance is dated the 10th of March, and says that Nanna Furneess held a council on that day with all the Mahratta chiefs, with whom it was determined to make a general attack on our army, for which great preparations were making; and that our camp was strongly fortified. While I write I gain new intelligence: General Goddard writes that he had collected two months' provisions to enable him to prosecute the war, but he does not intimate what his plan was. Poonah is not an object; Poorunder would be a wonderful acquisition, if it could be gained as Gualior was.

Cocan is ours and in peace. Our possessions in Guzerat and Surat as quiet, to use the expression of a letter from Bruen, which I will send if I can find it, as the twenty-four pergunnas, and a revenue of thirty lacs realized from them. What Cocan yields I know not; but Mr. Hornby writes that they are miserably distressed for money. Goddard says nothing of money. We shall not readily supply either. I leave a vacant space for subsequent advices.

By recent letters from Bombay, the select committee there write that *they* have resolved to confine the war to the defence of their new acquisitions, and have ordered Colonel Brown, with the Madras infantry, to return to Bombay, intending to send them by sea to Tillicherry and thence by land into the Carnatic. We have no letters from Goddard of so late a date, nor does this correspond with those which we have from him, but looks like a resolution formed without consulting him. It is certainly ill timed, when Goddard was so near Poonah and the war to a crisis, which required a more vigorous exertion than at any other time. They say, *we* have resolved, &c. &c., which looks as if Goddard had no share in it.

Major Carnac's detachment.—This man has most grievously disappointed me. He began his operations successfully by the conquest of the fort of Sippree (or Sipparee), lying beyond the pass of Narwar. He proceeded to Sironge, an open town, without interruption. Here Sindia met him, and Major Carnac, apprehending the loss of the short provisions which he had, and which were only for fifteen days' consumption, or, which I think more probable, distrustful of himself, suffered himself to be confined in this place by the enemy, and even cannonaded without retaliation. This conduct brought on the evil which he dreaded, and he was at length compelled, by the extremity of want, to leave Sironge; Captain Bruce alone advised their advance to Bopaul. The chief of that place was in our interest, and had done us material service when General Goddard traversed his country. His other officers advised a retreat, a measure in my opinion equally impolitic, ignominious, and desperate, for every peril becomes multiplied by a confession of inferiority. The retreat was wretchedly conducted, and little better than a route. Our baggage was pillaged, and the wretched followers of it cut to pieces. In this disgraceful scene Major M'Clary and Captain Bruce maintained the reputation of our arms, the last in a most distinguished manner.

At Callaross (you must find it in the map) Major Carnac was with difficulty prevailed upon to make an attack upon the enemy. He did so on the night of the 25th of February, and, after many hesitations in the different periods of his success, it terminated, most completely and decisively, by the capture or destruction of a great part of Sindia's grain and baggage, the capture of all his guns, tumbrils, and ammunition;—that is, eight guns; tumbrils all equal to the best of ours, and three howitzers, one of them said to have been part of the pillage of our army at the memorable

defeat at Wargaum: add to these his standard elephant.

In the meantime Colonel Carnac had written from Sironge, and repeatedly afterwards, to Colonel Morgan for succours, pointing out Colonel Muir, a senior officer, as the person whom he wished to command them; and in his precipitation, which would not leave him time to reflect that he was at too great a distance to obtain the effect of this relief in the situation which suggested it, he wrote in like manner to Colonel Muir himself, urging his instant departure without authority. Colonel Morgan very properly considered this a case of extraordinary necessity, that would not admit of his waiting for authority; he ordered Colonel Muir immediately to march, and to join Colonel Carnac with three regiments of sepoys, the grenadiers of a fourth, a regiment of horse, Carnac having one already detached to him, and a company of artillery. The orders were issued the 10th March; perhaps it would have been better judged had he sent the reinforcement from his own brigade and replaced them with Muir's detachment; but in the event it is likely to prove as effectual. Nothing material has happened since; Colonel Muir was within four coss of Sipparee on the 14th ultimo, and sixteen from Carnac, who seems too late to have discovered his error, and to fly from Colonel Muir, whose junction will, of course, deprive him of command. This evasion will not avail, for, on the knowledge of Colonel Morgan's orders, we confirmed and approved them; and, to prevent the hazard of a competition, sent orders to Colonel Carnac to deliver his command to Colonel Muir, and to Colonel Muir to receive it. These were despatched above a month ago and in duplicate. They have been received.

I have the highest opinion of Colonel Muir's military capacity, experience, and spirit, but I fear for the

infirmities of his constitution, and have, therefore, given him Forbes Auchmuty to be his second in command. We have desired him to return all the troops and guns which he can spare after his junction, and especially one of the regiments of cavalry. He will have a sufficiency with Colonel Carnac's original force and the regiment of horse destined for him. It will be for his credit to send back the rest, which I shall privately insist on, though not in orders.

After all, Colonel Carnac's campaign, with all its errors, has fulfilled its professed object, by drawing the whole of Sindia's attention from the new conquests in Guzerat, and from General Goddard. It has virtually been the cause of the reduction of Bassein, the possession of the passes which lead to Poonah, and of the quiet collection of a large but unknown revenue. It has proved what our sepoys are capable of even under the worst conduct; and even to the misconduct and timidity of the commander, we are indebted for a more signal and decisive success, than any that the activity and enterprise of General Goddard could obtain over an enemy that dreaded and respected him, but despised his present opponent, and has therefore given him all the advantage of which the latter has happily availed himself against him.

As to other advantages, I know of none. You saw my instructions to Carnac. These recommend his proceeding directly to Oojein, to endeavour to reduce or invite the neighbouring states into subjection to the Company, and to draw a revenue from them; to hesitate before he began to move, but never to stop or take post after he had moved, nor to make detachments. Not one point of these has he regarded.

You know the general opinion of Colonel Carnac's character. No man stood in higher credit. Now every one piques himself upon having foreseen that he

would miscarry; and I expect to be blamed for my want of judgment: without cause surely. I am deprived of the regular means of discovering the characters and talents of the military officers, by the care which has been taken to preclude any intercourse between me and them; and besides how contracted is the sphere of my choice! Those whom their rank admits of holding great commands are very few, and these either distributed to other services, or invalids, or incapables. It is less easy to select a Goddard from the summit of the list, than a Bruce or a Welsh in the inferior ranks, which are precluded from my choice. Nor am I circumstanced alone by rank. I am compelled to pay some regard to private attachment, the want of which, and the prevalence of an adverse interest, may often operate against me even with officers of the first merit. I could exemplify this by an instance not very distant, and you will recollect it.

Champion was not my choice, but I formed the design of his expedition, and it succeeded almost in despite of him.

Leslie was my choice, because I had no other. Goddard was entirely mine, and I superseded Parker to make room for him. Carnac was my choice, and the public voice justified it, but he has discredited it. Pearse, Edmondson, and Forbes Auchmuty are mine, and the event will, I trust, show them to have been well selected. If it should prove otherwise, I do not know where I could have picked better men.

Subsidiary Operations.—We have taken possession of the fort of Calpee, and have summoned the chiefs and Rajahs of that district to submit themselves to the Company, and pay the same tribute to our Government that they have paid to the Mahrattas. I mean to employ Colonel Cummings in enforcing this measure, and hope to be able to introduce a new system of war

which shall pay its own expenses. His command (as I now intend it) will include Calpee, Bundelcund, and the other lands lying between the Jumna and Nerbudda, Gohud excluded. At present he stands appointed to the forces stationed in Rohilcund, with a declaration that he shall succeed to the first vacant brigade; and he is satisfied. To save Hampton, and indeed for my own relief, I propose to make him fixed commandant of Fort William.

Of Major Popham I shall speak under the following head:—

Moodajee Boosla.—(This is repetition, but do not regard that—read on.) You already know that he rejected our treaty. His answer arrived about the 14th January. He objected to every article, and because he knew (as he said) that it would not be accepted by the administration at Poona, and a term of five months had been allowed for its acceptance, he had therefore kept the originals to be disposed of as I should direct, in hopes that I would amend them; and at the same time, that they might not miss their chance of producing a better effect than he expected on the mind of the minister, copies of them had been instantly despatched to the latter. I need not give you more particulars, as you have the entire letters, which I sent to you from Looksaugur. You will probably have observed in reading them that they contained, as usual, liberal professions, but dictated in short language mixed with reproach, in a manner which marked disappointment, and an opinion that our affairs were grown so desperate as to warrant the assumption of the tone of superiority. This conclusion further appeared in a letter received about a fortnight after from Dewangur Pundit to Beneram, telling him of our success against Bassein, and the defeat and death of Ramchunder Gunnis, and desiring him to give me a caution not to discredit what

they had before written, if this fortunate change should produce a different reception of our proposals by the minister, from that which they had before predicted.

We had no alternative left but to manifest the confidence which we placed in our own strength, as the means of acquiring the public confidence. We instantly ordered Colonel Pearse to march, and pursue his march against all opposition, but carefully to avoid both actual hostilities, and whatever might tend to produce them, which he most rigidly observed. At the same time, to preserve our footing with the government of Berar, and with a view to open a new negociation, we deputed Mr. David Anderson to Chimnajee, the son of Moodajee, who commanded the army at Cuttac, to notify the orders which had been given to Colonel Pearse, to apologise to him for the necessity which had compelled us to this measure, to desire him to move his army from the line of our route, lest its neighbourhood, or its situation in the direct road, might occasion hostilities; and to request him further to furnish the detachment with provisions.

About this time Chimnajee had led his army against Dekkanaul, a fortress, the capital of a zemindarry of that name, situated to the westward among the hills, the proprietor of which had proved refractory. In this expedition he met greater difficulties than he expected, and when Anderson arrived at Cuttac, he found the communication with Chimnajee totally precluded. He had expected to meet Bissumber Pundit here, whom I had despatched thither early, but he was gone with the Rajah, and Rajah Ram Pundit, the naib of Cuttac, too, as I recollect. Of this he advised us, and as the ostensible purpose of his mission had been fulfilled, and I did not choose to show too eager a solicitude upon the occasion, we ordered him to leave his commission with the highest person in office at Cuttac, and return, which he did.

In the meantime, Chimnajee, having succeeded in bringing the zemindar of Dekkanaul to submission, was on his return to Cuttac, and wrote to stop Mr. Anderson, both to him and to me. I accordingly despatched orders to Mr. Anderson to go back, but these went by a different route, and missed him. Mr. Anderson and Bissumber Pundit arrived in Calcutta about the middle of February.

As the Rajah continued to press the reappointment of Mr. Anderson, he was a second time deputed to Chimnajee, who advanced to Balasore to facilitate their meeting. The detail of this negociation you will find in the voluminous enclosure, which you must read, and read with attention, for it contains much weighty matter, and demonstrative of the propriety of the measures which terminated these conferences. The sum, however, I must add. Mr. Anderson left Calcutta the 1st or 2d of March. On the 22d he returned, accompanied by Rajah Ram Pundit, the Naib of Cuttac, with whom an agreement, as a preliminary to a more substantial treaty of alliance with the superior government of Naugpore, was concluded in the name of that Government, and executed in Council the 2d April. The terms were these:—

1. The Rajah was to join 2,000 effective horse to Colonel Pearse's detachment, to act under his orders: their pay fixed at one lac per month.

2. The rest of the army to march forthwith to Gurra Mundala, where they should be joined by a body of our troops who shall assist in reducing that place for Moodajee.

3. That a person should be deputed immediately to Naugpore by the Governor-general and Council to treat on the proposed alliance, and Dewangur Pundit come to conclude it.

4. Or if the Dewan cannot come, the treaty may be concluded at Naugpore.

It had been before agreed to present Chimnajee with thirteen lacs of rupees, the sum remaining of the sixteen promised for defraying the arrears of his army in October last, on the condition of their acceding to our treaty, and ordering the army to join us. Three lacs were at that time sent privately to him by me as a temporary relief to his troops, which were then in great distress.

This not being sufficient, we agreed to lend them ten lacs more on Rajah Ram's security, payable in two years. Thus we have converted an ostensible enemy into a declared friend, and transferred the most formidable member of the confederacy, next to Hyder, to our own party; saved Bengal from a state of dangerous alarm, if not from actual invasion, and all the horrors of a predatory war, and have completed the strength of Colonel Pearse's detachment by a body of horse sufficient for any service that can be required from it. It will be censured by cavillers; but I am happy in having so well terminated this business, and no less so in the consciousness that I have achieved what no other in my place would have achieved, or perhaps attempted.

For the rest I refer to the detail.

Carnatic.—On the same day, the 2d of April, was concluded and executed at the Council table another agreement with the Nabob Wallajah, through the channel of his Dewan Assam Cawn, and Mr. Richard Sulivan, whom he had deputed to us with joint credentials for that purpose.

The circumstances of this engagement are curious and extraordinary, but I wait for its issue to verify their present appearance.

Since the commencement of the war, the Nabob has pleaded absolute poverty, and the President and Select Committee have uniformly represented him as unable,

or determined not to assist them with a pagoda, and the resources of the Carnatic as irremediably lost to them. At the time the Dewan came away, they acquainted us that the Nabob's creditors had offered to make over to them the assignment of Angoli, and other lands equal to a yearly revenue of five lacs of pagodas, provided the Board would obtain the Nabob's assent to it, and would allow them credit for the collections, by which the Nabob's faith would be preserved, their rights secured, and the money appropriated, as it ought to be, to the expenses of the war. The Select Committee demanded the assignment, but without specifying the conditions, and the Nabob refused, so that, as the creditors have observed in an address to us upon the same occasion, the money, whatever its amount may be. is lost to all parties, for to the Nabob it can be of no use, if his inheritance is forfeited by the want of means to save it.

By the agreement now concluded, the Nabob assigns the whole revenue of his country for the charges of the war, under proper checks and regulations; credit is to be given by the Company to the creditors for the collections made in the lands of their assignment, and to the Nabob for the rest. The rest of this transaction, with the agreement at large, you will find in the enclosure.

What appears astonishing to me in this business is, that the Dewan, who had despaired of success, is the happiest man living, for my having consented to take his master's money; and Richard Sulivan assures me that the Nabob will be equally delighted with it. I should be as well pleased as either, if I could see the end as clearly; but the fact is, that the Nabob aims only at independence, that he is willing to purchase it with the sacrifice of all his wealth, provided he can ensure its undiminished passage to the Company, and its

entire appropriation to the defence of his country, and the discharge of his debts. I dare not trust myself, even to my most confidential friend, to pursue the subject. I should have told you that we have provided in the same adjustment for the discharge of the Nabob's debts, by payment of the principal and interest fixed in aggregate sums to the month of November, the interest ever after to cease, the principal of purchased bonds to be reduced, and the whole to be paid off by instalments. The creditors will (as I am assured) be thankful for this arrangement, the Nabob no less so, and I am sure the Company ought to be. I hope to have the thanks of all parties for so effectual and simple an expedient. Mr. Wheler is much pleased with it.

To give effect to this measure, and to establish a free intercourse between the Nabob and this Government, we have constituted Mr. Richard Sulivan our Minister at his Court.

What a world of enemies have I submitted to the hazard of creating by the disregard of personal consequences in the adoption of such unusual measures as have appeared to me necessary to retrieve our past misfortunes and losses! In this establishment I have deprived the bulk of both military and civil servants of their settled means of acquiring rapid fortunes. At Fort St. George I have taken, or done my utmost to take, the Nabob out of their hands, and to establish an immediate and internal control over their political conduct. I have, for aught I know, given equal offence to the Company, the government of Madras, and the creditors, by one arrangement. I have excluded the men of Madras from one profitable commerce, the importation of coast salt to Bengal. The proposed diminution of the investment will hurt my credit with numbers in England, besides the Board of Trade and all its connexions:—The Commander-in-chief is irri-

tated at me beyond reconciliation, for I know not what, nor seek to know:—and the most important acts of this Government are constituted on principles diametrically opposite to popular and established opinions. Add to all, the infinitude of claimants for posts of profit, the disappointment of nineteen in the proportion of one who can be gratified, and the consequent odium thrown upon me for being the sole distributor in the general estimation, because I have the casting voice. But to resume my narrative. I choose to close the preceding subject by observing that the business with Assam Cawn and Rajah Ram Pundit was all negociated and concluded in one week, and on the same day. Let this serve as a proof that I am not idle, nor uselessly employed when I withhold myself from private importunity, or from public view, which I often am compelled to do, and am often employed in secret conversation, or in listening to volumes of letters read to me by my moonshee for hours, and even days together, while matters of inferior consideration lie neglected. In my department the proper choice consists not so much in what is to be done, as in what can be with least inconvenience left undone. And you know, Scott, that whenever any work is to be executed that requires a more than common attention, or to be guarded by nice collateral provisions, I always make the task my own. Few are the moments that I give to relaxation; my amusements are quiet and domestic, and they preserve me in temper, health, and spirits, by which I have been enabled to go through as great a load of business, with what ability or effect let others judge, as the most able of my predecessors.

Military Regulations.—You are in possession of those which we formed on the constitution of sepoy regiments. I am grieved to say that they have been productive of great discontents and of improper compe-

titions between the majors and their captains, besides (what most affects me) avowed complaints of the appropriation of such emoluments as no officer ought to take, or without shame confess. The line of authority is now accurately drawn, and will preclude the possibility of future contests by the subsidiary regulations which I shall send you, and let them speak for themselves. They are drawn by General Stibbert, and I am extremely pleased with them. They contain additional checks on the paymasters, but these are not to be kept in order by any rules, nor denunciation of public disgrace; for although it has been declared that any paymaster who neglects to send his accounts monthly to the Board, shall be instantly dismissed, they are all but two in arrears; some for two, more for three months, and Goddard's for nine. I cannot *yet* punish them, for they are protected; but I will conquer this presumptuous spirit, and Mr. Wheler shall support me in it.

Revenue.—We have abolished all the Provincial Councils, and have given the general administration of the revenue to a committee, consisting of four persons. The present members are Anderson, Shore, Chartres, and Croftes. They have no fixed salaries, and are sworn to receive no perquisites. In lieu of both they are to draw a commission of one per cent. on the monthly amount of their net collections, and that commission is doubled on such sums as are paid immediately to the treasury in Calcutta. By this plan we hope to bring the whole administration of the revenues to Calcutta without any intermediate charge, or agency, and to effect a saving of lacs to the Company, and to the zemindars and reyatts. I hope, also, to make a large increase in the collections, and to add to that increase in the next year. The increase made this year will be about twenty-seven lacs, and the saving of expenses

twelve: in all thirty-nine lacs. I have left the chiefs for a time as collectors. The others have been allowed to retain their salaries till they get other employments, and, with the addition of new courts of justice, distributed at equal distances throughout the provinces, and by other means, I have fortunately provided for many of them. Read the plan, and the minute introducing it. It will not discredit me, but the event will put those to shame who condemn it.

Courts of Justice.—I have said that I have established other courts, that the distribution of justice may be equal. The judges are all sworn. They have a fowjdarry jurisdiction added to their former powers, that is, the power of apprehending robbers and other capital offenders against the public peace. This duty was before vested in fowjdars, who were appointed by Mahommed Rizza Cawn, subject and accountable to him only, and maintained at an expense of five lacs a-year, besides what they drew by oppressive exactions from the poor reyatts, of which there have been great complaints. The judges are young men, as well chosen as they could be. They are under the instruction and control of the chief justice, and therefore less liable than they would be to error if they acted with no other check than that of the Board, which has too many occupations to give the requisite attention to them; and being under his protection, they will not be discouraged from the discharge of their duty by the apprehension or threats of prosecution in the Supreme Court.

Investment.—We have agreed to allow the Board of Trade to grant certificates for sixty or sixty-five lacs (I forget the exact sum), to be raised on their credit; and these will be exchanged for Company's notes. This will keep up the sum of their investment, and it will not interfere with our credit. In true policy the investment had better, perhaps, be suspended, for the

French have, at least, an equal chance of getting it; but Mr. Wheler, who knows the subject (I do not), assures me that no consideration or argument would satisfy the proprietors, or reconcile them to a disappointment of their annual cargoes, and I have yielded.

Customs.—We have abolished the collectors, that is, Petrie's office, and established a new one, under the management of three commissioners, who are to be paid by a commission on their monthly collections, like the committee of revenue. The Company's goods provided in the provinces will be subject to the same duty as others, but a drawback allowed on their amount when made part of their cargoes. This is to prevent the trade of individuals from being covered by the Company's dustucks. Petrie and Mackenzie are the two first commissioners. Had new men been nominated to the charge, it would have furnished a plea to tax us with having constituted a new department for the sake of providing for favoured men at their expense; and Petrie is unquestionably the fittest person to preside over it. My objects in this alteration are to free the trade of the country from unauthorized exactions, and to make the duties equal and certain, ultimately to produce an increase of trade, and of the revenues arising from it in consequence.

Salt.—The season for manufacturing salt is from November to June. In February, 1780, the Council of Revenue of the division of Calcutta told us that no one would contract to provide the salt of the twenty-four pergunnas, which used to yield an annual quantity of five lacks of maunds, but at a rate below the price which it then bore in the market (I write from memory, but I know that I am right in substance). I recommended to provide it by agency. To this every member objected. I then entreated the Board to allow the trial to be made on my single responsibility. They consented.

I nominated Mr. Griffiths the agent. The season was more than half elapsed before he took charge. He realized four lacs of maunds, and raised the price from 80 or 90 rupees to 190 per 100 maunds. This success encouraged me to propose the extension of the same plan to the whole sea coast for this year. I should have mentioned that the salt business had failed in every part of the province where that article is made, in the same manner that it had declined in the twenty-four pergunnas. Six agents have been appointed, two only of my nomination, and Vansittart (nominated by me) is at the head of the office. These, too, are all sworn and paid by a commission on the net produce. Vansittart told me some time ago that he expected to clear thirty lacs certain for the Company in this year. If he does, it will be more than thirty lacs clear profit; for hitherto, what with the various and multiplied cookery of the Provincial Councils, salt agents (as they were then called), Board of Trade, our own Board (which was as bad as the rest), contractors, and the Supreme Court of Judicature, the Company has sustained an annual loss by this article of their revenue for some years past. If they gain by it hereafter, the merit is exclusively and peculiarly mine.

Buxey Connah.—This office is abolished, and a simple pay-master appointed in its stead, with a commission on his payments. The post-office has been regulated on the same principles, but this is scarce worth enumerating.

I now return to the political subjects, for besides those which I have omitted through haste, new matter grows upon me as I write.

Guallior.—On the 2d of April, the same day on which the preliminary agreement was executed with Rajaram Pundit, orders were passed and issued for the delivery of the fortress of Guallior to the Ranna of Gohud. You

must have heard me express the regret which I continually felt at the necessity which compelled me to keep the possession of this place against a solemn condition of a public treaty. The necessity was a political one in its most contracted sense. It was the fear of popular reproach that prevented my proposing to relinquish it; and had I proposed it when it ought to have been yielded, it would have been ineffectual, for I sounded Sir E. Coote upon it, and found him vehement against it. Mr. Francis would have opposed it on system, and Mr. Wheler was then in his traces. All the English world was proud of the conquest, and seemed to think it dishonourable to part with it, and imposing terms were used to justify the usurpation. It covered Carnac's expedition. It was the key of Hindostan. It opened a communication to Malwa; it was a pledge for the Ranna's fidelity, and (God forgive them that have said it) it was an advantage to hold out in treating with the Mahrattas. It has proved the reverse; it has impeded the expedition. We possess by it no more ground than the rocks on which it stands, and of an influence not an inch. It has attracted the avidity and encouraged the expectations of the Mahrattas, and it has alienated the Ranna from us. Besides these oppositions, it has deprived us of the services of an entire regiment of sepoys, and of one of the best officers in the service. To counteract its bad tendency I did all I could do. I wrote to the Ranna the most solemn promises, that I kept the fortress but for his use, and that he should have it, and I sent him an extract from our proffered treaty with the Mahrattas, in which we stipulated that it should be reserved to him, because our faith was pledged to it; but he was not satisfied. He murmured, complained, intrigued, counteracted us (at least he is charged with it), and was upon the point of abandoning us and

leaguing with Scindia against us. In all this time there was a general outcry against him that he was disaffected to us, and even Palmer has at length joined in this reproach. And what title had we to his attachment? We have conquered for ourselves. We treat him with contempt. We withhold from him the rights which we ourselves had given him, and yet resent every symptom which he betrays, or which we choose to impute to him, of indisposition towards us. I never looked for so disinterested a character in the chief of any state or people, nor would it have excited my indignation so much as my compunction had he declared himself openly our enemy.

Besides, I had other fears; fear for its influence on the general credit of our faith; and to obviate such an effect I have taken especial care to make it known, wherever I thought it necessary to be known, that it was our firm determination to deliver Guallior to the Ranna. It was critically necessary to guard against this consequence when we were upon the eve of a negotiation with the government of Berar, which in its effect might prove the foundation of a new political system, and decide the future fortune of the British interests in India. I had the satisfaction to find Mr. Wheler most cordially of my opinion, and we agreed to give up the point in the handsomest manner by a positive and unconditional order to Major Popham to deliver over the fortress of Guallior to whomsoever the Ranna should appoint to receive it, at the same time that we signed the agreement with Rajaram Pundit, to whom I took care to make it immediately known. I believe he was in the council-room at the time. Major Popham was ordered instantly to proceed to the service assigned him in Gurra Mundelah. This was sufficient for Rajaram Pundit. I left him to make his own comment on the first part of the order. I wait to see what effect it has

produced on the Ranna. If good, so much the better; if bad, I will at some period or other, not very distant, make him repent it, and exact ample vengeance from him. He is not an object of a nicer management. As to the rest, I have ever manifested so steady an attachment to my engagements, that I am sure this instance of it will do my influence no hurt, and as far as my own personal credit is concerned, I rely on its giving the greatest weight to all my negociations. I heartily wish that the law would declare it felony to break treaties. Nothing would contribute more to the permanency of our influence.

Carnatic.—I omitted under this head to speak of Sir Eyre Coote's progress against Hyder. It may be reduced to a very narrow compass. His return from Wandewash on the advice of the French squadron was unfortunate in its consequences, if not ill judged. It was too precipitate, and surely unnecessary, had the worst happened that could have been expected from such an armament. It retrieved Hyder's credit, and he has made the most of it in his circulatory communications. It enabled him to pass the station which our army had gained, and to carry his ravages into Tanjore, for it was impossible to recover the ground and advantage of time which we abandoned. At Cuddaloor the General drew out his army in view of Hyder's, which he calls offering battle; but there he has stuck ever since, incumbered with an unmanageable load of artillery, not less (as I learn, for he has not told us, nor sent us any returns) than sixty pieces; unable to move for want of bullocks and provisions. What he will do when Pearse joins him, I know not; but it appears to me that, from his mode of conducting the war, which may yet be right, for I profess myself not sufficiently informed to judge of it, every accession of strength will be an addition to his difficulties, and

rivet him the more strongly to the spot where he must remain to get provisions. He has written a letter of great ill humour to the Board, which I will send you. It does not require or merit a comment.

Mr. Holland.—Some time ago he solicited our permission to resign his station on the account of his ill health. We gave it, and made him a present of 10,000 rupees for his services. We had before interceded with the President and Council of Fort St. George to revoke his suspension. This they did previously to the receipt of our letter, which was doubly honourable for Mr. Holland. Mr. Holland, seeing appearances of a disposition in the Nizam to renew his alliance with us, and to join us against Hyder, has expressed a desire to stay, and to be the instrument of concluding it. He will stay of course. Dewangur Pundit advises me to gain this Nabob to be a party with us, which will make his master's part so much easier. How this design may terminate I cannot yet foresee or conjecture, because it is the growing policy of Nizam Ally to excite others to fight his battles, and himself to look on and take the advantage of their losses. But it is at least probable, almost to a degree of certainty, that he will not take a part against us. His Buxey, and secret adversary, Fazil Beg, is dead, as Mr. Holland relates, although Moodajee's letters of a very late date speak of him as living. Fazil Beg is nearly connected with Moodajee, who is (or was) a kind of protector to him against the designs of Nizam Ally, and will consider his death as a loss.

Lucknow.—This head will comprehend many. It is my intention to visit Lucknow. I may set out about the beginning of August, and shall travel partly by water and partly by land with the laid bearers. I dread the thoughts of it, for I see infinite need of reformation in that quarter, and am afraid I shall want

both time, materials, and a vigorous hand to support what I may have accomplished. Something too will be required at Benares, and something more than I shall dare to attempt; for if it were left to my option, I would restore that zemindarry to the Nabob of Oude. Either that ought to be done, or the Rajah reduced to the condition of a zemindar.

But my principal and ruling motive for this expedition is to determine Dewangur Pundit to a meeting with me. He has been writing about it these two years, and his letter expresses a more earnest desire for it than he has ever intimated before, but he is sick, he says, and must wait the return of health. Calcutta is at a most discouraging distance, and while he only intends the visit, and the time of performing it is not prescribed by some point of necessity, it may be procrastinated till the occasion which requires it is past. Benares is near, and its sanctity has inducements to a Hindoo, and yet greater to the superstition of age and infirmity. If I give him the opportunity of seeing me there, and appoint the time, he must come, or for ever relinquish all thoughts of an interview, which I am sure he wishes. Nothing can be stronger than an expression to this point in his last letter. "I have great designs," says he, "to propose to you when we meet. What they are I will not relate, because what you shall hear and see, or, in other words, what you will receive on the evidence of your own senses, will render every promise that I can now make superfluous." These are not his words, but their sense in my recollection of them.

I shall go with a very light retinue, and intend to return within three months. As I can subsist with few conveniences and with little state, I shall not find this a matter of much difficulty.

Mr. Wheler.—My conduct towards Mr. Wheler may

be termed by some political, by others liberal, and by many too attentive. I have made it a rule to give him the first option in most vacant appointments, and have provided handsomely for all his friends. I treat him with an unreserved confidence, and he in return yields me as steady a support as I could wish. I like his manners and temper, and have only to complain of his attachment to people whom he ought to shun, the lees of Mr. Francis. Such are Mr. Bristow, Mr. Shee, Mr. Ducarell, and Mr. Livius, and to these he has added others, to whom he has allowed a consequence which they do not deserve, by the practice of a strange policy of hearing whatever any man has to say, and especially against public measures. This he supposes will afford him the means of obviating all objections, and he compares it to having spies in an enemy's camp. But the fact is, that these spies, instead of giving him an insight into the designs of his enemies, give him false intelligence, and practise upon the pliancy of his disposition. Besides that, they acquire the habits of confidence, and thereby gain his protection, which encourages them to intrigue against me with the assurance of impunity. About two months ago, Messrs. Livius, Murray and Ducarell took it into their heads to reform the state on the suggestion of Mr. Livius, who called it an *impromptu*,—a blockhead. They endeavoured to convince Mr. Wheler that I was engaged in a policy which would lead to certain ruin, and that nothing could prevent it but the recall of Carnac and Pearse, and the offer of peace to the Mahrattas on any terms which they should prescribe. From him they proceeded to Sir E. Impey with the same propositions, and with his consent to state them as points which he was not disinclined to consider. Sir Elijah brought them to me, but without mentioning by whom they had been suggested. In

the mean time they had been tampering with Mr. Dacres, Colonel Morgan, and Colonel Watson, and had proposed meetings with them and others, on the hint of the associations of your western world. Colonel Watson, who mortally hates Murray, informed me of their design, and I told it to Mr. Wheler and Sir Elijah. Mr. Wheler received it strangely, as if he had been charged with having joined in the plot, and therefore refused to credit it. Sir Elijah was alarmed, and thought I ought to punish the intriguers. But having well reflected on the consequences, and seeing that it would be impossible to take a public notice of the affair without an irreparable offence to Mr. Wheler, and exposing both his name and Sir Elijah's to many disagreeable suggestions, which would arise out of a formal inquiry, and the depositions of persons not well affected to Sir Elijah, nor perhaps to either,—and as I knew that no danger could possibly ensue from such plots, or such plotters, I suffered my resentment to subside, and yield to the policy of forbearance. To Livius I make large allowances for his folly and vanity, which I believe prompted him more than malice. Murray has no excuse. Ducarell has made the best for himself that the case will admit, and has protested to me that he suggested no danger but what he really apprehended, and thought Sir Elijah and Mr. Wheler the most unexceptionable channels for conveying his sentiments to me, because they were nearer to me than any in confidence and attachment. This is partly true and partly false, for he has access to me himself and needed not the agency of another to convey to me his opinions. Having consented to pass over his behaviour, I have been under the necessity of making a liberal provision for him as an indemnification for the loss of his late office of superintendent of the Calsa records, which had been abolished by the institution of

the Committee of Revenue. This I did to gratify Mr. Wheler, who had it much at heart, and has expressed himself much indebted to me for it. As to Murray, I cannot so easily forgive him. Mr. Wheler, though averse to the removal of Shee and Bristow, has endeavoured to induce both to remove themselves. Bristow has peremptorily refused it, and Mr. Wheler has agreed to join me in recalling him, which shall be done immediately. His continuance at Lucknow against my will, at a time when I have so much occasion for all the influence of my station, would defeat all my purposes. As to Shee, an indiscreet promise of Middleton's to Mr. Wheler, and some other causes not worth detailing, have afforded Mr. Wheler a just cause to object to his immediate recall, and I have admitted it. He must, however, be removed, not from my objection to the man, but to the office. It is dishonourable to our Government, which has no right to exercise a control in that quarter, nor to abet the Nabob in his usurpation.

I believe you already know that Markham has Fowke's place at Benares.

From the length of the preceding narrative, you will be induced to attribute to me a more passionate interest in the facts related in it than I really feel, or ought to feel. They have never occupied much of my thoughts, nor were they worth the time which I have bestowed in writing them. But they are written, and shall therefore stand.

I will add a few words more concerning my present colleague, and with them conclude my letter. He has received an intimation from England, that it would be an acceptable service to administration if he yielded his support to me. He has returned an answer by the same channel, that, from the time that he thought himself at liberty to give me his support, he had given

it, and was cordially disposed to continue it. He has assured me that such is his firm determination. I believe it implicitly, and I believe too that his inclination has some share in his present attachment, on whatever policy it may be founded. For this reason I shall make it a request to my friends that they will support him against any attempts that may be made to supersede him. I cannot desire an easier associate, or a man whose temper is better suited to my own; and I am certain that he will never find himself so much at his ease, or so creditably situated under any change of interest, nor even of station.

The attention which I have shown to Mr. Wheler I consider as a political duty, independently of what I may voluntarily sacrifice to the love of ease and (may I say so much of myself?) to a natural benevolence of temper, which even impels me to sentiments of kindness towards those with whom I daily converse, and am placed in a situation to improve it. It is true that I could, if I chose it, assume all the powers of the government, and exclude him from any share in it; but what should I gain by it? He would be my enemy and opponent. Business would be clogged with formalities, and obstructed by frequent Councils and minutes of controversy. I should be obliged to guard every measure with ostensible pleas, and labour through a tedious detail at the Council Board to get at it, instead of producing it by a private and summary process, and bringing little more than simple resolutions on our public proceedings. He would have his partisans, who would be bold under his banner. Every discontented man, and many there must be, would flock to him with contributions of abuse, and perhaps of just censure. Every person, whether of public or private character, whose interests were affected by my acts, would make his appeal to him, and expect, though

not a redress from his present power, some immediate support in an opposition to me, and a complete reparation from his representations to England, or from an accession of influence here on the arrival of the first new member of the Council appointed to fill one of the vacancies in it. This instability and uncertainty would particularly affect our political concerns, for every state has a vakeel or spy in Calcutta, and these know everything that passes, except the secrets which are confined to our own breasts. Every zemindar of our own provinces would assume an independence, as the Rannys of Radshahee and Burdwan have long done, women, and even old women, as they are. Our public enemies would acquire a confidence, and the support of popular opinion, and our public friends would be fearful of binding themselves by a decided connexion with a doubtful interest. These and many more would be the consequences of my assuming the whole power of government by violence, and yet I know there are many who are astonished that I have not. I have done better. I have carried every essential point, with the concurrence of Mr. Wheler, which I could have effected without it. His judgment has literally accompanied mine in every measure, and in many it has added improvements to them, and some it has suggested. His union with me has added great strength to the government, and enabled it to produce its resources; and the conclusion universally drawn from it is, that my authority has acquired support from home, and that what is done under it will be consistent and permanent. I am easy, and my colleague satisfied, and the public will reap the fruits of the good understanding which subsists between us.

Reflections on the late Alterations.—Read what we have written in the revenue letters concerning innovations in general. That in the system of the collections

is none but the execution of my own plan projected and recorded in the year 1773. The other reformations, as well as this, are all founded on principles which I have invariably recommended both at this presidency and while I was there at Madras, and which I once took the liberty to recommend in a long letter to Lord North, which you have read, for the ground of every establishment in the service. These are, to bind men to the faithful discharge of their duty by the ties of honour and acknowledgment; to abolish fixed salaries, which are the scanty pay for dead and unprofitable labour, and to eradicate every temptation and pretext for perquisites, embezzlements, and corruption; to draw the emoluments of office out of the labours of it, and proportion them to the success attending it; and to unite the interest of individuals with that of the public. On these grounds I have substituted commissions on net receipts, which are equally a recompense for money gained, and for expenses saved, and fees, in the place of monthly fixed allowances. These emoluments are liberal, and will frighten those who judge of them by custom, and by the comparison of them with ostensible salaries. But they are far short of former profits; and those who enjoy them are satisfied, and happier in the creditable possession of the allowed means of acquiring a reasonable provision for their future independence, than in the accumulation of lacs by indirect practices, accompanied with the perpetual fear of detection and shame.

Another point I have laboured to accomplish, which is, to divide the weight of business, to lessen the fatigues and occupations of the superior government by transferring the detail, which it could not manage, to other hands, and reserving to it the control which is its proper duty, and such others as require, by their magnitude or urgency, its special and unparticipated atten-

tion. We had so much to do before, that we did nothing well. Those to whom we have delegated the portions of our former concerns are certainly more capable of managing them, with their whole time devoted to them, than we in a few hours hastily bestowed to each in the course of a week or month.

Simplicity is another principle which I have endeavoured to introduce into all our business, and I flatter myself that it is the distinguishing character of every plan and composition of mine of whatever kind. Even the intricacies of salt accounts have been unravelled, and that branch of the revenue rendered as intelligible as the sales of broad cloth and copper.

I am compelled to say more in my own praise than modesty would warrant, were it not necessary even to the success of my acts, and that the public might derive from them the benefits which I have devised, that the principles on which they are framed should be known, for I am not sure that they are obviously perceptible, though I am not certain that, when shown, they will be acknowledged. I now conclude. I have written a long letter, but I have omitted many things which might have been added. It has been written in different periods of time to the present date, which is the 15th of May; I am afraid you will meet with apparent inconsistencies in it, though not real contradictions. If I can get all the papers finished which should accompany it, these will afford you a more authentic information, and will be necessary to explain parts of this letter. I desire you will show it to my confidential friends, and be yourself its commentator, for it will want one. Mr. Sulivan will copy it for his father. Adieu, my dear Scott. I am ever affectionately and most truly yours.

There are but few matters referred to in this

masterly paper which seem to me to stand in need of elucidation, and on these few the correspondence still to be inserted will touch. I may, indeed, observe in passing, that the remarks headed "Military Regulations" refer mainly to certain changes which were at this time introduced into the constitution of the Indian army, by which the establishment of each battalion was fixed at a thousand men, and two battalions allotted to each regiment. Of these the command was given to majors, a new regimental rank in the Company's service, where battalions used to be commanded by captains, and promotion beyond that step conferred by brevet; while from the commanding officers all perquisites arising from the payment of the troops were taken away. In like manner it may be necessary to remind the reader that, under the head "Mr. Holland," the writer takes notice of his own untiring efforts to return to terms of amity with the Nizam, his anxiety to accomplish which, as well as his determination to arrest the gross blundering of those at the head of the Madras government, had induced him to deal rigidly, perhaps sternly, first with Mr. Whitehill and afterwards with Sir Thomas Rombold. But these are subjects into which it is not necessary to go at length. Mr. Hastings felt that he was struggling for the very existence of the Company's power in India. He knew that vigorous measures alone

could save it; and he did not allow the thought of personal responsibility or personal danger to operate for one moment as a restraint on their execution.

As a specimen of his firmness and decision, in the conduct not less than in the formation of an important plan, take the following answers to certain queries which Colonel Pearse sent to him. Colonel Pearse had already received his commission, and was not therefore ignorant of the object which he was expected to accomplish; but various minor difficulties presented themselves to his mind after the expedition had set out, and he applied for further counsel. This was not withheld, though the language in which it is conveyed is somewhat peculiar.

You will perceive, from the accompanying papers, that I have but one object, and that I earnestly recommend it to your attention, namely, to prosecute your march with all possible expedition, till you have fairly entered the Carnatic, not suffering your view to be withdrawn from it, nor your progress checked or diverted by any consideration whatever.

From that point I can give you no instructions or advice, but rather wish you may be left wholly to your own judgment, excepting the continuation of the same general design of your expedition, which is to effect a junction of your detachment with the army which is under the immediate command of Sir Eyre Coote. This you may not be able to accomplish without an engagement with Hyder's whole force, for it appears morally

impossible for the General to meet you, or to reinforce you, except by detachments of Europeans sent along the coast by sea. May that event happen! I most anxiously wish it, from a conviction that it will be more likely to terminate in our success than by the union of the dispirited sepoys of that establishment with yours.

Enclosed are two of the march routes which I promised you. If I can find the other, which is that from Cuttac to Ganjam, I will forward it in time. I will desire the acting chief of Massulipatam to furnish you with another for the road from thence to Fort St. George. I am, sir, your most obedient humble servant.

Points submitted to the consideration of the Honourable the Governor-general relative to the march of the Detachment.

Questions.	Answers, 29th January, 1781.
1. By what route, there being two, one by Jawnpore and the other by Jellasore.	1. That of Jellasore is at this time preferable, as being at a greater distance from the Mahratta detachment, and in the way of supplies from Balasore.
2. The Mahrattas being in the country, will, if they are friends, supply us with provisions and necessaries, and dispose of their army out of our route; but supposing they dissemble, possibly they may not choose to engage, and in that case they will get away from our route until we are passed, and then get between us and the borders of the provinces, and possibly attempt to harass our rear or flanks. If we should want provisions and they refuse us, it will be	2. If you have no other means of supplying yourself with provisions but force, you must use force; which, however, I much doubt will never be found very effectual. An attention to your bazaar, that no one commits extortions on the vendors of provisions, or interrupts them on their way, for whatever purpose, seems to promise the surest effect of obtaining a plentiful and regular supply. Mr. Wordsworth, at Ballasore, has orders to prepare a store against your approach on requi-

necessary to take it by force and pay for it; therefore instructions on this head will be necessary, because taking it by force and paying for it may bring on a quarrel and end in war.

sition from you; and similar applications have been made, both public and private, to the chiefs of Ganjam, Vizagapatam, and Massulipatam, who, if you want, may send supplies to meet you. You are not likely to meet an enemy before you pass the Kristna.

3. If the Mahrattas do get between us and our borders as soon as we pass, are we to take any notice of it, or march on?

3. March on.

4. If the Mahrattas should oppose our march, shall we force our way, and to that effect attack them after having tried fair means and negociations?

4. Force your way. Give them due warning, and avoid being the aggressor; but do not stop to negociate.

Your prescribed object is to reach the Carnatic as expeditiously as possible. Fix your attention on this point, nor suffer any cause, of whatever nature, to divert it. If other instructions shall eventually become necessary upon this question, in consequence of Mr. Anderson's deputation, these may be given hereafter.

5. If we should be forced to come to action with them, shall we, after having opened our passage, proceed on our march, or attack Cuttac?

5. No; march on.

6. If we take Cuttac, it will be necessary to leave troops in it, but they must be supplied from the provinces; therefore provision must be made for that and for recruiting our losses.

6. Answered above.

7. Shall we, supposing we are forced to come to extremities after taking Cuttac, march on our destination, or change it

7. No; march on.

towards Berar or some other place, and what other place?	
8. Supposing all peace and friendship with the Mahrattas, are we to take any of them with us, and how many, and are they to be under their own officers or ours? but at any rate they must be as much under my command as the rest of the army. If they go with us, how are they to be paid?	8. On this head you will hav instructions whenever the case shall require it.
9. Supposing the detachment fairly passed through Cuttac and drawn near the Nizam's country; if he be at peace with us and offer to send a body of forces with us, are we to take them?	9. Yes; exercising your own discretion and using such precautions as, from circumstances, appear necessary.
10. If he be not a friend, are we to enter his country, or march on?	10. March on.
11. Supposing him a friend, and that he should offer to enter Hyder's country by the Hydrabad route and call for our assistance, shall we change our route or proceed straight on to Madras?	11. March on.
12. When is the detachment to be under the orders of the Madras President and Council, if ever?	12. Never. You are to obey no order but that of the Commander-in-chief.
13. If the matters before mentioned are subject to occasional orders, from whom am I to receive them?	13. From the Commander-in-chief.
14. If by any fortunate event Hyder Ally or his sons should fall into the hands of the detachment, shall he be sent to Bengal or Madras, or rather, shall he be considered as the	14. I do not choose to suppose a case so unlikely in the present state of affairs to happen. In all cases the powers which you derive from your instructions and the authority

prisoner of the Governor-general and Council, or of the Madras President and Council, or of the Nawaub?

of the Commander-in-chief, will be competent to dictate to you what you may do with the exercise of your own judgment, and to give validity to all your acts.

15. When the detachment shall join General Coote, are the Bengal troops now there to become part of my detachment, or remain separate?

15. Your detachment will remain in all cases a separate corps with respect to its immediate command, its account, detail, and pay. The rest must depend on the will of the Commander-in-chief.

16. If we should join General Goddard, are we to mix entirely with his Bengal detachment and cease to be a separate body, or to continue as a distinct detachment, serving with him and under his command?

16. This is answered above.

17. The same question as to Major Carnac's detachment, if it should join mine.

17. Answered above.

18. In case of junction with either or both of these detachments, is the Deputy Commissary-general of my detachment, by virtue of his office, to audit the bills of the others, supposing they remain as distinct detachments under their present commanding officer?

18. Answered above.

19. Parker is a colonel by brevet, but he is a junior lieutenant-colonel; in case of junction, how is our rank to be settled?

19. Your rank is settled beyond a possibility of a dispute.

20. It will be necessary to give me a person to draw money for the detachment, if we should by any accident want it; and for this particular instructions will be requisite.

20. You have such a power; but I hope you will have no occasion to use it, as we have desired the chiefs of Massulipatam and Vizagapatam to keep what money they may have

accumulated from their revenues for the service of your detachment, and to the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George to order payment of it accordingly.

21. If I join Goddard and become a simple part of the Bengal detachment, are my allowances to cease?

21. Your allowances will remain the same, with your command.

22. I think Colonel Owen may join us; if so, it will be necessary to guard against the discontent that will prevail.

22. To this I cannot reply at present.

23. We may have occasion to carry a store of provisions with us, in which case we shall be obliged to hire a number of additional cattle. I beg to mention it, that if such a contingency should occur, it may not be supposed inexpedient.

23. You have the power of authorizing whatever contingencies you shall find necessary for the service.

W. H.

CHAPTER IX.

State of Affairs at Benares—Journey of Mr. Hastings thither—Rebellion—Its result.

If it be true that the characters of men are as fully displayed in the management of affairs comparatively trifling as in their mode of conducting the gravest matters, we need no further evidence than this paper affords of the firmness which belonged to Mr. Hastings. He has taken his line and resolves to keep it, let happen what may, whether the obstacles opposed to him arise out of the hostility of open enemies, or the treachery of professed friends, or the mutual jealousies of his own officers. But there was another point then at issue, which made, far more than the march of Colonel Pearse's detachment, demands upon his temper and his courage. Cheyt Sing, so far from yielding with a good grace to a necessity which was apparent, became from day to day more refractory. He was constantly in arrear with his payments, and so continued, on one occasion, till the march of a body of troops threatened to enforce them. The circumstance, however, which filled up the measure of his delinquencies in the eyes of the Governor-general was the refusal, on the plea of inability,

to furnish for the public service two thousand horse. He offered, indeed, to raise five hundred, and proposed to strengthen them by the addition of as many matchlockmen; but two thousand cavalry far exceeded his means, and he positively refused to supply them. Now, if the Rajah of Benares had been in poverty, and affected neither magnificence in his domestic arrangements, nor pomp and state in the conduct of his public affairs, these excuses might have been accepted; but Mr. Hastings was perfectly well informed of the reverse of all this. I find, for example, in the voluminous correspondence that lies before me, letters from various officers, all of which unite in representing Cheyt Sing as at this particular juncture both wealthy and disaffected. "It is impossible for me," says one of these, bearing date 25th of June, 1780, "to start any new idea to you on this subject (the Mahratta war). The only difficulty we can possibly feel in the prosecution of the war will be from a want of money, and this difficulty may, I think, be easily obviated by your insisting upon Cheyt Sing's contributing his quota to the expenses of our advanced army, in lieu of being ordered to join it at the head of his own forces. Were he a zemindar, dependant on any other government than our own, this would be insisted upon; and as his ability to advance a large sum seems to be universally acknowledged, why should he alone be exempted

from the expenses, as well as the devastations of war?" Another, dated 18th October, of the same year, is still more explicit:—

"Cheyt Sing," says the writer, "very ill repays you for the state of independence and affluence which he has enjoyed from the time he became a tributary to the Company. All his measures tend to impress the natives of this province with an idea of our injustice and rapacity. You know how strongly he objected to the payment of the five lacs last year. He then made it a plea for raising his rents, by which he has carried a much larger sum, if I am rightly informed, into his own coffers. This year he has played the same farce over again, has offered his jewels to pawn, and says that he is curtailing his expenses and straining every nerve to comply with our demands; and it is only two days ago that he most solemnly declared to me his absolute inability to make the payment in future, and begged me to intercede for a remission of it to you when I went to Calcutta; and by the way of impressing me with an idea that every thing which he had urged was true, he begged me to accept of a present of two thousand rupees for my little girl, which he has not sent, because he wants that sum to complete his payment of five lacs to the Company. But the mischief is more important. These are little arts which are easily detected and seen through. The shock which public credit has received, and the failure of almost all the capital bankers at Benares, is attributed, and I think very justly, to his withdrawing all the money which he had in their hands from them, and lodging it in his fort. I have taken all the pains in my power to procure information as to the quantity of specie he is possessed of, and no person rates it at less than a crore and a half, most people at two crores, of rupees."

From these extracts, and I might greatly add to their number, the reader will be able to judge how far the Rajah's plea of poverty was admissible. With respect, again, to his lack of horsemen, it was proved, on the occasion of Mr. Hastings's visit to Benares, that his body-guard alone, the mounted men whom he kept about his person for purposes of mere show, exceeded by several hundreds the total amount of the force which he had been requested to employ against the common enemy. And to sum up all, his disaffection to the British government, his intrigues to produce disaffection elsewhere, his preparations for actual war by secret enrolment of troops, and his threats of resistance should a force be sent against him; these were matters neither hidden from the Governor-general nor overlooked by those on whom he depended for accurate intelligence. Can we be surprised if, under such circumstances, Mr. Hastings should have entertained strong feelings of indignation towards the Rajah? Was there any just reason why he should not visit offences so grave and so wanton with punishment?

I am not going to argue here the question of moral fitness, as that was assumed at the period of Mr. Hastings's trial to be affected by the terms of existing treaties. Enough has been said elsewhere to show that, whatever might have been the Nabob Vizier's claims upon the Rajah of Benares, these

were in 1775 transferred to the East India Company; and that they included the right of sovereignty, in its fullest and best understood sense, nobody, while the arrangements with the Vizier were going forward, entertained the shadow of a doubt. It is true that, in consideration of certain services rendered to the Company when they were at war with the Nabob Shujah Dowla, the Company had taken Bulwant Sing, the father of Cheyt Sing, in some degree under their protection, by stipulating that he should thenceforth pay a certain amount of rent for his zemindarry, and that the Nabob should engage not to increase it. It is equally true that Cheyt Sing, when handed over by Shujah Dowla's son to the English, came under the sovereignty of the East India Company, subject to the same amount of yearly rent, and no more. But neither the one nor the other of the parties assenting to this agreement ever gave up the right which is inherent in all sovereigns—of asking for additional aids from their vassals as often as the necessities of the state may require them. Accordingly, Shujah Dowla, when hard pressed by the Company for the payment of a debt in 1766, called upon his dependent zemindars to assist him, to which call Bulwant Sing, among others, responded, by contributing as his quota three lacs of rupees.

Here then was a precedent for the demand

made in 1778 by Mr. Hastings, as well as an explicit admission on the part of the Rajah that he was not exempt from the common liabilities of all zemindars; for the point was established by it, that the Company's guarantee neither affected, nor was ever intended to affect, the mutual relations of sovereign and vassal. Therefore, as Bulwant Sing, supposing him to have refused to make the advance after a clear case of necessity was made out, would have exposed himself, in 1766, to be treated by the Nabob as a rebel and a traitor; so the refusal of his son, in 1778, to comply with the Governor-general's demands, at a moment when the Company's affairs were in a very critical state, amounted to an offence, the proper punishment of which would have been not less than confiscation. Did Mr. Hastings proceed with the haste of an Oriental sovereign to inflict that punishment and to supersede the Rajah? He did nothing of the sort. He was too wise, as well as too humane, wantonly to engage in an enterprise which he could not hope to carry through without some loss of life and much confusion. But he determined to teach the Rajah a lesson of greater prudence in time to come, by mulcting him of a portion of the treasures which he had accumulated, and of which he clearly did not know how to make a proper use.

The amount of the fine which Mr. Hastings

resolved to impose upon his refractory vassal was fifty lacs of rupees; a considerable sum, doubtless, but not exceeding one year's rental of Cheyt Sing's zemindarry. He was desirous, likewise, of levying it with as little stir as possible; and having further in view a plan for the better administration of the affairs of the district, he found himself considerably impeded by the absence of a fit instrument wherewith to work. For Mr. Francis Fowke, the resident at Benares, was not the man of his choice; he had been forced upon him by circumstances which I have elsewhere detailed, he had never given to him any share of his confidence, and he was now informed that over the Rajah himself Mr. Fowke exercised no influence whatever. Under these circumstances, Mr. Hastings judged it expedient to remove Mr. Fowke; and he made an effort to accomplish that end by a private arrangement, which failed. He could not, however, permit considerations of individual feeling to impede the progress of public business. He therefore recalled Mr. Fowke, found for him employment in another line, and sent Mr. Markham, son of the Archbishop of York, a young man of talent and greatly devoted to himself, to supply his place.

This preliminary step being taken, Mr. Hastings proceeded to communicate to his Council the outlines of a scheme which he had for some time been

meditating. The affairs of Oude were, as might have been expected, in great confusion. The Nabob, cruelly wronged at the beginning of his reign, had never been able to lift his head above the waters, but sank year by year more deeply into difficulties, from which by any ordinary means escape was now impracticable. Far be it from me to justify the man on the score of prudence or judicious management; a more foolish person never occupied a throne: while his private vices are reported to have been as detestable as his weakness was conspicuous throughout. But, had he been the reverse of what he was, it may be questioned whether, pauperized and imposed upon at the outset, it would have been possible for him to maintain order in his own provinces, and at the same time liquidate the debt which he owed to the Company. Moreover, his English allies, whether as a government or as individuals, showed him no mercy. The government, as has been stated, imposed upon him terms far more stringent than those to which his father had been subjected; while its servants robbed him without scruple, by loans advanced at an exorbitant interest, and pensions and jaghires wrung from him in return. The consequence was, that, long before the period at which our narrative has arrived, he had become utterly useless to Bengal as an ally; for his payments were all in arrear, and the state of his country was such that nothing save the presence

of a British force among them kept his subjects from rebelling.

It had been a subject of anxious thought to Mr. Hastings for some time how the state of Oude ought to be dealt with. He was not, indeed, in any doubt as to the real causes of the existing evils, but there were serious obstacles to the removal of the greatest of these, which very much hampered him in his deliberations. But Mr. Hastings was not the sort of man to be diverted from any important enterprise by obstacles, however serious. "If I cannot accomplish all that I wish, I will at least do what I can," was a rule which he had established for himself in every condition of life; and on that rule he determined to act in reference to the point before him. Accordingly, he submitted to the Supreme Council, consisting at this time only of Mr. Wheler and himself, a proposition that he should be permitted to visit the Nabob Vizier in his capital, and arrange with him on the spot some better plan of proceeding, as well in the management of his domestic concerns as in his dealings with the Company. Moreover, as Mr. Hastings's designs extended to a sweeping revocation of all the grants which, whether by Englishmen or by natives, had by improper methods been obtained, he felt that it would be necessary to begin by establishing near the Nabob's person an agent or minister on whom he could rely. Now such an agent he had not in Mr. Bristow,

who, like Mr. Fowke, had always been opposed to the Governor-general's policy, and held his appointment, by a direct order from the Court of Directors, in defiance of the Governor's will. Mr. Bristow, therefore, must in the first instance be removed, and he was removed. And then, having trustworthy agents both at Benares and Lucknow —Mr. Markham at the former station, Mr. N. Middleton in the latter—Mr. Hastings set about the arrangement of his ultimate schemes, not only without hesitation, but in the full assurance of success.

Mr. Hastings was too much of a politician not to be aware that the issue of great movements generally depends at least as much upon the secrecy and skill with which arrangements are made before hand as upon the decision which may be exhibited in the actual conduct of the game. He was, therefore, very guarded in the language which he held while yet in Calcutta, speaking only to Mr. Wheler and the most confidential of his friends of the fine which he meant to impose upon the Rajah of Benares, and stating vaguely his belief that in Oude some sweeping changes must of necessity be effected. He did not, however, make such preparations for his journey as could induce a belief that he anticipated the smallest opposition. His escort consisted of little more than the body guard which generally attended him; and Mrs.

Hastings, recently an invalid, but now so far a convalescent that she was able to travel, bore him company as far as Mongeer. There, however, she halted; and the event proved that it was well both for herself and her husband that she had not been tempted to proceed further.

The fact of the Governor's resentment had long been known to Cheyt Sing; and no sooner was he informed of Mr. Hastings's departure from Calcutta than he hastened, by professions of deep regret for the past and promises of better behaviour in the future, to avert the threatened storm. He offered, moreover, to advance for the use of the Bengal government a sum of twenty lacs, and otherwise conducted himself as a vassal might be expected to do who is conscious of having incurred the anger of his superior and dreads its effects. But Mr. Hastings, resolving to take Benares on his way, rejected the whole of these advances; and even when met by Cheyt Sing, who came as far as Buxar, at the head of six hundred cavalry, to do him honour, he refused to hold with him any familiar communication. In like manner the Rajah's proposed visit on the day of Mr. Hastings's arrival in the city was declined; for Mr. Hastings was determined first of all to make him aware of the nature of the ground on which he stood, and then to treat him either leniently or the reverse, according as he should exhibit a spirit of meekness and submission, or its opposite.

On the following day, the 15th of August, Mr. Hastings transmitted to the Rajah a paper, in which the various grounds of complaint against him were set forth, and an explanation of his behaviour and motives in each particular case was demanded. The Rajah replied to this paper; but his explanations were so little satisfactory, that at ten o'clock the same night Mr. Markham, the resident, received instructions to place him under arrest. This he was directed to do at an early hour in the morning of the 16th, when two companies of sepoys would be present to support him, and put down any disturbance, should such arise. But no opposition was offered to the resident's proceedings; the Rajah, on the contrary, sent a submissive message to Mr. Hastings; and Mr. Markham, who afterwards paid him a visit at his own desire, reported that all was peaceable and quiet. Nevertheless, during the interval which elapsed between the execution of the arrest and Mr. Markham's second visit, large numbers of armed men had crossed the river, who, passing by groups of three or four within the gates of the palace, now crowded all its courts and blocked up its avenues. It is worthy of remark, moreover, that these were not a mere rabble, hastily called together by apprehensions for their chieftain's safety; they constituted a portion of the extensive levy which for some time previously the Rajah had been or-

ganizing; and they came prepared to execute any orders which they might receive from their master. Accordingly, wrangling and disputation soon arose between parties of these warriors and the British sepoys, which led first to individual contests and scuffles, and by and bye to a general tumult. It is well known in what a tragical result this tumult, as it has been called, resulted. Through some unaccountable negligence the two companies of sepoys had come to their post without ammunition; and being unable to defend themselves against the attacks of superior numbers, they were, after a stout resistance, cut to pieces.

The tumult in the palace soon became known both to Mr. Hastings and the inhabitants of the city, and the former directed two additional companies to support and reinforce the detachment on duty, while the latter ran in great crowds to intercept these supplies and assist the rebels. Unfortunately, the officer in command of the reinforcement held the rabble to whom he was opposed somewhat too cheap. He marched straight towards his point, through narrow streets, commanded on either side by numerous windows, and was with his people utterly destroyed ere he could penetrate to the precincts of the palace. Thus, in the space of two hours, the entire force, on which the Governor-general depended for protection, suffered annihilation. Yet neither the Governor-

general nor the gentlemen in attendance on him lowered their tone of confidence for a moment, though reduced to the number of less than fifty persons. They barricaded the house in which they were assembled, and prepared to sell their lives, should an attack be hazarded, at as dear a rate as possible.

Had Cheyt Sing been gifted with ever so moderate a share of active courage, he would have dared everything at that moment to get possession of the person of the Governor-general. With such a hostage in his power, he might have dictated his own terms, if he lacked hardihood enough to go further, by throwing himself at once into the arms of the Mahrattas. Some blood would have doubtless been shed; for the force round the Governor-general, though small, was composed of resolute men, all of whom were prepared to die in his defence. Yet fifty persons, however brave, could have offered no effectual resistance to an army, more especially as their stock of ammunition appears to have been limited, and they were entirely destitute of cannon. Happily for the interests of British India, however, Cheyt Sing either did not perceive or was too much agitated to avail himself of the opportunity. On the contrary, he took advantage of the affray to escape through a postern gate: and letting himself down the steep bank of the river, by means of a rope of turbans

tied together, he hastened across to the opposite side, whither the bulk of his retainers immediately followed. The consequence was, that no attack was made upon the position which the Governor-general had taken up; though the insurgents still held together in overwhelming numbers, and, occupying all the outlets from the town, kept him in a state of close blockade.

Desperate as such a situation might well appear, the firmness of Mr. Hastings was in no degree shaken by it. He took no notice whatever of a letter which the Rajah hastened to convey, and refused to treat on any other terms than those of unconditional submission. Yet he did not all the while sit with folded arms, as if exertion on his part were either uncalled for or impossible. Carefully guarding against the excitement of unnecessary alarm, as well in Calcutta as at Lucknow, he yet contrived by means of hircarrahs, who passed through the enemy's lines, carrying in their ears quills into which letters were introduced, to open a communication with the officer in command at Chunar, and to acquaint him with the dangers that threatened. Moreover, he took care by the same conveyance to set the mind of Mrs. Hastings at ease in reference to his own personal safety. And what is more remarkable still, as bearing testimony to his rare strength of nerve, as well as to the command which he never ceased to exercise over

all the faculties of his mind, he sent, through the same channel, instructions to Colonel Muir, who was at that time negociating a treaty of peace with Mahdagee Scindia, the Mahratta chief. Such resolution, such perfect presence of mind, could hardly fail of carrying the Governor-general through all his difficulties. Colonel Popham, with a battalion of four hundred men, hastened to the scene of action, and Colonel Morgan, the commandant at Cawnpore, moved without orders on the same point; while from Lucknow, and indeed from every other station within reach, corps after corps set out with all haste, to deliver the Governor from the perils which menaced him. I need not go on with the story. A premature and ill-managed attempt to reduce Ramnagur, ere sufficient force had come up, failed. The horizon became in consequence more dark than ever. Mr. Hastings escaped by night to the military post at Chamnagur, and there set himself to arrange what might thenceforth be described as the plan of a campaign against a confirmed and still extending rebellion.

I do not think that I am required to give of the transactions that followed any minute or detailed account. Influenced by a principle which will be best explained in the correspondence of which by and bye I shall transcribe a portion, Mr. Hastings resolved not to listen to any propositions which

Cheyt Sing might make, but to push the war against him to the extreme point of depriving him of all further share in the management of the country. Accordingly, the Rajah's army, consisting of not less than forty thousand men, was defeated in two separate actions. His fortified camps at Patuta and Suttufpoor were stormed, and himself reduced to take refuge with a handful of followers within the hill fort of Bidgegur.

Having seen his enemy thus stripped of the means of offering further resistance, Mr. Hastings left Major Popham to conduct the siege, and returned himself to Benares, for the purpose of establishing there a new and permanent government for the province of which it was the capital. From Cheyt Sing all authority was of course taken away. Having been publicly proclaimed a rebel and a traitor, he was, with due formality, deposed; and a grandson of Bulwant Sing by one of his daughters, a youth of eighteen or nineteen years of age, became Rajah in his place. But the management of so important a province being a charge too weighty for the shoulders of so young a man, Mr. Hastings gave the new Rajah and his domestic concerns into the hands of his father, as Naib; while Ibrahim Ali Cawn, a native of great talent and integrity, was appointed to preserve order in the city, as head of the police. Finally, the rent of the zemindarry was raised from twenty-

two to forty lacs per annum; the right of coinage was taken away from its chief, and all doubt thereby removed as to the sort of relation in which he was thenceforth to stand towards the East India Company.

Meanwhile Major Popham pressed the siege of Bidgegur with great vigour. He was not, indeed, so fortunate as to shut up the Rajah within its walls; for Cheyt Sing entertained too great respect for English prowess to abide the issues of an assault, and escaping ere they came, to the court of one of the petty princes of Bundelcund, removed thither the great bulk of his treasures. But the wife and mother of Cheyt Sing were both in the fort, and they defended themselves for a while with considerable resolution. At last, however, terms of surrender were proposed, which would have secured to the ranny or widow of Bulwant Sing the undisputed possession of the wealth, as well as the occupation, in a state of comfortable independence, of the valuable pergunnah or district of Hurlak; but to these Major Popham would not agree till after reference should have been made to the Governor-general, and the Governor refused on any account to sanction so gross an usurpation. "With respect to the booty," continued he in a letter, never meant to be taken for more than the unguarded communication of friend with friend, "that is rather your consideration than mine. I

should be very sorry that your officers and soldiers lost any part of the reward to which they are so well entitled ; but I cannot make any objection, as you must be the best judge." There can be no doubt that Mr. Hastings committed a serious error in thus dealing with a subject of such grave importance. He ought to have remembered that the lightest word which is written by one in authority passes current for all which it can be supposed to imply; and that if it shall seem to sanction, no matter how remotely, proceedings out of which profit may accrue to individuals, the individuals interested in giving to it any particular interpretation will, as a matter of course, take care so to receive it. Accordingly, Major Popham, having made himself master of the fort, untrammelled by any conditions save the assurance of personal protection to the prisoners, seized with a strong hand upon all the treasure contained in it, and proceeded without delay to distribute the amount as prize-money to the troops by whom the conquest had been achieved.

Mr. Hastings was exceedingly annoyed by such a termination to the enterprise. He never pretended to conceal that one great object of his journey to Benares was to exact from Cheyt Sing, in the shape of fine, such an amount of treasure as would place at his disposal for the general uses of the government fifty lacs of rupees. And when

Cheyt Sing, instead of complying with the demand, hoisted the standard of rebellion, then Mr. Hastings considered himself at liberty to confiscate and apply to public purposes whatever money might be found in his coffers. But Major Popham and his brother officers came completely in the way of this arrangement. They appropriated, without reserve, every coin that fell into their hands, and left the government which they served not only as embarrassed as it was ere the expedition began, but loaded with fresh debts, contracted in order to equip and put the troops in motion.

I subjoin two letters written at Benares, and referring almost exclusively to the subjects now under discussion. The former shows that Mr. Hastings entertained serious apprehensions lest his motives should be misunderstood, and a false colour put upon his conduct at home; the latter fully bears me out in all that I have asserted relative to his wishes and designs regarding the treasure found in Bidgegur. Not that this evidence was in reality needed; for it seems ridiculous in the extreme to suppose that the head and representative of a government which stood upon the brink of bankruptcy should have meditated a proceeding so suicidal as the surrender to Major Popham and his detachment of treasure found in a place not carried by assault. Yet even with this offence malignity has charged Mr. Hastings; and

it is therefore due to his memory that the question should be set at rest for ever.

To Major Scott.

Benares, 1st January, 1782.

My dear Scott,—As ill news commonly flies with more speed than good, you will probably have heard long before this can reach you of the troubles and dangers which have attended my visit to this quarter. How the world may judge of me with respect to them, I only conjecture at random. My friends will see nothing in the past which will discredit their opinion of me; and that the malevolence of others may not avail themselves of my first calamities to misrepresent me, and to impute them, as the public are apt on all occasions to impute misfortunes, to misconduct, I have drawn out a minute narrative of the whole, authenticated by copies of official papers, and affidavits of the most material facts, taken mostly before the Chief Justice. The narrative was begun in the midst of the events which it relates, and while my mind was affected by them. To you, and to my other confidential friends, I do solemnly repeat the asseverations contained in it, that it was written in the spirit of truth, and that I believe, and am morally certain, that every material fact, and I believe every less essential circumstance, related in it, are strictly and literally true. I have endeavoured to make them appear so to others by simplicity in the narration, and by authentic evidence. The last was collected in a hurry, and on the suggestion of Sir E. Impey, who told me that facts of the most stamped notoriety here would be doubted at home, unless such means were taken to establish their reality. I could have collected a larger fund of evidence, and the evidence of more important facts; but I wanted time for it; and besides the carelessness of

some, and the fears of others for the consequence, have caused them to suppress many things which are more pointed and strong than anything which has been deposed. An instance of this occurs in the last of all, which was accidentally produced by conversation with Colonel Hannay. Middleton sent me a narrative of the Gorookpoor insurrections, which makes a number in the first part of the Appendix. I desired him to verify it on oath, which I knew he might do, for the original letters which he quotes, and which compose the principal matter of it, were all or almost all shown to me, and read by me when he was with me at Chunar. Instead of this, he delivered to Sir Elijah the unmeaning affidavit which I have placed at the head of the others upon the same subject.

Observe, nor let them escape the observation of others, the following points:—

1. I have not only avoided all obscurity in the narrative, but I have written it in so plain a style that every intelligent old woman in England may understand it without reference, and without prior acquaintance with the subject.

2. The calamities which befell me turned on three essential points:—my arrest of Cheit Sing; the defenceless state of the guard which was placed upon him; and lastly, the precipitate and unexampled temerity of Captain Mayaffre. I have taken some pains to justify the first of these measures. The other two are not my own. I had nothing to do with the second, nor knew the circumstance till its effect was past. The last passed both against my precautions and against orders.

3. It will appear to every impartial reader that what happened from an accidental cause would, had this cause not intervened, have happened at another time, and from the effect of a concerted and mature plan.

It was a mine sprung before its appointed time, and therefore it failed of the mischief for which it was intended.

4. My conduct after these events will, I presume, escape even the most inventive malice; for I cannot with all my skill recur to a single circumstance in it which by the most tortured construction will justify censure, nor recollect a single thing which ought to have been done that was left undone.

5. I am told that my situation caused violent alarms in Calcutta. I excited none by my representations, nor by my applications. My letters to Mr. Wheler, then the only efficient member of the Board, simply recited what had passed, and promised the most prosperous issue from it.

6. I added nothing to the embarrassments of the presidency; I asked neither for money nor troops, but left Mr. Wheler to the free management of his separate share in the administration, reserving the exclusive charge of my own.

7. I forbad the Nabob Vizier to come to my assistance both in my letters to him and to Mr. Middleton, that the dignity of our Government or its credit, might not suffer by the opinion of its requiring an extraneous aid to suppress its internal disturbances. Hyder Beg, in recapitulating the past transactions in conversation with me, dwelt more forcibly on this than any other, as a public evidence of the power of our Government, and of our firm assurance of it.

8. I rejected every advance from Cheit Sing for peace, even when he had 40,000 men in arms, and I had not 2,000 to oppose them; and even when I was at his mercy at Benares, if the wretch had known his advantage; because I thought it dishonourable to treat on equal terms with a vassal and a murderer; and because I thought that the future existence and perma-

nency of our state depended on the issue of this first instance of open defection in its own subjects; and this reason I assigned to Mr. Wheler in a doubtful period of the contest.

9. I claim some merit in the impetuosity with which the officers and even the men flew to my assistance. The cause was, it is true, a common one,—but I do not believe that Sir Thomas Rumbold or Mr. Whitehill would have attracted so prompt an assistance, had either held my station, and experienced the like personal danger in it.

10. I lost the zemindarry with a rent of twenty-two lacs. I recovered it with a revenue of forty. The Company possessed only its stipulated rent under Cheit Sing. It is now as much a member of their Government as the zemindarry of Burdwan, and more effectually theirs than many parts of Bahar.

11. I negociated and concluded a treaty of separate peace with Mahdajee Sindia in the midst of a desperate rebellion, from which the opinions of all ranks of men immediately spectators of it, except my own countrymen, denounced my personal destruction, and the eventual ruin of the national interests.

12. I have been the instrument of making known to all the Indian world the constitutional union and resources of our Government, and of proclaiming an example which will deter future attempts to oppose its authority.

13. The Berar Government took no advantage of my distresses, though solicited by powerful offers from Cheit Sing; but, on the contrary, Moodajee expressed every testimony both public and private of his concern for my safety and success; and while he knew only of the rebellion, but not of its issue, requested that an English gentleman might be deputed to go to him, and assist in negociating a peace with the administration

of Poona: and yesterday a man of credit came expressly deputed by him to present me with offerings of cloths and jewels in congratulation of my success; and to see with his own eyes, and report my actual condition. He arrived in eighteen days from Naugpoor.

I could add that our influence and credit are at this time as high as they have ever been in any period of our dominion; but this being an opinion, however established and known where I am, it may be disputed in England. I might also add a circumstance much in my own favour, which it is possible you may hear from others, although it is a point less within the compass of that knowledge which men derive from each other within the confined precincts of Calcutta. I have been assured that the danger to which my own person was exposed in the late troubles afforded matter of much apprehension to many, and I do not attribute the whole of this information to flattery.

I have desired my friend Larkins to send you a complete copy of the narrative by the Swallow, which has been detained for the public copy. I desire that you will obtain the permission of the Court of Directors, if you can, for printing it. I have written it with that view, and therefore made it as intelligible as I could; and I think that the events are so much out of the common road as to excite and gratify the curiosity of those even who are not interested in them. My friends, *i. e.* my confidential friends, must first read it: but make a point of publishing it, unless they shall unanimously oppose it. Perhaps I consider the subject of it of more importance, from the natural bias of the part which I personally bore in them, than they deserve; and perhaps I have been too ingenuous in my declarations and professions for the public opinion. The first I admit a valid objection. The last must not operate against the publication; for I trust implicitly

in the justice as well as integrity of my actions and intentions, that they will do me credit hereafter, let what will be the present judgment of them.

Be yourself corrector of the press, and be particularly attentive to the punctuation; for it is inconceivable how differently negligent readers, and such is the bulk of readers, judge of the sense of what they read from the facility with which they read it, and its easy connexion. Make an alphabetical list of proper names for the composer, that they may be all spelt uniformly. Take the spelling as you find it in the narrative itself, because that was corrected by myself, though I have left many of the names variously spelt, where the difference was not very great. Do not allow too large a margin, nor let the paper be too white:—And let the whole, though the divisions of the parts composing it should be well marked, be bound in one volume.

The first part of the Appendix consists of little distinct narratives of unconnected subjects. The first part is my agreement with the Nabob Vizier. This has excited a world of clamour against me. Even Mr. Wheler has been infected by it. If Mr. Middleton does his duty, the event will justify and acquit me to the public; but I confess he has hitherto disappointed me, and to such a degree that I am at this instant debating with my own mind whether I shall not go myself to Lucknow to execute the purposes of this agreement; and while I write this, my resolution must be formed. If I go, I shall not be surprised to find myself involved in a scene of troubles as great as those from which I have recently escaped; I am certain of accumulating ill will and reproach, whether I succeed or not, and I am pretty certain of doing some good.

One thing will be expected from me which I will not do. If the Nabob opposes my measure, I will attempt nothing by violence, but exact from him assets

for the discharge of his debt to the Company, and leave him to himself. I think he is not likely to push me to that extremity, especially if I am with him myself; but I am not so desperate a politician as to usurp his authority, and to divest him of all his rights, because I can do it; nor do I think it good policy; for I fear that our encroaching spirit, and the insolence with which it has been exerted, have caused our alliance to be as much dreaded by all the powers of Indostan as our arms.

The police which I have established for the town of Benares is all after my own heart. The men of business in England will not know what to make of it; and my enemies will sneer at it. But the people are pleased, and if it answers my expectations, its influence will extend my reputation to the remotest parts of India. All India could not furnish a man so equal to the charge of it as Ally Ibraheem Cawn, and his conduct and character are equally approved by the inhabitants. Hitherto there has been no police in Benares since the death of Bulwunt Sing, except the infamous marketing which was introduced by Captain Smith, or rather his infamous minister Collichurn.

The best comment, both on this establishment, and on the settlement of the zemindarry, which is the next work, is the Board's letter upon both, which I wish to have printed with them. I am highly gratified by it, and delighted with Mr. MacPherson, who is the undoubted author of it.

In my negociation with Mahdajee Scindia, my merit is so small that, in the comparison with Colonel Muirs, it is imperceptible. He has shown no less zeal for the service in this transaction, and forbearance in his conduct towards the Ranna, who is a traitor. Another would have resented Anderson's commission. Muir received him with kindness, and assisted him with the

most liberal communications. I am much pleased with him.

The regulation of customs is trivial, and hardly merits a comment, nor requires one.

I must return to the main subject of the narrative: you will observe in the Rajah's letter a repeated allusion to the insolent language of a chubdar of Markham's, named Cheitram. I have no doubt of the fellow's insolence, but I have taken no notice of it in the narrative, because it had no necessary relation to it. The chubdar did not arrive at Shawalla till the tumult had almost begun. This I know, because he accompanied a Vackeel of the Rajah's, whom I ordered to go to the Rajah, and to tell him that if any blood was spilt, his should answer for it. I had then heard of the forces that had crossed and landed at Shawalla. I addressed this message both to the Vackeel and the chubdar. The latter delivered it in his own fashion, and added some impertinence. He lost his life for it, and he deserved it; for he had been, as I have since learned, guilty of frequent instances of ill behaviour. There were also two men styled moolavies, who had acquired too great a share of the resident's confidence, and abused it by acting an incendiary part between him and the Rajah. These fellows, with the chubdar, Markham inherited from Graham, and with them too many of Graham's prejudices. I had occasion, in Graham's time, to take notice, of the conduct attributed to the moolavies, and intended to have obliged Markham to remove them. I gave him an early account of the character which they bore with the people, and the injury which they had done to his, and with difficulty convinced him of it. He was astonished, for he assured me that he regarded them as patterns of fidelity and virtue. I did exact his promise to hold no further intercourse with the survivor, and intended to have

banished him from the country: but it was unnecessary. One fell in the massacre of Shawalla, a marked object. The other was murdered by the order of Cheit Sing, at Bidjeygur. Both deserved their fate; but the rancorous revenge taken of the latter, stamps the sanguinary character of the wretch who ordered it.

What I meant by the introduction of this subject was to obviate what might possibly be reported, and what indeed the Rajah seems to affirm, the supposition of this massacre having originated from the chubdar. The chubdar was there by accident, Cheit Sing's armed men were appointed, and in readiness to cross at a moment's warning, and were the same who attended him to Buxar. They had actually crossed, and had become so tumultuous, a full hour before the chubdar went from my presence, as to have excited my apprehensions of what did actually ensue. It was not possible for any provocation of the chubdar to have given rise to a design actually formed before he arrived, and then ripe for execution; or to have brought over the armed multitude which had arrived before he came. Neither was it probable, if possible, that what he said to the Rajah should be heard or known by the mob on the outside of the house. Neither the chubdar nor the moolavies had the slightest concern or participation in the bloody deeds of this day. Nor could I mention the guilt imputed to them without departing from the purpose of my narrative, and producing an unnecessary charge against them. They have paid the forfeit of their crimes. Those of Cheit Sing are purely his own, and bear no affinity to them, nor are derived from them. Neither does it appear that he ever considered them of much moment; for he never complained of them to me, and it was from the report of others, that I was informed of their characters. Do not publish these anecdotes, unless you

find it necessary for the refutation of any conclusions predrawn from them and given already to the public; because they might otherwise injure the man whose influence enabled these fellows to do the mischief imputed to them. He is innocent of it, and is incapable of an ungenerous action. With many of the failings of youth and inexperience, Markham possesses all the ingenuousness and generosity of the former, and I shall leave him in charge of his office without fear of his discrediting my appointment of him.

I am much pleased with my new associate, Mr. MacPherson; and by the agreement of all the private reports concerning him, I find every one equally pleased with him. I only lament that I could not see him, and furnish him with all my opinions and views, and receive his corrections of them, so as to be able to leave him with one common and uniform plan of measures mutually agreed on. For want of that, I dare not venture on any undertaking that is likely to keep me long absent from the presidency, lest any misunderstanding should arise between us, or he should grow cool in my support, or, not intimately possessing all my motives, be unequal to defend my measures; or Coote come round, as he is expected, and embarrass me by captious propositions dictated to the Board, and either from indifference or inadvertency admitted; for I do not believe that Mr. Wheler will readily abandon me, and I am sure that Mr. MacPherson will not. This is my strongest objection to my proceeding to Lucknow. Add to this,, that Mr. Middleton has declared in a solemn manner that he is of himself able to effect every measure prescribed to him, and that my going will produce opinions that will counteract the present authority and obstruct the collections.

17th January.—I am now near Dinapoor. I shall stay one day at Patna, and if the Nabob in answer to

the letter which I believe I told you I had written to him on the 1st of this month, does not arrive in that time, I shall go on. I shall proceed by the post bearers from Baugulpoor, and hope to be in Calcutta in a fortnight from this day. Adieu, then, for the present. Yours, my dear Scott, most affectionately.

To Major Scott.

Fort William, 21st February, 1782.

My dear Scott,—I have said nothing to you yet concerning the Bidjeygur prize money. It has given me infinite uneasiness, and I am no less mortified at the rapacity which the officers of Major Popham's corps have shown on that occasion than at my public disappointment. I had not the shadow of a suspicion that Popham would have taken any decided step in a matter of such concern without an authority from me, especially as I was so near. Judge of my astonishment when I tell you that the distribution of the plunder was begun before I knew that the place was in possession, and finished before I knew that it was begun. A very uncandid advantage was taken of a private letter written by me to Major Popham on another occasion during the heat of the siege, at which time I made it a point to answer all his letters on the instant of their receipt, and generally by another hand, and often in the most familiar style. The fact is, that, instead of receiving my letters as authority, they were afraid that I should stop or qualify the distribution, and therefore precipitated it to prevent me. I referred the matter to the Board, but they chose to wait my return, and we have since publicly called upon the sharers to refund, and submit their pretensions wholly to our decision. If they refuse, I shall propose to try whether the law may not compel them. Popham's fault in the business was a

want of resolution, and he has avowed that he could not withstand the universal clamour and vehemence of his officers for the scramble.

The officers sent a very elegant sword as a present to me, and a set of dressing boxes for Mrs. Hastings, all beautifully inlaid with jewels: I returned them all.

CHAPTER X.

Transactions with the Nabob of Oude and the Begums—Letters on these subjects.

THOUGH the rebellion at Benares was thus effectually put down, and the prospects of an increased revenue from the province in all time coming appeared excellent, Mr. Hastings was too well aware of the state of parties at home not to feel that his conduct from the beginning to the end of the outbreak might, and probably would, expose himself to serious personal inconveniences. He knew that the charge of being actuated by an overweening ambition lay heavily against him in Leadenhall Street, and the fact of having set aside, by force of arms, a chieftain, between whom and the Company something like a treaty of alliance subsisted, was not, as he could easily perceive, calculated to do away with the impression. Under these circumstances he determined to collect and to arrange such a body of evidence as should force conviction upon the minds even of his enemies; and Sir Elijah Impey happening at the moment to be engaged in a tour of inspection among the provincial courts, he gladly availed himself of the offer of assistance which the Chief Justice made.

Accordingly Sir Elijah repaired to Benares, where a multitude of witnesses, as well native as European, met him. These were carefully and separately examined upon oath; and their several depositions being taken down, a sort of appendix to the Governor-general's narrative was produced, the most cursory examination of which will not now fail to convince every impartial inquirer that from first to last Mr. Hastings had to deal with a traitor to the English government and influence in India.

It is not, however, to be supposed that the conduct of these matters, important as, in a public point of view, they doubtless were, and personally to himself of the deepest interest, gave to the mind of Mr. Hastings full occupation, even when the adjustment appeared to be the most remote. During the very height of the rebellion, while he was suffering a species of imprisonment at Chunar, Mr. Hastings dictated the terms of a treaty of peace with the Mahrattas, and gave instructions to his agents relative to the manner and temper in which it was expedient that they should comport themselves in its negociation. Moreover he received in the same place, and at the same moment, a visit from the Nabob of Oude, who came to offer assistance, and give evidence of his own fidelity, and who stayed to arrange with the Governor-general a plan for the better administration of his

kingdom, where, as I have already taken occasion to show, the utmost confusion prevailed. To what end the conferences between Mr. Hastings and his ally pointed will best be shown in the sequel. For the present, my business is to make the reader aware, that if any act were meditated of which it can with truth be said that it jarred, in ever so trifling a degree, with the dictates of abstract right, Mr. Hastings was not only not the proposer of that act, but that, in giving to it his sanction, he but obeyed a political necessity, to which, circumstanced as he then was, it became his positive duty to render all other considerations subservient. For the state of the case was this:—

When Mr. Hastings began his journey to Benares, the British empire in India stood upon the brink of ruin. The resources of both Madras and Bombay were completely exhausted. The treasury at Calcutta was empty; a furious war pressed them on every side, and there were no means at the disposal of government wherewith to pay the troops already in the field, far less to equip more, and send them where their presence was needed. It is idle to try a man, placed at the head of a nation thus circumstanced, by such tests as we are justified in applying to the cases of rulers, whose countries are struggling for anything less vital than their very existence. Mr. Hastings had one great object to attain, before which all minor duties must

of necessity disappear. He was bound to save the empire, let the effort cost what it might, and he could not save the empire without money. Whence was the money to be procured? There was no parliament at hand to which he could appeal; no legislative body by whose decree fresh taxes might be imposed upon the people; no people under his rule capable, if so taxed, to sustain the burden. He could not draw upon the Company at home, for the system of bills had been carried to its utmost limits; he could not borrow, because public credit, never in India very extensive, was at an end. What was to be done? Purchase an insecure truce by concessions which would but tempt his enemies to renew their attacks so soon as they should be better prepared for the struggle, or give up the game at once, and with the English settlers withdraw from a country where they could no longer maintain themselves? Mr. Hastings could not bring himself to contemplate either expedient, yet there was but one alternative left. If the empire was to be saved at all, it must be saved at the expense of individuals. The chiefs and nobles dependent on the British Government for protection must be called upon to supply the Government with the means of continuing such protection,—by fair means, wherever a legitimate ground of appeal could be discovered, where such might be wanting, as a measure of stern though melancholy

necessity. There can be no doubt that Mr. Hastings would have gladly avoided this extremity, had any other course been open to him, for Mr. Hastings was mild and humane, as well as vigorous and clear-sighted. Yet these very qualities of mildness and humanity urged him to proceed, and he did proceed, in defiance of the heavy personal responsibility which he was bringing upon himself. What had he to gain by the plunder of chieftains whose treasure was to be expended in defence of the state? What amount of censure could apply to him for adopting this method of defending it? The Court of Directors might merit blame, so might the Imperial Parliament, inasmuch as by neither had provision been made for such an emergency as had arisen. But Mr. Hastings's acts were those of one who, having a great empire to preserve, is compelled to sacrifice for its preservation his own personal feelings, as well as the property, and in some instances the rights, of individuals. Was he singular in this respect? nay, does not the same thing occur in all cases where the safety of the state and the rights of individuals come into competition? The Parliament of Great Britain never votes a new tax without offering an injury to the properties of British subjects in general. The houses which would afford shelter to an enemy near the glacis of a beleaguered city are never burned down without doing an outrage to the rights

of their proprietors. Yet nobody thinks of denouncing either the one act or the other, so long as the necessity for its performance can be shown to be imminent. In like manner I must be permitted to repeat, that had Mr. Hastings been the originator of the schemes of spoliation which, by the bye, did not originate with him, I can perceive in the circumstance no ground at all for censure. The country could be saved only by levying forced contributions upon its gentry; for the salvation of the country Mr. Hastings was responsible; and he would have merited and incurred both the indignation of his superiors, and the total loss of reputation as well as of self respect, had he scrupled to adopt the single expedient that lay open to him, however revolting the course might be to all his preconceived ideas and feelings.

It would be absurd to deny that, oppressed and harassed as he was, Mr. Hastings had often looked with a wistful, and therefore a covetous, gaze towards the enormous wealth of the Begums or Princesses of Oude. He remembered that of these overgrown sums the Begums had originally possessed themselves by dishonest means; that, in the first place, they had never produced the will, nor a copy of the will, under which they claimed to inherit; and that, in the next, had such a document been forthcoming, it would have passed in their case, as in all cases similar to theirs, for mere waste

paper. Sujah Dowlah had no right to alienate from his successor the funds which were necessary to defray the expenses of the government, more especially at a time when the government was deeply in debt both to its ally, the East India Company, and to the troops and civil functionaries which served it. On the other hand, the English Government for the time being, that is to say, General Clavering and his majority, had committed a grievous blunder, not to call it by a harsher name, in espousing the cause of these Begums against the claims of Asuph ul Dowla; while the bargain into which they had induced the young Nabob to enter, when he accepted fifty lacs as a compensation, was altogether iniquitous. Still there lay the guarantee, signed and sealed, by which the English pledged themselves to protect the princesses against all new demands on the part of their sovereign; which gave to them the unquestioned enjoyment of some crores of rupees; which left them in possession of a very rich jaghire, with the powers of sovereignty attached to it; which enabled them, out of their savings, to purchase other estates from the needy Vizier, till in the end they stood forth rather as independent princes than as subjects. There can be little doubt that the contemplation of such a state of things had given to Mr. Hastings many an anxious hour, and that he had repeatedly considered with himself whether or not the mischiefs

arising out of it were beyond the reach of cure. I cannot indeed find any written evidence to show that he ever seriously meditated an infraction of the agreement, absurd and iniquitous as it was. Yet I discover numerous applications from the Vizier to this effect, enforced by urgent assurances that from no other source than this, the ill-gotten and ill-used gains of his relatives, would it be possible for him to provide a fund for the liquidation of his arrears to the Company. At the same time, I will not undertake to affirm that Mr. Hastings never entertained a project of the kind; for the substitution of Mr. Middleton in the room of Mr. Bristow as resident at the durbar seems to imply that he meditated some important changes. Be this, however, as it may, the necessity of taking the lead was completely obviated by the bearing of the Nabob, who, at Chunar, earnestly renewed his entreaties, and gave many and excellent reasons why they should be attended to; while the scruples which had heretofore kept the Governor-general irresolute, the conduct of the Begums themselves removed. It came out in the course of the inquiries which were instituted into the behaviour of Cheyt Sing, that the Begums had not only been privy to his designs, but had assisted him to collect the means of carrying them into effect. They had furnished him with money to a considerable amount; they had raised men and sent them to his army;

they had encouraged other petty chiefs to adopt a similar line of proceeding, and made themselves in every respect parties to his plot. These were points to which their own vassals bore testimony, some of whom were taken with arms in their hands; nor was the smallest reason assigned either then, or in after years, why the credibility of the witnesses should be questioned.

As soon as he was put in possession of these facts, on authority which appeared to be sufficiently conclusive, Mr. Hastings made up his mind to deal with the Begums as they deserved. He announced to the Vizier that the Company's guarantee in favour of the arrangement of 1775 was withdrawn; and that the Nabob was in consequence free to demand from his relatives both a surrender of the jaghire and a portion at least of the treasure which they had so long usurped. But Mr. Hastings's benefactions to his overloaded and helpless ally did not end there. He agreed to relieve him from the expense of maintaining the extra, or, as it was called, the temporary brigade, with which a recent treaty had burdened him, and put a stop at once to the heavy payments which he was accustomed to make to multitudes of Englishmen who, on one pretence or another, contrived to render themselves pensionaries on his bounty. Moreover the Vizier was permitted to resume such jaghires within his own

territories as he himself might judge expedient, subject only to this condition, that wherever the Company had pledged themselves to maintain the occupant in possession, he should be pensioned off with a sum equal to the net annual rental of his lands.

Such is the substance of an arrangement entered into between Mr. Hastings and the Nabob Asuph ul Dowla, when the latter, desirous of showing his fidelity to the Company, went up, during the progress of the Benares revolt, to visit the Governor-general at Chunar. Though perfectly justifiable on the ground of what was due to a prince in alliance with the British Government, who, partly through his own folly, partly through the misconduct and chicanery of others, had become a pauper in the capital of his own dominions, it seems to be still more susceptible of defence when we take into account the desperate state of the Company's affairs at the moment. Yet this very treaty, out of which arose in due time a long state of comparative prosperity to Oude, as well as a large accession of wealth to the English, without which they would have found it impossible to sustain the burden of the war for another year, was charged against Mr. Hastings as an act of the grossest oppression. What ground of reason was there for this? It has been shown elsewhere that the Begums obtained possession of their enormous wealth by a

fraud; that in this fraud the majority in the Supreme Council supported them; that Mr. Hastings protested from the first against arrangements which were not sanctioned either by justice or sound policy, and was restrained from setting them aside, so soon as he regained his influence, only by the respect which was due to the honour of the British name, however inconsiderately pledged. Surely Mr. Hastings, believing all along that the position of these women towards their sovereign was a false one, was not bound to support them in it after they had given proof of their hostile feeling towards the English, by raising and equipping troops for the service of a rebel? And as to the mode by which the terms of the agreement were carried into effect, let the subject be considered in connexion with the usages of the country, and the well-known tempers and habits of the individuals concerned, and the outcry which was raised by the personal enemies of Mr. Hastings will, I apprehend, meet with very little encouragement. For, in the first place, the cruelties, such as they were, of which the Begums and their ministers became the victims, were not the act of the Governor-general, and, in the next place, to what did they amount?

The Begums, or Princesses of Oude, like women in all countries, and especially in the East, could be considered as little else than the creatures of the

ministers or favourites to whom they entrusted the management of their affairs. These ministers were two eunuchs, Jewar Ally Cawn and Rehar Ally Cawn, men crafty, intriguing, selfish, and mercenary; who encouraged their mistresses to resist the demands of the Vizier, not only because compliance would have materially affected their own interests in the meanwhile, but because their views extended to an appropriation of the funds in question by themselves or their personal connexions, so soon as the Princesses should have passed from the stage. Moreover, the Begums, though nominally owners of the late Nabob's treasures, exercised over these treasures no control whatever. Not a rupee was in their own personal keeping; nor could any order from them secure the disbursement of the sums necessary for the daily expenditure of the palace, till by one or other, or both, of their ministers it had been countersigned. To speak, therefore, of the arrest of the eunuchs as a measure sanctioned by no law of reason or of right, far more to represent the mistresses of these eunuchs as yielding to a cruel demand because their sympathies were touched and their generosity awakened, is to employ language which is calculated only to deceive. There was no such thing as an awakened sympathy in the case. The eunuchs, like the majority of their countrymen, loved money more than they loved their own persons: and stoutly

held out against imprisonment and the privation of food till the uneasiness occasioned by the latter became insupportable. I really must be pardoned if I venture to characterise as something pre-eminently ridiculous and wicked, the sensibility which would strive to balance the well-merited sufferings of those usurpers against the preservation of British India. The eunuchs deserved death for having advised their mistresses in the line of crooked and unwise policy which they followed. They escaped with a little personal suffering, which was applied only so long as they refused to surrender up a portion of that wealth, the whole of which their own and their mistresses' treason had forfeited.

It was in the month of September, 1781, that Mr. Hastings and the Nabob mutually pledged themselves to the treaty, of which the substance has been given above. The Nabob, after settling this important matter, returned to Lucknow, where, with the assistance of Mr. Middleton, then resident at the durbar, he proceeded to carry into effect its several terms. The arrangements for dismissing the extra brigade and withdrawing from the English their ill-gotten pensions, were easily carried into effect. Neither was much difficulty encountered in recovering from his own subjects such of the jaghires as the Nabob judged expedient to claim. But when he addressed himself to the Begums, he was met by a decided refusal. The

Nabob hesitated. There were some minions of his own who still retained the jaghires which in moments of weakness or wickedness he had conferred; it was impossible to press his demand against the princesses without at the same time depriving these men of their possessions. Wherefore, and not through any feeling of compassion for a mother and a grandmother, both of whom he held in small account, this imbecile prince scrupled to enforce the only conditions in the treaty of Chunar which promised to afford to the distressed government of Bengal the immediate relief of which it stood in need. It appears, too, that Mr. Middleton, whether misled by mistaken sentiments of compassion, or that his judgment was overclouded from some other cause, did not exert his influence as he ought to have done in the matter; so that Mr. Hastings, disappointed in the supply which he expected to have found in Benares, returned to Calcutta as destitute as ever. But this was a state of things which could not be permitted to last. Mr. Hastings wrote strongly to the resident; the resident remonstrated with the Nabob, and threatened, in case further delays were practised, that he would take the business absolutely into his own hands. Upon this the Nabob directed a portion of the English brigade to enforce compliance with his claims; and the palace at Fyzabad was

invested. Still the Begums adhered to their determination of not disbursing a single rupee, and the troops proceeded to occupy the palace. They entered it without bloodshed, and carefully abstaining from intrusion upon the zenana, they arrested the two eunuchs, and the Nabob cast them into prison. Neither by threats nor by entreaties could these men be prevailed upon to write such a letter as should ensure the surrender of the coveted treasure. They were, therefore, subjected, according to eastern usage, to torture—that is to say, food was refused to them, and they were loaded with irons. Now it would be vain to deny that such a proceeding was both harsh in itself, and at variance with all our notions of humanity and of law. To compel men by the fear of starvation to disgorge their wealth, even if it be needed for the uses of the state, is indeed a refinement in severity of which we know nothing; yet the practice was then as common in India as arrest for debt used to be among ourselves, and in cases similar to that of the Begums' ministers it was to the full as rational. For if a man be unable to satisfy his creditors while at large, he is surely not in a better plight for doing so after he shall have been shut up in prison; whereas the prospect of a lingering death by hunger can hardly fail of subduing the firmness of the most obstinate, inasmuch as wealth becomes worthless even in the

miser's eyes, if such be the sole condition on which he is permitted to retain it. Accordingly, the eunuchs had not suffered long ere their resolution gave way; the necessary order for a payment was issued, and within a day or two of the application of this discipline Mr. Middleton was put in possession of treasure sufficient to cover the arrears that were due from the Vizier to the Company up to the close of the year 1780.

Having thus traced down the history of Mr. Hastings's dealings with the Nabob to the date at which his correspondence was last interrupted, I would return at once to the excellent practice of leaving him to tell his own tale, were I not anxious in the first instance to bring what may be called a remarkable episode in his biography to a close. In few words, then, let me state, that having still the arrears of 1781 to make good, the Vizier did not release the ministers from confinement, though he permitted food to be regularly supplied to them. On the contrary, he kept them in ward, and was soon driven, by the refusal of the Begums to make good this fresh demand, to a renewal of the system of torture. On this occasion the eunuchs themselves undertook, out of their own funds, to supply the necessary sum within the space of a month. Surely such an undertaking was marvellous on the part of men who professed to subsist

entirely upon the bounty of their mistresses; yet the Vizier did not scruple to accept it. In like manner the Begums, mother and daughter, remained under a guard, and were subjected to considerable privations whilst so dealt with. Nevertheless, the result showed that, in the adoption of these severe measures, neither the Nabob nor the British resident had gone much beyond the line either of prudence or necessity. Once more the money required was paid; once more those persons who professed to have sold their household goods in order to satisfy the first demands of an oppressive government were seen to have at their disposal resources amply sufficient to meet the second; while by and bye it came out that a residue remained after all, which, in rough numbers, may be stated at twelve hundred thousand pounds sterling. Surely two women had nothing to complain of who, though compelled to surrender up a million of that which, in point of equity, never ought to have been treated as their own, were yet left in the undisturbed possession of twelve hundred thousand pounds sterling.

Such, divested of the high colouring which party prejudice and personal malice have given to it, is the true history of transactions which supplied the Supreme Government at a moment of extreme peril and poverty with funds, through

which, and through which alone, it was enabled to save India to the British nation. It was a business in which Mr. Hastings was no further concerned than that he consented to what was termed the spoliation of the Begums ; in other words, that he permitted the Vizier to extract from them who had waged war against the Company's troops the funds that were requisite for liquidating his own debts to the Company. But as Mr. Hastings did not direct the means to be used in order to compel the surrender of these funds, so is he free from the responsibility, whatever it may be, which attaches to their adoption. Moreover, it is worthy of remark, that the Court of Directors, after ordering in 1782 an inquiry to be made into the matter and justice to be done, approved in 1783 of the whole series of transactions, and gave directions that Mr. Hastings's final arrangement with the Vizier should be considered as binding and permanent. Yea, and more than this ; the Begums themselves, the parties said to have been wronged, lived many years afterwards in contentment and tranquillity under the dominion of their relative, and were among the number of those from whom, at the period of his trial, Mr. Hastings received strong letters of friendship and commiseration. I think that, after this, Mr. Hastings's memory will be cleared from the stain of having acted without the

plea of right, far more of having acted cruelly. He punished certain rebels, it is true, and brought into an exhausted treasury a certain sum of money; yet these very rebels, after the bitterness of the moment was passed, spoke of him as their friend; and India remained to be what it still is, "the brightest jewel in the British crown."

I subjoin now a brief series of letters which Mr. Hastings wrote during the progress of these transactions. They exhibit him in the light of one who never for a moment ceased to have his country's welfare in view, and set all considerations, even of personal influence, at nought in order to secure it. It will be seen, too, that they speak well of the new colleague with whom, as a member of the Supreme Council, the authorities at home had supplied him; and, altogether, breathe a spirit of hope and cheerfulness which is not always to be found in his correspondence; for he had free scope for action, he knew how to deal with it. and was not distrustful of the issue either at home or abroad.

To Major Scott.

Fort William, 20th February, 1782.

My dear Scott,—My letters are desultory, and the subjects of the first in date grow obsolete before the last are written. You must piece, and compile, and combine them.

Since my arrival most of my objects are either accomplished, or in prosperous train.

Middleton, whose activity I have been compelled to rouse, by letters written in a style of the greatest severity, has exerted himself so far as to induce the Nabob to give his effectual sanction to the resumption of all the jaghier lands, and to reclaim the treasures of his father, of which his mother had retained the possession. The latter have amounted to fifty-five lacs, and have been assigned by the Nabob in payment of his debt to the Company. There will remain nearly the same sum to discharge the whole of his balance; and I have pledged my word if Mr. Middleton failed to accomplish it, I would myself go to Lucnow and charge myself with it, with an assurance that I would perform it.

I left Benares in perfect order, and with every reasonable expectation of receiving the complete revenue from it in the course of the year.

Mr. Anderson has been received by Mahdajee Sindia with every public demonstration of joy and cordiality, and every private symptom of sincerity, and of a desire to improve his alliance with us.

Chapman has reported his arrival at Naugpoor, where he was received with equal marks of good will.

General Goddard had despatched Captain Witherston as his agent to Poona; but lest this act should counteract or embarrass Mr. Anderson's negociations, we have directed his recall, and forbidden General Goddard to negociate. I am sure of Anderson, but cannot trust an army contractor to be an instrument of peace. A cessation has taken place. The presidency of Bombay is in quiet possession of all its acquired revenues, and has passed a resolution, communicated to us through General Goddard,—but not by them,—to appropriate them to the expenses of their own establishment, and to exclude the Bengal detachment from a participation in them.

A reinforcement sent from Bombay, since the cessation, to Tillecherry, enabled Major Addington (or Abbington) who commanded in that place to make a sally with his whole garrison, three battalions, on Hyder's army which besieged it, with the most complete and decisive success. The particulars you will read in all the papers before the receipt of this. If the presidency of Bombay follow this advantage as they ought, and the peace with the Mahrattas is finally ratified, as there is a moral certainty that it will, Hyder's destruction is inevitable. The same despatches bring advice of the arrival of General Meadowes, and of the fleet at Bombay.

Our arms in the Carnatic have been repeatedly successful. No decisive advantages have been gained, and we lose men by every victory; but Hyder gains nothing from our losses, and destructive as the war has proved to the Carnatic, and to our resources in it, he certainly suffers in a greater proportion than we, nor is it possible that he can maintain the war much longer, or find means either in his hoarded treasure, or current revenue, to feed and subsist so great a force at such a distance from his own capital, and with his other great disbursements.

We shall form a detachment immediately which will either act with Nizam Ally Cawn, if he will take so fair an occasion to invade Hyder's dominions, to which he appears perfectly disposed; or it will assist the war in the Carnatic by such other means as the circumstances and occasions of it may suggest, if this design fails. Popham will command it. I experience in Mr. MacPherson every aid and support that I expected, and an ease with a benevolence of disposition exceeding—even far exceeding—my expectations, and even my own knowledge of him.

With Mr. Wheler I am upon the most friendly and confidential terms. Such an union, and I am sure that

it will last, is of more substantial worth than the acquisition of a crore of rupees to our treasury with a divided Council.

In my letter of the 1st January, I enumerated such points as appeared to me to merit a particular consideration as they relate to my late proceedings at Benares. To these I add the following reflection:—although the forces of this Government have been sent to the most distant quarters of Hindostan and Deccan, and it has afforded all the means to the other presidencies of maintaining their wars with the two most powerful states of India, and has in a manner directed the operations of both; and although a confederacy had been formed for a combined attack of Nizam Ally Cawn, the Peshwa, Hyder Ally, Mahdajee Sindia, and Moodajee Boosla, or, in other words, of all the Indian States against our possessions, and our own provinces were threatened with an invasion actually projected and ostensibly begun; yet these provinces have continued in an unvaried state of profound peace with armies surrounding them; and the only calamity which at any time threatened their tranquillity was confined to the person of the Governor-general alone, and to the scene in which it originated; and its extreme duration was but thirty-one days.

You will have heard of the bravery, zeal, and activity of those whose professional duty called on them for an extraordinary display of these qualities. Let me for a moment indulge my warmer feelings in adding one name—that of a person most nearly connected with me, whose conduct displayed as exemplary a fortitude, and as generous a zeal for the public service, as any of the most applauded of its supporters. I need not add that I mean Mrs. Hastings. I am too proud of her virtues not to wish that my friends should know them, and I am happy even in the reflection of her sufferings

which furnished such an occasion to call them forth. I know them only by report, and though I know that report to be genuine, yet I cannot trust to the fairness of my own repetition of it. I have desired Captain Sands, who attended her through the whole of that trying scene, to give you the history of it, and I have made him promise upon honour that he will not exaggerate, but adhere most rigidly to truth in his relation. Let my confidential friends see it. She rejoined me at Benares in health, went with me to Chunar, and returned to Benares with an indisposition which hung on her for many days, and greatly alarmed me. She is now well, but wants much of her former strength. I had left her at Baugulpore, from whence I proceeded by the post to Calcutta, and arrived here on the 4th of the month. She followed, and arrived on the 15th, after an absence of eight months from Calcutta. I am almost superstitious when I reflect on my journey to Benares; I left her at Mongeer, more from a secret impulse than any solid reason; and what would have been my condition had she been a witness of the bloody events which followed at Benares, and my companion at such a time! Her coming to Benares afterwards had its political uses, as it was a demonstration of the tranquil and secure state to which the zemindarry of Benares was restored.

She desires me to assure both you and Mrs. Scott (to whom I beg you will present my compliments) of her affectionate remembrance, and Lizzy of her love. I am ever, yours most affectionately.

To Laurence Sulivan, Esq.

Fort William, 21st February, 1782.

This is the first letter which I have written to you since my late expedition. It has proved a perilous and critical one, and required in me so wary a conduct to

steer me through it, and extricate me from the embarrassments into which I was thrown, that I feel an uncommon degree of anxiety to receive the sentiments of my friends upon it. I have flattered myself that they will see nothing done which ought not to have been done, nor anything left undone which ought to have been done; that the troubles, alarming as they were, were confined to my own person, and the territory of which I made the central point; that I neither excited the fears or difficulties of the presidency, nor demanded either men or money, though for a time destitute of both; that I rejected all extraneous aid; that accidents sprung a mine before its time, which was laid for the most desperate crisis; that I obtained my rescue more from the affection than obedience of my officers; that (to use a classical phrase) I did not despair of the safety of the state, but supported its dignity, when I lay at the mercy of the rebel, had he known his advantage; and that I conducted a successful negociation of peace with Mahdajee Sindia, in the most desperate period of my distresses; and finally, that I converted the most dreadful calamity that ever threatened our possessions in India since the war with Cossim Ally Cawn, into the instrument of increasing the reputation of our constitutional power, annexing a valuable and defensible principality to our dominion, and of raising a precarious revenue from twenty-two and a half lacs to forty.

I have written a narrative of these transactions, which Major Scott will deliver to you for your perusal, and afterwards for that of my other confidential friends. Be not discouraged by the size of it. It is of consequence to me that you should read it, and I have written it with such plainness that it will neither perplex nor fatigue the attention. I have desired Major Scott to petition for the leave of the Court of Directors to print it, if you see no public objection to it. I am indifferent about personal consequences.

My late engagement with the Nabob Vizier will demand your close attention, for I expect much abuse for it, because I have hurt the interests of many individuals by it.

These are points in which it becomes the Company and the Government to give me their fullest support, as they wish to see their administration here exert themselves in the defence of their interests against private competition. Let me enumerate my claims on this principle.

1. The disavowal and repeal of the treaty made by the presidency of Fort St. George with Bazalut Jung, and their breach of faith with Nizam Ally Cawn.

2. The restitution of the Sircar of Guntoor to Nizam Ally Cawn, and our pledge given to him for the payment of his arrears of Peshcush.

3. Our suspension of the Government of Fort St. George.

4. The assertion of the powers of this Government against the dangerous encroachments of the Court.

5. The dissolution of the provincial councils, and establishment of the new system of revenue.

6. The abolition of the control exercised by the commanding officers of the sepoy corps, in the payment of their men, the prevention of arbitrary stoppages, and false musters; evils at this time universally known and acknowledged to have existed to such a degree as to have caused a vast diminution of our real strength, and a continual fluctuation in the identity of the individuals composing it.

Lastly, the recall of lucrative commands too remote for control, and the annihilation of the Nabob Vizier's pension list.

I might have put at the head of the catalogue the conduct of this Government (which was notoriously my own) in its decision on the resolution at Fort St.

George in 1777, a decision to which the Company owe the tranquillity which followed that dreaded convulsion, and prevented a civil war, which a temporizing or more guarded conduct on our part would most probably have excited. I have not had that justice done me on this occasion, nor in the transactions passed on the commencement of the war in France, which the Company ought for their own interests, and for the sake of example, to have dealt to me.

For other matters I must refer you to my letters written to Major Scott, which are in effect written to you; and to all the motives of them.

P.S. I ought to inform you that by the seizure of the treasures which were in the possession of the Vizier's mother, the Nabob was enabled to pay fifty-five lacs of his balance to the Company, and the resumption of the jaghiers will yield a sufficiency far more than the discharge of the remainder. I beg that you will always bear in mind these two points, either of which is a justification to the Nabob, and the last an obligation on me for these confiscations. The Begum was entrusted by the Nabob, Shuja Dowlah, with the charge of all his treasures. At his death she kept them for herself, nor durst her son reclaim them though his undoubted right. With Bristow's help he obtained from her thirty lacs, and gave her a written promise to take no more. We were made the guarantees of this engagement. On the revolt of Cheyt Sing, she and the old Begum, Shuja Dowlah's mother, raised troops, caused levies to be made for Cheyt Sing, excited all the zemindars of Gorookpoor and Bareich to rebellion, cut off many parties of sepoys, and the principal Aumil and a favourite of the younger Begum openly opposed and attacked Captain Gordon, one of our officers stationed in his neighbourhood.

Let this be an answer to the men of virtue who may

exclaim against our breach of faith and the inhumanity of declaring war against widows, princesses of high birth, and defenceless old women. These old women had very nigh effected our destruction.

Our extra resources of this year are as follows, viz :—

	Lacs.
1. The treasure recovered from Bow Begum as above	55
2. The revenues of the resumed jaghiers, the amount unknown; I rate it at the balance remaining of the Vizier's debt. . . .	26
3. Increased revenue of Benares	17
4. Increase made in our own revenue by the new establishment	40
5. The salt fund, expected 30, I rate at . .	20
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To this I might add a saving in the investment, as we shall have more than a sufficiency for one complete year's tonnage lying in the warehouses, after the ships of this year are all gone, including the despatches of November or December next.

I subjoin to these a letter, earlier in point of date than either of the preceding, and of the matter of which a brief explanation is necessary. The truth is, that while Mr. Hastings and the Nabob were together at Chunar, the latter, acting on the recognised policy of all eastern chiefs, offered to the former a gift of ten lacs of rupees. Mr. Hastings was then absolutely penniless. Neither in his own escritoir nor in the public treasury was there an available rupee wherewith to meet the current expenses of the hour, while the troops were all in arrears—some, and these actually engaged in sup-

pressing Cheyt Sing's rebellion, to the extent of six months. The offer of ten lacs, even though it came in bills, was not by a man so circumstanced to be rejected, and Mr. Hastings did not scruple to avail himself of it. But he committed, at the same time, the only act throughout the whole of his political career of which it is impossible to deny that it was, at least, injudicious. He communicated to the Court of Directors the fact of the present having been made, and while he set forth his mode of applying it to the public service, he hazarded a request that by the Court it might be given back to himself as a token of their approval of his conduct. What can I say about this? It was clearly not the act of a dishonest man—for such an one would have pocketed the money without so much as alluding to it in his communications with the India House. It was not the act of a mercenary man—for Mr. Hastings's character was the reverse of mercenary. It could not be the result of weakness—for of weakness no one will accuse him. And, which is more extraordinary still, it was a proceeding of which, almost to his dying day, he used to speak as if there could be but one opinion respecting both the justice of his claim, and the hardship of having it rejected. I am inclined to think, therefore, that he must have entertained on the subject views peculiar to himself, of which, never having heard them discussed, I can give no account.

To Major Scott.

Patna, 20th January, 1782.

My dear Scott,—I have written a letter to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, which will be thought extraordinary; indiscreet by my friends and presumptuous by my enemies—at least these will affect to think so. Enclosed is a copy of it. I am neither a prude nor a hypocrite. Had I succeeded, as I had reason to expect, in the original objects of my expedition, I should have thought it, perhaps, allowable to make some provision for myself when I had filled the Company's treasury; but I am disappointed. I have added, indeed, a large income to the Company's revenue, and, if Middleton does his duty, I have provided for the early payment of the debt due from the Nabob Vizier to the Company. But these are not acquisitions of *eclât*. Their immediate influence is not felt, and will not be known at all till long after the receipt of these despatches. It will be known that our receipts from Benares were suspended for three months, and during as long a time at Lucknow. It will be known that the pay and charges of the temporary brigade have been thrown on the Company, and that all the Nabob's pensioners have been withdrawn; but the effect of my more useful arrangement, thanks to Mr. Middleton, yet remains to be accomplished. I return to an empty treasury, which I left empty. I will not suffer it to be said that I took more care of my own interests than of the public, nor that I made a sacrifice of the latter to the former.

As to my attempting or hoping to deceive or seduce by the offer, if I was, indeed, capable of such a poorness of mind, it would have surely prevented my making it at all, and especially at a time when I have every reason to believe that the many private interests which I have excited to opposition against me will be

most prevalent in the new body to which I have submitted my pretensions, particularly the connexions of Mr. Wombwell, which include the whole body of the Court of Directors, besides their eventual patronage at the same mine of oppressive rapacity.

I am afraid that few men in England would understand me if I were to ask by what right or policy we levied a tax on the Nabob Vizier for the benefit of patronized individuals, and fewer still, if I questioned the right or policy of imposing on him an army for his protection which he could not pay, and did not want. With what expression of features could I tell him, to his face, "You do not want it, and you shall pay for it?" The first was a scandal to our government; for every Englishman in Oude was possessed of an independent and sovereign authority. They learned and taught others to claim the revenue of lacs as their right, though they could gamble away more than two lacs (I allude to a known fact) at a sitting.

Our encroaching spirit, and the uncontrolled and even protected licentiousness of individuals, have done more injury to our national reputation than our arms and the credit of our strength have raised it. Every power in India dreads a connexion with us, which they see attended with such mortifying humiliations to those who have availed themselves of it; and in my heart I always believe, and always did believe, that this was the secret and sole cause of the hesitation of the Government of Berar to accept of our alliance, although I had carefully worded the conditions of it so as to obviate that objection. More I need not say on this subject. On that of the enclosed I have but a word: be you passive—solicit no one. Only prevent, if you can, the refusal from being accompanied by abuse.

CHAPTER XI.

State of Parties at Home—Changes in the Administration—Hostility of Fox, Dundas, and Burke—Letters to Mr. Hastings.

It will be necessary at this stage in our narrative to advert to certain circumstances which, though belonging more to the province of general history than to that of biography, were yet so closely connected with the personal fortunes of Mr. Hastings, that to pass them by unnoticed would involve all that might hereafter be detailed in obscurity. Happily for the reader, as well as for myself, a brief and hurried explanation will serve every purpose which I have in view, and beyond this it is not my intention to proceed.

First, then, in reference to the governments of Bombay and Madras, it must be borne in mind that by the Act of 1773 these Presidencies had become, in all the important matters of war and peace, and treaties of alliance and friendship with foreign powers, absolutely dependent on the Supreme Government. Whatever their relations might be with the native states around them, the right of making changes in these was taken away, till their plans should have been submitted to the Governor-general and Council at Bengal for consideration, and by them approved. In the management of the

internal affairs of their provinces, indeed, such as providing the investments, collecting the rents, levying taxes, and maintaining order, the Governors and Councils of Bombay and Fort St. George were still free to exercise their own discretion; but in every question which might appear to affect the interests of the British empire in India, properly so called, the will of the Supreme Council was to be by them accepted as law.

Of the little attention paid by the Bombay authorities to the spirit of the Act of Parliament, as well as of the consequences which resulted from their infraction of it, sufficient notice has been taken elsewhere. Their precipitate support of Rogobah involved them in a war, which they conducted without vigour, and from which they must have withdrawn with disgrace had not the power of Bengal been put forth to support them. In like manner allusion has been made to the ill-judged attempt of Sir Thomas Rumbold and Mr. Whitehill, at Fort St. George, to place their government in a novel relation towards the Nizam of the Deccan, by withholding from him the tribute which the Presidency was pledged to pay, and negociating directly with his brother and vassal, for the transfer to themselves of one of his provinces. I have shown that to this attempt, and to the indignation which it excited in the mind of the Nizam, the Company were indebted for the formation of the league which

joined Hyder to the list of their enemies; and would have further brought against them the force, not inconsiderable, of the Deccan, had not the Supreme Government interfered to prevent it. But the Madras Government, under Sir Thomas Rumbold, had been guilty of other extravagances than this. They chose to deal with the Nabob of Arcot, not as with a sovereign prince, whom they were bound by treaty to protect in the just exercise of his prerogative, but as a vassal and dependent, from whom it was lawful for them to wring as much as possible, and whose wishes, in the management of his own affairs, they were quite at liberty to disregard. In a word, the policy of Sir Thomas Rumbold and Mr. Whitehill had tended to reduce the Nabob of Arcot to the condition of the Nabob of Bengal, that is to say, they desired to stand forth in their own persons as the acknowledged rulers of the Carnatic, and to allow to its chief, out of the rents which by their own agents they should collect, a mere pension or stipend for the support of himself and his family.

Mr. Hastings entirely disapproved of this scheme, and opposed it throughout on the two-fold ground of abstract injustice and particular inexpediency. He did not offer himself as the apologist of the Nabob's extravagances, far less encourage him in withholding from the Presidency the payments which were due. But as he could not upon

principle permit a prince, especially named in the treaty of Paris, to be reduced to the rank of a private person, so he was not ignorant that the act of thus reducing him must, if carried out, tell against the Company's interests with all the powers of India. He accordingly leaned to the side of the Nabob in his controversy with the Rajah of Tanjore, combated the plans proposed by his enemies to degrade him, and suggested more than one expedient for extricating him from his difficulties, without offering the smallest injury to his honest creditors. For this he was not thanked at the seat of the Madras Government. But when hostilities with Hyder began, and the Nabob, harassed at home, applied to Mr. Hastings for protection,—when Mr. Hastings afforded him this protection, and accepted an assignment of his revenues, not as Sir Thomas Rumbold would have done, in perpetuity, but only during the continuance of the war,—when this treaty was by the Nabob urged as a sufficient exemption from the demand of a total surrender of his authority into the hands of the Madras Government, and he openly declared himself to be in communication with the Governor-general and Council,—then was there excited a feeling which the progress of each new day rendered more bitter, till it brought about by and bye an open rupture between the Supreme and the subordinate Governments. Neither was this the sole

ground of offence which Mr. Hastings had given. When the Madras Government, indignant with Mr. Holland, because he, too, had presumed to communicate with Calcutta otherwise than through themselves, recalled that gentleman from his situation as resident at Hyderabad, by Mr. Hastings, acting as the organ of the Supreme Government, he was reinstated. Of such proceedings as these the consequences were immediate and inevitable. Sir Thomas Rumbold returned home in disgust, the jealousy of his colleagues was excited, and the sufferings of the Carnatic, which their own improvidence had occasioned, were attributed by them, and their friends, to the Mahratta war, and to Mr. Hastings's reckless ambition.

The Court of Directors, though generally well pleased to espouse the cause of any man who set himself in array against their Governor-general, saw enough in the conduct of Sir Thomas Rumbold to demand their censure. They, therefore, sent out an order of recall, which, by a voluntary resignation, he anticipated; and then, taking the advice of the proprietors, they resolved to choose for him a successor, not as had heretofore been done, from among men brought up in their own service, but out of the general list of British subjects distinguished in public life for practical abilities. The individual on whom their suffrages fell was Lord Macartney, a nobleman who had recom-

mended himself to notice by good service rendered in the adjustment of a Russian treaty, and for twenty years of employment in various situations under the Crown; and the appointment gave the more general satisfaction, that the friends of Mr. Hastings anticipated from the new Governor a willing co-operation in carrying out the views of him whom they regarded as the saviour of India.

It would appear, from the tone of such portions of their correspondence as has come into my possession, that there was at the outset a disposition on the part of these two functionaries to act heartily together. Mr. Hastings, indeed, was prepared by the letters of Mr. Pechell and others, to find in his Lordship a zealous as well as an able colleague, and writing to him on his first arrival with perfect frankness, was answered in a spirit which seemed to correspond with his own. But it is next to impossible for a person, circumstanced as Lord Macartney was, not to imbibe some portion of the feelings of those around him, and he too began, by degrees, to exhibit tokens of jealousy on the score of interference. Mr. Hastings, eager to conciliate the Nizam, and holding the value of the Circars exceedingly cheap, had proposed that they should be restored, on condition that his Highness would join the English in the war against Hyder. Lord Macartney took quite a different view of the question, and pronounced the Circars to be by far the most

valuable of the Company's possessions on that side of India. In like manner he entirely underrated both the military power and the personal faith of the Nizam, and instead of adopting the plans of one who knew far better than he how the balance of power in India was to be preserved, he suggested projects of his own, and stoutly, though with perfect politeness, adhered to them. Moreover he, too, adopted the idea that the Mahratta war was of Mr. Hastings's seeking, and that to it all the misfortunes which had befallen the Carnatic were attributable; and clamorous for peace with that nation, neither he nor the members of his family were at all careful to keep back their opinions, however groundless and unjust, from their correspondents in England. Then, again, there was extreme umbrage taken at the mode in which their own war was conducted. Depending absolutely on Bengal for every rupee in money and every measure of rice,—supported solely by the troops which Bengal had furnished, and, above all, sustained and directed by the Commander-in-chief whom Bengal had sent to them in their hour of greatest despondency,—they yet murmured and complained, and strove to thwart Mr. Hastings in his favourite measures, because to Sir Eyre Coote, and not to the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, the Supreme Government had entrusted the management of funds, which were supplied from the revenues or the credit of Bengal

for the sole purpose of enabling the General to carry on the war with vigour. It will be seen by and bye that the behaviour of Lord Macartney in this respect was neither overlooked nor misunderstood by Mr. Hastings, and that the estrangement created by it grew into something like personal hostility ere the public life of the Governor-general came to an end.

Meanwhile the state of parties at home, subject to almost daily changes, with each of which Mr. Hastings's proceedings were in some shape or another mixed up, presented as strange a spectacle as ever came under the observation either of the politician or the philosopher. It would carry me far beyond the limits of my present undertaking were I to give of these a comprehensive detail; but I am bound to notice them as far as they are seen to affect the personal fortunes and public character of Mr. Hastings, and the materials out of which my brief sketch shall be formed are happily abundant.

Enough has been said concerning Lord North's views and sentiments to show that they had never been very favourable to Mr. Hastings's general line of policy. Like his predecessor in office, the great Lord Chatham, Lord North desired nothing so much as to obtain an unlimited control over the Indian patronage, and as this was not to be done except by bringing the Company's government into

disrepute, he lost no convenient opportunity that offered of placing it in an unfavourable light before the public.

In this spirit the nomination of Messrs. Clavering, Monson, and Francis, to be members of the first Parliamentary Council, took place. They were all open and avowed friends of the minister, well acquainted with his objects, and well disposed to forward them, for which indeed they possessed ample opportunity; for so long as they acted together their voices must needs prevail, according to the terms of the law which vested all power in the majority. Accordingly they entered at once upon a course of factious opposition to the plans and devices of their chief, which may be described as having had but one object in view, namely, so to discredit the characters both of the Company's local governments in general and of the individuals to whom they were entrusted in particular, that the people of England might become disgusted with both, and demand an entire change of system. With what zeal the majority laboured to accomplish this object, and how very nearly they had effected it, I have been able in the course of these pages to explain. Yet their failure was complete in the end, insomuch that Lord North himself, if he never laid aside his desire of change, ceased by degrees to avow it, and supported the very man,

through the misrepresentation of whose acts he had expected to secure for himself the great prize at which he was aiming.

For the triumphant issue of the struggle, in which during four long years he had been engaged, Mr. Hastings, doubtless, stood principally indebted to his own firmness and integrity. Something, however, as has been shown elsewhere, he owed to what the world calls chance; for the minister who had lost America, did not care to risk the loss of India likewise, and therefore sought to represent matters as great and prosperous there by way of a counterpoise to the evils which had overtaken the nation elsewhere. Hence in the Act of 1781, Hastings was by name continued in office, with powers neither diminished nor enlarged, nor with any important change effected in the constitution of the Company which he served. Still Lord North was at the best lukewarm. Of the Directors very many were hostile, while the people at large continued to cherish suspicions, which, considering the care that had been taken to excite them, were neither extravagant nor unnatural. Accordingly, when Mr. Francis departed for England, with a mind inflamed rather than softened by the issues of his personal quarrel, Mr. Hastings felt that the dangers which menaced his own reputation and honour were largely increased. He, therefore,

determined to send over a person to whom his entire confidence should be given, and who, appearing in London as his avowed and accredited agent, might have always at hand a body of facts wherewith to refute the calumnies, of whatever nature they might be, with which his public and private character should be assailed.

I have elsewhere explained that this delicate trust was confided to Major John Scott, who, arriving in London towards the close of 1781, watched, during four whole years, with exceeding care over the interests of his principal. Happily for me the correspondence between these gentlemen has been preserved; and I shall not hesitate, as often as occasion may require, to make use of it.

Though the minister professed at this time to be friendly, and his secretary, Mr. Robinson, talked of a peerage, there were various circumstances which militated against Mr. Hastings both in the House of Commons and in the Court of Directors. By the former body the appointment of Sir Elijah Impey to be head of the Adawlut Courts was regarded as a flagrant job. Mr. Burke in particular, who was in close communication with Mr. Francis, inveighed vehemently against the arrangement, and found ready listeners among many, who—by what principle swayed it is not my busi-

ness to determine—seemed, like Sir Robert Walpole, to believe that all men have their prices. To be sure, Mr. Hastings had his defenders both in the House of Commons and elsewhere, conspicuous among whom were his old friends General Caillaud and Mr. Pechell,—Lord Mansfield, Lord Stormont, Lord Thurlow, and Sir Gilbert Elliott. Yet Lord North, while he avowed a conviction that the motives which swayed the Governor-general were pure, refused to stand forward as his advocate. Again, the Directors were furious, as well on this account as because he had presumed to remove from their situations certain personal favourites of their own, among whom Mr. Fowke and Mr. Bristow deserve especially to be enumerated—so petty were the grounds on which the representatives of the East India Company judged it not unworthy of the high office which they held to array themselves against the man who for nearly thirty years had served them faithfully, and whose services, more than those of any other individual on record, had tended to secure to them and their constituents the rank which they still held as an independent and a ruling body. On the other hand, the King exhibited, by his cordial reception of Major Scott, a friendly feeling towards Major Scott's employer. Lord Mansfield, too, was particularly kind, often expressing his anxiety that the powers of one who knew so well how to wield them, might be enlarged;

while Mr. Francis, however busy and unscrupulous, met, except from Mr. Burke, a reception the reverse of flattering in almost all influential quarters. The results were, that Mr. Scott's early letters represent his client's cause as flourishing, even while they express fears of a different issue by and bye, to be brought about rather by the timidity or indolence, than by any hostile feeling on the part of the minister.

Thus passed the month of January, 1782, in a sharp and almost universal contest, out of which, however, no consequences arose that could materially affect either the immediate situation or future prospects of Mr. Hastings. For the Court's angry letters were matters to which he had long been accustomed, and the nomination of Mr. Stables to be of the Council at Bengal, seems to have been regarded by his friends in the Direction as, at least, not injurious to his interests. In February and March, however, thicker clouds began to gather. The former of these months saw General Smith bring up the report of his committee on Sir Elijah Impey's case, in which strong language was used and heavy reflections cast on Mr. Hastings's character: the latter witnessed the sittings of the select and secret committees on India affairs, of which Mr. Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, was at the head. However the circumstance may be accounted for, it is very certain that

both these committees were conducted in a spirit of bitter hostility towards Mr. Hastings. Not content to investigate his proceedings with a microscopic eye while wielding the destinies of the Indian empire, they went out of the way to call for papers in which, with respect to his supposed resignation, they expected to find matter whereof to accuse him, and gave, as is well known, such a colouring to the whole transaction, as left it long a subject of doubt even with the unprejudiced. Meanwhile Lord North, professing to be his supporter, and avowing his conviction that the Governor-general's authority ought to be extended, either from a deficiency of moral courage or because he shrank from the labour that would attend it, abstained from introducing a measure to that effect into Parliament. Indeed Mr. Hastings's position became, by degrees, as little satisfactory as it is possible to conceive. For the very men, who were most prompt to acknowledge that by the grandeur of his schemes he had saved India, seemed, equally with the crowd, eager to discover some acts on account of which they might affix a stigma to his private character.

Lord North's administration, which had for some time previously existed only by sufferance, came, on the 16th of March, 1782, to an end. It was succeeded by a cabinet, of which the Marquis of Rockingham and the Earl of Shelburne were at the head, both, in former times, strenuous supporters

of Mr. Hastings, yet neither, as the result proved, inclined at this critical period in his career to take him by the hand. Of the good will of Lord Shelburne nobody appears, indeed, to have entertained a doubt. Mr. Dunning, also, now created Lord Ashburton, made an open avowal of his predilections, while the Marquis of Rockingham could not himself entertain personal hostility to one whom on former occasions he had patronised. But Lord Rockingham was entirely in the hands of Mr. Burke, and Mr. Burke's political opposition to Mr. Hastings had degenerated by this time into rancour. He threatened to resign office as paymaster of the forces, unless the strength of the Cabinet were put forth against his enemy; and the Cabinet, not very cordial upon any point, yielded to his violence in this. "What can we do?" was the language both of Lord Shelburne and Lord Ashburton; "we entertain the highest personal respect and regard for Mr. Hastings, but the interests of the nation are at stake, and we cannot, to save an individual, however meritorious, ruin our party and break up the government." In like manner, so fearful were private members of disturbing an order of things from which they expected much public benefit to arise, that they, too, began to grow lukewarm in his cause. Mr. Thomas Pitt, for example, afterwards one of the most earnest of his defenders, made no secret of his

motive, namely, that he could not, at a juncture so delicate, introduce disunion into the King's councils; and hence, though he should never appear in the list of Mr. Hastings's accusers, Mr. Hastings's friends must not, at that moment, look to him for support. All this amounted, as I need not explain, to a declaration of open war on the part of the Cabinet and the legislature, and an election of Directors happening to take place while the feeling was at its height, the influence of government was thrown into the scale against Mr. Hastings, and greatly prevailed.

Time passed, and on the 15th of April the Lord Advocate, Dundas, delivered his famous speech, in which Mr. Hastings's most conspicuous acts of government were one by one condemned; from the withdrawal of the Mogul tribute to the proposed Dutch treaty. Mr. Dundas was supported by Mr. Burke, who, on each fresh occasion, seemed to go beyond his former display of violence; and these, carrying the passions or the fears of the House along with them, proposed that an entire change should be effected in the constitution of the East India Company. It is worthy of remark, too, that leave was sought for and obtained, to bring in a bill for the accomplishment of this purpose, without one tittle of the evidence on which the Committees professed to have grounded their report having been put into the hands of members. Now there was such

flagrant injustice in this; it savoured so completely of a determination to legislate, not for the correction of any acknowledged evil but for the sheer purpose of throwing patronage into the hands of the minister, that Mr. Hastings's friends, whose activity was sleepless, gained rather than lost by the proceeding. Major Scott, acting under the advice of Mr. Sulivan, importuned not only the Lord Advocate himself, but a majority of the members on both sides of the House, and carried his point without any great difficulty, so far, that the bringing in of the bill was deferred. Meanwhile a Court of Proprietors having been summoned, in order to pass a vote of thanks to Sir Eyre Coote and Sir Edward Hughes, advantage was taken of the opportunity, and an allusion being made to Mr. Hastings's great and distinguished services, a burst of enthusiastic cheering followed. So far, then, they who took the liveliest interest in his concerns, received comfort from the conviction, that there was at least one body in the kingdom which had not swerved from its old opinions. And men felt, that, should matters be pushed to an extremity, in the Court of Proprietors, if no where else, Mr. Hastings was sure of finding support.

The devices resorted to by the enemies both of Mr. Hastings and the Company to blacken the character of the one and bring the other into dis-

repute, were as full of art as their zeal in turning the impression to account was indefatigable. In Parliament Mr. Hastings was described as a man of boundless ambition; arbitrary, extravagant, cruel, yet possessed of talents so commanding that the authorities whom he affected to serve could neither remove nor restrain him. Out of Parliament, again, he was spoken of as the most mercenary and heartless monster of his age, whose private fortune already exceeded a million sterling, and who thought nothing of an expenditure of five hundred thousand pounds, or more, so long as he could purchase by it the support of senators as venal as they were needy. It is past dispute, moreover, that though answered and refuted both within doors and without, these and similar calumnies worked upon the public mind; more especially when it was found that the Court of Directors, of whose capability of judging aright the public entertained a very mistaken idea, were against him. Still his party was strong, especially in the rank, station, intelligence, and personal conduct of the individuals composing it. Nay, in the Government itself, notwithstanding the bondage under which Burke's vehemence brought it, a majority was with him; insomuch, that while anticipating his fall, both Lord Ashburton and Colonel Barrie declared that his only fault lay in this, that his abilities were of an order too lofty to be understood, or rightly appre-

ciated by his employers. So also Lord Shelburne and the Chancellor professed themselves entirely satisfied even with the much censured arrangement into which he had entered with the Chief Justice, and would have gladly put a stop to further proceedings in the matter, had their influence been equal to their will. But Lord Shelburne, though powerful in the Cabinet, was in the House of Commons exceedingly weak. There Burke and Charles Fox carried every thing before them; and, for the furtherance of schemes which did not fully develope themselves till the following session, they ceased not in this to labour for the ruin of the man whom they justly regarded as the most formidable obstacle in the way of the accomplishment of their purposes.

Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox undeniably carried all before them in the House of Commons, that is to say, their declamations were feebly answered and their plans generally assented to; yet the wretched attendance on the day when Burke's forty-four resolutions were brought forward seems to imply, that the hearts of the multitude scarcely went with them. There were but twenty-six members present to vote a string of resolutions, the last of which declared, "that it was the duty of the Court of Directors to address the Crown for the removal from India of all those whom the House of Commons had censured." But such a

vote, proposed and carried under such circumstances, fell powerless to the ground. The Proprietors of East India stock immediately met, and, in a crowded Court, it was carried by an overwhelming majority, "that the Court of Directors were not bound to attend to any suggestions which might emanate from any one branch of the legislature."

In the face of this declaration on the part of the Court of Proprietors, the House of Commons could do nothing. The consideration of Mr. Hastings's affairs, and those of the Company, was, therefore, permitted to drop; nor would they have been revived again, at least for a season, had not a garbled account of the revolt of Cheyt Sing, and of all that befel at Benares, happened at this time to reach London. The story, so told as to convict Mr. Hastings of tyranny, deceit, and injustice, was taken up with great vehemence in the House. Mr. Burke became more rabid than ever; and though Lord Shelburne endeavoured for a while to stem the torrent, he was at last obliged to yield. Accordingly, on the 27th May, the Lord Advocate again appeared in the van to present a report on the Benares business. He gave notice at the same time that he should next day move for the recall of Mr. Hastings, and being supported by Mr. Burke and General Smith, the first of whom spoke, by the bye, in terms of great personal

respect of the delinquent, it was finally determined to attempt once more the attainment of their end through the Court of Directors. But Mr. Hastings's friends were not to be taken by surprise: they waited upon the Chairman, pointed out both the injustice of these proceedings, as far as the individual was affected by them, and the tendency of such votes to supersede the Charter, and requested that he would either give a pledge not to obey the wishes of the Commons, or refer the case, as he was bound to do, to the Proprietors. The Chairman, Mr. Gregory, though professing himself Mr. Hastings's friend, played but a doubtful part on the occasion. An appeal was accordingly made to the Proprietors, who met in full Court, took the matter into consideration, and once more saved, by their decision, both the Governor-general and the East India Company. After an animated debate, a large majority resolved, that "the Court of Directors be recommended not to take any steps for the removal of the Governor-general, without laying their proceedings before a General Court, to be specially called for the occasion."

Nothing could exceed the rage of Mr. Hastings's enemies when this second act of interference on the part of the Proprietors became known. Sir Adam Ferguson, a member of the secret committee, complained loudly in his place as if an

insult had been offered to the whole House of Commons, and expressed a hope that during the recess some sweeping measure would be proposed, by which the management of India might pass into more competent hands. Mr. Fox, likewise, felt exceedingly sore, and stated, that when they met again some decisive steps would certainly be taken. But it may be well, perhaps, if I permit Major Scott to tell at this juncture the tale both of his own proceedings and of the state of parties as it seemed to affect the interests of his principal.

The following letter is at least a curiosity; I think also that it is a document of some value.

From Major SCOTT.

London, Holles-street, 26th June, 1782.

My dear Sir,—On the 24th instant, a motion was made by General Smith in the House of Commons for a censure upon Sir Robert Chambers, for accepting the office of Chief Justice of Chinsurah, and it was intended to follow this with a resolution for his recall. Some debate passed, and Sir Adam Ferguson, a Scotch member, and one of the secret committee, observed, that no man could be ignorant of what had passed the other day at a Court of Proprietors, or of the indignity with which the resolution of the House of Commons had been treated; that he had the honour to be nominated a member of the secret committee; that their proceedings, which were very voluminous, had been laid before the House; that various resolutions, growing out of those reports, had been voted; but that now, if these resolutions were to be mere waste paper, the laborious researches of the secret committee, instead of doing good, would be attended

with the most mischievous effects; that the present sessions was so far advanced, that nothing decisive could be done; but he earnestly conjured His Majesty's ministers to turn their thoughts to this important subject during the recess, and to have a fixed and permanent system adopted early in the next session. I was in the gallery at the time: Charles Fox got up and observed, that he well knew the proceedings to which the baronet had alluded, and that, late as it was in the sessions, something undoubtedly must be done by the House upon that subject; and so the matter passed off.

This is Wednesday, and Monday the House adjourns until the Lords are ready, and then the Parliament is to be prorogued; a dissolution of it will in all probability soon follow.

Whether, in the present temper of the people, or disunited as the ministry undoubtedly are, they will attempt so strong a measure as bringing in a Bill to deprive the East India Company of their chartered rights, is a matter of very great doubt with me. Sir Robert Palk, and others with whom I have conversed, say that they certainly will not; but I do hear from other quarters that it is absolutely fixed and determined that Lord Cornwallis shall succeed you, and that they depend upon the popularity of his character, to reconcile the Proprietors to a measure certainly harsh and unjustifiable.

We have fairly knocked up Smith and Francis, and whenever you do come away, my dear Sir, it will surely be to your honour, that a man of the highest rank almost in this country is pitched upon to succeed you. That Smith or Francis would have been the man I have not a doubt, had we not fully and clearly explained their characters to the public: and in my opinion, it is not the mere matter of being removed

from Bengal that you are so solicitous about, but it is that your character might be rescued from those base attacks which (as was foretold) have been made upon it. All men in this country are now sensible that you confer an obligation upon the Company by remaining in Bengal, not that the station is an eligible one to yourself—it is certainly a point of honour with you neither to be bullied nor cajoled out of office. Both have been long and ineffectually tried.

In a few words, my dear Sir, I will recapitulate hat has passed since my arrival in London on the 17th December, 1781. The ministry were at that time so firmly fixed, and the present men so personally obnoxious to the King, that there appeared no prospect of a change; Lord North, merely to employ some troubled spirits, had consented to establish two committees, a secret and select: they were sitting on my arrival, and their principal aim was to deprive you of the government of Bengal. The minister professed his determination to support you in unequivocal terms; upon that principle he avowedly sent out both Mr. Macpherson and Mr. Stables. Lord Hillsborough professed an esteem for you, and Lord Stormont a very sincere personal friendship; so did Lord Mansfield, who had at that time great weight; Lord Bathurst and the Chancellor were also your professed friends, the former very much so. To a settled determination of the then ministry to support you, I attribute the extraordinary gracious reception I had the honour to meet with from His Majesty; perhaps Lord North, perfectly indifferent to the personal abuse that has been heaped upon himself, thought that provided you kept your station in India it was of no consequence what was said of your administration. Francis arrived a month before me, big with resentment, disappointment, spleen, and envy; he flew to

the Directors with information, carefully arranged during a long voyage. Not being so well received there, or by the ministers as his vanity induced him to expect, he threw himself into the arms of Mr. Burke, the select committee, and the opposition.

I had the good fortune completely to destroy his little remaining credit at the India House, and to expose his misrepresentations. At the west end of the town all went well, and you would have been supported as vigorously as it was in the nature of Lord North to support any man. His Lordship, with wit, knowledge, integrity, and abilities equal to any of his successors, was certainly so indolent, as to be the worst minister for the public this country has ever had. An unexpected change took place. In the moment of desperation almost, the opposition, by the desertion of the Tory country gentlemen (a most contemptible set of beings to be sure) from Lord North, succeeded. The men who came in had professed themselves your friends when the ministry persecuted you so unjustifiably, but the moment there was an appearance of their doing justice to your merits, you lost your popularity with these people. At this moment the two committees came forward with their reports. Anxious to pay court to the new people, all their venom was pointed at you; Smith and Burke attacked your interior government and the Lord Advocate your politics. Few men in the House of Commons understand anything of India matters, but many of them wish for appointments in that country. The old ministry, willing to avoid a storm, retreated to the country, and whatever was proposed was carried at once. Under these circumstances, however, we made a noble stand; we drove the committees from all their ground as far as reason and unanswerable arguments could have effect upon a popular assembly. We drove them to the necessity of

attempting to do that by trick which they could not accomplish without, and we have since had the good fortune, aided by the astonishing weight of your personal character, even to render their trick ineffectual. I should rather say, my dear Sir, that it was the weight of your personal character which did the business, and that all that was required from us was industry, zeal, and attachment. This is a short account of the transactions of the last six months, in that time even the most sanguine of your friends have repeatedly given the cause up as desperate. My former letter will tell you all the hopes and fears by which we were at times actuated, until we obtained the late explicit declaration of the Court of Proprietors in your favour. This, indeed, was so strong that nothing but a violent act of power can now shake you. The inquiry carrying on at the India House is, perhaps, the greatest farce that ever was practised by a public body, and as such shall be exposed at a proper time. The two chairs are against you, and they bring forward papers which may tend to criminate you, that is, to justify them in proposing your removal. Now they are got to the treaty with the Ranna of Gohud; and judging from a paragraph in the Swallow's letter, that the Ranna had behaved unfaithfully, they want to pass a censure on the original treaty, although the capture of Gualior at a most critical time was the consequence of it. They mean also to lay great stress upon the contract granted to Auriol for supplying the Carnatic with rice, although Lord Macartney speaks in the warmest terms of praise of the very ample and effectual relief afforded him from Bengal. How much, my dear Sir, must these men be pushed to find out matter against you, when they descend to such trivial occurrences. I met Gregory at the House of Commons two days ago, and had a very long conversation with him. He affected to

lament that we had called a Court of Proprietors—perhaps he did so in reality—and said it would compel His Majesty's ministers to adopt a tone of severity which perhaps they would not otherwise have thought of. I told Gregory that I did not conceive any thing could be more honourable for you than the result of that meeting. The Proprietors were your constituents, and in a very full assembly of them justice had been done to your character; that to recal you against the sense of your constituents would not be to disgrace you, and that your honour, not your station, was, I was clear, the point you were most anxious to secure.

June 28th. The season is now so very far advanced, and the ministry are so divided amongst themselves, and the Marquis of Rockingham so dangerously ill, that I think the Houses of Parliament will be up before any thing can possibly be done, and the gentlemen who composed the secret and select committees, finding it to be the determined sense of a great majority of the Proprietors, that none of them shall be permitted to go out to Bengal, are now grown very lukewarm in the prosecution of this business. Mr. Burke, too, has lost his popularity, and the unworthy motives by which he was actuated in his illiberal persecution are now very fully understood. Nothing can long be certain in this country, but, to judge from present appearances, I should think you will be left in the undisturbed possession of your government for some time longer. Yet, my dear Sir, how greatly inadequate is that to what you have a right to expect. No support—no confidence—no communication with the confidential servants of His Majesty, and a resolution of the Commons remaining upon their journals as unjust, in point of fact, as it is illiberal in expression. I hope to God you will not suffer this resolution to give you uneasiness. Consider it, as it really is, the work of a party, and be

assured, my dear Sir, all good and impartial men will join with that respectable body of Proprietors, who are determined to defend you against the violence, the injustice, and the folly of a small part of that branch of the Legislature, or to give up their charter. The shameful manner in which those resolutions did pass, the evidence that your greatest enemies so unwillingly bore to your abilities and integrity at the very time they accused you of sacrificing the national honour, have rendered their votes a public jest, I do assure you. Many of your friends and the friends of the public are exceedingly uneasy lest, in consequence of what has happened, you should quit the government in disgust, but they earnestly hope you will remain on every account, public as well as private. Never man, I assure you, obtained such a triumph as you have done, and let me again tell you what Lord Mansfield told me yesterday, that beyond all doubt you were the most wonderful man of the age. He earnestly wishes you may not think of giving up the government.

Mr. Berrie carries for you all the material newspapers of the last two months, and some pamphlets. I suppose Mr. Macintosh's infamous letters will find their way to India; they are held in the utmost contempt here. I believe I have now related everything of consequence. Lord Shelburne still keeps the same distance and reserve. General Smith, as you will see by the papers, has put off his motion respecting Sir Robert Chambers's recall until the next sessions. The friends of Sir Elijah Impey will doubtless take advantage of this. I have inquired very particularly, but I do not find that the order for Sir Elijah's recall is yet gone out; some of the wisest and the best men in England say, that Sir Elijah's appointment was one of the most meritorious acts of your government. This is Saturday, Monday without fail Mr. Berrie goes;

I shall write a few lines and send that day's paper. I remain, with the warmest sentiments of respect, gratitude, and affection, my dear Sir, your much obliged and faithful humble servant.

P.S. Sunday 30th June. I am this moment come from Sir Robert Palk, who will send you a short letter. He saw Lord Ashburton on Friday; his Lordship lamented most feelingly the unhappy situation of this country at present, and the infatuation of a part of the present ministry, who would at once overset our establishments in India without having made any provision for their future government. If his Lordship can be depended upon, Lord Shelburne, in whose department India is, has not concurred in any of the late measures, nor will he without great difficulty give you up; but, my dear Sir, surely you have a right to expect support and cordial support too. I read that part of my instructions to Sir Robert, in which you say, that if you are not supported from home you shall deem yourself freed from all obligation to remain in the service. This alarmed him excessively, for he looks upon it, so does every rational man in England, that if you quit Bengal, India will be lost. Charles Fox on Friday told the House, that he was astonished at the conduct of the Directors and Proprietors—that he hoped they would reconsider their late resolutions, and not act in opposition to a vote of the House of Commons; but, if they did, he pledged himself to bring India affairs before the House early in the next session. Such violent, such ridiculous language will only irritate the Proprietors the more, and you may be assured, my dear Sir, they never will be bullied out of their rights, nor will they consent to remove you to please a pitiful faction in the ministry. What I dread is, that you will not be persuaded to remain. This

sacrifice of your feelings, however, the virtuous, independent people of England hope and expect you will make in return for their support; and perhaps in the next session of Parliament, or in a new one, the members in a full House will be as ready to do you justice as fifty-six of them were to condemn you unheard. The present ministry is made up of such discordant parts, that they cannot hold much longer together. Our public affairs are yet in a very ticklish situation: Rodney's success in the West Indies has saved us from ruin there; but the Americans will not treat separately. The Dutch are obstinate, and we are obliged to abandon the North Seas in order to send Lord Howe out in force to meet the combined fleets, who are now in the chops of the Channel. His Lordship will have thirty-two sail of the line to encounter thirty-eight, and I hope he will fight them at all events.

Enclosed is a copy of my letter to Lord Shelburne, which I hope will meet your approbation. Although I most sincerely hope that you do not, or will not, think of giving up the government after the cordial support which you have received from the Proprietors, yet, my dear Sir, as you have directed me to make your sentiments fully known, I thought I could not with propriety withhold them from Lord Shelburne. Mr. Berrie goes early to-morrow, but I shall write to him by Friday's post to Venice, which will be as late accounts as you can possibly receive from Europe. I am just come in from Mr. Sulivan, who is in the country. He is tolerably well, but his eyes are so bad he cannot write himself. Enclosed is his note to me for your perusal and for the satisfaction of Mr. Stephen Sulivan. The ships are to be despatched this week; I shall send copies of all my letters by them.

The event of which Major Scott speaks as of probable occurrence came to pass not long after the preceding letter was despatched. On the 3rd of July 1782, the Marquis of Rockingham died, and he was succeeded in the office of Prime Minister by the Earl of Shelburne. It is well known that of this appointment, the immediate result was the secession from the Cabinet of the entire Rockingham party, whose dislike to the politics of their avowed rivals, the Tories, proved in the end to be far less influential with them, than their personal jealousy of the new premier. Yet some, at least, of the faction were not without plausible excuses for their conduct. Mr. Fox, for example, declared, that he could not support Lord Shelburne, because his Lordship would not consent to recall Mr. Hastings from India, while Mr. Burke, though not of the Cabinet, held the same language, and gave up his place as Paymaster-general of the Forces. At the India House, on the other hand, a belief that Mr. Hastings was about to receive the countenance of the government operated powerfully in his favour. His enemies became more cautious, his friends more active as well as more bold ; indeed the universal feeling subsided into one of alarm, lest he should have already taken offence at the tone of the Court's letters, and resigned: for it is a remarkable fact, that the most rancorous of his opponents could never

divest themselves of the feeling of respect, which commanding talents are sure to exact, even from those who may distrust the particular mode of their application. With respect, again, to his supporters in what may be termed private life, they were greatly elated by so favourable a change in his position. Lord Mansfield, in particular, was loud in his praises, pronouncing him to be by far the most remarkable man of the age, and declaring that he, more than any other individual in the kingdom, had been the cause of the overthrow of the Rockingham Administration. Yet the progress of a little time sufficed to prove, that these appearances of triumph were unreal.

Lord Shelburne, in spite of his own good intentions and the hearty support of the King, never possessed influence enough to carry on the Government. Even on the India question he was so weak, that a change, at least of men, became necessary; for a change of men implied the control over a very valuable patronage, and never did minister more stand in need of patronage than he. While, therefore, he expressed himself warmly in favour of Mr. Hastings to his friends, he did not conceal from them that a new Governor-general must be appointed, assuring them however, that as the appointment would be conferred only on a nobleman of the highest rank, so should all the circumstances attending Mr. Hastings's recall be

managed with the most anxious regard to his honour and convenience. Accordingly, in the month of August, Mr. Smith, the Company's solicitor, made known to Major Scott certain resolutions which were, he said, to be submitted to the Court of Directors, and to which he trusted that Major Scott would offer no opposition. I am not very willing to go on with this history except in the words of one who himself played a part in it. I therefore transcribe the following:—

Major Scott to Warren Hastings.

London, 29th August, 1782.

My dear Sir,—Yesterday I closed what I suppose will be my last despatches by these ships; but lest another delay should arise in their sailing, I now sit down to give you a full account of what has occurred lately.

My last letter is dated the 11th of August; many have been written since, but of them I could keep no copies, as they were despatched from time to time, at the India House, on a supposition that they would barely arrive before the departure of the packet. Since Mr. Berrie left London, which was on the 1st July, I have written seven letters to you overland; if one of the seven arrive safe, I shall be perfectly satisfied. The two last were to advise you of the extraordinary resolutions which had been shown to me by Mr. Smith, the Company's solicitor. They have now been made so public at the India House, that it is needless to write them over to you in the secret manner I did yesterday; I will therefore send you the business fully by these ships in case of accident.

On Thursday last, at the election of a director in the

room of Mr. Gregory, which we carried for Mr. Bosanquet, Mr. Smith, the Company's solicitor, took me aside, and told me, after having asked if I had heard anything further of your removal, that he had been desired by some of the leading Directors to draw out certain resolutions, which he then read to me, and as nearly as I can recollect, they are as follows: —

Resolved, That Warren Hastings, Esq., Governor-general of Bengal, hath performed many very great and meritorious services to this Company; that in no one act of his government hath he been actuated by a corrupt motive, nor is he suspected of peculation; but it is resolved by this Court, that Warren Hastings, Esq., hath formed wrong opinions upon points of great political importance, and that he hath acted upon those opinions so as to bring great distress upon this Company. It is therefore resolved, that he be removed from the government of Bengal; such removal to take place, on or before the departure of the last ship of the season after these advices shall arrive in Bengal. That E. Wheler, and T. Macpherson, Esq., having concurred in opinion with the said Warren Hastings, Esq., be also removed, and that Sir Eyre Coote, having applied for a successor, be also removed.

That, as it is necessary that the office of Governor-general of Bengal should be filled by a person of rank and consequence, be appointed Governor-general. That it be recommended earnestly to the said Warren Hastings, Esq., to give to his successor every information which his great experience enables him to do. That be appointed to succeed Messrs. Wheler, Macpherson, and Sir Eyre Coote.

When I had read this paper, Mr. Smith earnestly conjured me not to give to it any opposition, but to suffer the matter to be quietly settled; if it was not, the

whole must again be brought before Parliament, when it might not be done so agreeably to you, as it would be by this mode. I told Mr. Smith that there were certain cases, in which I was not allowed to exercise my own judgment. That the instructions which I had received from you were clear, positive, and pointed, to defend your conduct, as far as I know of it, and to do no act whatever that might appear like a resignation of the government for you; That the proprietors were pledged to protect you, until some delinquency was proved against you, which I was clear would never be; That I certainly should oppose these resolutions being carried, both with the Directors and in the Court of Proprietors; That I had sent a copy of part of my instructions to Lord Shelburne, and if his Lordship would be good enough to reperuse them, he would see I could not possibly act otherwise than I meant to do. Smith said much more to convince me it would not be for your interest to have the matter brought again before Parliament. I said that the more your conduct was publicly discussed, the higher would it exalt your character.

I have since seen Mr. Sulivan, who very highly approves of my answer to Mr. Smith. His opinion is, that Lord Shelburne, afraid of Fox and Burke bringing India affairs before the House of Commons, wishes to settle everything before the meeting of Parliament; and again, the patronage annexed to so many appointments in Bengal is both tempting and advantageous to his interests: but Mr. Sulivan is clear nothing can be done to hurt you, provided the proprietors stand by us, which we have not the smallest reason to doubt.

These resolutions have been read by some of the Directors, but Sir Henry Fletcher, the Chairman, assures me he has not seen them, nor were they drawn up by his desire, or the desire of the deputy. He further assures me upon his honour, that no measures whatever

will be proposed, except in a full Court of Directors; and that if any resolutions tending to your removal should at any time pass, very sufficient notice would be given before a General Court was called, without whose approbation, as he observed, I well knew, nothing which the Directors could do would be of any consequence.

Thus, my dear Sir, this matter now rests. I confess what gives me great uneasiness is this:—you have been most basely, most infamously used; yet you are placed in that very peculiar and delicate situation, that however you may resent the conduct of the Directors, and some part of the ministry, you are precluded from quitting the chair. I earnesly wish you to be placed in that situation that you may be able to quit with honour if you choose it; but was I to say too much upon this subject, it might be construed into an intention of entering into a compromise. I have done what appeared to me the best, which is to make that part of your instructions public to the Directors, which you desired me to communicate without reserve, and this I have done without a comment.

While our wise men at home are differing upon trifles, I almost tremble when I reflect upon the state of our affairs in India. An express overland has brought us an account of the landing of the French troops at Porto Novo. To think of removing the only man who can preserve India at such a crisis is surely treason to the state.

My former letters, I believe, contain everything that I had to say. This is a time of the year when no business is done of any consequence. Our illiberal opponent Burke is sunk, never, I hope, to rise again. Mr. Fox, who is an astonishing man, keeps perfectly quiet during the recess.

There is again some faint hopes of peace, but if it

should take place, it must be upon the most disgraceful terms.

I shall continue writing to you overland once a fortnight, and when anything of moment happens, I will send a messenger express.

It would appear from this letter, first, that the resolutions quoted did not emanate either from the Directors in their individual capacity, or from the Company; and next, that to get them passed was a manœuvre on the part of Lord Shelburne, who, desirous of strengthening his own hands, was willing to cover Mr. Hastings's retreat by the same measure which should give to himself a large increase of patronage. I am not sure that the proceeding deserves much praise on the ground of candour; but at least there was no hostility about it; and it is curious enough, that it should have been proposed and rejected at a time when a question far more delicate, because affecting Mr. Hastings's private character, was under discussion. For his account of the Nabob's present had not long reached the India House, and among both Directors and Proprietors his desire to appropriate the amount to his own use was treated at least with delicacy. Indeed I may go further than this. Many, to whom the real state of his private affairs was known, expressed a wish to accede to the proposal; and of these there were some who, on all questions of general policy, stood

opposed to him. Yet the body of persons who one by one could thus indulge their better feelings towards the man, became, so soon as they met in Court, vehement in their condemnation of the Governor. They could not forgive his open and avowed contempt of their orders, and insisted, in a despatch written under the influence of that feeling, that not only Messrs. Fowke and Bristow should be reinstated in their offices, but that Cheyt Sing himself should be restored.

Though Mr. Smith's propositions were by Mr. Hastings's friends rejected, Lord Shelburne did not for a moment abandon his design, of relieving, for he would not call it superseding, the whole of the existing government of Bengal. The individual, moreover, on whom he fixed his choice as a becoming successor to Mr. Hastings was in every respect so competent in the public estimation, that he had the less hesitation in renewing his overtures; and Lord Cornwallis was openly named as the Governor-general elect. Nevertheless, Mr. Hastings's friends would not enter into any compromise in the matter. If indeed the measure should be brought into Parliament, they might or might not oppose it, according to the form which it should assume; but they would be no parties to an arrangement which, telling against Mr. Hastings's credit, would at the same time exhibit him in the light of one so purely selfish as to fail of taking

into account the probable wishes of his best and steadiest supporters, the great body of the Proprietors. But Mr. Hastings's friends did more than this. In the Direction, the instructions for Messrs. Fowke and Bristow's reinstatement had been carried by only fourteen votes against ten. The minority wrote to desire that he would pay no attention to the order, while Major Scott informed him, on the authority of Lord Mansfield, that as the Directors had no right to command the restoration of Cheyt Sing at Benares, so Mr. Hastings would be acting illegally if he paid the slightest regard to such command.

In this manner the recess wore itself out, the minister renewing from time to time his overtures, and more than once hinting at a peerage, as the price of Mr. Hastings's acquiescence in his wishes. Meanwhile, Mr. Hastings's friends steadily refused to compromise, in any degree, the public or private character of the Governor-general. No decisive steps had therefore been taken, when, on the 5th of December, the Houses met, and listened to a speech from the throne, of which a large portion was devoted to the affairs of India. Mr. Dundas, who had joined Lord Shelburne's government, as Treasurer to the Navy, moved on the 16th, that the resolutions of the 28th of May preceding should be read; and the motion being complied with, he went on to animadvert in strong language upon the

spirit of opposition which had been displayed by the Proprietors. He ended by giving notice, that after Christmas he should call upon the House to take the matter into consideration; and requested in the meanwhile that copies of the late proceedings at the India House might be laid upon the table.

The motion of Mr. Dundas for copies of the Court's proceedings was not resisted. Both Governor Johnstone, however, and Mr. T. Pitt, reprobated the terms in which he had spoken of the Court of Proprietors, whose right it was, secured to them by Act of Parliament, to support their own Governor, and who had only exercised that right when they refused to obey the mandate of the House, by petitioning the Crown for Mr. Hastings's recall. Then rose Mr. Fox to denounce Mr. Hastings as a great public delinquent, a proceeding which called up Governor Johnstone again, by whom Mr. Fox was referred to his own speech delivered in the previous May, in which Mr. Hastings's qualities both of head and heart had been very tenderly handled. But I write of times when less even than at present men submitted to the restraints of consistency and good faith; and so Mr. Fox, strong in the support which his party was prepared to give, took of Mr. Johnstone's reference no notice whatever. Yet Mr. Fox's language was tame when compared with that of Mr. Burke. Offensive as he had been on

many previous occasions, his feelings seemed on the present to hurry him beyond all self-control; indeed his charges were so grave, so heavy, and so fiercely adduced, that they excited the indignation, much more than they carried the sympathies of his audience along with them. Mr. T. Pitt, in particular, dared the speaker to the proof, when Mr. Hastings might have an opportunity of meeting him face to face; while Mr. Burke, probably without reflecting on the serious nature of the proceeding, pledged himself that Mr. Pitt's desire should be fulfilled to the letter. Finally, the proposer of the original motion closed the debate by declaring that he was aware of no criminal proceedings on the part of Mr. Hastings, neither was it his intention to bring any criminal charge against him; but for political reasons he should do his best to remove him from his station, and bring in, at a convenient season, a bill for that, and for other necessary purposes.

Even from this imperfect sketch of the manner in which the ex-ministers conducted themselves, it will be seen, that their hostility to Mr. Hastings's views partook largely of personal hatred to himself, —and that there was no proceeding, however uncandid or unfair, in which they would scruple to embark, provided it held out a prospect of crushing him. Not content with denouncing him in their speeches, the members of the two committees,—

packed tribunals, if ever such there were,—made every conceivable effort to rake together a body of evidence, such as might cover him with disgrace, and render him odious to the English people. No sooner were they informed of the arrival of persons who entertained, or were supposed to entertain, a grudge against Mr. Hastings, than they issued summonses for them to attend ; and they had scarce the decency to hide their chagrin as often as the statements of these persons contradicted their own anticipations. Take the following case as a specimen of the temper in which such matters were arranged :—

"Captain Rayne," (writes one of Mr. Hastings's correspondents,) "the nephew of Colonel Champion, came to England with Fairfax in the Nancy. Smith (General Smith, chairman of one of the committees) knew, of course, of Champion's conduct towards you, and naturally supposed he should find the nephew your enemy, and ready to say what he would wish him to declare. In this persuasion he sent for Rayne to his house, and examined him relative to the Benares business, having understood that he had been there soon after the rebellion. Rayne, like a man of honour, declared what was strictly true; assured the General that there never was a man more detested and despised in his zemindarry than Cheit Sing; that he was, in fact, supported merely by the countenance of the English; that his behaviour, previous to your putting him under an arrest, had been to the highest degree contumacious; that he had undoubtedly formed a design to throw off the English Government altogether; that this was prevented by your journey to Benares; that the rebellion was actually owing to an accident; that

in one month the country was effectually reconquered, and in the most perfect tranquillity; that it had continued so ever since; that the natives were highly pleased with the change, having ever held Cheit Sing in the utmost contempt and abhorrence; that you, so far from having forfeited the confidence of the natives, enjoyed it in the highest degree; and that he could not possibly offer a stronger proof of it, than Moodajee Sindia's having actually signed the peace at the moment when, if he had determined to carry on the war, and to assist Cheit Sing, he had a prospect of doing so with success; but that, from his confidence in the character of Mr. Hastings, he had determined to seek our friendship and alliance. That the Vizier had given such proofs of fidelity and attachment at the moment of danger as must effectually prove his confidence in, and regard for Mr. Hastings; and he had no doubt but that this would increase every day.


"Smith heard him with evident marks of impatience and disappointment, said he must be mistaken, and as this evidence does not answer his purpose, he has never seen him since; but I shall take care he appears before the Select Committee."

It is not worth while to pursue these details any farther. In the Houses of Parliament, in the Court of Directors, among members of the Cabinet, and throughout almost every circle of society, Hastings, his merits and demerits, constituted a standing topic of discussion. For if his enemies were vindictive, his friends were not slothful; and the latter could boast of, at least, as large a share of talent as the former. Moreover, the feelings of the House of Lords were decidedly with him, as was shown by the reception that was given to Lord

Walsingham's speech, who, just before the recess, spoke largely in commendation of Mr. Hastings's policy, and attributed to him the chief merit of Sir Eyre Coote's successes in the Carnatic. Still his position was a very critical one, inasmuch as the minister either could not or would not support him; and the best and ablest of his friends, feeling it to be such, devoted the interval between the prorogation and the reassembling of Parliament to fresh negociations. I subjoin Major Scott's account of these, as being at once more graphic and more full than any which I could give:—

"On the 1st of January," he writes, "I saw (Governor) Johnstone at the drawing-room, who told me that Whitshed Keene, Lord North's relation, had met him as he was going to court and begged to see him on particular business respecting Mr. Hastings. After the drawing-room, Johnstone desired me to accompany him, introduced me to Mr. Keene, and told him that whatever passed on the subject of Mr. Hastings would, of course, be communicated to me by him, and therefore he thought it was best we should meet at once.

"Keene seemed confused and very shy, said he had no authority from Lord Cornwallis or Lord North to propose anything; at the same time he declared that, as a member of the state, he wished some mode might be fallen upon to prevent the removal of Mr. Hastings; that these were Lord North's sentiments, too; that the situation of India was very critical, and there was a strong party against Mr. Hastings, yet his cause certainly gained ground every day; that he had the strongest reasons for believing the sentiments of Lord Shel-



burne to be as friendly as those of Lord North, but that both were desirous of Lord Cornwallis being hereafter the Governor-general of Bengal; that he had accidentally seen a gentleman last night at the opera, who is in the confidence of Lord Cornwallis, and from him he understood that Mr. Hastings's friends would be perfectly satisfied provided he was permitted to remain three or four months in the chair after Lord Cornwallis should arrive there. If this was the case, Mr. Keene thought there was but one more point to settle, namely, to secure a decent retreat for the Lord Advocate, who had pledged himself to bring in a Bill; and this he conceived Lord Cornwallis would be able to effect.

"I told Mr. Keene I was extremely sorry to find that my candid declarations, both to Lord Cornwallis and Major Ross, had been so much mistaken. Every man in the kingdom who had read the reports, knew that I not only had no authority, either directly or indirectly, under any circumstances whatever, to resign the Government for Mr. Hastings, but that he had communicated this resolution both to the Directors and the Ministers; that therefore all I could offer was matter of opinion, by which Mr. Hastings was not bound in the slightest degree. I had said, and I again repeated, that the idea industriously thrown out (and it had made an impression upon Lord North), that Mr. Hastings, if left to himself, would never quit Bengal, was totally false. I would stake my life that Mr. Hastings wished to come home when he could do so with honour, and without endangering the safety of India; that I was equally certain Mr. Hastings never wished to embarrass his Majesty's Government, or to have his cause turned to the purposes of faction or party; that, convinced in my own mind of the truth of the assertion, I had said it was my firm opinion Mr. Hastings would retire a few

months after Lord Cornwallis's arrival; but then it was mere matter of opinion;—as such I mentioned it, declaring, at the same time, that nothing I had said or might say was in the slightest degree binding upon Mr. Hastings.

"Johnstone then spoke and said, if Mr. Keene had nothing to propose, it was wrong in me to open myself so much as I had done; for if we were to be at variance, where was the necessity of explanations?

"Johnstone added, he knew Lord Shelburne's sentiments perfectly well; that they were in favour of Mr. Hastings, but that, afraid of the Rockingham party in the Cabinet, he had disguised his real sentiments, and was taking a hostile part against the man whose cause he wished to support; that the friends of Mr. Hastings had no fears; they knew well that the overtures which had been indirectly made from several quarters were occasioned by an apprehension on the part of Government that they would be foiled in their attempts to remove the Governor-general by Bill; that, in short, as I had already stated to Lord Cornwallis and Major Ross, there was but one way of settling the business that we could agree to; this was, that his Lordship should go out second in Council and Commander-in-Chief, and that the Governor-general should resign whenever he thought proper. Our conference ended here; and on our return to the drawing-room, Mr. Orde, Lord Shelburne's secretary, spoke to Johnstone upon the same subject. His answer was the same, and he expressed the same confidence of success to our cause, provided it was carried any further by the minister.

"On my return home, I found a letter from General Caillaud, in which he enclosed a copy of one from Lord Clarendon to him. This nobleman has invariably professed the utmost respect and veneration for your character. He laments the present appearance of things,

says that ministers are determined upon your removal; that it may be effected in a manner exceedingly disagreeable, and that it is a point of prudence and policy to compromise before the meeting of Parliament; that though I am debarred from acting, yet Lord Ashburton or Mr. Sulivan should boldly step forward and resign for you upon honourable and advantageous stipulations.

"General Caillaud seemed to think Lord Clarendon's reasoning worth attending to, and that your situation was exceedingly critical. I replied to the General as I did to Keene, and from his answer I see he is convinced we can do nothing; but I am also clear we ought to do nothing, even if we had the power, and that no investigation can take place which will not redound most highly to your honour. I feel I act right in this business.

"The Benares business is now most effectually cleared up, and the evidence of Fairfax and Captain Rayne upon this subject when Parliament meets again, will force conviction upon the minds of all men.

"9th January.—I have just had a conversation with Sir Robert Palk relative to our present situation. He thinks with me that the matter may still be amicably adjusted, and I have convinced him there is but one way of effecting this desirable point,—by Lord Cornwallis accepting the succession, and, in the mean time, the command of the army.

"Sir Robert has not a doubt but that Lord Shelburne's sentiments are exceedingly favourable towards you; but there is so strong a party of Rockinghams in the Cabinet, that he dare not avow his real sentiments."

Meanwhile, and during the progress of the first months of 1783, a succession of events befel, of

which the general historian will be apt to say, that however discreditable they may be to the parties concerned in them, they yet teach a great moral lesson to all statesmen in all ages. With these I am no further concerned than as they bore upon the fortunes of the subject of this memoir. For whether Lord Shelburne had stayed in or gone out,—whether the coalition had brought their plans to bear or broken to pieces in the act of arranging them, he, I am inclined to think, would have been equally the sufferer. Both parties, indeed, thirsted to be put in possession of the patronage of India, and both knew that the end was to be attained only through the disgrace and ruin of the Governor-general. It, therefore, excites in us no surprise whatever to find Mr. Dundas, a member of Lord Shelburne's administration, bringing in a Bill for the reconstruction of the government of British India, one clause of which required that Mr. Hastings should be recalled, and succeeded in his office by Lord Cornwallis. As little can we wonder that a Bill, having for its objects the accomplishment of ends which the opposition professed, generally, to keep in view, should have been resisted by the same opposition with such vigour as to lead to its abandonment. The truth indeed is, that neither Lord Shelburne, nor Lord North, nor Mr. Dundas, nor Mr. Fox, took the smallest interest in the welfare either of the East India Company or the Company's Governor, and that, being equally

ready to sacrifice both in the establishment of their own political influence, they differed only in this, that they were alike unwilling that the sacrifice should be made, except for the exclusive benefit each of his own particular faction. Hence, after Mr. Dundas's bill had been lost, and the existence of the Government endangered by it, the Secret Committee continued to inquire and to report—each fresh report tending more and more to cover Mr. Hastings's name with obloquy, as well as to demonstrate the necessity of some radical change in the whole system of Indian administration. For though Mr. Francis made but little way in society, with Mr. Burke he was all-powerful, and over the proceedings of the Secret Committee Mr. Burke never ceased to exercise an overwhelming influence.

Matters had taken this shape, and the Committee were, as usual, vindicating the independence and the honour of Cheyt Sing, and deploring the cruel wrongs that had been done to the Begums, when letters arrived both from Madras and Bengal, which had no tendency to divert the tide of popular prejudice out of the channel into which it was the business of Mr. Burke and Mr. Francis to lead it. In the former, some of which proceeded from the pen of Lord Macartney himself, Mr. Hastings was described as wasting the resources of his own province, and starving the war in the Carnatic for the purpose of pressing that against the Mahrattas.

In the latter, the Mahrattas were represented as having rejected the terms offered to them, and Mr. Hastings, who communicated the intelligence, made no secret of his own satisfaction that they had done so. Now, as neither the Court of Directors nor the people of England could know the grounds on which he stood—as they were ignorant of the position of Goddard's army at the time, and knew not that a few marches more would enable him to dictate peace on his own terms in the enemy's capital, they not unnaturally leaned to the side of those who represented the Governor-general as actuated by an over-weening ambition, such as could not be satisfied except by the total overthrow of the Mahratta state and the annexation of their territory to that of the East India Company. Accordingly, the clamour against Mr. Hastings grew daily louder, the Government offered to it no opposition, and Lord North, never ceasing to *speak* as if his feelings were entirely on the side of the oppressed, *acted* like one who would not take the trouble to interfere for his protection.

Lord Shelburne's reign was by this time, however, drawing to a close. So early as the opening of the session after the Christmas recess, it was evident to all men that he could not hold his ground; for his personal adherents in the House of Commons scarcely numbered forty, and the rest who supported him, from caprice or interested motives

might at any moment desert him. One ground of security he had, to be sure, and one alone, namely, that the political opinions of Lord North and Mr. Fox were much more at variance with one another than either of them, on any given subject, could be with his; and trusting to this, he made an effort to carry on a government—but the effort availed him not. The peace which, under his auspices, England made with France and Holland, and the United States of America, gave rise in both Houses to an animated debate, upon which the minister obtained in the Lords a majority of fourteen, and in the Commons was left in a minority. I think that the following letter, besides connecting, better than any words of mine, this defeat with the progress of the Indian inquiry, is, on other and more obvious grounds, well worthy of insertion:—

From Major Scott.

London, Queen Square, Friday, 21st February, 1783.

My dear Sir,—The events since my last are most curious. God knows how the business will end! I wrote you fully overland by this night's post, and as the Dutch passes are not yet come, perhaps these ships may convey the result to you.

I will give you a detail of our late political operations, observing, however, that my worthy friend Toone, should he arrive early with you, will answer every question you can put to him to the moment of his leaving London, which was last night.

The preliminaries of the peace were debated on Monday last, in both Houses. In the House of Lords

the minister carried an address of thanks, after a violent struggle, and a debate that lasted till five in the morning. He had a very scanty majority considering the force of government in that hospital of incurables, only fourteen. Lord Shelburne spoke ably, and artfully, and in some instances falsely, for he asserted (against proof) that you had been duped by the Mahratta general Sindia, and that there was no prospect of peace with the Mahrattas.

In the Commons, Mr. Thomas Pitt opened the business. He spoke remarkably well. When he touched upon India, he said, that we were in no danger there, while so able a statesman as Mr. Hastings, and so gallant a general as Sir Eyre Coote, conducted our affairs in the cabinet and the field.

When Mr. Burke came to reply to Pitt, he flew out as he always does when India is mentioned, but so much to the dissatisfaction of the House, that not the smallest attention was paid to him. After a debate, that lasted from four in the afternoon, till eight in the morning, the motion for an address was negatived by a majority of sixteen. I shall send the complete debate by this night's coach to Portsmouth. The most extraordinary coalition took place upon this question —Lord North, Charles Fox, and the whole of the Rockingham party,—but the effects of that coalition have been extraordinary upon the minds of the people, who say to a man, that they are all rascals alike; and in this temper, Shelburne, who plays his cards well, has procured an address from the city of London to the King, (which passed with only one dissenting voice,) expressing their sincerest gratitude to His Majesty, for complying with the wishes of his people, in procuring them the inestimable blessings of peace.

Should this address be followed, as I believe it will, by the principal trading towns, Shelburne will dissolve

the Parliament. We shall know more before I close this letter to-night.

The situation of England is truly melancholy, and alarming, from this circumstance, that there is not a grain of public virtue amongst public men. Those gentlemen of large fortunes, and independent spirits, who might be expected to step forth, are either lazy, or ignorant, and with men of decayed fortunes, or with adventurers, such as Burke, politics are a trade.

In the division on Monday, Lord Shelburne had all the men of property and all the country members with him, except three. However these political vermin disagree, and quarrel amongst themselves, there is one point in which they all meet,—a desire to provide for their needy dependants in India; and though we have hitherto warded off the blow, I yet plainly perceive that the minister, whoever he may be, when the present struggle is over, must, and will, lay violent hands on the East India Company.

I see this so clearly, that I trust you will prepare for anything that may happen, being assured at the same time of this truth, that your honour they cannot hurt.

Toone will tell you all that Johnstone mentioned to us. He is strongly of opinion that Lord North's coming in will secure you, and he says John Robinson told him, before the division on Monday last, that if Lord North and Fox came in, our friends in India were safe. I saw Robinson on Sunday; he told me Lord North was highly pleased with the late accounts, and that we should see our way clearer on Tuesday. Still, my dear sir, let me repeat, be you prepared for anything that may happen. Mr. Sulivan begs me also never to send a letter without strongly stating the uncertainty of your situation.

We had a General Court yesterday, but nothing was said very particular. Johnstone observed, it was no

wonder our expenses had been enormous in India, since the French had made such vast efforts there. He added, that the French ambassador, the Marquis de Monstier, had assured him, a few days ago, that the expeditions to India this war had actually cost France above seven millions sterling; and that, however party or faction might misrepresent the conduct of English gentlemen in power in India, they had acquired immortal honour by their prodigious exertions.

February 22nd. The newspapers which I shall send to Portsmouth to night, by the coach, will give you an idea of last night's debate. Lord Shelburne has but one game to play now, and that is, to dissolve the Parliament; if he does not, the ministry must be changed next week, for it is impossible he should stand with a majority of seventeen in the House of Commons against him.

The advocate meant to bring in his India Bill, the 2nd of March;—now the scene must be altered, and you may, perhaps, my dear Sir, remain some time longer in a state of uncertainty.

25th. I believe Lord Shelburne will not have courage or influence enough to dissolve the Parliament, so that he must retire in the course of this week. The idea is, that the Duke of Portland (a cypher) is to be at the head of the Treasury; Lord John Cavendish, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord North, Privy Seal; his son, Paymaster-General; Burke, Treasurer of the Navy; and the other ministers to be fixed to-day. You will know the whole perhaps before the ships sail, but I send down every night to prevent any accident.

I came late from Mr. Sulivan's last night; Barwell was there too. They both agreed that your office was of too much consequence to the minister, for you to be allowed to retain it much longer, and they earnestly begged you would be prepared for anything that might

happen, always remembering that your honour was beyond the reach of such wretches. James Macpherson still asserts, that Lord North has taken care of you. I do not believe a syllable of it, and this I know, that the hopes of Lord Cornwallis's friends are revived again. I will write again to-morrow, and remain, my dear Sir, most faithfully and gratefully yours.

From the same.

London, Queen Square, 23rd March, 1783.

My dear Sir,—We have undergone so many changes within these few days, and are still in so unsettled a state, that I may perhaps again mislead you by my accounts, though they come from the first authority. I will give you Lord Mansfield's account to me of the progress of the negociation for a new ministry. The coalition between the house of Cavendish, Lord North, and Charles Fox, I informed you of, both by my late letters overland, and by the ships. North had agreed that our steady and upright friend, Lord Stormont, should be included in the new arrangements, as President of the Council, and a cabinet minister. This being done, he wrote to inform Lord Stormont of the transaction, and that he (Lord North) was to have a seat in the Cabinet as Warden of the Cinque Ports. Lord Stormont, in reply, said, he was much obliged to Lord North for what he had done for him entirely unsolicited, but that he must decline taking any part in an administration, in which the person with whom he professedly came in sat in the Cabinet without possessing one of the great offices of state; that his Lordship had seen the absurdity of Lord Ashburton being a cabinet minister, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and that therefore he must decline bearing a part in an administration so formed.

In consequence of Lord Stormont's refusal, and

North's friends representing to him the absurdity of his own conduct, he came forward with a fresh proposition, that he should be one of the secretaries of state, and he again wrote to Lord Stormont, and begged to know if he would then come into office with him. Lord Stormont in reply observed, that the business was now materially changed by Lord North's being in an active office, and that he would come in himself as President of the Council, and a cabinet minister. The Duke of Portland and his party consented; and I went to the drawing-room on Thursday last to see the ceremony of kissing hands; but about three o'clock on that day, the Duke of Portland wrote a letter to Lord North, in which he spoke of Lord Stormont in the warmest terms, both as a private and a public man, but in the end observed, that the gentlemen with whom he acted, did not approve of his having a seat in the Cabinet. Lord North replied by letter, that then the whole negociation was at an end, and his Grace and his friends might do as they pleased.

On Friday morning, at breakfast, Lord Mansfield told me these particulars, and added, "Hastings will yet be allowed to save India, whether the negociation is renewed or not."

The Duke of Portland and his party, however, came to their senses, and sent to tell Lord North that they complied with his wishes relative to Lord Stormont, and with some difficulty coaxed him to consent to draw with them, but this difference totally destroyed all confidence between them.

On Friday the Duke of Portland went to the King with the following arrangement:—Duke of Portland, First Lord of the Treasury; Lord John Cavendish, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Stormont, President of the Council; Lord Carlisle, Privy Seal; Lord Keppel, First Lord of the Admiralty; Lord North

and Charles Fox, Secretaries of State. These seven to form the Cabinet.

The ministry was looked upon as firmly settled. Yesterday morning, (Sunday,) the Archbishop of York called upon me; he told me the King had declined giving any answer until he had seen all the inferior arrangements. At night I saw Lord Mansfield again, and heard the same from him, and thus the business stands at this moment. Lord Mansfield told me that the King was most sincerely to be pitied; that he is as worthy, and as good a man as ever lived, and has been treated by them all in the most inhuman and barbarous manner; but the general opinion to-day is, that the majority of the House of Commons, as well as of the City of London, and the nation, is so disgusted at the infamous conduct of both parties, that if His Majesty would firmly step forward, and appoint his own ministry, he would be supported by every honest man in England. You may guess something of the temper of the times, from reading the enclosed paper of this day. The Archbishop told me yesterday that the conduct of Lord Stormont was perfectly unexceptionable throughout this business; he knew nothing of Lord North's previous negociations, and would not depart a step from his own terms. His Grace added, that he had known Lord Stormont from a boy, and that there was not a purer, or a better character in England, and I might be assured, he never would sacrifice you upon any consideration. This Lord Mansfield had told me before, and Lord Stormont has invariably expressed the greatest personal affection for you as a private gentleman, and an enthusiastic admiration of you in your public character. Of Lord Stormont we are secure, of Lord North I have my doubts, but I will relate all that concerns himself. While he was out of office, I have repeatedly seen him, and never

without having some conversation with him, or without his cracking two or three jokes (the delight of his life) with me. He was at all times particularly civil, and seemed to talk of you with pleasure and esteem. When this coalition was first on foot, Johnstone found him rather cold, and expressed his doubts to me; however he got him afterwards to be more explicit. A diabolical attempt has been made by Edmund Burke, to injure Mr. Sulivan in his election next month, which the inclosed letter from me to the proprietors fully explains from first to last. This carried our worthy old friend, Sir William James, and Mr. Woodhouse to Lord North, who received them very kindly, promised to clear up the matter, and assured them of his support in the election, and authorized them to go to John Robinson, at Sion, to take the usual steps. In consequence of this, these three gentlemen, Johnstone, and Lord Sandwich, who is most cordially our friend, went to Robinson. He entered heartily into the cause, but said he must see Lord North before he wrote letters to his friends in North's name. Lord North, agreeably to his irresolute nature, wanted then to retract, told Robinson he must talk the matter over with the Duke of Portland and his new friends, before he took any further steps. This was communicated to Lord Sandwich and Johnstone on Friday morning, who posted instantly to Lord North. He found the Duke of Portland, Fox and Burke, waiting to see his Lordship, who was denied to Johnstone, who however brushed passed the fellow into Lord North's bedchamber, where he found him. He apologised for his intrusion, but said the occasion required it, for he had a character to lose, and though he loved Lord North, he must accuse him of a positive breach of promise, if he did not boldly stand forward in support of Mr. Sulivan

and his friends. North hesitated at first, but it fortunately happened, that the negociation with the Duke of Portland, &c., was then off, as I have before related, and Johnstone had the address to convince Lord North of this truth, that if he set out, by giving up his oldest and staunchest friends, he would ruin himself for ever; and did not quit him till he got a letter from him, which was to be circular to all his friends, earnestly begging their support of Mr. Sulivan, and his list, at the next election. This is a point of the utmost consequence, as it entirely disarms Mr. Burke, and I do really think with Lord Mansfield, my dear Sir, that all will now be settled perfectly to your satisfaction.

We are totally in the dark as to the Mahratta peace, but, thank God, one point is sufficiently clear, that you have not been deceived in Sindia, and that, as far as depends on you, the peace is actually concluded. You may easily conceive the illiberality of our opponents, from this circumstance:—we have not heard from you since the 15th of April, 1782, nor from Madras, since the 9th June, but last week some letters were received from Bombay, by way of Bussorah, and in one of them, the 24th October, it is said, "all hopes of peace with the Mahrattas seems at an end." Burke and Smith went to the House of Commons, said you had been deceived by Sindia, and peace was not to be had. This report flew over the town, and gave great uneasiness to our friends, till we learnt the true state of the case,—that peace had actually been ratified in Calcutta on the 3rd of June.

When I got this news, I took care to insert it in all the papers, and Lord Mansfield observed to me upon it, "Whatever the issue may be, or whatever obstructions the people of Bombay may throw in Hastings's way, he has the sole credit of saving the Carnatic, and

breaking the power of the Mahrattas, by converting the most considerable of that nation from a bitter enemy to a cordial friend."

We impatiently wait for further advices. The Euridice has been sailing these five weeks, but kept here by the mutiny of her men; however these disturbances are tolerably well settled, and she is expected to sail immediately, so that I shall despatch this by the coach to-night to Portsmouth, and a duplicate of it overland to-morrow. Perhaps in a postscript to-morrow night I may be able to tell you something further. Our old friend Mr. Sulivan is again in perfect health and spirits; Mr. and Mrs. Woodman are so too. I mention them because they may not write by this ship. I wrote to you last night by the Johanna Maria, a Dane. Adieu, my dear Sir, and believe me ever, with the warmest sentiments of respect, gratitude, and affection, your much obliged, and faithful humble servant.

It is no business of mine to describe either the extent to which the King carried his opposition to the formation of this Cabinet, or the means that were adopted in order to overcome that opposition. Enough is done when I state that the coalition came into power; and that the friends of Hastings, though, like the country in general, they counted little on the public or private honour of the parties composing it, were led to believe that his interests would at all events be advanced by the change which had taken place in the Cabinet. They accordingly assailed Lord North with requests that he would exert his influence to obtain the erasure of the resolutions which affixed, as they

asserted, so deep and unprovoked a stain on the character of their client. But Lord North, as usual, played fast and loose; now amusing them with general professions, now evading or making light of the subject; while Mr. Burke proposed that a parliamentary commission should be appointed, and investigate on the spot the merits of the Indian Government. It is somewhat edifying to find that the persons specified as peculiarly well qualified to discharge so important yet so delicate a trust, were Mr. Philip Francis, Mr. Long, General Burgoyne, Lord Macartney, and Mr. W. Burke; of whom the first was Mr. Hastings's inveterate enemy, as well as a candidate for his office, should he be thrust out; while of the remaining four, there was not one who had not taken part in the course of the parliamentary proceedings against him.

Mr. Hastings's friends did not succeed in obtaining the end at which they aimed; neither was Mr. Burke permitted to run away with the India question altogether. In his projected commission the rest of the Cabinet withstood him; and the session wore away without any decisive step having been taken to follow up the recommendations of the ministers. For Mr. Dundas allowed his Bill to drop, and with it much of the hostile feeling which had previously swayed him; while Mr. Fox assured the House that, when they met again, the

subject should be early and effectually brought before them. It would be hard to say whether the nation was or was not dissatisfied by this meagre issue to preparations so ostentatious. But of the degree to which it was supposed to bear upon Mr. Hastings's situation at the moment, as well as on his future prospects, the following gives a tolerably good account:—

From Major SCOTT.

London, 17th July, 1783.

My dear Sir,—My last overland was dated the 4th of July. No prospect of the Euridice sailing. Yesterday the Parliament was prorogued. You will see by the King's speech that His Majesty gives notice of their intention to resume the consideration of India affairs when the Houses meet again. The enclosed* preface will tell you what passed in the House of Commons as the King was coming to Westminster. That infamous scoundrel, Mr. Burke, could not permit the last day to pass over without showing his malicious intentions; and in order to carry an appearance without doors, he got Lord North (who is equal to anything) to second the motion for laying all those papers respecting Munny Begum, &c., before the House. From the Commons I went to the Peers, and stood next to Lord North while the King was speaking. When His Majesty had done, Lord North turned round to me and said, "Well, Sir, you see we are to begin upon you as soon as we meet again." I answered, "Yes, my Lord, and the sooner the better; but I wish we had been dismissed this year in a more gentlemanlike manner." His Lordship stared and said, "What do

* It was sent with the original of this letter.

you mean?" I replied, "I do not mean, my Lord, to allude to His Majesty's speech, but to the manner in which Mr. Edmund Burke prefaced his motion for the trash of 1775 to be laid before the House. Upon this ground, however, I dare him to proceed, and indeed upon every other. If there is a man upon earth free from peculation it is Mr. Hastings." His Lordship replied, "Major Scott, you should not be so violent; consider peculation is a very common word in the House of Commons, and very frequently used." I answered, "True, my Lord, and it has been applied by Mr. Burke, in former times, to your Lordship, with as little justice, I believe, as he now applies it to Mr. Hastings." He laughed at this, and said, "We shall see how you come off next year," and then went away. I shall not have room in this letter to send you my second letter to Burke complete, but it shall be enclosed, as far as I can get it from the printer, and I will send you several copies of it by sea. Every man of honour in the kingdom condemns the conduct of the ministry towards you; and even those who do not wish you well say that they either ought to remove or to support you. There never was a more unpopular ministry than the present. The King hates them most cordially, and will certainly remove them if he can. Should Lord Temple be at the head of the next ministry, with Lords Thurlow and Shelburne of the Cabinet, I am convinced Lord Cornwallis will still go out to Bengal to succeed you, and that the mode of settling the business will be highly honourable for you. The present men anxiously wish to remove you, Mr. Wheler, and Mr. Macpherson, merely for the extension of patronage; nothing but the dread of consequences to themselves prevented them from doing it this year; and I know for a fact that Lord North told them the ministry would be ruined if they attempted

your removal this year. Let me entreat you, my dear Sir, to be prepared for anything that may happen, being assured, however, of this fact, that your honour is beyond the power of such unprincipled scoundrels to injure. I have nothing new to tell you. We are omnipotent at the India House, and shall take care to profit by the present recess from parliamentary business. The Euridice and the Swallow are both to sail as soon as the definitive treaty comes. Johnstone is as firm as a rock, and we gain converts every day. We are in great impatience for the arrival of the Fox. I hope to God we shall receive pleasing accounts of your health when she arrives. I am ever, most faithfully and gratefully yours,

JOHN SCOTT.

From the same.

London, 18th July, 1783.

My dear Sir,—I have just closed and despatched a packet to you by the way of Bussorah, which I hope will be with you in December at furthest. Yesterday I went to Court, where I met Lord North and Governor Johnstone; the former saluted us both with his usual good humour, and then observed to the Governor, "Do you know, Mr. Johnstone, that Major Scott flew into a violent passion yesterday in His Majesty's presence, and what do you think it was for? Why, because Mr. Burke had made use of the word peculation in the House of Commons just before. Now you know that it is a very common word in our House, and strict parliamentary language; and as Major Scott attends so constantly in the gallery, I am astonished he should be so much hurt at the repetition of a word which he must have heard so often." I replied, "It is true, my Lord, I have heard the word very often, and Mr. Burke has repeatedly in my hearing applied it to your Lord-

ship with as little justice, I really believe, as he now applies it to Mr. Hastings. There was a time, my Lord, when Mr. Burke persecuted your Lordship with as much inveteracy as he now does Mr. Hastings." "True," replied his Lordship, "they badgered me till they turned me out; and shall I tell you a secret? they will badger Hastings till they rout him out too." I said that was a matter of little moment, I was perfectly indifferent as to that, but we would take care he should not injure the honour or the reputation of Mr. Hasting. I added, "It gave me great pleasure to hear your Lordship second Mr. Burke's motion. Your Lordship saw all the papers he called for in 1776, and you must have been convinced of the falsehood of the charges, or you never would have proposed Mr. Hastings, both in 1780 and 1781, to be again and again Governor-general of Bengal. By moving for these papers, your Lordship was desirous that every member who would take the pains of reading them, should be as firmly convinced of the Governor-general's integrity as your Lordship was. This must have been your motive for seconding the motion." His Lordship then said, "I am sure I have no idea of accusing Mr. Hastings of having done anything improper." Company coming up put an end to this curious conversation, of which you have the substance, if not the expressions very exact. I am, my dear Sir, most faithfully and gratefully yours,

JOHN SCOTT.

From the same.

London, 29th July, 1783.

My dear Sir,—I wrote to you overland on Tuesday the 22nd, to advise you of the arrival of the Fox packet two days before. Mr. Morris delivered to me very safely your several letters of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 9th of February. I want words to ex-

press to you, my dear Sir, how happy the receipt of these advices has made me on every account, public as well as private. The flattering terms in which you mention your approbation of the steps I have taken are highly grateful to me, and it will ever be the first wish of my heart to act in such a manner as to ensure a continuance of your friendship and esteem. My letters on Tuesday last were written so much in a hurry, that I had barely time to acknowledge the receipt of the packet. The effect which the public advices has had in your favour is very great. Notwithstanding all I could urge, some of your best friends had their doubts as to the ratification of the Mahratta peace. Sir Henry Fletcher, the chairman, too, would insist upon it that you had been deceived by Sindia; consequently the Fox's arrival was a complete triumph to our friends, and a miserable disappointment to those who would have rejoiced at any event that tended to discredit your administration. The universal opinion now is that it will not be in the power of the present ministers to injure you, should they retain their offices, which is very doubtful, and be inclined to do it. Burke sinks more and more every day into contempt; his conduct, and the behaviour of the leading Directors towards you, is execrated universally. On Thursday last I dined with Lord Mansfield and Lord Stormont, and was charged particularly to present their sincere congratulations and hearty good wishes to you, both on the recovery of your health and the wonderful change which your perseverance, firmness, and constancy has wrought in our affairs in the East Indies. Lord Stormont told me he had read all the papers relative to Lord Macartney which have been transmitted to His Majesty's ministers. He says you are right; but as Lord Macartney is so powerfully connected, you must expect the matter to be taken up very warmly in this

country. It would have been fine food for the Select Committee had they been sitting when the Fox arrived. Lord Stormont expressed his surprise and concern that Lord North should have seconded Burke's motion, but he thinks he did it without any fixed design, though the other had a view in getting him to second it; but Lord Mansfield said, "Hastings soars so much above them all, that he may now despise anything they can do. I defy them all to injure him now." The Suez packet I am afraid is lost; we have never heard a word about it. You will find, I hope, by the regular receipt of my letters, that since July last I have regularly written once, and frequently twice, a month, by the common post, and I have had intelligence from Bussorah of my letters of the 1st of March being safe arrived there. There seems to be a total stagnation of politics just now; all parties are lying by for the winter. One fact, however, is beyond dispute, that the King will change his present ministers if possible, and they are despised and hated throughout the nation. The majority of them are gamblers, swindlers, and beggars. Lord Stormont told me there was not the smallest danger of the peace, and that it might be expected in a few days. Lord Mansfield observed that your operations in India would forward it. The moment it comes the Euridice sails, and she is to be followed by another frigate, to ensure you the speediest advices. You will find, my dear Sir, that the Benares business has been so satisfactorily and fully explained, that not a doubt can remain in the breast of any man as to the propriety of your conduct throughout that arduous business; but the fact is this, your enemies must fix upon something, and what was so likely to answer their purposes as a misrepresentation of the circumstances which induced the Rajah to rebel? The moment the subject comes forward again we shall be

ready. You have said everything that can be said in your narrative. Lord Mansfield and Sir Joseph Yorke have both pronounced it to be a complete justification of your conduct; but we shall continue to answer all the committee say on this as well as on every subject.

By the Euridice I have sent you a late report, in which your narrative is again published by Parliament, and an attempt made to prove, even from your own statement, that there was no cause of just complaint against Cheyt Sing. This came out just before the Houses were prorogued. We shall completely refute every assertion in it, to be ready when Parliament meets again. Halhed is indefatigable upon this as upon every other occasion, and he is esteemed the first political writer in England. Lord Mansfield told me he had read my two letters to Burke and the preface which were sent you by the last overland despatches, that he never read a pamphlet in his life which pleased him so much, and that I have most happily exposed Burke by bringing his own solemn declarations to convict him. I find by a letter this moment received from Mr. La Touche, that mine to you of the 21st February, which contained an account of the ratification of the peace, was despatched from Bussorah on the 1st May, so that I trust it reached you by the end of last month. One great plea of Lord Shelburne's for making the peace was in order to preserve India; but you, my dear Sir, will be allowed by all men the glory of having saved our empire in the East before peace was even thought of in England, at least to your knowledge.

31st July.—We have received intelligence from Bombay of the success of General Matthews in the Bidenora country. This must, I think, be decisive in our favour: and it shall not be forgotten, that to your exertions and injunctions it is owing that an army from Bombay was furnished with supplies and put in

motion. Mr. Hornby has signified his intention of quitting. That Government will be a bone of contention here I fancy. Enclosed is a small letter for my brothers, and one from Lord Mansfield to Sir Thomas Miles. No immediate prospect of the definitive treaty. I am ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully and gratefully yours,

JOHN SCOTT.

From the same.

1st August, 1783.

I do not recollect anything particular to add just now. We are all quiet at the India House. Mr. Sulivan is determined to bring the affair of the nineteen lacs before the proprietors, if the Directors behave shabbily, as I expect they will, upon the business. In every letter let me repeat my usual request to you, to look upon your Government as drawing to an honourable close. Consider, my dear Sir, what a temptation your office is to a corrupt Government; but be assured we will fight the ground inch by inch; and when I talk of your removal, I expect myself we shall be victorious; but I speak the sentiments of English politicians, who know the nature of the people here better than I do, though hitherto I have been right in my conjectures: and it is my firm opinion that a successor will be sent to wait your time of yielding the Government to him. I am so far confirmed in this opinion by Lord Mansfield, that he declares, "Ministers dare not use Mr. Hastings ill." Ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully and gratefully yours,

JOHN SCOTT

CHAPTER XII.

Position of Mr. Hastings in reference to the Country Powers—His Correspondence with his Agents at the Court of Sindia, at Lucknow, and Benares.

I RETURN now to Mr. Hastings, whose position, though in some respects improved, was not yet such as to satisfy a mind like his—eager and zealous and indefatigable in its efforts to work out the well-being of the country. The arrangements to which he had come, for example, at Lucknow and Benares, though full of promise for the future, brought no immediate accession to his available resources. There was a lack of zeal among his own agents, of which notice will be taken by and bye; while of the natives, to whom, at the outset, the care of the provinces was committed, almost all sadly disappointed him. In like manner his negociations with the Mahrattas went on but slowly, for each chief was jealous of the part played by his neighbours, and all were alike disposed to embrace or create opportunities to procrastinate. I say nothing of the state of the Carnatic, over which the tide of war was sweeping; or of the expected arrival of an armament from France, to which the Madras government had nothing to oppose. These calls upon his vigilance

and care have been fully noticed already; as well as the means which he adopted to meet them. But a not less crying want, that of grain wherewith to nourish both man and beast, soon began to appear. Again Mr. Hastings showed himself capable of grappling with and surmounting every difficulty. After maturely considering how the measure could be best and most economically effected, he determined to furnish the necessary supplies by contract: and so faithful as well as active was the individual to whom the contract was assigned, that not in a single instance did a failure occur. Moreover, it was at this critical moment, when external cares seemed to press most heavily upon him, that Mr. Hastings found leisure to arrange his plan of a salt monopoly, a project to which every member of the Government except himself stood opposed, and of which the advantages were not made apparent for some time afterwards. In a word, with ample ground of self-congratulation, and the best reason to anticipate a triumphant issue sooner or later out of all his difficulties, Mr. Hastings continued, throughout a large portion of this year, anxious and uneasy. His disappointments were great—his mortifications frequent—his courage and constancy alone never failed; and by these he sustained himself in spite both of the waywardness of his colleagues and subordinates in

India, and the hostility, all but openly avowed, of his superiors at home.

The following letters, which relate, some to the Mahratta negociations; some to the state of affairs in Benares and Oude; some to the wants of the Carnatic, and the best means of supplying them, will show far better than any formal statement from me, how the mind of the writer adapted itself to circumstances. The gentleman to whom the first series is addressed was employed by Mr. Hastings to represent him at the court of Sindia. He was a prodigious favourite with the writer; and appears, by his talent and his zeal, eminently to have deserved this favour.

To DAVID ANDERSON, Esq.

Fort William, 15th March, 1782.

My dear Anderson,—You will now receive your last instructions, and even these are superfluous. You must act upon your own judgment, and trust to the Board for their approval of whatever you do for the public service. It is not peace with conditions of advantage that we want, but a speedy peace; and we would rather purchase it with the sacrifice of every foot of ground that we have acquired from the Mahrattas, excepting Salsette and the little islands adjacent to Bombay, than hazard the loss of the present opportunity by contending for more. Get Bassein, if you can; but if this is likely to prove an obstacle to the conclusion of the treaty, give it up. In effect, every territorial acquisition on that side is a loss in substance, and only valuable in point of credit, and those are the least valuable which are the furthest removed

from the seat of Government, because they will require a larger force to defend them, and that will eventually prove a diminution of strength to the capital. Whatever I write, whether under a private or official address, is for authority, and you may use it as such: nor is it only that I possess that power from the Board. On these subjects we have but one mind, and our confidence in you is the same, and it is unbounded. Do not, therefore, cramp yourself by the letter of our orders, but decide with boldness and decision. Act yourself in any point which may be presented to you, and which is either not provided for by your instructions, or which may require some deviations from them, except such as are positive, and declared to be indispensable, what choice of conduct I should make were I personally present. I promise you that you will not err.

I am afraid of nothing but delay. It is impossible to forsee all the casualties to which our affairs are liable in the interval in which this business is suspended. No change of prosperity, nor reverse of fortune, can affect our desires for peace with the Mahrattas; but it may operate on theirs, and especially on the weak mind which appears to possess the principal ruler. Nanna Furneess may hear of the arrival of a French armament; and again wish to throw the Mahratta state and his own personal interests into the hands of Hyder, from a supposition that this accession of strength will decide the contest in Hyder's favour. I believe it will not operate in the same way with Mahdajee Sindia. I had a proof when I was at Chunar either that he possessed a firmness of character, or some personal interest, which counteracted the natural influence of such events. Yet he may be embarrassed by fresh instructions, and cautions founded on such causes. Besides, Hyder exists, and exists with a superiority, while the

war lasts, or is supposed to last, between us and the Mahrattas. I am clearly of opinion that Hyder will abandon the Carnatic as soon as he hears of a peace, because he will expect a visit from the Mahrattas.

Nothing could be more unseasonable than the appearance of the French armament at this time on the coast. It affected me much in the manner that Cheyt Sing's rebellion did when I began my first negociations with Mahdajee Sindia. Happily its worst effects are past, and if the last intelligence which we have received shall prove true, I think we shall have cause to rejoice that so formidable an exertion has been made against us, instead of repining at it. It was certainly made at an enormous expense, (and the French government cannot afford expense,) and with great prepations and great promises from Europe. Its object was no doubt adequate to such appearances, and the expectations which have been long and publicly entertained of it. It would have been no less than the extirpation of our nation from the Carnatic, and the transfer of its dominion from the Nabob Walla Jah under our influence, to the Nabob Hyder under theirs. They have at length appeared. They have brought the force which they promised. They were superior, greatly superior, to our squadron in strength. Ours engaged them (not they ours), beat, dispersed, and pursued them. Many of the transports with troops and stores have fallen into our hands, and as we know that all their ships of the line were crowded with soldiers, their loss in military must have been so great, that they could land only mutilated corps, and those they must abandon (if they land them) to the mercy of Hyder, and the fate of war without a resource, because their squadron cannot remain to protect, or receive them again on board, if they should be defeated. So dreadful a calamity terminating in nothing is

equivalent to the greatest positive advantage. As soon as I receive the authentic communication of this intelligence I will send it to you. In the mean time I give you an exact copy of the private report which has been transmitted from the ship which is said to have brought public letters to us from Madras on the same subject, but not yet come up to town. Make what use of it you can. Translate it, and give it to Sindia, with my salam if you will.

Do not neglect our injunction to send instant advice by duplicate (and add triplicate) despatches overland by way of Surat. Be very short. I am, my dear Anderson, your most affectionate friend.

To the same.

Calcutta, 2nd April, 1782.

Dear Anderson,—I will reply to your two last letters in full to-morrow. Weatherstone will be ordered to leave Poona. We have ordered Colonel Cumming to march back again with five regiments to the Caramnassa, and he shall proceed to the Jumna if your further advices shall makeit appear to be necessary. Your answer to Mahdajee Sindia upon the two demands concerning the Antrebede and the Chout of the Carnatic was perfectly right. Reject every new demand, especially on points which have no relation to the war, with a peremptory denial and a refusal to treat upon them or with them.

You will receive a letter from Lord Macartney and his committee filled with exaggerated descriptions of the distressed state of the Carnatic, vehemently urging you to conclude a peace. Pay no kind of regard to it, nor let it influence you to make one single advance to obtain it. Answer it respectfully, but go on your own way. These men will ruin their own affairs by proclaiming that they are desperate. I know not why, for they

certainly are in a more prosperous condition than they were. Yours affectionately.

To the same.

Fort William, 6th April, 1782.

Dear Anderson,—You will receive a public letter on the subject of that which has been written to you by the Select Committee of Fort St. George. I am as anxious for peace as they are; but I would neither sue for it, nor break the faith, nor tarnish the honour of the nation to obtain it; neither would such sacrifice produce such an effect. I own I am uneasy at the delays which have arisen, and which seem to grow against the accomplishment of our hopes. Above all, I am alarmed at Mahdajee Sindia's late requisitions, because they mark too strongly a desire to find pretexts for evading a conclusion, or for concealing his want of authority to bring it to pass. You must absolutely reject every proposal hereafter that shall be in itself unreasonable and bear no relation to the points of our past differences and reciprocal claims. Such are the claims on the Doaub and to the Chout of the Carnatic. The Nabob of Oude obtained possession of the Doaub long before we had any disputes with the Mahrattas, and the Carnatic never paid the Chout to them. These were not objects of the war, nor ought to be of the peace; neither shall they. If these pretensions are revived, answer that you have orders to refuse them, and to refuse to treat upon them.

But, in fact, I have doubts of Mahdajee Sindia's authority to conclude a general peace. Mr. Holland has advised us that the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn has proposed to go to Poona, to assist at the nuptials of the Peishwa and to summon a general congress; and he has actually begun his progress to the westward. I received a letter from Chapman this morning, in

which he writes that Moodajee is going to Poona, to assist at the nuptials of the Peishwa, and to join in an assembly which is to be held there, and which is to determine either on a renewal of the confederacy or on a peace. And the same post brought your letters of the 13th and 20th ult. to Major Palmer, which mentions Sindia's intention on the same points exactly agreeing with theirs.

I see nothing but confusion and delay in a general meeting, if it takes place before the peace is concluded, and this is to be the object of it. Each party will lay in his respective claims, and will be influenced by his separate and probably concealed views of interest or policy.

Endeavour to bring Sindia to a conclusion at once. His merit will be lost in the production of the same end with the participation of others, and his influence and credit may suffer by it. If he has not authority to conclude a peace finally, I should be satisfied with the next alternative, which he seems to offer, viz., a conditional peace, referable for its ratification to the principals, provided he will bind himself to support it, and to oppose any other demands upon us.

I have given great offence both to the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn and to Moodajee Boosla by the preference shown to Mahdajee Sindia. All their letters mark him to be an object of their envy, and that they and Nanna Furneess, all equally wish to disappoint him of the credit of having been the author of a peace. State these things with the address and language of which you are a master, and urge him, if you can, to a decision. At all events, let me know his answer and resolution.

I am much afraid that the contents of the Select Committee's letter will be known. They best know their own condition; but their report of it differs

widely from private opinions, and of authority; and in their letters to us they enclose, as a proof of their distress, a state of their store and grain, which exceeds by far what I had conceived they could have had at any one time amassed together. I send you a copy of it. At the same time I understand that they have at this time an open communication, with abundant supplies of provisions of all kinds, with the Pollams; a large recruit of draught and cavalry cattle; and Hyder's army certainly reduced, by death and desertions, to one half of its original strength.

To the same.

Fort William, 12th April, 1782.

Dear Sir,—I have received your letter of the 25th ultimo, accompanied by one for the Board, containing a detail of the progress and state of your negociations.

Should Sindia continue his demand of our entire cession of Ahmedabad, and you have no expectation that he will recede from it, do not suffer this consideration to retard the peace. A mode of accommodation presents itself in the sixth article of the treaty with Futty Sing, by which it is stipulated that he shall be put in possession of Ahmedabad and its dependencies in lieu of Autavasy and a participation in the revenue of Surat. These territories may be re-exchanged with Futty Sing, and Ahmedabad completely surrendered to the Mahratta state; but do not adopt this expedient unless you are convinced that peace is unattainable without it, or unless peace can be immediately obtained by it.

The claim urged by Sindia on the lands ceded to us by Futty Sing is rendered nugatory by the treaty of Poorunder, which confirms that cession, provided it should appear that Futty Sing had a right to make it; and that right has been incontestably proved. But,

admitting that Futty Sing had not established the proofs of such a right, it would then be incumbent on us to restore the lands in question to the person from whom we received them; and they would of course revert to Futty Sing. I state these circumstances that you may employ them to obtain other concessions in our favour; for, in fact, I do not desire to retain a foot of the territory acquired from the Mahrattas, either by war or treaty, except Bassein. Relinquish all for that object and peace; and even relinquish the former, if the latter cannot be had without that sacrifice.

If I am particularly tenacious of the property of Futty Sing in Ahmedabad, &c., it is to mark to the Mahrattas and to all Indostan, the scrupulous attention of the English nation to the interests of their allies. It is preposterous to suppose, that in an alliance between powers which have the same object in war—the distress of a common enemy—one party should relinquish and the other retain all the benefits acquired by it.

If Futty Sing was to be placed exactly in the same state in which he stood before the war, he would be a gainer by the consequence which he would derive from being included in the treaty; and he has no claim to any higher consideration from us than that we will attend equally to his interests with our own.

In a word, I recommend it to you to consider the spirit of the treaties and of your instructions, and to apply it liberally to our actual situation and the advantages of peace. You know what may be, and what ought not to be, sacrificed for that object; exercise your judgment freely, and make no more references, although they should cost but a delay of four-and-twenty hours.

To the same.

Alipoor, 4th June, 1782.

My dear Anderson,—It will be necessary that some person go on our part to the other side of India to see that our stipulations in the treaty be duly executed. If Mahdajee Sindia returns to Poona, you will, of course, I suppose, be desired to accompany him to assist in forming the plan of future measures for bringing Hyder Ally to reason. I shall propose no one for the first commission till I hear from you, because in the latter case you ought to have the charge of it.

I subjoin the following, because it relates to the subject of the Mahratta peace, concerning the adjustment of which Mr. Hastings was at this moment very sanguine:—

To the Right Honourable Lord MACARTNEY.

Fort William, 5th June, 1782.

My Lord,—Lest our public despatches should not be prepared in time for this night's post, I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that Mr. Anderson has concluded and interchanged a treaty of peace with Mahdajee Sindia, the representative and plenipotentiary of the Mahratta state. It was executed on the 17th ult. The last form only remains, and you may rest assured that it is merely a form, that it be ratified by the principals of each state, and again interchanged by the persons who have conducted the negociation. The conditions are in substance as follows:—

1. All places and territory taken in the course of the war from the Peishwa are to be restored in two months after the interchange of the treaty.

2. Salsette and the other islands to remain ours.

3. Baroach to remain. We propose to make a separate grant of it to Sindia.

4 and 5. All other territory to which we have a claim by the treaty of Poorunder, to be relinquished to the Peishwa.

6. Ragonaut Row to go where he pleases out of our protection, and allowed four months for that purpose; to be allowed 25,000 rupees per month if he shall choose to place himself under the protection of Mahdajee Sindia.

7. The allies of each party to be included in the treaty.

8. Futty Sing to be replaced in his original state without retrospection.

9. The Peishwa agrees that Hyder shall relinquish all his conquests in the Carnatic, and release all his prisoners within six months after ratification of the treaty; and the English engage that they will abstain from hostilities with him while he is at peace with them and with the Peishwa.

10. The 7th enlarged.

11 and 12. The navigation and commerce of each state open to the other.

13. No European factories to be allowed in any of the Peishwa's dominions, except such as the Portuguese already possess.

14. Neither party to assist the enemies of the other.

15. Each party answerable for all the members and individuals of their respective authority that they shall be faithful to the treaty.

16. Mahdajee Sindia guarantee of the treaty.

17. All claims obtained from Ragonaut Row to territory renounced by the English.

In addition to the 9th article, Mahdajee Sindia has solemnly promised that if Hyder Ally shall refuse to abide by it, the forces of the Peishwa will join with ours in compelling him.

I hope you will view this event in the same light of

advantage that I do, and in the firm persuasion that you will, I do most heartily congratulate your Lordship upon it. I have the honour to be, with the greatest esteem, my Lord, your Lordship's most obedient and most faithful servant.

It is matter of history that the formal ratification of the treaty just transcribed was, on one pretext or another, long deferred by the Mahrattas. Of the uses which were made of this delay to injure the cause of Mr. Hastings at home, some notice was taken in the previous chapter. The following letters will at once account for the fact, and explain the process by which so disagreeable a contingency was overcome:—

To David Anderson, Esq.

Fort William, 23rd August, 1782.

My dear Anderson,—I lose not a moment in communicating to you the following substance of two voluminous packets, which I have just received from Naugpoor, one from Moodajee, the other from Nizam Ally Cawn. The purport of both is the same, viz.:—

That both are united in the same plan; that the treaty concluded by Mahdajee Sindia on the part of the Peishwa is invalid and unauthorized; that no peace can take place without the concurrence of all the parties in the confederacy; that Mahdajee Sindia knows this, his seal being affixed to the treaty which constituted it; that Nizam Ally Cawn and Moodajee are willing to be the mediators; that peace cannot be made without their mediation; that we must satisfy Nizam Ally Cawn concerning his arrears of peshcush for the sircars, and his satisfaction is rated at fifty lacs; that Hyder has negociated and brought to a conclusion a new treaty

with the Peishwa, in which the French are included as parties; and that he has sent Satoocar bills for six lacs of rupees to Sindia to engage him to invade our dominions which lie contiguous to his.

The following is the sum of the treaty said to be concluded with the French:—

1. That all the ports of the English, if conquered, shall be yielded to the French, except one or two, which shall be reserved to Hyder and the Peishwa, as they shall be chosen for their conveniency to either.

2. That Trichinopoly, with its dependencies, which Hyder claims in virtue of some agreement of thirty years standing, shall be shared equally between Hyder and the Peishwa.

3. That all the possessions formerly held by the English in the Carnatic shall be yielded to the French, the rest shared equally by the other two parties.

4. That the ports of Bengal, in the event of our expulsion, shall be given to the French, and the land of the provinces shared equally by Hyder and the Peishwa.

5. That all the treasure and effects plundered shall be equally divided by the three parties.

6. That Pondicherry and its dependencies shall remain in their former state to the French.

7. That whatsoever has been taken by the English from either party, shall, if recovered from them, revert to the original proprietors.

8. That the French shall invade Bengal, assisted by 10,000 horse, furnished by Hyder, and as many by the Peishwa.

I give little credit to such a confederacy and to such a treaty, and yet less to the sincerity of Nizam Ally and Moodajee respecting them; yet I receive the report as an indication both of their opposition to the peace concluded by Mahdajee Sindia, of which I gave

you an early intimation, and of some reluctance on the part of Nanna Furneess.

We shall give a flat refusal to Nizam Ally, adhering only to the declaration already made to him, that if he remains neuter we will faithfully discharge the arrears whenever peace is concluded; but as he has confessed himself the author of war, he must submit to his own loss, while we employ all our resources in providing the means of repelling it.

Represent all these matters to Sindia; we rely on him. We will not cancel what has been already done by listening to new suggestions, nor, if we suspected the validity of his act, would we perplex our affairs by employing a multitude of negociators, and sacrificing to all their wants.

I have seen nothing hitherto in the conduct of Sindia but what has been consistent with honour, good faith, and, above all, a steady adherence to his own designs. I am persuaded that he is deceived himself if he has deceived us; but it is necessary that he should explain the degree and extent of the reliance that we may place on him if the treaty which he has made shall not be ratified. He is doubly bound to us, first by the separate treaty of peace concluded with him, and secondly by that concluded with the Peishwa, through his agency and with his guarantee. The length of time which has passed since the treaty was sent to Poona affords too strong ground of suspicion. If, when you shall have received this, the treaty shall not have been yet returned, we must understand and construe such a delay a refusal, and provide for our own interests without regard to it, abstaining, however, from all hostilities with the Mahrattas until they shall first renew them. I here repeat that I still consider Sindia in every case as our friend.

Be explicit with Sindia, and endeavour to obtain

from him a decided and full explanation of his designs and of his expectations. I am, my dear Anderson, your most affectionate friend.

P.S. I have ordered a copy of the French treaty to be made, and will enclose it.

To the same.

Fort William, 25th August, 1782.

My dear Anderson,—I have received yours of the 8th, and am pleased to find my opinion of Mahdajee Sindia so literally verified. I should be perfectly satisfied with the state of suspense, if I had only my own satisfaction to consult.

I am yet much in the dark with respect to the Poona politics, whether to ascribe the delay of the ratification to a combination of the Mahratta chiefs, or to Nanna Furneess alone; to his disapprobation of it; to his fear of the other confederates; to his jealousy of Mahdajee Sindia; to a design of making previous conditions with Sindia for himself; to the spirit of pride and a desire of displaying his own supremacy; or, lastly, to the Mahratta habits of procrastination. I cannot suppose that he has entered into a decided plan to oppose the operation of the treaty or to engage afresh with the French and Hyder. He is said to have exhausted both the public resources and his own long ago. Hyder can ill afford to supply him. Moodajee and Nizam Ally, had they an interest in the war, are too poor to aid it, but with plunderers.

I do not despair of receiving a solution of my doubts long before you can afford it in reply to this.

In the mean time, I send you a curious paper of intelligence received last night. You will guess from what quarter, but do not mention it. I forgot to give you that caution respecting my authority for the last intelligence. I believe this to be fabricated; for

it is not the less suspicious for the assurance, that it is all *Droost evarast.*

I am not quite so satisfied about the French treaty, because it accords exactly with Hyder's language to Sir Eyre Coote.

The Admiral writes that he should be able to put to sea again in quest of the enemy about the 15th. There is no doubt of the superiority in the last action being decidedly on his side, and the addition of the Sceptre, a fresh ship completely manned, with sixty-four guns, leaves little apprehension for the state of the next contest.

It is not necessary to make any positive reply to Futteh Sing; but he has quoted an engagement which never existed. We never agreed to more, than that, when a general peace was concluded, we should take as much care of his interests as our own.

To the same.

Fort William, 4th December, 1782.

My dear Anderson,—I have received yours of the 13th ultimo. It is near a month since your letters informed me that the delivery of the ratified treaty had been promised in fifteen days, and repeated and positive assurances given by Mahdajee Sindia, that his engagements should be fulfilled to your entire satisfaction, or something to that effect, for I have not your letters by me. If, when you have received this letter, the ratification has not been made, nor Sindia afforded the proofs, whatever they may be, of his fidelity to his engagements and ability to maintain them himself and enforce them on others, I shall pay no attention to his future declarations. Had I the power to act from myself alone, I would bring this business to a very short issue. Let us, however, do what we can. Tell Sindia, but tell him in person, and in my

name:—1. That you have continued too long with him for the honour of our Government, if you were only to be the attendant of his person. 2. That it is necessary to come to a full explanation, and a determinate one, on the points which remain to be adjusted, and for which alone you have been permitted to remain so long with him. 3. That these points are, first, the ratification of the treaty; and secondly, a plan of co-operation against Hyder Ally. 4. That we have expected the former only as it led to the latter, not considering it necessary to the confirmation of the peace, which by our ratification of the general treaty, and its conclusion by him under the full powers which he possessed, is as fixed and binding as the most solemn of all possible sanctions could make it. 5. That until the treaty is ratified, we shall consider him in his own person as the party to it, and when it is ratified, as the guarantee; but the state bound equally in either case, the form of the ratification being his concern, not ours. 6. That we are satisfied with our alliance with him, and prefer his name and faith to any other, for the security of the engagements of his nation. 7. That the general treaty was concluded and executed seven months ago, and ratified by us on the instant of its receipt. 8. That the procrastinating spirit of the Mahrattas, which is proverbial, in all their negociations and concerns with others, has already been the cause of one renewal of hostilities with the English, in spite of the laboured endeavours of this Government to prevent it, and has always a tendency to produce the like consequence by the distrust inseparable from such appearances. 9. That I acquit him of this national censure, having found him decided and consistent in every transaction which has passed between us, and which depended on himself alone. 10. That therefore this remonstrance is intended for others, with whom we have no communication but

through him rather than for him. 11. That General Sir Eyre Coote, having come to Bengal for the recovery of his health, expects to be able to return to the Carnatic in the beginning of the next month. 12. That we shall in the mean time concert with him the plan of his operations there, whether for peace or war, and give him his final instructions. 13. That Hyder himself is desirous of peace, and would agree to it on easy conditions. 14. That his resources are greatly exhausted, his army reduced in numbers, and discontented. 15. That the Carnatic, which afforded them a subsistence, and the incitements of plunder, is now a desert, and more unprofitable to them than to us. 16. That we have received large reinforcements of soldiers, of the King's own army, from England, which lie inactive, because we are waiting the determination of the Mahratta Government, not choosing to involve ourselves in any designs which might eventually impede or embarrass our engagements with them. 17. That it is therefore my desire to know, and I conjure him to tell me with that sincerity which has hitherto marked and done honour to his character, whether the engagements which we are willing to conclude with the Peishwa against our common enemy can be formed and executed in this season, or whether it is impracticable. 18. That in this act we must require the sanction of the Peishwa's name, and the concurrence of the minister to give it its due influence and credit; and for the same reason I wish for the ratification of the treaty likewise, because the world will not believe them to be in earnest, while they withhold it. 19. That I wish to bring our contest with Hyder to an issue, while we have a superiority in strength, as there is a probability that he will be joined by a powerful armament from France in the next year, which may enable him to bid defiance to our united efforts, if delayed so long. 20. That if they will engage in a

plan of immediate co-operation with us, we will make that our object. 21. But that if they will not, we will take care of ourselves. 22. That we make no scruple of owning our wants, because we know theirs to be at least equal to them; since the total loss of the Carnatic, were we to lose it, would be no real loss to us; it would indeed be a loss of credit, and injure our national character by involving the ruin of an old and faithful ally; but our substantial possessions would acquire an additional value from it; Hyder is in possession of a large portion of the Mahratta dominions, and with the conquest of the Carnatic, (an event which I only suppose for argument,) would be in a condition to make an easy prey of the rest of Deccan; but if he is only freed from the war with the English, and left at liberty to carry all his forces towards the Krishna, he will not only be able to secure his new possessions in that quarter, but to add to them.

I rely on your firmness and address, to give this remonstrance complete effect. It is certainly *my* wish to prosecute the war against Hyder to his destruction: but if the Mahrattas will not assist us, our forces and resources in the Carnatic are not equal to a war with him and his allies the French, and it will be more for our interest, and even credit, to make peace with him. This alternative I have therefore resolved to adopt for myself. The old general, I believe, inclines to a peace and would be pleased to be the instrument of effecting it. These are my own sentiments. Make what use of them you please. Those of my colleagues in this matter I have not consulted. I am, my dear Anderson, your most affectionate friend.

The following has reference to proceedings at home, of which mention was made in a previous Chapter.

To the same.

Fort William, 5th December, 1782.

My dear Anderson,—I cannot conceal from you my apprehension of the effects which the late reports from England may produce on your negociations. You have doubtless heard what everybody knows, and what the newspapers have circulated through all the states of Europe and Asia, that by a resolution of the House of Commons, passed on the 17th or 18th of May, it was declared to be the duty of the Court of Directors to remove me from my office because "I had acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of the British nation." It was, after much deliberation among the Directors, agreed that they were not bound to submit to the dictates of the House of Commons, who are only one branch of the Legislature; that without a regular act of parliament no notice ought to be taken of the resolution; that the Directors were the proper judges of the conduct of their own servants, and could not legally admit of any other power to sentence and punish them. It was therefore resolved not to admit the mandate of the House of Commons as authority; yet, to show some respect to it, the Court agreed to investigate my conduct by going through the papers which the Commons had taken as the ground of their resolution. In the meantime the Proprietors, alarmed for the consequence, and ignorant of what the Directors were doing, called a general meeting, which was to be held on the 19th of June.

From this state you may judge of the probability of my being recalled. I think it unlikely. The Directors are said to be very little disposed to favour me, and therefore their disobedience to the orders of the House has arisen from another cause,—their fear to lose their credit with the Proprietors. I have other strong grounds of belief that the attempt has failed. I care

very little for the event, but I dread the consequence of the suspension, and have therefore given you this history, that you may contradict any unfavourable conclusions drawn from it. My dear Anderson, I am not so easy to move. Even the wretch who has dealt the blow at me has acknowledged that my exertions have saved the Carnatic, and that my conduct is free from any moral stain.

That you may be early apprized of the issue of this affair, I desire that if any letters from the other side of India are sent to you to be forwarded to me, you will open and read them; but do not let any one else see them nor know more of their contents than may be necessary to answer the purpose for which I have used this caution. If they contain good news, publish and make the most of it; if bad, keep it to yourself. I am, my dear Anderson, most affectionately yours.

To the same.

Fort William, 16th January, 1783.

My dear Anderson,—I have received your letter of the 28th December and 1st instant, with Sindia's enclosed in the latter. This is very short, but perfectly satisfactory. I intend to answer it with this. As you mention that the draught had undergone some alteration, I will send you a copy of the letter. Perhaps you may gather something from the difference.

Hyder's death is confirmed beyond all doubt. It happened about the 6th of December. That of his Vakeel is a most fortunate coincidence. Another is said to have happened in the defeat of Tippoo Saheb by General Matthews, near Calecutt, on the 24th of November. Hyder's army remains in the neighbourhood of Arcott, and there seem to be the sparks of a dissension rising between his sons Tippoo and Kereem Saheb. The last is in command of the main army,

and of weak understanding. Our army has been so much dispersed since the departure of Sir Eyre Coote, that it could not avail itself of the great advantage presented by Hyder's death. I am not sorry. The good old General will shortly return, and everything may be expected from his reputation and activity.

I have just received the enclosed* in duplicate from Ragonaut Row. It might give alarm to the Mahratta government if left to his communication of it. You may therefore, if you will, tell Sindia that he has received such a letter, and explain that nothing more was meant by it than a mere complimentary return; and that, had more been intended, it could not affect the treaties concluded with Sindia which supersede all authority, and shall be to me as sacred as my Bible.

Souffrein has made his appearance off Ganjam, but his object is unknown. He has, however, afforded a recent occasion to rejoice at the miraculous interposition of fortune or providence in our favour, for the Indiamen from Madras, bringing with them our Bengal infantry and artillery, have passed him, and are safe arrived in the river.

I wait with some curiosity to learn what effect Hyder's death may have produced in the Mahratta politics, as it seems to be a crisis that should compel them to dispense with their usual spirit of procrastination. Adieu, my dear Anderson, yours most affectionately.

To the same.

Fort William, 9th March, 1783.

My dear Anderson,—I have received yours of the 22d February, with others in their order preceding it. I own that I suspect a motive in these delays very foreign from the state of the Mahratta affairs, or dif-

* A letter from the Court of Directors to Ragonaut Row.

ferences in the political opinions of Sindia and Naroo Reo Deo. But I have calls for a greater exertion of my patience than any which this instance requires, and am satisfied that the ratification of the treaty will have its accomplishment whatever may cause this procrastination of it.

The General is not yet gone, but will certainly depart in three or at most five days. The government of Fort St. George is negociating with Tippoo, as you will see by the enclosed paper. But they will not attempt to conclude any agreement without our authority, which we certainly shall not grant while Sir Eyre Coote is absent, and to whom our instructions will be specially entrusted, as he is best acquainted with our intentions, and therefore best qualified to carry them into execution. But whatever is done after his arrival will be final and irrevocable.

Inform me on what footing Cheit Sing is now with Mahdajee Sindia. I am, most affectionately, yours.

P. S.—I send you an extract of a letter* which I have just received from Chapman. If the treaties have been interchanged show it to Sindia; if not, use your own discretion to communicate or suppress it.

To the same.

Fort William, 31st March, 1783.

My dear Anderson,—I have received yours of the 14th, and the preceding, in their order. I write to Sindia by this conveyance, and send you a copy and translation of my letter. You will explain it. His behaviour shall lose none of its merit in my report of it to my superiors in England, and their good will is an acquisition not to be slighted, even by a Mahratta ruler.

* Two letters, first dated 15th February, 1783, second dated 16th February, 1783.

I am alarmed at what Colonel Morgan writes about the Pindarries in the Autovesee. Tell Sindia that great caution ought to be observed on both sides in the infancy of our connexion. These hostilities may serve as a pretext to withhold the surrender of the districts in which they are committed, and they will every way be the sufferers from so unseasonable a policy.

The lands are theirs, and will be delivered on demand; but violence may come to a refusal, and, in the angry judgment of many of our countrymen, warrant one. Advise him to cause an instant stop to be put to these indiscretions. Let people be sent in form, but without a military apparatus, to demand possession; and do you send witnesses to be present when the demand is made. Indeed, I am convinced that it is necessary that you depute your brother on this service. The gentlemen of Bombay may wish to evade the surrender of the lands in their possession. They may: I do not think they will. If they do, this government has the power of punishing them, as well as the most effectual means of removing the evil, by their suspension; and you may assure Mahdajee Sindia that we will not suffer the faith which we have pledged to be injured. He must depend upon us, and not suffer the transient obstacles which others may studiously oppose to the execution of the treaty to defeat its objects. It is our business to remove them, and we will. He too has his opponents.

I am highly pleased with his letter to Tippoo Saheb. We have sent it to Fort St. George, as a sample of the manner in which they should treat with their enemies. Pray send me an entire copy of the letter. I want to see the Alcaub.

I approve the draft of the treaty. You must except the province of Bidanoor and its dependencies from the partition, because we were in possession of these

before the final conclusion of the treaty, and obtained them without the participation of the Mahratta alliance. It is reported that General Matthews has entered into some engagement with the chief of that province, which is an insurmountable objection, or may be one, to the transfer of it; and it lies more convenient to us than to the Peishwa. Perhaps a way may be found to accommodate this point, if it should be a subject of contention in the adjustment of our other conquests, whether made by the Mahrattas or by our forces.

But of this you must not yield, nor give hopes that you will yield, an inch.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Sir Eyre Coote has had a clear passage out of the river, and the winds have been most unseasonably favourable to him.

The Government of Madras have been treating with Tippoo, and we have desired them to desist.

To the same.

Fort William, 17th December, 1783.

My dear Anderson,—I have received yours of the 2nd, and others in their orders preceding it. Your letters to Mr. Bristow and Colonel Morgan are very proper; yet I am fearful of misconceptions, and therefore recommend it to you to be very brief in your correspondence; and upon the state of the Mahratta treaty, whatever your doubts may be, either wholly silent or declaredly satisfied. Let not a word escape you that may serve as a foundation of doubt to others. I necessarily except cases requiring military preparation.

I am less sanguine than you are, and you are but little sanguine, in the expectation of the ratified treaty. It appears plain to me that it is withheld by the jealousy and envy of the other parties, and Nanna

Furneess's fears of them. Nizam Ally Cawn has from the beginning indignantly protested against any peace not made by himself. Moodajee complainingly makes the same objection, and says that it has been seriously proposed to deprive Nanna Furneess of his authority by giving such irregular powers to Sindia. This is a proof that the impediment is not of Nanna Furneess's creation. I have written long letters to Moodajee, appealing to his own advice to make Sindia our friend. He is not satisfied. He says that if I had written to the Peishwa and to Mahdajee Sindia that he had originally recommended Sindia for the instrument of negociation, it would have saved his credit; that even now he can and will procure the instant ratification of the treaty, if I will leave it to him; and the Peishwa's Vakeel was produced to swear to his assertion. He writes very respectfully of Mahdajee Sindia, but complains bitterly that he is not included. Beneram assures me that his master will be satisfied if he is yet made a party, and has given me a written note of what should be done for this effect. It is as follows:—

"That as I have acknowledged to Moodajee Boosla that the advances to a friendship with Mahdajee Sindia were made by his advice, and the subsequent negociation and mediation were the effect of the same counsel; as I consider him the original mover and cause of the treaty concluded with the Mahratta state, through Mahdajee Sindia; he therefore proposes that I will make known these facts to Mahdajee Sindia and the ministers of Poona, and require that, in consideration of the rank and situation of Moodajee Boosla, his friendship, and connexions with both the contracting powers, and the important share which he has had in effecting the pacification, as the original adviser and mover of the measure, his seal and signature be affixed and subscribed to the treaty as a guarantee to the

same." The word is Witness, "*shâhid;*" but I suppose this to be an error of Beneram's. I will add the proposition in the Persian language, that you may show it as authority, if you have occasion.

If you have not received the ratification of the treaty before you receive this, and have no well-grounded expectation of receiving it, I conceive that it may be proper to accept this proposal. There can, at least, be no inconvenience in imparting it to Sindia, and asking him whether he approves it. We must bring this business in some way to a conclusion, and I have a claim on Sindia for some attention to me in return for my steadiness to him. I have no doubt that Nizam Ally Cawn and Moodajee would readily become the guarantees for the treaty as it stands, and exact the ratification of it; but I do not like to change my measures; and, on every condition, I prefer the alliance and security of Mahdajee Sindia; yet I see no objection to the addition of Moodajee's name, if it is not productive of delay. It cannot be inserted, or his seal affixed to the original treaty; but it may to a counterpart or mutâbek. This you will manage and concert, if it goes so far, with Chapman.

I have written a letter to Sindia, which is enclosed with a copy; deliver or suppress it, as you think proper. The personal subject to which I refer is what you have already received from Captain Frith. I will repeat the substance.

On the change of the ministry a plan was formed by some of the dependents of the new administration to remove me from this government, and afterwards all my colleagues from the Council. It so far succeeded, that a resolution passed in the House of Commons that it was the duty of the Court of Directors to recall me. This passed on the 18th of May. On the 19th of June, the proprietors, in a General Court called for that

purpose, resolved to protect me and maintain their own rights against the resolution of the House of Commons, which they declared to be illegal. I am, therefore, secured in my seat during another year. The death of the Marquis of Rockingham, which followed on the 1st of July, produced other consequences which I regard as conclusive of my firm and permanent continuance, in the resignation of Mr. Burke, who is represented as the vehement mover of my dismission, and sworn (I know not why) to effect it. Lord Shelburne, who has succeeded Lord Rockingham, is better informed in India affairs than almost any man in England, and his opinion of my conduct is as high as I can wish it: I am sure of his justice. In a word, if no new changes not foreseen intervene, I am sure of remaining as I am. I repeat, my friend, that I am not easy of removal; and spirits as determined as any that now seek it have experienced that I am not. Undeceive Sindia, if these reports, the first I mean, have come to him.

I will send you a copy of a letter to-morrow from Hyder, which will show his disposition for peace. It is written to the General's agent at Madras.—Adieu, my dear Anderson, your affectionate friend.

I need not pursue this subject farther. The treaty with the Mahrattas was, after many delays, ratified at last. They and the Nizam became immediately the allies of the English, and the war against Tippoo was carried on, with what results the correspondence yet to be inserted will show.

I turn now to a different subject, namely, the carrying out of the treaty of Chunar, for which

Mr. Hastings incurred at the moment no trivial share of odium, and which constituted, a few years later, one of the gravest articles of charge against him in his impeachment. It was said that he acted cruelly, making all considerations of personal suffering, and justice, and right, subserve to the promotion of his own objects. Now what were those objects? To save British India, and nothing else. Let the following letters answer for the temper and the feeling in which even that great and solemn duty was discharged. I need scarcely observe that Mr. Middleton, to whom many of these letters are addressed, was Mr. Hastings's especial friend and protegé, whom he had employed in managing his connexion with the late Vizier, and whose appointment about the person of the reigning Nabob gave so much offence to the Court of Directors. Nobody can suppose that towards such a man Mr. Hastings would think of behaving otherwise than considerately; yet see how a sense of duty to the public overbears every other consideration. Major Palmer, again, was an officer of great merit, whom he had had some time in his family, and in whom he reposed the utmost confidence. The names of the other actors in the little drama must all be by this time familiar to my readers.

The following letter of instructions was called forth by a degree of remissness on the part of Mr. Middleton, which will presently be noticed. I beg

to draw the reader's especial attention to the clauses which relate to the offered present of ten lacs.

To Major WILLIAM PALMER.

6th May, 1782.

Sir,—I depute you to go to Lucknow, and to wait upon the Nawaub Vizier in my name, observing the following instructions:—

First. You will assure him that I feel it a sensible disappointment that I am myself disabled from performing the visit to his court which I promised him at Chunar, by many causes which at this time render my presence at Calcutta indispensably necessary. These causes, as they are fully known to you, you will explain as far as you shall judge it proper or conducive to the other and more essential points of your commission.

Secondly. It has been a matter of equal concern and surprise to me to learn, by the letters of the resident, that the Nawaub Vizier was with difficulty, and an almost unconquerable reluctance, induced to give his consent to the attachment of the treasures deposited by his father under the charge of the Begum, his mother, and to the resumption of her jaghier, and the other jaghiers of the individuals of his family, although these measures were the effects of his own suggestion, and proposed with great earnestness to me for my concurrence.

I desire that you will inform him, that in these and the other measures which were either proposed by him, or received his concurrence in the agreement passed between us at Chunar, I neither had, nor could have, any object but his relief, and the strengthening of his connexion with the Company and that I should not on any other ground have exposed myself to the personal obloquy which they could not fail to draw upon

me by my participation in them, but left him to regulate, by his own discretion, and by his own means, the economy of his own finances, and with much more cause the assertion of his domestic rights. In these he had no regular claim to my interference, nor had I, in my public character, any claim upon him but for the payment of the debt then due from him to the Company, although I was under the strongest obligations to require it for the relief of the pressing exigencies of their affairs.

He will well remember the manner in which, at a visit to him in his own tent, I declared my acquiescence freely and without hesitation in each of the propositions which afterwards formed the substance of a written agreement, as he severally made them; and he can want no other evidences of my motive for so cheerful a consent, nor for the request which I added as the means of fulfilling his purposes in them. Had he not made these measures his own option I should not have proposed them, but having once adopted them, and made them the conditions of a formal and sacred agreement, I had no longer an option to dispense with them, but was bound to the complete performance and execution of them as points of public duty and of national faith, for which I was responsible to my King and to the Company, my immediate superiors; and this was the reason for my insisting so peremptorily on their performance and execution when I was told that the Nawaub himself had relaxed from his original purpose, and expressed a reluctance to proceed in it.

When you have given him this explanation of my motives in regard to the late transactions, you will endeavour to learn, both by immediate application for that effect to the Nawaub himself, and by inquiry from others, what were the real causes which influenced the apparent change in his inclinations respecting this

transaction, and whether he had any, and what grounds for offence or dissatisfaction in the course of it As these, if they exist, are beyond the reach of any satisfactory conjecture which I can form, I can give you no special instructions for your reply, but leave you to remove the Nawaub's exceptions by such assurances as you may be enabled to make to him by your general but intimate knowledge of my sentiments and intentions in whatever has a relation to his interests and his alliance with the Company and the British nation.

Thirdly. I desire you to endeavour to obtain from the ministers and from Almess Alli Khawn such sums of money as they can spare from their own means, or raise by their credit, upon loan, for the service of the Company. To effect this point, it will be necessary to convince them that they will be no losers by it, but that, on the contrary, their property will acquire a security from being lodged in the Company's funds. Explain to them the nature of the Company's interest notes, and the means of credit by which they pass in circulation, and are transferable from the original to other successive proprietors, so as to give them a just idea of the tenure and of the equal footing on which native, alien, and British proprietors stand in the possession of them. At the same time, it will be proper to apprize them of the fluctuation of their current value, which it would be criminal to suppress. You may assure them that when peace is restored to our establishment, and our expenses are consequently diminished, the debt will be gradually paid off, as a former debt, contracted before my appointment to the Government, to a much larger amount, was discharged in the course of two years, within your own remembrance; and that the estimated value of the notes will rise to the rates of their specific sums, and even above them, on the prospect of payment, so that the proprietors

will be subjected to no loss, unless they shall choose to part with their property in the notes during the intermediate time of our inability to discharge them, the annual interest due in the interval being duly and punctually paid. I have no doubt of their fidelity, but it can no way be so strongly shown, nor the Company's support of them so strongly engaged, as by the assistance required.

Fourthly. The Nawaub Vizier having, by an intimation made to Mr. Middleton in the month of February last, been pleased to express his desire to make me a present of ten lacs of rupees, and requested my previous consent and acceptance of the same, I desire you will make my acknowledgments in proper terms for this instance of his liberality and benevolence, and acquaint him that I am precluded from accepting it by many considerations, but by one especially, which I beg him to take in good part, namely, that if I had received it at the time in which the tender of it was made, it would have been liable to constructions, even in his own breast, so repugnant to the disinterested friendship which I profess and bear towards him, that no consideration of personal profit could have induced me to accept it at such hazard. If he should renew the offer to you, you will inform him that my objection remains the same, and is insuperable, but that if he will be pleased to transfer it to the Company for the relief of their present and known distresses, I will accept it on their behalf with a thankfulness equal to that which I should have felt and expressed for the gift had it been made to myself, the wants of the Company being at this time of equal concern to me as my own. Let him understand this subject rightly, and he will see in my refusal, thus qualified, the most convincing proof of my friendship to him and regard for his interests.

Fifthly. It is very much my desire to impress the Nawaub with a thorough confidence in the faith and justice of our Government; that is to say, in my own, while I am at the head of it. I cannot be answerable for the acts of others independent of me. I hope it will not be difficult to convince him of this truth, for I have certainly afforded proofs of it, nor has the reverse been ever personally imputed to me. It is my desire to assist him in regulating his administration, because the success of my own is nearly connected with it, but is much more liable to suffer by its defects or misfortunes. The inverse of this observation will not apply to the effects of our misfortunes on his affairs except in the most desperate extremes. Though we have been involved in wars with all the states around us, his dominions have enjoyed a state of tranquillity undisturbed by foreign enemies, because we have stood between him and those who might have been his enemies. But were we to withdraw that interposition, he would soon experience a dreadful reverse. I know not how you will convince him of this by words, nor do I wish to put it to proof; but you may assure him that we will never interfere in his affairs beyond his own desire, nor make any claim upon him but for what may remain of his debt to the Company, the payment of his subsidy, and of the future charge incurred by other military detachments employed at his requisition and for his defence. Much delicacy and caution will be required in your declarations on this subject, lest they should be construed to extend to an immediate change in the administration of his affairs or to the instruments of it. Their persons must be considered as sacred while they act with the participation of our influence. This distinction the Nawaub understands, nor will it be either necessary or proper to allude to it unless he himself should first introduce the subject.

Sixthly. Give the ministers privately assurances of the present support and future protection of our Government.

Let your stay with the Nawaub Vizier be short; and be careful to prevent its affecting the influence of the resident.

For your complete information upon the subject of these instructions, I shall furnish you with copies of the agreement made by me with the Nawaub Vizier in August last, and of my instructions to the resident respecting it.

I shall also give you letters of introduction both to the Nawaub Vizier, and to the ministers.

You will communicate these instructions and my sentiments on every other subject of your mission to Major Davy, who attends you as your assistant; and in case sickness or any other accident should prevent your proceeding to Lucknow, you will transfer them to his charge for execution. I am, Sir, your affectionate servant.

To Mr. Nath. Middleton.

Fort William, 7th May, 1782.

Sir,—When his Highness the Vizier did me the honour of a visit at Chunar, he made me a request that we might have an interview once in every year for the purposes of discussing and adjusting the mutual concerns of the Company and himself, and of improving the harmony and confidence which subsisted between the two Governments. To this requisition I readily assented, and greatly lament that the situation of affairs makes it impossible for me to effect a meeting at this time. The present important conjuncture demands the united and vigorous exertions of both Governments for the common safety and success; and in this situation, whilst the greatest cordiality is requisite, you inform me that his Highness is much

dissatisfied on many points contained in our late agreement, and which he made his own request. To remove his uneasiness on these subjects, and to give him entire satisfaction on others which may be objects of his fears and suspicions, and to give a lasting cement and increase of strength and reciprocal advantage to our alliance, would be impracticable by any other mode than verbal communication, explanations, and assurances. And as, for the reason above assigned, I cannot make these in person, I think it indispensable to delegate the trust to another. For these purposes I have deputed Major Palmer to attend his Highness and his ministers at Lucknow. Major Palmer, as you know, has been my confidential secretary for several years; I have disclosed to him, without reserve, my sentiments on every point of the relative connexion between the Company and the Court of Oude, and I can rely upon him for a faithful explanation of them.

I have also instructed Major Palmer to give the most express assurances to the ministers of my approbation of their conduct, and determination to protect and support them, so long as they preserve their attachment to this Government and pursue the real interests of the Vizier.

Major Palmer has other public objects in charge, which he will personally communicate to you, and I most earnestly require of you the strongest co-operation of your authority and influence towards his attaining them. I think his success almost certain if he meets with your cordial support and assistance. Whatever may be the event, a considerable share in producing it will be attributed to you, and affect you accordingly.

Such explanations as are intended solely for the satisfaction of the Nabob, and coming from myself, I have directed Major Palmer to communicate separately

to him, but in doing this, to use every precaution to avoid any diminution of your authority or influence.

I have sent Major Davy as a confidential assistant to Major Palmer, and in case any accident should happen the latter, to execute his commission. I am, Sir, your obedient humble servant.

N.B. Majors Palmer and Davy set out on this embassy May 9th.

The gentleman to whom the preceding letter is addressed owed all his fortunes to Mr. Hastings. He had been early taken up by the Governor-general and employed in situations which, offering the best opportunities for the display of talent and zeal, were at the same time sources of great emolument to himself. It is not, therefore, to be supposed that, either in wantonness or from sudden caprice, he would be cast aside by his first and steadiest patron. Yet this, and more than this, has been alleged of Mr. Hastings. "Mr. Middleton," says the late Mr. Mill, "continued the exertions and practised all the severities which have already been described for extorting the money which the Governor-general demanded; yet he was formally accused by the Governor-general on the 23rd of September, and pronounced guilty of remissness in his duty." The severities alluded to by the historian amounted simply to this: that through Mr. Middleton the sanction of the British Government was given to the measures which the Vizier judged it expedient to adopt for the purpose of enforcing obedience to

his own edicts; which sanction, by the way, could not be withheld, consistently with the terms of existing treaties or the usages of the country. And as to the proceeding of Mr. Hastings, the following letters will, I think, show that the sentence, if pronounced at all, was not unmerited. Mr. Middleton, it appears, took greatly to heart the mission of Major Palmer, and, regardless of the inconvenience to which the public service might be subjected, tendered his resignation. Mr. Hastings would not accept it till the blunders committed during the resident's administration should have been repaired.

To Major PALMER.

Fort William, 2nd July, 1782.

My dear Palmer,—You were not aware that by encouraging Middleton's offer of resignation, you threw me into embarrassments. Mr. MacPherson, from whom I had withheld my own knowledge of it, conceived it from your letter to have been a point concerted with me, and that I had been guilty of duplicity to him. How could he avoid it? I had told him a very different story. I had shown him and Mr. Wheler your written instructions, and explained my future intentions. These were to avoid any change in that department which might involve my colleagues in the guilt of my disobedience to the orders of the Court of Directors, and my friends in England in the trouble of defending me; and for that cause to wait for the next despatches from home, which must either insist on the execution of their former orders, or revoke them, and leave me at liberty to nominate my own representative, or (which I shall deem equivalent to it) be silent on the subject.

But there are other causes which may operate for a longer time as objections to Mr. Middleton's removal. I had promised myself full surely, and, unfortunately trusting against all experience in his assurances, I have written the same promises home, that the Nabob's debt would be all discharged in the course of this year. But on reference to his accounts, I find that event at as great a distance as ever, and the balance at the end of this year likely to be as large as it was at the end of last. There was due on the 30th of April, 58,28,724 rupees. No state of the Nabob's debt. and the growing demands upon him for the current year, nor proposed assignments for their payment have ever been sent to the Board; but I find one transmitted to the comptroller, Mr. Wheler, for about seventy lacs, in which seven are styled jaghiers; and of the whole amount only twenty-four are collected in the course of seven months. What makes this the more alarming is, that the Nabob's expenses are diminished, new funds have been created, and the influence of my government exerted, with little credit to myself, for both purposes, and no advantage to the Company. If I could permit Mr. Middleton to leave his office in such a state, would you accept the temporary responsibility of it? He must stay till he has cleared the Nabob's account,—and if he does not to the satisfaction of the Board, I will take care that the blame of it, with all its consequences, shall fall where it ought.

For these reasons united, but chiefly for the last, I will not be the channel of conveying Mr. Middleton's resignation to the Board, and as I received the letter from you, I return it to you, at the same time declaring that I will not consent to the acceptance of it, if he shall transmit it to the Board. I am, my dear Palmer, yours affectionately.

To Mr. Nath. Middleton.

Fort William, 2nd July, 1782.

Sir,—I desire that you will not leave your station at a greater distance than Patna, as the Board will have occasion for your presence there speedily for the adjustment of the accounts of this, and for framing the assignments of the ensuing year. Instructions are preparing for you on both subjects. I am, Sir, your most obedient servant.

The following is not the letter of a reckless tyrant, nor of a mercenary man; yet Mr. Hastings has been denounced as both the one and the other.

To Major Palmer.

Fort William, 7th July, 1782.

Dear Palmer,—I have received yours of the 25th ultimo. You have so embarrassed your own commission, that I scarce know how to give you any instruction upon the points which you have submitted to me.

Mr. Middleton must return and settle the accounts of the Company with the Nabob. The balance due on the 30th April (we have no account later) was 58,28,724 10 8. The Nabob tells you that his debt is entirely liquidated; you say, he affirms it. Middleton, I suppose, has told him so, and has quietly made his retreat, leaving you with the false information to correct his errors, and complete his deficiencies as you can.

I desire that you will yield up my private claim to the ten lacs. I was deceived, and thought that the Nabob could well afford that gratuity to the Company in the time of their distresses, when he was freed from the heavy debt which he before owed to them. I will not load him with a greater, now that I find his debt as great as it was. Mr. Middleton has received cor-

rected accounts from the Accomptant-general, and it is his duty to exact payment of the balance, or to adjust it if any of the articles for which the Nabob's account is debited are exceptionable.

I shall write to Mr. Middleton to withdraw the interference of our Government in favour of Mozuffer Jung, if no part of his assignment has been paid. You may privately let the Nabob and his minister know as much.

I am sorry to find by your letter, and by one which you wrote to Major Brown, that Mr. Middleton's resignation and your succession have been publicly notified, or known at least to the Nabob and his ministers. His departure will be a confirmation of it. I cannot, nor will I let him depart until he has completely made up his accounts. His return will create a thousand surmises which may affect his influence, or it must weaken yours, and indeed you tell me as much in effect: and he will vindicate his own deficiencies by imputing them to your influence superseding his. In this dilemma I have no choice. He must return, and he must remain; and you must confine your stay to the execution of your own commission, and return. You will only hurt yourself and me by staying in a place where you lie at the mercy of men who, in the arts of deception, are too much for us both.

One thing you may tell the Nabob, viz., that if he will pay off all that he owes the Company, both the regiment stationed at Lucknow, and the residency itself shall, if he desires it, and the Board to whom I must communicate it, give their concurrence, be withdrawn, and every other of his propositions agreed to. Do not misunderstand me. I do not say that this shall be done; but that I will propose it, and urge the Board to agree to it. I am weary of the reproach of being the instrument of a nation's ruin.

I must entreat that you will shorten your stay at Lucknow, unless the Nabob himself shall entreat your continuance, and in that case that you will use every degree of caution to avoid whatever may in its effect prove, or be construed to prove, a hinderance to Mr. Middleton's influence, or the effectual exercise of his charge. I am, dear Palmer, yours affectionately.

To the same.

Fort William, 9th July, 1782.

Dear Palmer,—Notwithstanding anything that I may have written to you, do not intimate your intention of moving from Lucknow until Middleton returns, and I hope by that time to see a little clearer into this obscure business than I do at present, and to furnish you with other instructions more satisfactory to you and to myself. Yours affectionately.

The following throws some light on the real nature of those delinquencies, for which Mr. Middleton incurred the displeasure of the Governor-general.

To NATH. MIDDLETON, Esq.

Fort William, 24th July, 1782.

Sir,—Notwithstanding the faith of Government pledged to the Nabob for the removal of all unlicensed Europeans from his capital, and from his country; and notwithstanding my repeated injunctions to you, I am informed that numbers yet remain at Lucknow, and the Nabob himself has made it the subject of a formal complaint. He undoubtedly conceives them to be under our protection; and as it is your duty, so I must again desire that you will undeceive him, that you will represent to him that my credit, and the dignity of our Government, is hurt by this contempt of its authority; but that he is the magistrate of his own

country, and that it is incumbent on him to remove those who have been forbidden to remain in it. If they will not remove, why does he not use force to compel them? Why does he not cause them to be arrested, and transported beyond his borders, with orders to his aumils not to permit them to return?

I have been much solicited to let Mr. Scott stay, and his advocates have assured me that he had your promise. I cannot permit it, and if he has not left Lucknow, I must insist on his leaving it instantly. I am told that Captain Marsach is still there. Why do you, and why have you suffered it? for I know that it is not with the Nabob's connivance.

I some time since received a letter also from Captain Darell, requesting to be permitted to continue at Lucknow for the recovery of his health. If the Nabob will consent to it, I will not object to his staying till the end of the rains, if he shall find it necessary: but no longer.

I must desire that you will send me a list of all the English gentlemen of every denomination who shall be at Lucknow, or in any other parts of the Nabob's dominions when you receive this letter, and of the means used for removing those who have no right to be there.

Colonel Polier and Colonel Martine have been excepted by the Board from the general order, but their continuance must be with the entire concurrence of the Nabob.

To the same.

Fort William, 10th August, 1782.

Sir,—I have had the mortification to hear that Almess Ally Cawn has at length, as was long since foreboded, fled from the Vizier's dominions, taking with him an immense treasure, the fruits of his embezzlements and known oppressions. Though this intelligence has not come through its authentic channel,

I have no doubt of its truth. I am compelled to credit the reports, which assure me that every part of the Vizier's administration is in the same disorder. For this and every other failure in the instructions which I gave to you in writing on the 20th September at Chunar, you are solely responsible to this Government, as Hyder Beg Cawn is to the Nabob's; for to your conjoint hands has the administration of his affairs been from that time committed.

I have received your repeated assurances, addressed to myself and to the Board, that the Nabob's debt to the Company should be completely discharged by the close of the year. In my fears for a disappointment in this expectation, and in the contrary belief that in its actual train the debt is more likely to exceed the amount at which it stood the last year than to be paid, I hereby apprize you that, if at the end of the fessellee year any part of it shall remain in arrears, I shall move the Board to call upon you publicly to account for it; and that you may know that this declaration is not made on light grounds, I shall enter a copy of this letter upon the Company's records. It will do you no injury if you disprove the justice of my suspicions by the effects of your exertions.

I have written to Hyder Beg upon the same subject, and intended to refer you to his letter for my fuller sentiments, but I shall not have it ready for despatch for this post. I am, Sir, your most obedient servant.

To the NABOB HYDER BEG CAWN.

10th August, 1782.

When I prevailed upon the Nabob Vizier to commit the entire charge of his revenues and the administration of his finances to his ministers, of whom you are the acting and responsible person, with the concurrence of the resident, Mr. Middleton, I had so sure a reliance

on your integrity, diligence, and abilities, which are universally known, and no less on the same qualities of Mr. Middleton, that I departed with a mind perfectly at ease, expecting that order would be restored to the Nabob's affairs, capable and trustworthy aumils appointed to the superintendence of the districts, the forces duly distributed for the security of peace and the confirmation of the authority of the Circar, and that the past and growing debt of the Company would be completely discharged in the course of the year, and that I should receive the thanks of the Nabob, your master, for the effects of my solicitude for the support of his dignity and ease.

The event has proved the reverse of these hopes; an accumulation of distress, debasement, and dissatisfaction to the Nabob, and of disappointment and disgrace to me. Every measure which he had himself proposed, and to which he had solicited my assistance, has been so conducted as to give him cause of displeasure; there are no offices established by which his affairs could be regularly conducted; mean, incapable, and indigent men have been appointed aumils of the districts, without authority and without the means of personal protection; some of them have been murdered by the zemindars, and those zemindars, instead of receiving punishment, have been permitted to retain their zemindarries with independent authority; all the other zemindars suffered to rise up in rebellion and to insult the authority of the Circar without any attempts made to suppress them; and the Company's debt, instead of being discharged by the assignments and extraordinary services of money provided for that purpose, is likely to exceed even the amount at which it stood at the time in which the arrangement with his Excellency was concluded.

The growth of these evils was made known to me,

and their effects foreboded in the same order and manner as they have since come to pass. Added to these, I this instant learn that Almess Ally Cawn, to whom you had entrusted the greatest portion of the collections without any pledge or security for his fidelity, has thrown off his allegiance, and quitted the Nabob's dominions, taking with him an immense treasure, the fruit of his embezzlements and oppressions, and an army raised for its protection. This, too, was long since foretold, and ought to have been suspected,

In such a state of calamity and disgrace I can no longer remain a passive spectator, nor would it be becoming to conceal my sentiments or qualify the expression of them. I have hitherto forborne to interfere, that I might not weaken your influence and thereby disable you from fulfilling the responsibility of the great trust which had been assigned to you. I now plainly tell you that you are answerable for every misfortune and defect of the Nabob Vizier's Government. You possess abilities and the means of retrieving them, nor is it too late, for the resources of the country still remain. I expect it, and immediately; and, as the first effect of your exertions, I require that the balance which is due to the Company be fully cleared by the end of the year, so that not an anna shall remain in arrears. I have a right to exact this return to the confidence which the world has seen me place in you, and to the good offices which the friendship of the Nabob Vizier has enabled me to afford you. If I am disappointed, you will impose on me the painful and humiliating necessity of acknowledging to him that I have been deceived, and of recommending the examination of your conduct to his justice, both for the redress of his own and the Company's grievances, and for the injury sustained by both in their mutual connexion.

Do not reply to me that what I have written is from the suggestion of your enemies, nor imagine that I have induced myself to write in such plain and declaratory terms without a clear insight into all the consequences of it and a fixed determination upon them.

It would appear that Major Palmer, in obedience to the dictates of a zeal, which, in this case at least, carried him beyond the restraints of discretion, had applied to the Nabob for money in a strain which had some tendency to lower in the eyes of that prince the respectability of the English Government. The following letter from Mr. Hastings will show how the proceeding was by him regarded.

To Major Palmer.

Fort William, 14th August, 1782.

Dear Palmer,—I have received your letters of the 29th ultimo and 1st instant. I acknowledge the goodness of your intentions in the pains which you have taken to obtain from the Nabob a loan for the Company, a free gift to assist in the relief of their distresses; and his application for an additional military aid. Yet I must ingenuously tell you that I cannot bring myself to make acknowledgment which I think is your due for these services on the ground on which you have performed them. This must ever be the case where, acting for a principal, you dispense with his instructions and reject his information, to substitute your own plans in the place of his, and those constituted with materials which he has told you are fallacious. Instead of removing my embarrassments you add to them.

I want no loan from the Nabob. When I desired you to obtain one, I believed, for the resident had so assured me, that the debt due from the Nabob to the Company was or would be discharged in the course of this fussullee year. I have since discovered that, what with errors of account and fallacious assignments, the debt is likely to be, at the end of this year, as heavy as it was at the end of the last. I have told you so. You will not believe me, and go on soliciting from the Vizier's bounty what I claim as a right. The consequence will be that he will consider my claim as a pretext to deceive him. The same objection is equally strong against any donation. If he has made one, it must be received as a part of his balance. I acquit him of all right which he has given me to his benevolence.

But for the *application* made and urged to him, for *his application* for a new military aid, and a new subsidy, I see no warrant either in my original instructions or in apparent expediency. Such a proposal in any state of his and our affairs ought to have originated with him; but in the present, even if it was his undictated and optional request, I should hesitate to comply with it. He cannot pay the troops which by treaty are allowed him. I do not desire to swell the Company's military expenses in fitting out a detachment, which would load them with batta and contingencies beyond their ability to afford, nor to swell the Nabob's debt beyond his to pay.

I desire, therefore, that you will tell the Nabob that I want neither loan, gift, nor subsidy; and as to the debt outstanding, leave Mr. Middleton to clear it as he can.

Indeed, my dear Palmer, you cannot leave Lucknow too soon. You walk through snares, and every step that you tread, either entangles you in them or detects them. You have a recent instance of this in the as-

signment of the bills which were tendered as a donation to me, and which were afterwards declared to be transferred by my request to the Company's use. You send me a copy of the Nabob's letter, which you tell me contains his consent to a gratuity of ten lacs of rupees to the Company, yet, on the perusal of the letter, I find it granted in such ungracious terms, that, were there no other objection, I would not accept it. He says, that as I have demanded it, he cannot refuse, bids you take it, but takes care to state it not as a gift, but as the purchase of concessions enumerated in a separate paper. His words are literally, I will give them "*Basherté wasoole Motaulebaut,*" on condition that my demands are yielded. And when you accept it you find it already assigned for the next year's debts.

Undeceive the Nabob, if you can; at least, I beg you will attempt it, and leave him. I am, dear Palmer, yours affectionately.

P.S. I cannot close my letter without explaining what will probably make an impression different from my intentions. I am disappointed, and write with strong feelings of all the disorders which I see, and to which every remedy that I have applied to them has but served to increase. I am vexed and angry, but it is with the subject only. I express it to you because I write to you, and because you chance to be a party in the general concern; but as I know you have been undeviatingly actuated by the wish to promote my views, I give you credit for the design; and when I can bring my mind to more composure, I will thank you for it.

To the same.

Fort William, 11th August, 1782.

Dear Palmer,—I am sorry for your embarrassments, but they are of your own creation, and I have more

than an equal share in their effects. Mr. Middleton complains of your influence over-ruling his, and impeding his business. I have written to him, that if the Nabob's debt is not discharged by the end of the fussullee year, a public inquiry should be ordered into his conduct. Your stay at Lucknow can be no longer of use, and he will avail himself of it as a plea for his deficiencies. For all these reasons I must desire that you will immediately quit Lucknow. One only commission I give you to execute before your departure. I have written a letter to Hyder Beg, which Mr. Middleton will deliver. I send you a copy of it. Show it to Hyder Beg, and lest he may be misled by any constructions given him of it by Mr. Middleton, tell him that, as I have been his friend hitherto, I will continue such if he complies with what I have required of him, that is, if he pays off the whole of the Company's debt by the close of the year, and he gives the attention which he ought to the collections of the ensuing; but that if he does not, I will insist on the Nabob's giving the administration to other hands, and compelling him to answer for the losses sustained by his misconduct. And what I have threatened I swear that I will perform.

Look to my instructions for what you shall say to the Nabob. I am unfortunate in my attempts both to serve him and to please him.

I desire it as a special and essential service that you will furnish me with a copy of Mr. Middleton's intended letter of resignation. I am, dear Palmer, your affectionate friend.

It will be seen from these letters that Mr. Hastings had other reasons to be dissatisfied with Mr. Middleton, than that he was remiss in executing the ferocious orders which a ferocious Governor-

general had issued. Mr. Hastings was displeased, because, through the negligence of the British agent, and the misconduct of the native head of the government, the affairs of Oude were permitted to fall into confusion, overturning in their fall all the hopes which he had built upon the treaty of Chunar. For Mr. Hastings desired to accomplish much more than to realize an increase to the disposable revenues of his own province. It was his anxious wish that Oude should flourish under a just and a vigorous government, and he had the satisfaction, ere he quitted India, of witnessing the accomplishment of that wish. Moreover, Mr. Hastings did not betray, nor desert, nor give to the tender mercies of the Nabob, Fyzoolah Khan, the last of the Rohilla chiefs, to whom, at the termination of the war with these Tartars, British protection had been extended. On the contrary, he treated Fyzoolah Khan more than ever as a sort of ally of the British nation, and settled a resident at his durbar, with instructions which are best explained in the letter which contains them. I have only to add, that in consequencce of Mr. Middleton's deficiency of vigour, his resignation, often tendered, was accepted at last, and that Mr. Bristow, agreeably to the directions of the authorities at home, was re-established as resident at Lucknow. The following tell their own tale :—

To JOHN BRISTOW, Esq.

Fort William, 23rd November, 1782.

Dear Sir,—You will receive instructions from the Board to recommend and urge to the Nabob Vizier a conciliatory negociation with Fyzoolah Khan. Indeed, it is full time to put a stop to the alarms and jealousies which have been excited between them, and which, if not seasonably checked, will of themselves grow into the consequences which have been so industriously, and I believe falsely, portended. The proper means of effecting this service, since our Government must be eventually the guarantee of it, will be by the deputation of an English gentleman; and I prefer Major Palmer for the charge of it, because I can implicitly rely on his integrity and personal attachment; because he is amply qualified by his knowledge of the subjects which arise, or may arise, out of the relation of Fyzoolah Khan to the Vizier's government, and ours to both; and because it will remove the discredit which has fallen on me by an unfortunate train of circumstances, through the unsuccessful agency of a man who is known to possess a principal share of my confidence. On the grounds, and for the reasons premised, I wish you to put him into the proper way of being appointed on this commission; I mean that the Nabob himself may nominate him, rather than that he acquiesce in his nomination from your recommendation of him; at all events let him be the agent.

If this is not to be effected, apprize Major Palmer of it early, that he may leave the place without further delay. It is not fit that he should remain there, either by his presence to countenance the supposition of a double influence, or to afford an argument for the diminution of mine to those who may be disposed, as there are many, to represent him as my secretary, as a

man for whom I have an affection, reduced to a cipher. I am, with much esteem, dear Sir, your most obedient servant.

To Major PALMER.

Fort William, 24th November, 1782.

My dear Palmer,—Major Davy will have sent you the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Bristow. If what I have proposed in it shall take place, and in the manner which I have proposed, you may finish your deputation creditably for yourself and most beneficially for the Company. I see no possible cause to prevent its being done but one which I will not suppose; but if it should not, you must instantly take your leave of the Nabob Vizier and of his dominions.

The purposes of your intended commission are these:—First, to convert the engagement by which Fyzoolah Khan is bound to furnish the Nabob Vizier with a military aid, when required, into a fixed subsidy. Secondly, to treat with Fyzoolah Khan for an annual tribute for the increased value of his jaghier, and for the revenue derived from the services of the Vizier's reiats, to whom he has afforded an asylum. And lastly, to promote and confirm a lasting reconciliation between them. This last article, though general and unapplied, may include many points which are unknown to me, but must be left to your discretion. Your instructions will be given by the Vizier, through the channel of the residency; but the above subjects will form the basis and sum of them, nor can I yet say more upon them.

I have only to recommend despatch and decision.

I wish I could spare Davy to assist you, but you want no assistance; he is more serviceable to you here. The length of the journey would not admit of his being with you in time, and the conclusions which would be

formed on his going would prejudice the business of the resident, at least people would say so. I conclude by repeating, as a positive injunction, that you accept the commission if it is offered to you, and in a practicable form, but that if it is not, or if it is not immediately offered, you leave Lucknow and return to me. I am, my dear Palmer, yours ever and most affectionately.

Mr. Bristow had never been personally a favourite with Mr. Hastings; and the feelings which he cherished towards the Governor-general were the reverse of friendly. It seems difficult to account for the fact, that the Court of Directors, being fully aware of this circumstance, should have nevertheless thrust him, despite of Mr. Hastings's avowed opposition, into an employment so delicate as that of resident at Lucknow. Had he been the ablest as well as the most upright of all their servants, it was next to impossible for him to do his duty, either with credit to himself, or satisfaction to his employer—for where there is no confidence between the head of a government, and his subordinates, grounds of complaint on both sides are sure to arise. And whenever it comes to this, that the letter and not the spirit of men's instructions is attended to,—public interests as well as private character invariably suffer. Mr. Bristow returned to Lucknow full of resentment, because of his temporary supersession. He saw nothing in the altered circumstances of the Nabob's

affairs, of which he could approve; and he certainly does not appear to have accommodated himself in anything to these changes. The consequences were, an angry correspondence between him and the Governor-general, which, at a later period, took a new and more decided form. Mr. Bristow was charged before the Supreme Council with repeated violations of duty, and dealt with as shall be explained by and bye. In the meanwhile, I must direct the reader's attention to the condition of affairs at Benares,—where, on the removal of Mr. Fowke, Mr. Markham had been appointed to reside. Of the total change which was wrought in the government of that zemindarry by the expulsion of Cheyt Sing, notice has elsewhere been taken. The following letters will show how imperfectly for a time the new machinery worked, and how untiring as well as judicious were all Mr. Hastings's efforts to bring about a happier result.

To William Markham, Esq.

Fort William, 15th July, 1782.

Dear Sir,—I have lately received two letters from you, in which you inform me that the aumils employed by Doorbejey Sing have been guilty of great oppressions upon the ryats; that he, so far from restraining, has connived at their irregularities; and that he is himself to the last degree remiss and indolent in discharging the duties of his office. To the first of these letters I deferred sending an immediate answer, from the apprehensions that, were I to take that notice of his conduct which from your representations it seemed to merit, I

might probably lessen his authority, and afford him a pretext for the future breach of his engagements. Under this idea I contented myself with representing to his own Vakeel the very great impropriety and evil tendency of his conduct, and hoped that, when through this medium he should become acquainted with my sentiments, prudence, if not justice, would have taught him the necessity of amending his behaviour. Your last letter, however, has convinced me that these hopes were fallacious; the very language, indeed, in which your complaints are conceived, has impressed my mind with so clear a conviction of their justice, and of the necessity of redressing them, that I have thought it proper to write to Doorbejey Sing the letter of which for your information I enclose a copy. You will there learn the displeasure I have expressed at the oppressions under which the ryats are suffered to labour, and the means I have directed for bringing to justice the men whom you have pointed out as the principal authors of their distresses. It is possible that the same motives which first led him to select these men may now induce him to support them even in disobedience to my express commands. If this should prove the case, or if he should not carry them into execution within one week after his receipt of my letter, it is my positive order that you cause Babboo Zallum Sing, Sunker Rutton, Bugwant Roy, and Boniade Sing, to be brought to Benares; that you give notice thereof to the Naib, and require him to appoint three persons of ability and approved integrity, to inquire into their conduct, yourself appointing two persons of the like description for the same purpose; that, in case of his refusal or neglect to appoint persons for such investigation, you do yourself nominate five men of ability and integrity, with power to hear and examine the complaints of the ryats against the aumils above men-

tioned, and that you do transmit to me as speedily as possible a statement of their proceedings, keeping at the same time the persons of the said aumils in confinement, in order that they may not evade the judgment which shall be passed upon them. And to prevent any prejudiee, or the possible pretence of prejudice to the revenues from the execution of these orders, I desire that you will call upon the Naib to appoint proper persons for holding the employment of the said aumils during their absence from their respective districts; and if he shall neglect so to do, I then desire that you will yourself select and nominate proper persons for that purpose. Hitherto, though I have expressed my disapprobation of the Naib's conduct, I have forborne to make him an object of that rigour with which I have thought it right to treat his servants. I am willing to have patience with him, and to make every allowance for the novelty of the situation in which he is placed, and for the difficulties which may attend it, but if I perceive in him a wilful neglect of my advice, and an obstinate adherence to that system of conduct against which I find you have so often warned him, he shall certainly feel the most severe effects of my displeasure.

Having thus attempted to remedy the evils of which he is the author, I must not neglect those of which he complains. I have lately received several papers from him, all tending to prove the misconduct of Captain Baker, when sent to apprehend the murderers of Durmoo Dooby. It appears that, instead of attempting to apprehend such only of the kosacks as were guilty of the offence, he first made a general attack upon all who resided in the village of Burragong; and when he had subdued them, with as little discrimination, and as it is alleged for his private emolument, set them all at liberty, and again restored them to their possessions.

Remembering the conduct of Captain Baker upon a former occasion of this kind, I flattered myself that he would never be again employed on any service which might give him a possible pretence for interfering in the affairs of the zemindarry. If he is not yet recalled, I request that he may be without a moment's delay, and that you will apply for that purpose to Colonel Blair. I desire you will consider it as your duty to prevent all officers employed for the purposes of enforcing the collections, and maintaining the Rajah's authority, from going beyond the express line which their duty prescribes to them.

The detection of a few murderers seems to have created almost as much inconvenience as could have arisen from their impunity. My orders were explicit, and known, I thought, as well to you as to the Naib. Three people were by name pointed out to me as the murderers of Durmoo Dooby, and I directed that those and no others should be brought to punishment. Pray let me know what has been done in this business, and state to me particularly the conduct of Captain Baker whilst employed in it.

The business which this letter will impose on you may, I hope, be soon concluded, and if your private concerns shall then call you to the presidency, you have my permission to visit it; but if those of the zemindarry furnish the only motives for your journey, I could wish you to remain at your station. Of your public business I will myself be the agent; and though it is true that many affairs demand my time and attention, those of Benares shall not be neglected. I am, dear Sir, your most obedient humble servant.

To the same.

Fort William, 7th August, 1782.

My dear Markham,—I have received yours of the 27th ultimo, and am perfectly satisfied, from your rela-

tion of the affair, that the charge against Captain Baker is utterly false. Indeed I allowed it a greater weight, because I understood it to appertain to a later date, and was displeased at the renewal of his command, which would have been a direct breach of my orders to Colonel Blair.

You some time since desired to come to Calcutta. I intimated my wish that you would suspend it. I now leave you to your own option, with this reservation, that if your object in coming is to state any business to me, you will rather write it. You shall have your turn in my attention, and the most minute instruction upon every point that may require it. Let me add, that I shall give it with pleasure, because I with pleasure observe the diligence which you bestow on your department, and the conformity of your conduct to my own wishes in every instance which has come before my notice.

If your personal concerns call you to Calcutta, and you are sure that your official business will not suffer by your absence, come; I shall expect you to be my guest. I am, my dear Markham, yours most affectionately.

To the same.

Nea Serai, 29th September, 1782.

Dear Markham,—I have received your letter of the 8th instant, and am no less pleased with your conduct than I am dissatisfied with that of Doorbejey Sing. I am thoroughly convinced of his incapacity and of the necessity of removing him. Your recommendation of Ally Ibrahim Khawn gives me pleasure; (I consider it as a confirmation of his worth, and as an additional proof of yours, that you have conceived a friendship for the man who, from the nature of his office, might possibly have been to many others, in your situation, an object of jealousy). For the reasons you have assigned,

I think he cannot with propriety accept the Niabut, and for the same reasons I should be unwilling to make him a Sezawaul;—it is an invidious office, inferior in point of dignity even to that of Naib, and invariably exposes the person who possesses it to the ill-will not only of his immediate superior in his district, but of all over whom his authority extends. The post he already fills is as laborious as it is useful and important; not only perfect leisure, but popular esteem is in some measure necessary to the perfect discharge of its duties, and I should be very sorry to give him an employment that might contribute to rob him of either. Avail yourself, however, of his experience and abilities upon all occasions where they can be of service to you in your public business, and particularly upon the arrangements which this letter will authorize you to make.

I need not tell you, my dear Markham, that I possess a very high opinion of your abilities, and that I repose the utmost confidence in your integrity; the whole of your conduct since our acquaintance has served to impress me with these sentiments, and mine, I hope, has proved that I entertain them. From your long residence at Benares, and from the part you have had in the business of that zemindarry, you must certainly best know the men who are most capable and deserving of public employment. From among these I authorize you to nominate a Naib to the Rajah in the room of Doorbejey Sing, whom, on account of his ill-conduct, I think it necessary to dismiss from that office.

It will hardly be necessary to except Oossaun Sing from the description of men to whom I have limited your choice; yet it may not be improper to apprize you that I will on no terms consent to his being Naib. In forming the arrangements consequent upon this

new appointment, I request you will, as far as you can with propriety, adopt those which were in use during the life of Bulwunt Sing—so far at least as to have distinct offices for distinct purposes, independent of each other, and with proper men at the head of each, so that one office may prevent or detect any abuses or irregularities in the others, and together form a system of reciprocal checks. Upon that principle I desire you will in particular establish, under whatever names, one office of receipts and another of treasury. The officers of both must be responsible for the truth and regularity of their respective accounts, but not subject in the statement of them to the control or interference of the Rajah or Naib; nor should they be removable at pleasure, but for manifest misconduct only. At the head of one or other of these offices I could wish to see the late Boxey Rogoobe Dyal. His conduct in his former office, his behaviour on the revolt of Cheyt Sing, and particularly at the fall of Bedjeygur, together with his general character, prove him worthy of employment, and of the notice of our Government. It is possible that he may have objections to holding an office under the present Rajah; offer him one, however, and let him know that you do so by my directions. In forming these arrangements, do not wholly neglect the Rajah; consult with him in appearance, but in appearance only. His situation requires that you should do that much, but his youth and inexperience forbid that you should do more.

With respect to Doorbejey Sing, he has dishonoured my choice of him. It now only remains for me to guard against the ill effects of his misconduct, to detect, and punish it. To this end, I desire that the officers to be appointed in consequence of these instructions do, with as much accuracy and expedition as possible, make out an account of all the receipts, disbursements, and trans-

actions of Doorbejey Sing during the time he has acted as Naib of the zemindar of Benares, and I desire you will, in my name, assure him that, unless he pays at the limited time every rupee of the revenue due to the Company, his life shall answer for the default. I need not caution you to provide against his flight and the removal of his effects. I am, dear Markham, very affectionately yours.

Though this letter is, in its address and in its style, familiar, you must consider it as bearing all the force of the most formal and positive orders.

The results were, as has been stated in substance already, that a change was effected in the system of administering the zemindarry; and that it came in due time to be accounted one of the most prosperous and well ordered of all the districts over which the British rule extended in India. A settled revenue was derived from it of forty lacs. Crime was suppressed, industry fostered, and law rightly administered; insomuch, that the city became again the resort of pilgrims from all quarters, and its inhabitants grew rich from the commerce which their arrival created. Yet the acts which secured both to the people and the Government such unspeakable advantages were denounced by the enemies of Mr. Hastings as crimes! So wayward was his fate in all the transactions of his public life, and so perverse the tempers of those whom he served, often in spite of themselves.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.



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